The Coming War With Taiwan

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Prof Triggernometry
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The Coming War Over Taiwan​

Hal Brands and Michael Beckley/NYTimes​



"If war comes, it is likely to feature the massive application of force. Beijing could theoretically try to coerce Taiwan into unification with a more limited operation, such as an air-sea blockade or the seizure of Taiwan’s small offshore islands. Yet none of these options can guarantee Taiwanese capitulation, and all of them would give Taipei, Washington and other democracies time to mount a punishing response. To achieve its goals, China has to go big and brutal from the start.

Its war plan could well involve a surprise missile and air attack against Taiwan and U.S. military bases in the Pacific, strikes on the satellite communications that underpin the American way of war and a wave of sabotage and assassinations within Taiwan—all as prelude to a massive airborne and amphibious invasion.

Both U.S. and Taiwanese forces could be crippled as the PLA rushes toward its objectives. Even if America avoids rapid defeat, the nightmare scenario currently envisaged in Ukraine—direct clashes between the U.S. and a nuclear-armed great power—would be the reality at the outset. A Sino-American war could escalate rapidly because it will involve technologies that work best when used first, including cyberattacks, hypersonic missiles and electronic warfare. The side that is losing might decide to use low-yield nuclear weapons to turn the tide or force its opponent into submission.

The economic fallout would also be horrendous. Vital waterways would become shooting galleries; the world might find itself cut off from the more than 90% of cutting-edge semiconductors that are manufactured in Taiwan. According to the RAND Corporation, one year of fighting would reduce America’s gross domestic product by 5% to 10% and China’s by 25% to 35%. A global depression would be all but guaranteed.

American officials aren’t blind to the problem, but Washington—thanks to a mixture of inertia, distraction and simple denial—isn’t racing to address it. President Biden has pledged, albeit ambiguously, to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack. Speaker Pelosi has joined a growing list of lawmakers to visit Taiwan. The Pentagon calls China its “pacing challenge.” Yet such symbolic gestures will amount to cheap and provocative talk if not backed by a strong and resilient defense—something the U.S. and Taiwan currently lack."

https://energiesnet.com/the-coming-war-over-taiwan-hal-brands-and-michael-beckley-nytimes/

A sobering article and must-read for those who want a glimpse into the near future while our eyes are on Ukraine. Read the whole article
 
Lmao...this isn't the near future. This is your fear mongered brain on BDS
 
No t
Lmao...this isn't the near future. This is your fear mongered brain on BDS
^^^
This is you being an uneducated dipshit.

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books, including, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (2022), The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order (2019) co-authored with Charles Edel, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (2018), Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (2016), What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014), Latin America’s Cold War (2010), From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (2008), and The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (co-edited with Jeremi Suri, 2015). Professor Brands served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning from 2015 to 2016. He has also served as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, and consulted with government offices and agencies in the intelligence and national security communities.

Michael Beckley is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

His research on great power competition has received awards from the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association and been featured by numerous media including the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, NPR, and the Washington Post.

Previously, Michael worked for Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense.
Michael holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University. His first book, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, was published in 2018 by Cornell University Press.
 
No t

^^^
This is you being an uneducated dipshit.

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books, including, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (2022), The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order (2019) co-authored with Charles Edel, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (2018), Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (2016), What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (2014), Latin America’s Cold War (2010), From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (2008), and The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft (co-edited with Jeremi Suri, 2015). Professor Brands served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning from 2015 to 2016. He has also served as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, and consulted with government offices and agencies in the intelligence and national security communities.

Michael Beckley is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

His research on great power competition has received awards from the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association and been featured by numerous media including the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, NPR, and the Washington Post.

Previously, Michael worked for Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense.
Michael holds a PhD in political science from Columbia University. His first book, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, was published in 2018 by Cornell University Press.
I was talking about YOU, fuckhead, who not only read that bullshit, but you ate it up, yum

Whether they have credentials or even credibility has no bearing on whether their article is speculative fear mongering meant for clicks.

The very first sentence starts off "if war comes...."
 
I was talking about YOU, fuckhead, who not only read that bullshit, but you ate it up, yum

Whether they have credentials or even credibility has no bearing on whether their article is speculative fear mongering meant for clicks.

The very first sentence starts off "if war comes...."
Go fuck your mother.
 
How many wars will vetteman, the disgraced Marine, put us in this week?

And there's a big fucking difference in war "over" Taiwan and war "with" Taiwan. Learn your words, you uneducated hillbilly.
 
My personal opinion is, if they were to go soon they would have already. There's been enough provocation, even, I think smartly taking their possible excuses away slowly. They can, very likely will, pull Belarus... that is, we should count on the current excercises to continue perpetually, slowly increasing non-blockade blockade. But with each passing day right now the chance those turn from excercise into the real thing should go down not up.

Chinese reaction to the first two weeks of Ukraine was to announce overhaul of their militarily officer education system. So based on that alone we have, what, two years at a minimum? There's been other assessments based on construction and/or weapons systems procurement that point to similar timelines, as a minimum. Then, of course, nobody's ever been ready for whatever war when it goes off anyway.
 
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