Pure
Fiel a Verdad
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- Dec 20, 2001
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Defending the Undefendable, by Walter Block. [orig. pub. 1976]
This is a classic in the minimal government genre. He argues that whatever we think about the morality of the following persons, the governement should NOT be coming after them. IOW, there should be no laws on the books by which they can be prosecuted Indeed, in economic terms, says Block, many of them contribute, despite their scapegoat status. [[ADDED: That is one reason that Block calls them 'heroes'; they are doing something worthy despite social opprobrium.]
http://www.scribd.com/doc/8051279/Defending-the-Undefendable
Among those he considers and defends are the following.
pimp, blackmailer, drug pusher, slanderer/libeler, the dishonest cop, the strip miner, the employer of child labor.
What is Block's criterion for a proper law? according to him, the [only] correct justification for a law and the use of the cops to enforce it: if someone, improperly, initiates force or threatens to, against another. removal or destruction of someone's property will be included in this description.
Comments? Does this simple concept generate all the proper laws?
I post this because some self said proponents of liberty, here, apparently want a VERY active government, e.g. one which tells people whom they can marry, and who can sell contraceptives to whom, etc. these are better classified as 'social conservatives' who believe in strong gov't authority.
The Blackmailer
THE BLACKMAILER
t first glance it is not hard to answer the question, “Is blackmail really illegitimate?” The only problem it would seem to pose is, “Why is it being asked at all?” Do not blackmailers, well . . . blackmail people? And what could be worse? Blackmailers prey on people’s dark hidden secrets. They threaten to expose and publicize them. They bleed their victims, and often drive them to suicide. We will find, however, that the case against the blackmailer cannot stand serious analysis; that it is based upon a tissue of unexamined shibboleths and deep philosophical misunderstandings.
What, exactly, is blackmail? Blackmail is the offer of trade. It is the offer to trade something, usually silence, for some other good, usually money. If the offer of the trade is accepted, the blackmailer then maintains his silence and the blackmailee pays the agreed-upon price. If the blackmail offer is rejected, the blackmailer may exercise his rights of free speech and publicize the secret. There is nothing amiss here. All that is happening is that an offer to maintain silence is being made. If the offer is rejected, the blackmailer does no more than exercise his right of free speech.
The sole difference between a gossip and a blackmailer is that the blackmailer will refrain from speaking—for a price. In a sense, the gossip is much worse than the blackmailer, for the blackmailer has given the blackmailee a chance to silence him. The gossip exposes the secret without warning. Is not the person
with a secret better off at the hands of a blackmailer than a gossip? With the gossip, all is lost; with the blackmailer, one can only gain, or at least be no worse off. If the price requested by the blackmailer is lower than the secret is worth, the secretholder will pay the blackmailer—this being the lesser of the two evils. He thus gains the difference to him between the value of the secret and the price of the blackmail. When the blackmailer demands more than the secret is worth, his demand will not be met and the information will become public. However, in this case the person is no worse off with the blackmailer than he would have been with the inveterate gossip. It is indeed difficult, then, to account for the vilification suffered by the blackmailer, at least compared to the gossip, who is usually dismissed with slight contempt and smugness. Blackmail need not entail the offer of silence in return for money. This is only the best known form. But blackmail may be defined without reference to either.
Defined in general terms, blackmail is the threat to do something—anything which is not in itself illegal—unless certain demands are met. Many actions in the public arena qualify as acts of blackmail, but, instead of being vilified, they have often attained a status of respectability! For example, the recent lettuce boycott is a form of blackmail. Through the lettuce boycott (or any boycott) threats are made to retailers and wholesalers of fruits and vegetables. If they handle nonunion lettuce, the boycotters assert, people will be asked not to patronize their establishments. This conforms perfectly to the definition: a threat that something, not in itself illegal, will take place unless certain demands are met.
But what about the threats involved in blackmail? This perhaps more than anything else, is the aspect of blackmail that is most misunderstood and feared. At first glance, one is inclined to agree that threats are immoral. The usual dictum against aggression, for example, warns not only against aggression per se but also against the threat of aggression. If a highwayman accosts a traveler, it is usually the threat of aggression alone that will compel obedience.
Consider the nature of threats. When what is threatened is aggressive violence, the threat is condemnable. No individual has the right to initiate aggressive violence against another. In blackmail, however, what is being “threatened” is something that the blackmailer does have a right to do!—whether it be exercising the right of free speech, or refusing to patronize certain stores, or persuading others to do likewise. What is being threatened is not in itself illegitimate; it is, therefore, not possible to call the “threat” an illegitimate threat. Blackmail can only be illegitimate when there is a special foresworn relationship between the blackmailer and the blackmailee.
