For Those Who Might Be Wondering Why We Might Be In Ukraine

[astuffedshirt_perv]

... By dropping the Seym River bridge at Glushkovo, Ukrainian forces just created a highly uncomfortable situation for the remaining Russian forces south of the river. \

This, to me, it the biggest mystery of the war. Why hasn't every bridge within striking range already been dropped? A year ago Ukraine wasn't allowed to strike inside of Russia. Now, they should be dropping all the bridges, one after the other.

 

[ll74]

This, to me, it the biggest mystery of the war. Why hasn't every bridge within striking range already been dropped? A year ago Ukraine wasn't allowed to strike inside of Russia. Now, they should be dropping all the bridges, one after the other.

There is no bridge to cross. It's a land border.

 

[LLCox]

This, to me, it the biggest mystery of the war. Why hasn't every bridge within striking range already been dropped? A year ago Ukraine wasn't allowed to strike inside of Russia. Now, they should be dropping all the bridges, one after the other.

This war is run by totally stupid Generals/Leaders on both sides. The Kursk invasion is the the perfect example. Pootin could cut off the Ukes in a heart beat. The Ukes are totally overextended. They have got to be living off the land. The Ukes are not strong enough to invade Russia and that goes without saying. Pootin might have a brain (maybe) but no one under him does.

 

[astuffedshirt_perv]

There is no bridge to cross. It's a land border.

??? did you not read the post? Or the map, for that matter?
Reading is fundamental.

 

[ll74]

??? did you not read the post? Or the map, for that matter?
Reading is fundamental.

I saw someone dropping bridges. You were not clear on what you meant by that.

I'm specifically discussing the Ukranian advance into Russia. (No bridges) Perhaps add some context

 

[Rightguide]

I saw someone dropping bridges. You were not clear on what you meant by that.

I'm specifically discussing the Ukranian advance into Russia. (No bridges) Perhaps add some context

The Ukrainians dropped a couple of bridges. The Russians built pontoon bridges to replace them.

 

[ll74]

The Ukrainians dropped a couple of bridges. The Russians built pontoon bridges to replace them.

I didn't ask you to add context for someone else.

 

[Rightguide]

I didn't ask you to add context for someone else.

Tough shit you got it anyway. Like you won't reply to any of my threads unless you're personally requested to do so, right?

 

[ll74]

Tough shit you got it anyway. Like you won't reply to any of my threads unless you're personally requested to do so, right?

Yes, you decided you knew what they were talking about.

Unless they're an alt of yours, probably just stfu.

I asked them specifically to add context about what they said.

 

[Rightguide]

Yes, you decided you knew what they were talking about.

Unless they're an alt of yours, probably just stfu.

I asked them specifically to add context about what they said.

Pick up your tweezers and go pleasure yourself.

 

[ll74]

Pick up your tweezers and go pleasure yourself.

Not my fault you think you can speak for other people. I asked a question to someone else because I wanted their answer.

I already know your "answers"...there is nothing you have to offer that is new to me.

 

[BrightShinyGirl]

Yes, you decided you knew what they were talking about.

Unless they're an alt of yours, probably just stfu.

I asked them specifically to add context about what they said.

The bridge that was destroyed was over the Seym River.

 

[ll74]

The bridge that was destroyed was over the Seym River.

Re-adding - I had Chloe blocked. That is why I asked for more

 

[Lazaran]

Ukrainian strategy:

Primary objective:

Invade Kursk oblast to force reallocation of Russian resources from the Russian’s relatively successful efforts elsewhere along the front lines in hopes of slowing the Russian advances so Ukraine can hold its current positions until the end of the fighting season: Ukraine needs more time to build up its defensive and offensive capabilities and more time to import recently approved weapons systems and ammunition from the U.S. and other allies. (Remember: Trump and the MAGAt "republicans" BLOCKED those weapons and ammunition deliveries for SIX MONTHS, which allowed Russia to make relatively significant gains.)

Observation:

Ukraine’s strategy will not work unless the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is placed in imminent peril of being disabled or falling into Ukrainian hands, imho.

