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Prof Triggernometry
- Joined
- Feb 7, 2017
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It's about time. Myself and many others have been saying the same for years:
Putting the “War” Back in War Colleges
Our nation’s senior-officer educational institutions no longer teach warfighting—and that must change.
Thomas BruscinoMitchell G. Klingenberg
September 2, 2021
We must reckon with the hard truth that the United States has lost another war. Though errors made by policymakers certainly played a part, our military lost in Afghanistan because it no longer knows how to fight and win wars. This wasn’t because our military professionals lack will or effort but because they have forgotten the real purpose for which militaries exist. Nowhere is this truer than in America’s war colleges—the schools our nation established to teach officers how to fight and win wars. The plain fact is that these schools no longer teach warfighting. This may sound incredible—even unbelievable—but it is true.
In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published guidance for the education of future senior military leaders that repeatedly emphasized the need for all senior officers to learn how to fight wars and campaigns as a joint force. The various services are specialized to fight and win battles on land, at sea, and in the air, but campaigns and wars require building, supporting, and commanding formations that fight in all three environments simultaneously, often far from the United States. The Joint Chiefs issued their guidance because our senior-officer education system does not prepare its students for joint warfighting, which is enormously complicated.
At the war colleges, this cry for help has gone missing in a maze of bureaucracy and jargon. Educational standards take the form of vague word salads: “Senior leaders who lead complex organizations and think strategically and skillfully as adaptive and collaborative problem solvers to develop strategies to achieve national security outcomes.” Such “standards” are neither measurable nor focused on winning wars, yet educators congratulate themselves for meeting them, while graduates leave not even knowing what they don’t know.
Here is what we know: the only standard that matters is whether our military officers can prevail in war. As recent events in Afghanistan have demonstrated, we don’t meet that standard. How did we get here?
In 1967, the commandant of the U.S. Army War College wrote that developments since World War II made the old, warfare-focused curriculum “outdated.” As the American military flailed away aimlessly in Vietnam, he argued that “today’s military professional, while first and always a soldier, must also be a diplomat, an economist, a scientist, a historian, and a lawyer.”
The remainder of article here:
https://www.city-journal.org/puttin...eges?wallit_nosession=1#.YTEJ-FYVp3o.linkedin
The author:
Thomas Bruscino, Ph.D., is a military historian and an associate professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. Mitchell G. Klingenberg, Ph.D., is a military historian and a postdoctoral fellow and instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. The views and opinions presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Putting the “War” Back in War Colleges
Our nation’s senior-officer educational institutions no longer teach warfighting—and that must change.
Thomas BruscinoMitchell G. Klingenberg
September 2, 2021
We must reckon with the hard truth that the United States has lost another war. Though errors made by policymakers certainly played a part, our military lost in Afghanistan because it no longer knows how to fight and win wars. This wasn’t because our military professionals lack will or effort but because they have forgotten the real purpose for which militaries exist. Nowhere is this truer than in America’s war colleges—the schools our nation established to teach officers how to fight and win wars. The plain fact is that these schools no longer teach warfighting. This may sound incredible—even unbelievable—but it is true.
In May 2020, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published guidance for the education of future senior military leaders that repeatedly emphasized the need for all senior officers to learn how to fight wars and campaigns as a joint force. The various services are specialized to fight and win battles on land, at sea, and in the air, but campaigns and wars require building, supporting, and commanding formations that fight in all three environments simultaneously, often far from the United States. The Joint Chiefs issued their guidance because our senior-officer education system does not prepare its students for joint warfighting, which is enormously complicated.
At the war colleges, this cry for help has gone missing in a maze of bureaucracy and jargon. Educational standards take the form of vague word salads: “Senior leaders who lead complex organizations and think strategically and skillfully as adaptive and collaborative problem solvers to develop strategies to achieve national security outcomes.” Such “standards” are neither measurable nor focused on winning wars, yet educators congratulate themselves for meeting them, while graduates leave not even knowing what they don’t know.
Here is what we know: the only standard that matters is whether our military officers can prevail in war. As recent events in Afghanistan have demonstrated, we don’t meet that standard. How did we get here?
In 1967, the commandant of the U.S. Army War College wrote that developments since World War II made the old, warfare-focused curriculum “outdated.” As the American military flailed away aimlessly in Vietnam, he argued that “today’s military professional, while first and always a soldier, must also be a diplomat, an economist, a scientist, a historian, and a lawyer.”
The remainder of article here:
https://www.city-journal.org/puttin...eges?wallit_nosession=1#.YTEJ-FYVp3o.linkedin
The author:
Thomas Bruscino, Ph.D., is a military historian and an associate professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. Mitchell G. Klingenberg, Ph.D., is a military historian and a postdoctoral fellow and instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. The views and opinions presented are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