A secret-keeper may take a lawyer or a private investigator into his confidence on the condition that the confidence be maintained in secrecy. If the lawyer or private investigator attempts to blackmail the secret-keeper, that would be in violation of the contract and, therefore, illegitimate. However, if a stranger holds the secret without contractual obligations, then it is legitimate to offer to “sell” his silence. In addition to being a legitimate activity, blackmail has some good effects, litanies to the contrary notwithstanding.
Apart from some innocent victims who are caught in the net, whom does the blackmailer usually prey upon? In the main, there are two groups. One group is composed of criminals: murderers, thieves, swindlers, embezzlers, cheaters, rapists, etc. The other group consists of people who engage in activities, not illegitimate in themselves, but which are contrary to the mores and habits of the majority: homosexuals, sado-masochists, sexual perverts, communists, adulterers, etc. The institution of blackmail has beneficial, but different, effects upon each of these groups. In the case of criminals, blackmail and the threat of blackmail serves as a deterrent. They add to the risks involved in criminal activity. How many of the anonymous “tips” received by the police—the value of which cannot be overestimated— can be traced, directly or indirectly, to blackmail? How many criminals are led to pursue crime on their own, eschewing the aid of fellow criminals in “jobs” that call for cooperation, out ofthe fear of possible blackmail?
Finally, there are those individuals who are on the verge of committing crimes, or at the “margin of criminality” (as the economist would say), where the least factor will propel them one way or another. The additional fear of blackmail may be enough, in some cases, to dissuade them from crime. If blackmail itself were legalized, it would undoubtedly be an even more effective deterrent. Legalization would undoubtedly result in an increase in blackmail, with attendant depredations upon the criminal class. It is sometimes said that what diminishes crime is not the penalty attached to the crime but the certainty of being caught. Although this controversy rages with great relevance in current debates on capital punishment, it will suffice to point out that the institution of blackmail does both. It increases the penalty associated with crime, as it forces criminals to share part of their loot with the blackmailer.
It also raises the probability of being apprehended, as blackmailers are added to police forces, private citizen and vigilante groups, and other anticrime units. Blackmailers, who are often members in good standing in the criminal world, are in an advantageous position to foil crimes. Their “inside” status surpasses even that of the spy or infiltrator, who is forced to play a role. Legalizing blackmail would thus allow anticrime units to take advantage of two basic crime fighting adages at the same time: “divide and conquer,” and “lack of honor among thieves.” It is quite clear that one important effect of legalizing blackmail would be to diminish crime, real crime, that is.
The legalization of blackmail would also have a beneficial effect upon actions which do not involve aggression, but are at variance with the mores of society as a whole. On these actions, the legalization of blackmail would have a liberating effect. Even with blackmail still illegal, we are witnessing some of its beneficial effects. Homosexuality, for instance, is technically illegal in some instances, but not really criminal, since it involves no aggression. For individual homosexuals, blackmail very often causes considerable harm and can hardly be considered beneficial. But for the group as a whole, that is, for each individual as a member of the group, blackmail has helped by making the public more aware and accustomed to homosexuality. Forcing individual members of a socially oppressed group into the open, or “out of the closet,” cannot, of course, be considered a service. The use of force is a violation of an individual’s rights.
But still, it does engender an awareness on the part of members of a group of one another’s existence. In forcing this perception, blackmail can legitimately take some small share of the credit in liberating people whose only crime is a deviation from the norm in a noncriminal way. In reflecting on the old aphorism, “the truth shall make you free,” the only “weapon” at the disposal of the blackmailer is the truth. In using the truth to back up his threats (as on occasion he must), he sets the truth free, very often without intent, to do whatever good or bad it is capable of doing.
THE SLANDERER
AND
LIBELER
It is easy to be an advocate of free speech when it applies to the rights of those with whom one is in agreement. But the crucial test concerns controversial speech—statements which we may consider vicious and nasty and which may, in fact, even be vicious and nasty. Now, there is perhaps nothing more repugnant or vicious than libel. We must, therefore, take particular care to defend the free speech rights of libelers, for if they can be protected, the rights of all others—who do not give as much offense—will certainly be more secure. But if the rights of free speech of libelers and slanderers are not protected, the rights of others will be less secure.