Conclusion:

Watch for a MAJOR (not a feint) Ukrainian push toward seizing or disabling the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. If no such push occurs, then the Ukrainians’ gambit will likely fail in its primary objective. (The secondary objective of exposing Russia’s vulnerability and sowing doubt about Russia’s leaders among the Russian population has already been accomplished, but the primary objective is faaaaar more important, imho.)



Slava Ukraini.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Ukrainian strategy:

Primary objective:

Invade Kursk oblast to force reallocation of Russian resources from the Russian’s relatively successful efforts elsewhere along the front lines in hopes of slowing the Russian advances so Ukraine can hold its current positions until the end of the fighting season: Ukraine needs more time to build up its defensive and offensive capabilities and more time to import recently approved weapons systems and ammunition from the U.S. and other allies. (Remember: Trump and the MAGAt "republicans" BLOCKED those weapons and ammunition deliveries for SIX MONTHS, which allowed Russia to make relatively significant gains.)

Observation:

Ukraine’s strategy will not work unless the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is placed in imminent peril of being disabled or falling into Ukrainian hands, imho.

Conclusion:

Watch for a MAJOR (not a feint) Ukrainian push toward seizing or disabling the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. If no such push occurs, then the Ukrainians’ gambit will likely fail in its primary objective. (The secondary objective of exposing Russia’s vulnerability and sowing doubt about Russia’s leaders among the Russian population has already been accomplished, but the primary objective is faaaaar more important, imho.)

Slava Ukraini.

Add a couple more objectives and some background here - and I'm taking a lot of this from Andrew Tanner and Tom Cooper in large part, plus a couple of other sources. Syrskyi almost certainly had a series of branching plans going in that would determine how far Ukrainian troops would be asked to push. Had the border defenses held for more than a few hours, for example, the operation would have been called off or curtailed. Once they were breached, if Moscow had reacted effectively in the first forty-eight hours, Ukrainian troops might have fought skirmishes around Sudzha then pulled back. It was only when the enemy was visibly shocked and paralyzed for days that entire brigades pushed over the border to wreak havoc. After ten days, it seems clear that Ukraine remains firmly in control of the battle, frontline troops are maintaining an edge over the Russian forces rushing in to challenge them. After two fairly explosive growth spurts, the second naturally more measured than the first, Ukraine now appears to be in the midst of a third.

It looks like Kyiv understood about a week in that the operation was a success and that there was little reason to hold back from launching the next phase. Moscow i still reacting slowly, and the ZSU is well inside Russia's OODA loop and has been revealed to have few reserves available. In other words, after a week of fighting it was clear that Ukraine had a golden opportunity to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and set the stage for subsequent offensive operations on other fronts. More Ukrainian reserves are being formed, with Ukraine now churning out the equivalent of six brigades every month, when in May the numbers were just a third of that. Ukraine can afford to maintain up to half a dozen brigades in Kursk to tie down and degrade enemy reinforcements for weeks or even months. Eventually Ukraine will be able to swap out the over-strength attacking brigades for lighter ones that can conduct an area defense, slowly withdrawing towards the border one field or tree line at a time. In the process, the fighting will be in Russia rather than in Ukraine, and they’ll tie up forty to fifty thousand orcs who are needed to sustain the advance in Donbas. At this point, Moscow will be basically running on empty, vulnerable to new offensives on other fronts. This is how you seize the initiative.

So yes, a major objective here is now drawing units away from the other fronts and inflicting large scale casualties, which the ZSU is already achieving. Other estimates are that Russia will need 100,000 men to counter this move, especially if Ukraine widens the front. The L’gov-Rylsk-Sudzha triangle should be reasonably defensible. The Kursk nuclear power plant at Kurchatov would remain 10km or so from the front lines, forcing Moscow to commit a lot of forces to hold it unless and until Ukrainian troops are pushed back. Taking it would be a mistake, of course, because Ukraine would then be responsible for its security. It’s also possible that Ukraine will simply hold what it has, but this would probably be a mistake. The front line of the incursion is presently over 150km, even if the eastern flank consolidates. However, the border breach is only a third of that. Securing Rylsk would allow Ukraine to create a zone with only 150km of frontage, which is almost exactly the length of the section of the international border adjacent to its location. Ukraine’s goal is likely to spend the next ten days establishing a buffer zone of this size. This will eventually force Putin to dedicate almost all the combat power he can spare for offensives in Ukraine to securing Kursk and Belgorod rather than attacking elsewhere. Weak points along the front in occupied Ukraine will form. Syrskyi will exploit them, and the end game will begin.

