It wasn't that they didn't head it, the officer in charge thought it was the scheduled arrival of a flight of B-17's.
The technology was so new that the operators likely couldn't tell the difference between a large number of planes and the few B-17's, though the B-17 being much larger a few would present an image similar to a large number of single engine planes.
The attack wasn't supposed to be a complete surprise. It was only a complete surprise because of decoding and typing delays at the Japanese embassy. The message was supposed to have been delivered to Cordell Hull before the attack. Not that it was an actual declaration of war, but it was to say Japan was ending negotiations, which would have been a huge hint.
There were other US failures, aside from the the radar interpretation. Failure to take seriously the sinking of a mini-sub inside the anti-submarine nets at Pearl.
The FBI's failure to correctly interpret phone conversations they listened in on.
Thinking sabotage was a greater risk than military attack.
Failure of the US to learn from the Battle of Taranto and so thinking ships at Pearl were safe from torpedo attack.
Overall the attack did very little to impede the US war effort. The Japanese almost totally neglected the ship repair facilities which were key the success of the Battle of Midway (if the Yorktown, heavily damaged at Coral Sea, had had to go all the way to the west coast for repairs it likely wouldn't have been present to play it's pivotal role at Midway.
Many of the ships damaged at Midway were back in service, because of the on-site repair facilities, within months, including two battleships. But even without any battleships the course of the war would likely have been the same.
The key combat ships were the carriers, escort carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts. The Battle off Samar (one of the battles of Leyte Gulf) being a prime example, when the DD's and DE's (most notably the USS Johnston and USS Samuel B. Roberts, both sunk) charged headlong in to an overwhelming Japanese task force (four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and around ten destroyers) in and effort to give the escort carries time to withdraw.
"In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar"
— Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XII, Leyte
An uncle of mine died at Pearl so it's always held a particular interest for me. When I was a kid and first heard of the Roosevelt conspiracy, his secret meetings, etc., I thought "Wow!", but as I grew up and learned more about what actually happened, I can see there was no need for any conspiracy.
It's easy to look at history through the lens of the present and say, "It was obvious Japan was going to attack!", or "It could never have worked if Roosevelt hadn't aided and abetted." It's proper place is in the bin with the 9-11 conspiracies.
It can be hard to put yourself in 1940/41 and look at it from the perspective of just the pieces of information of which any one person was aware.
Nicely put, Average, and it tallies with what I know (and I am not going to claim to be a total expert)...you are correct about the repair facilities being Key, as you point out if they had been crippled, many of the ships damaged but salvagable would have been out of action a lot longer......between patching together the ships that were repairable (like the yorktown), and other ships, it allowed the US to stay in the war that led to Midway....which also bought us time for new ships to come online and modern aircraft that were in production. The problem with conspiracy theories is they take a question, like why did we fail at Pearl Harbor, but instead of looking at the facts, the details, and piecing together the truth, they instead make a supposition ("Roosevely and Churchill lied") and then try to find 'facts' that back them up, that often are suppositions (aka, we know that the US and Britain had code breaking groups, so therefore they must have known..what that leaves out is those codebreakers only broke certain codes, and I believe we hadn't broken the japanese naval code until well after Pearl which we did use at Midway(we did have limited capability on their embassy ones, but not enough). Worse, it requires fitting 'facts' to the theory, rather than fitting the theory to the facts