The reason civil libertarians have not been involved in the protection of the rights of libelers and slanderers is clear—libel is ruinous to reputations. Harsh tales about lost jobs, friends, etc., abound. Far from being concerned with the free speech rights of the libeler and slanderer, civil libertarians have been concerned with protecting those who have had their reputations destroyed, as though that in itself was unpardonable. But obviously, protecting a person’s reputation is not an absolute value. If it were, if, that is, reputations were really sacrosanct, then we would have to prohibit most categories of denigration, even truthful ones. Unfavorable literary criticism, satire in movies, plays, music or book reviews could not be allowed. Anything which diminished any individual’s or any institution’s reputation would have to be forbidden.
Of course, civil libertarians would deny that their objection to slander and libel commits them to the view described. They would admit that a person’s reputation cannot always be protected, that sometimes it must be sacrificed. But this, they might say, does not exonerate the libeler. For a person’s reputation is not something to be taken lightly. It may not be damaged without good reason. But what is a person’s “reputation”? What is this thing which may not be “taken lightly”? Clearly, it is not a possession which may be said to belong to him in the way, for example, his clothes do. In fact, a person’s reputation does not “belong” to him at all. A person’s reputation is what other people think of him; it consists of the thoughts which other people have. A man does not own his reputation any more than he owns the thoughts of others—because that is all his reputation consists of.
A man’s reputation cannot be stolen from him any more than can the thoughts of other people be stolen from him. Whether his reputation was “taken from him” by fair means or foul, by truth or falsehood, he did not own it in the first place and, hence, should have no recourse to the law for damages. What then are we doing when we object to, or prohibit, libel? We are prohibiting someone from affecting or trying to affect the thoughts of other people. But what does the right of free speech mean if not that we are all free to try to affect the thoughts of those around us? So we must conclude that libel and slander are consistent with the rights of free speech.
Finally, paradoxical though it may be, reputations would probably be more secure without the laws which prohibit libelous speech! With the present laws prohibiting libelous falsehoods, there is a natural tendency to believe any publicized slur on someone’s character. “It would not be printed if it were not true,” reasons the gullible public. If libel and slander were allowed, however, the public would not be so easily deceived. Attacks would come so thick and fast that they would have to be substantiated before they could have any impact. Agencies similar to Consumers Union or the Better Business Bureau might be organized to meet the public’s demand for accurate scurrilous information. The public would soon learn to digest and evaluate the statements of libelers and slanderers—if the latter were allowed free rein. No longer would a libeler or slanderer have the automatic power to ruin a person’s reputation.
This is a classic in the minimal government genre. He argues that whatever we think about the morality of the following persons, the governement should NOT be coming after them. IOW, there should be no laws on the books by which they can be prosecuted Indeed, in economic terms, says Block, many of them contribute, despite their scapegoat status. [[ADDED: That is one reason that Block calls them 'heroes'; they are doing something worthy despite social opprobrium.]
http://www.scribd.com/doc/8051279/Defending-the-Undefendable
Among those he considers and defends are the following.
pimp, blackmailer, drug pusher, slanderer/libeler, the dishonest cop, the strip miner, the employer of child labor.
What is Block's criterion for a proper law? according to him, the [only] correct justification for a law and the use of the cops to enforce it: if someone, improperly, initiates force or threatens to, against another. removal or destruction of someone's property will be included in this description.
Comments? Does this simple concept generate all the proper laws?
I post this because some self said proponents of liberty, here, apparently want a VERY active government, e.g. one which tells people whom they can marry, and who can sell contraceptives to whom, etc. these are better classified as 'social conservatives' who believe in strong gov't authority.
The Blackmailer
THE BLACKMAILER
t first glance it is not hard to answer the question, “Is blackmail really illegitimate?” The only problem it would seem to pose is, “Why is it being asked at all?” Do not blackmailers, well . . . blackmail people? And what could be worse? Blackmailers prey on people’s dark hidden secrets. They threaten to expose and publicize them. They bleed their victims, and often drive them to suicide. We will find, however, that the case against the blackmailer cannot stand serious analysis; that it is based upon a tissue of unexamined shibboleths and deep philosophical misunderstandings.
What, exactly, is blackmail? Blackmail is the offer of trade. It is the offer to trade something, usually silence, for some other good, usually money. If the offer of the trade is accepted, the blackmailer then maintains his silence and the blackmailee pays the agreed-upon price. If the blackmail offer is rejected, the blackmailer may exercise his rights of free speech and publicize the secret. There is nothing amiss here. All that is happening is that an offer to maintain silence is being made. If the offer is rejected, the blackmailer does no more than exercise his right of free speech.