Even if Putin’s troops do muster the strength to push Ukrainian forces back across the border, if the latter choose to mount an active defense as they slowly retreat they’ll inflict tens of thousands of casualties over the next few months. Putin’s army is already losing more soldiers and gear than it can replace and they're struggling to equip the mobiks, even with outdated equipment. Add in the need to equip even more units to hold the new frontlines, and Russia is being screwed to the wall for equipment. Further, Moscow now has to consider the possibility of Ukraine attacking anywhere along the border from here on out. On the Kharkiv front, this raises the specter of Ukrainian troops striking the rear of Russian formations pressing on Vovchansk. The orcs battling to reach the Oskil on the Kupiansk front are likewise vulnerable to a Ukrainian push along the river towards the big Russian base in Valuyki. The entire logic of Moscow fighting in Ukraine at all is utterly demolished if it faces the danger of losing some of its own internationally recognized territory. And with virtually all of Moscow’s combat power pulled from its other borders, save for much of its badly outnumbered Navy, anyone with a mind to has every reason to prod Putin while they can.

Now add in yet another factor. Logistics. The railway from Lgov south is one of the major logistical routes supplying Russian troops around Kharkiv and further south. Russian railways are already being pushed to the limit and starting to breakdown, experience increased accidents, and downright chaos. We are now seeing anecdotal evidence of the logistical chaos on the Russian railways behind the front lines in Kherson & Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RuAF shell usage there is down ~36%. This reduction, is likely the result of lots of ammunition being diverted to the Kursk Oblast to fight the Ukrainian incursion. The 'pipeline of supplies' to Kursk reduced that available in Kherson & Zaporizhzhia due to the rolling stock going elsewhere. The logistics of the Russian Army is rail logistics dominated by conscript backs and mountains of wooden boxes moved by hand. The AFU Kursk incursion is forcing RuAF to refocus it's artillery ammo supply chain from Donbas & Southern Ukraine to Kursk.







Heroiam Slava!

 

[ChloeTzang]

The bridge at Glushkovo was destroyed yesterday and Russians claim the bridge at Zvannoe was also destroyed the loss of these two bridges cuts off Russian Forces within the area highlighted in grey around 595 sq km. The loss of these bridges cuts Russian forces from Rylsk as a result Russians quickly deployed a pontoon bridge east of Glushkovo and will likely attempt to withdraw north of the Seym River. Rylsk is important because it guards the rear of Korenevo, Glushkovo, Tetkino and Kozino and is the extreme end of the Russian supply chain going back to Kursk supplying all the towns mentioned.

 

[ChloeTzang]

More on the ongoing collapse of Russian railways....The Russian railway backups are now train traffic jams that can be seen from space. And Russia really has no choice but to use trains closer to the front, because animal labor logistics in the age of GMLRS & Drone.

The logistics of the Russian Army is rail logistics dominated by conscript backs and mountains of wooden boxes moved by hand. Russians do not palletize, and the work involved in transfering for railway wagons to trucks by largely manual labor (no pallets and forklifts) is enormous. This is less than 1/3 as productive as US Army (or Ukrainian) mechanized logistics.

 

[Lazaran]

Add a couple more objectives and <snip>

Russia can give short shrift attention to the Kursk region because Ukraine doesn’t have the logistical capacity to fully exploit the "advantage" they currently enjoy there.



Meanwhile: Russia continues to press its advantage at other points along the front in Ukraine. The Ukrainians operating in Kursk aren’t available to assist in Ukraine, so unless there is an asymmetric event that causes the Russians to divert MASSIVE amounts (an asymmetrical amount) of resources away from their current offensives, then Russia is most likely (obviously) willing to take the publicity hits and minor military hits of the continued presence of Ukrainian forces inside Russia in exchange for concrete significant strategic gains on the battlefield in Ukraine.



The ONE thing that WOULD cause Russia to commit MASSIVE amounts (asymmetrical amounts) of resources to the Kursk region, would be an acute / dire threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. The disabling or seizure of the plant by the Ukrainians would be crippling / devastating to Russia in maaaaany ways. Unfortunately, the Ukrainians seem to have committed to NOT pressing their advantage to put the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant under threat, and therefore, the Russians are content to let the Ukrainians play in their little sandbox until they achieve more pressing objectives in Ukraine. The Ukrainians’ incursion into the Kursk oblast will remain a mildly disruptive diversion/ distraction that Russia can largely ignore, until it isn’t.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Russian Railway disruptions

 

[ChloeTzang]

Russia can give short shrift attention to the Kursk region because Ukraine doesn’t have the logistical capacity to fully exploit the "advantage" they currently enjoy there.

There I think you underestimate Ukraine's logistical capabilities. Syrskyi managed to assemble all the different ingredients in the right quantities and at the proper pace for this attack and it's been ongoing for twelve days now, with Brigades already having been rotated in and out. The ability to keep these units supplied and rotate units in and out is obviously not an issue - and from all the evidence, the ZSU has mastered the art of maneuver warfare in the breakout phase. This attack was beautifully planned and executed, right from the start, and one would assume, given this, that Syrskyi has plans within plans within plans, dependant on the situation, the way the Russians react, and where the ZSU can seize opportunities that align with their strategic goals, and obviously they haven't shared these with anyone, least of all the USA. One of the better accomplishments from this move is that Zelensky didn’t just call the essential bluff that is the heart of Putin’s power, he also kicked the entire mealy-mouthed, wishy-washy leadership caste that dominates the west in the teeth. It has been truly wonderful to see their entire carefully constructed plan for forcing Ukraine into a permanent stalemate and a forever war go up in smoke. And make no mistake, this is what the Biden Administration and Jake Sullivan have been shooting for all along. Zelensky and Syrskyi just put paid to that.

As for exploiting "the advantage," the situation hasn't settled and the ZSU is still on the move and pushing hard. Right from the syart, the ZSU strikes were coordinated on an extremely professional level, using artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, drones and other aerial vehicles. Communication and tactics show that the ZSU units involved have mastered maneuver warfare. At no stage in this war have the Russians ever employed this kind of professionalism. In addition, the discipline among Ukrainian soldiers not to use mobile phones and disclose communications as well as gains in territory left Russians (and the OSINT community) relatively in the dark. The Ukrainian silence in preparation and execution of this operation might be the most astounding factor in this campaign. It worked flawlessly.

Aside from the tactical cleverness the ZSU has displayed so far, it was and still is also the way they moved into the Kursk region. While Russian forces are infamous in trying to reach and overcome heavily fortified cities, towns and villages, the ZSU bypassed larger settlements, cut and intercepted the rear and encircled Russian troop concentrations, and by doing so stayed even more in the shadows. The Russians employed the same mistakes they made when starting the full-scale war back in February 2022. Some large columns which were thrown in, and were not only detected by Ukrainian forces, but as with the instance in Rylsk, completely destroyed. This single event made an already difficult situation for Russian forces worse. It might turn out that this single event will be responsible for vast losses in territory, starting with Korenevo, which has already been captured. Overall, the whole Russian operational situation shows that they are only trying to stem the tide, without any short-term hope of dislodging the ZSU from their gains. The ZSU's Blitzkreig has been an operational success, despite Russian resistance in some areas.