The sole difference between a gossip and a blackmailer is that the blackmailer will refrain from speaking—for a price. In a sense, the gossip is much worse than the blackmailer, for the blackmailer has given the blackmailee a chance to silence him. The gossip exposes the secret without warning. Is not the person
with a secret better off at the hands of a blackmailer than a gossip? With the gossip, all is lost; with the blackmailer, one can only gain, or at least be no worse off. If the price requested by the blackmailer is lower than the secret is worth, the secretholder will pay the blackmailer—this being the lesser of the two evils. He thus gains the difference to him between the value of the secret and the price of the blackmail. When the blackmailer demands more than the secret is worth, his demand will not be met and the information will become public. However, in this case the person is no worse off with the blackmailer than he would have been with the inveterate gossip. It is indeed difficult, then, to account for the vilification suffered by the blackmailer, at least compared to the gossip, who is usually dismissed with slight contempt and smugness. Blackmail need not entail the offer of silence in return for money. This is only the best known form. But blackmail may be defined without reference to either.
Defined in general terms, blackmail is the threat to do something—anything which is not in itself illegal—unless certain demands are met. Many actions in the public arena qualify as acts of blackmail, but, instead of being vilified, they have often attained a status of respectability! For example, the recent lettuce boycott is a form of blackmail. Through the lettuce boycott (or any boycott) threats are made to retailers and wholesalers of fruits and vegetables. If they handle nonunion lettuce, the boycotters assert, people will be asked not to patronize their establishments. This conforms perfectly to the definition: a threat that something, not in itself illegal, will take place unless certain demands are met.
But what about the threats involved in blackmail? This perhaps more than anything else, is the aspect of blackmail that is most misunderstood and feared. At first glance, one is inclined to agree that threats are immoral. The usual dictum against aggression, for example, warns not only against aggression per se but also against the threat of aggression. If a highwayman accosts a traveler, it is usually the threat of aggression alone that will compel obedience.
Consider the nature of threats. When what is threatened is aggressive violence, the threat is condemnable. No individual has the right to initiate aggressive violence against another. In blackmail, however, what is being “threatened” is something that the blackmailer does have a right to do!—whether it be exercising the right of free speech, or refusing to patronize certain stores, or persuading others to do likewise. What is being threatened is not in itself illegitimate; it is, therefore, not possible to call the “threat” an illegitimate threat. Blackmail can only be illegitimate when there is a special foresworn relationship between the blackmailer and the blackmailee.
A secret-keeper may take a lawyer or a private investigator into his confidence on the condition that the confidence be maintained in secrecy. If the lawyer or private investigator attempts to blackmail the secret-keeper, that would be in violation of the contract and, therefore, illegitimate. However, if a stranger holds the secret without contractual obligations, then it is legitimate to offer to “sell” his silence. In addition to being a legitimate activity, blackmail has some good effects, litanies to the contrary notwithstanding.
Apart from some innocent victims who are caught in the net, whom does the blackmailer usually prey upon? In the main, there are two groups. One group is composed of criminals: murderers, thieves, swindlers, embezzlers, cheaters, rapists, etc. The other group consists of people who engage in activities, not illegitimate in themselves, but which are contrary to the mores and habits of the majority: homosexuals, sado-masochists, sexual perverts, communists, adulterers, etc. The institution of blackmail has beneficial, but different, effects upon each of these groups. In the case of criminals, blackmail and the threat of blackmail serves as a deterrent. They add to the risks involved in criminal activity. How many of the anonymous “tips” received by the police—the value of which cannot be overestimated— can be traced, directly or indirectly, to blackmail? How many criminals are led to pursue crime on their own, eschewing the aid of fellow criminals in “jobs” that call for cooperation, out ofthe fear of possible blackmail?
Finally, there are those individuals who are on the verge of committing crimes, or at the “margin of criminality” (as the economist would say), where the least factor will propel them one way or another. The additional fear of blackmail may be enough, in some cases, to dissuade them from crime. If blackmail itself were legalized, it would undoubtedly be an even more effective deterrent. Legalization would undoubtedly result in an increase in blackmail, with attendant depredations upon the criminal class. It is sometimes said that what diminishes crime is not the penalty attached to the crime but the certainty of being caught. Although this controversy rages with great relevance in current debates on capital punishment, it will suffice to point out that the institution of blackmail does both. It increases the penalty associated with crime, as it forces criminals to share part of their loot with the blackmailer.