Any tactical and operational planning and especially execution should follow an overarching strategy. We saw this when Ukrainian forces were successfully defeating Russian forces in Kyiv and the North in March 2022, and even more so when vast areas in Kharkiv and Kherson regions were liberated. Russians, on the other hand, lack a strategy. Other than trying to atrit the enemy, there is nothing that really resemblance a strategy. The huge casualties in Bakhmut, Vuhledar and Avdiivka, where hundreds of thousands of Russians were KIA or permanently WIA, didn't yield any strategic gains, neither in terms of territory nor in trying to disable the Ukrainian army altogether. It is obvious that the Kremlin was trying to perpetuate the illusion that Russia can do this forever. And this has been the Russian strategy ever since, combined with projecting "red lines" which aim to stop or at least slow down Western aid for Ukraine, in hope of forcing Ukrainians into a diktat peace which Putin could sell to his subjects.

Counter-attacking in the same way was never a lasting solution for Ukraine, as the counter offensive in the South in 2023 showed. A different approach was needed. The choice to attack Russia in Kursk, which was not expected by Moscow, made it an ideal target. And the successes speak for themselves. Ukrainian forces have achieved in 12 days more territorial gains than Russians have achieved in one year of attritional warfare in Donetsk. The best part is that this was achieved with minimal ZSU casualties. One can only conclude that the Ukrainian strategy is working. The breakthrough in Donetsk has been prevented. The Russian gains are small, even dwarfed by the Ukrainian gains in Kursk, which are still ongoing, and the Russian gains came at a horrifically high price. To call this pyrrhic, does not do the term justice, because even pyrrhic victory bears the term "victory". Russians are nowhere near to achieve even that and Ukrainian forces might cause far more damage in Kursk, if the Russians do not relocate many more troops to this sector, effectively dashing their chances to achieve what they intended in Donbas.

The political implications might be even more disastrous for the Russian war effort. Having the Ukrainians firmly entrenched inside Russia projects is far worse for Putin than any defeat inside Ukraine. Putin having this defeat in Kursk under his watch shows how weak Russia in fact is. The entire Russian economy has has now been reoriented to sustain this war, and Russia cannot even hold the own borders, basically adding insult to injury. That will stick and not even Putin's propaganda channels are capable of fending this off. Even should it be be possible to stop the Ukrainian advance in the short term (and there's no signs of that happening so far), the Russian army is unlikely to dislodge the ZSU before the end of this year, if ever during this war. This is extremely important to point out.

Putin was intent on arm twisting Ukraine into a diktat ceasefire, using a slow but steady advance in the Donbas to show Western governments he was going to sacrifice whatever was necessary. It was absolutely imperative for him to deny Ukrainians any kind of territorial successes. This was more important to him than his losses, because he thought he could reach a suitable point before his reserves were spent. This was emphasized when Russia was always pointing out that Russia is advancing, ignoring that those advances were minuscule.

With Ukrainians in Kursk, on Russian lands, this has shifted the picture, dramatically. He cannot even think of a ceasefire as long as the Ukrainians control even an inch of Russia, but his problems are that he will need another hugely costly campaign, similar to what has been going on for the last 2 years in the Donbas, without an end in sight. Russia has already squandered huge amounts of human material and hardware and we all know that his reserves are burning down. Analysts vary, but in general the forecast is that the Soviet reserves will be spent by 2026-2027. Russia cannot sustain this war forever, and Putin cannot allow Ukrainians on Russian lands. The planners in Kyiv recognized this and maneuvered Putin into a corner where his demise is expedited. They also exposed Russian weaknesses and presented their Western backers with a case that Ukraine can win this war if the weapons and ammunition are guaranteed.

That the USA in particular does not want this to happen is less and less relevant, the stronger Ukraine becomes, and the more self-reliant they become in their own production of weapons and ammo. As long as Europe continues to back Ukraine, the USA becomes less and less of a factor. The bluff is called. This war can be ended quickly, either militarily with a decisive Russian defeat, or with a political change inside Russia. The Kursk operation has laid this completely open.

Now there are other advantages that can be exploited as well. Russia will HAVE to move troops from the Donbas and Kherson, and the attacks in the Donbas will trail away as manpower is redirected to Kursk. Artillery support for the Russians in the Donbas has already dropped by 36% as ammo is redirected to Kursk and railway logistics are impacted, becoming even less efficient than they were. Opportunities may well show themselves in the Donbas as Russian strength weakens - and do not forget that the ZSU is continually building new Brigades. Their limiting factor is NOT manpower, but weapons and equipment, and more IS arriving.

Personally, I'd take a wild stab and say, when the Russians have committed in Kursk, the SZU will cross the Dnipro and go on a Thunder Run through the Russian rear towards Crimea and Mariupol. The Crimean Isthmus is now "held" by Cadets (kiddies) as the Russian unit that was there has been transferred to Kursk. Yes, there'd be losses in crossing the Dnipro, but once across......the Russians have no defence in depth here.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Meanwhile: Russia continues to press its advantage at other points along the front in Ukraine. The Ukrainians operating in Kursk aren’t available to assist in Ukraine, so unless there is an asymmetric event that causes the Russians to divert MASSIVE amounts (an asymmetrical amount) of resources away from their current offensives, then Russia is most likely (obviously) willing to take the publicity hits and minor military hits of the continued presence of Ukrainian forces inside Russia in exchange for concrete significant strategic gains on the battlefield in Ukraine.

See above. The Russians will have to suck away troops from the Donbas and Kherson, and Kharkiv for that matter, they already are. They will keep up the attacks as long as they can, but the longer they hold off transferring troops to Kursk, the more gains the ZSU will make. Taking Belgorod would just be the icing on the cake - and large numbers of Russians are already self-evacuating the oblast. I suspect it will end up being more the inverse of what you describe.

The first phase of this war was where Russian had the initiative, and Ukraine was consistently on the defense. This is the second phase, where the ZSU holds the initiative and is both setting the pace and choosing the battle. The next phase will be the last, with Russia on the ropes, so to speak, and the ZSU choosing where to land the blows until the Russian Army goes down.

The ONE thing that WOULD cause Russia to commit MASSIVE amounts (asymmetrical amounts) of resources to the Kursk region, would be an acute / dire threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. The disabling or seizure of the plant by the Ukrainians would be crippling / devastating to Russia in maaaaany ways. Unfortunately, the Ukrainians seem to have committed to NOT pressing their advantage to put the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant under threat, and therefore, the Russians are content to let the Ukrainians play in their little sandbox until they achieve more pressing objectives in Ukraine. The Ukrainians’ incursion into the Kursk oblast will remain a mildly disruptive diversion/ distraction that Russia can largely ignore, until it isn’t.

And the ZSU will stay well away from the NPP. No benefit to taking it. Best leave it to the Russians to defend - it's the public humiliation, the logistics impact, and attrition of more Russian troops that's important here. That, and now the fighting in this area is inside Russia, NOT inside the Ukraine.

 

[Lazaran]

The Russians will have to <snip>

The Russians are perfectly fine with the Ukrainians playing in their little sandbox for the time being. The Russians are focused on their own offensives in Ukraine and understand EXACTLY what the Ukrainians are attempting to do.



For some clarity on Russia’s reaction to the Kursk incursion:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024

From the report:

“Russian forces are maintaining their relatively high offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, demonstrating that the Russian military command continues to prioritize advances in eastern Ukraine even as Ukraine is pressuring Russian forces within Kursk Oblast.”



Until that ^ changes, the threat continues to exist for Russia making irretrievable gains inside Ukraine before the end of the fighting season.

The ONLY thing that is going to force Russia’s hand to move MASSIVE AMOUNTS of resources away from their offensive push along the front in Ukraine, is an imminent threat to the Kursk NPP, imho.

Currently, Russia appears perfectly content to let Ukrainian forces become mired in the morass of dealing with displaced Russian civilians while simultaneously trying to conduct offensive and defensive operations in the area.



All other comments in previous posts stand.



Slava Ukraini!!!

 

[ChloeTzang]

All other comments in previous posts stand.

Slava Ukraini!!!

Let us wait and see and compare notes as things proceed.

Heroiam Slava!!!

 

[ChloeTzang]

 

[Buffalogurl]

https://www.breitbart.com/europe/20...raine-military-aid-amid-budget-crunch-report/
This is just in, I'm curious as to the implications this will have on Zelensky's war efforts....