It also raises the probability of being apprehended, as blackmailers are added to police forces, private citizen and vigilante groups, and other anticrime units. Blackmailers, who are often members in good standing in the criminal world, are in an advantageous position to foil crimes. Their “inside” status surpasses even that of the spy or infiltrator, who is forced to play a role. Legalizing blackmail would thus allow anticrime units to take advantage of two basic crime fighting adages at the same time: “divide and conquer,” and “lack of honor among thieves.” It is quite clear that one important effect of legalizing blackmail would be to diminish crime, real crime, that is.
The legalization of blackmail would also have a beneficial effect upon actions which do not involve aggression, but are at variance with the mores of society as a whole. On these actions, the legalization of blackmail would have a liberating effect. Even with blackmail still illegal, we are witnessing some of its beneficial effects. Homosexuality, for instance, is technically illegal in some instances, but not really criminal, since it involves no aggression. For individual homosexuals, blackmail very often causes considerable harm and can hardly be considered beneficial. But for the group as a whole, that is, for each individual as a member of the group, blackmail has helped by making the public more aware and accustomed to homosexuality. Forcing individual members of a socially oppressed group into the open, or “out of the closet,” cannot, of course, be considered a service. The use of force is a violation of an individual’s rights.
But still, it does engender an awareness on the part of members of a group of one another’s existence. In forcing this perception, blackmail can legitimately take some small share of the credit in liberating people whose only crime is a deviation from the norm in a noncriminal way. In reflecting on the old aphorism, “the truth shall make you free,” the only “weapon” at the disposal of the blackmailer is the truth. In using the truth to back up his threats (as on occasion he must), he sets the truth free, very often without intent, to do whatever good or bad it is capable of doing.
THE SLANDERER
AND
LIBELER
It is easy to be an advocate of free speech when it applies to the rights of those with whom one is in agreement. But the crucial test concerns controversial speech—statements which we may consider vicious and nasty and which may, in fact, even be vicious and nasty. Now, there is perhaps nothing more repugnant or vicious than libel. We must, therefore, take particular care to defend the free speech rights of libelers, for if they can be protected, the rights of all others—who do not give as much offense—will certainly be more secure. But if the rights of free speech of libelers and slanderers are not protected, the rights of others will be less secure.
The reason civil libertarians have not been involved in the protection of the rights of libelers and slanderers is clear—libel is ruinous to reputations. Harsh tales about lost jobs, friends, etc., abound. Far from being concerned with the free speech rights of the libeler and slanderer, civil libertarians have been concerned with protecting those who have had their reputations destroyed, as though that in itself was unpardonable. But obviously, protecting a person’s reputation is not an absolute value. If it were, if, that is, reputations were really sacrosanct, then we would have to prohibit most categories of denigration, even truthful ones. Unfavorable literary criticism, satire in movies, plays, music or book reviews could not be allowed. Anything which diminished any individual’s or any institution’s reputation would have to be forbidden.
Of course, civil libertarians would deny that their objection to slander and libel commits them to the view described. They would admit that a person’s reputation cannot always be protected, that sometimes it must be sacrificed. But this, they might say, does not exonerate the libeler. For a person’s reputation is not something to be taken lightly. It may not be damaged without good reason. But what is a person’s “reputation”? What is this thing which may not be “taken lightly”? Clearly, it is not a possession which may be said to belong to him in the way, for example, his clothes do. In fact, a person’s reputation does not “belong” to him at all. A person’s reputation is what other people think of him; it consists of the thoughts which other people have. A man does not own his reputation any more than he owns the thoughts of others—because that is all his reputation consists of.
A man’s reputation cannot be stolen from him any more than can the thoughts of other people be stolen from him. Whether his reputation was “taken from him” by fair means or foul, by truth or falsehood, he did not own it in the first place and, hence, should have no recourse to the law for damages. What then are we doing when we object to, or prohibit, libel? We are prohibiting someone from affecting or trying to affect the thoughts of other people. But what does the right of free speech mean if not that we are all free to try to affect the thoughts of those around us? So we must conclude that libel and slander are consistent with the rights of free speech.
Finally, paradoxical though it may be, reputations would probably be more secure without the laws which prohibit libelous speech! With the present laws prohibiting libelous falsehoods, there is a natural tendency to believe any publicized slur on someone’s character. “It would not be printed if it were not true,” reasons the gullible public. If libel and slander were allowed, however, the public would not be so easily deceived. Attacks would come so thick and fast that they would have to be substantiated before they could have any impact. Agencies similar to Consumers Union or the Better Business Bureau might be organized to meet the public’s demand for accurate scurrilous information. The public would soon learn to digest and evaluate the statements of libelers and slanderers—if the latter were allowed free rein. No longer would a libeler or slanderer have the automatic power to ruin a person’s reputation.
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