The failure of Romney's GOTV and Project Orca

zipman

Literotica Guru
Joined
Jul 30, 2002
Posts
38,536
I haven't seen any threads on this and thought it was pretty interesting:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

As conservatives search for an explanation for Mitt Romney's loss, much of the blame has been directed at the collapse of his campaign's Election Day get out the vote efforts, a massive organizational failure that resulted in lower Republican turnout than even John McCain got in 2008.

A major source of Romney's GOTV problems appears to have been the disastrous Project ORCA, an expensive technological undertaking that was supposed to provide the campaign with real-time poll monitoring that would allow Republicans to target GOTV efforts on Election Day.

In the week leading up to the election, Romney campaign spokesperson Andrea Saul told Business Insider that ORCA was "the Republican Party’s newest, most technologically advanced plan to win the 2012 election," touting it as the game-changer that would blow even the Obama campaign's sophisticated GOTV system out of the water.

But on almost all counts, ORCA failed miserably. In a fascinating piece for Ace of Spades, Romney poll-watcher John Ekdahl describes a perfect storm of technology problems that made the ORCA app unusable and left scores of Republican volunteers " wandering around confused and frustrated" on Election Day.

Worse still, Ekdahl told Business Insider that the Romney campaign failed to provide poll-watching volunteers in his region — Jacksonville, Florida, a key Republican city in a major swing state — with proper credentials and accurate voter strike lists, rendering them unable to perform their duties even if the ORCA app had worked.

In interviews with Business Insider last week, sources close to the Romney campaign confirmed Ekdahl's account, and described a technological undertaking that failed at every level. According to several of these sources, ORCA was developed by a small, isolated tech team working under Romney's political team. These sources told Business Insider that the product was never properly beta-tested, and wasn't revealed to the rest of the campaign — including the digital team — until the week of the election.

Most people on the campaign "weren't that surprised" by ORCA's failure, said one Republican communications strategist close to the Romney campaign.

"They wouldn't let anyone outside of Romney political circle in on it until basically November 6," the strategist said. "The digital strategy was so incomprehensible — they were playing Super Nintendo while Obama's people had PS3."

"Their priorities were so screwed up — [they were] hypersensitive about information security, but also wanted to use the best technology they could," the strategist continued. "In the end they got neither. They put out a laughable GOTV product."

And the Romney campaign's Election Day problems weren't limited to ORCA.

Another Republican activist, an attorney in Hamilton County, Ohio who declined to be named for fear of "burning bridges," told Business Insider that the campaign's GOTV organization in that crucial swing county completely collapsed in the weeks leading up to the election.

In an interview last week, the attorney, one of the "Lawyers for Romney" who volunteered to help the campaign's legal team by watching the polls on Election Day, described how the Romney campaign sent its legal volunteers the wrong training information, failed to provide volunteers with information about where they were supposed to be on Election Day, and stopped responding to phone calls and emails in the final two weeks of the campaign.

"It was basically a disaster," the attorney said. "They never explained what we were supposed to be doing — where we were supposed to start, where we were supposed to end, what I was supposed to do at the end of the night — they didn't explain any of it.... A month before, you couldn't get a phone call or an email answered."

"Four out of eight of my polling places didn't have a poll observer," the attorney continued. "How you don't even get people credentialed properly is beyond my comprehension."

The Romney campaign did not respond to Business Insider's request for comment on the campaign's Election Day issues.

While we may never know what really happened inside the Romney campaign's Election Day collapse, the Ohio attorney's story, taken with the accounts from Ekdahl and people close to the Romney campaign, paint a picture of a campaign in disarray.

It appears that in its singular focus on competing technologically with the Obama campaign, the Romney team neglected to adequately account for and organize the essential human element necessary to any grassroots undertaking. Thus when its technological efforts failed, the campaign was left without a Plan B, and its volunteers were forced to fly blind at the moment the campaign needed them most.

"I think sometimes people get enamored of technology and they take people out of the mixture because its easier," Republican strategist Dave Carney told Business Insider. "I think there'll be a lot of soul-searching and review of those processes and see what really makes a difference."
 
"Technology and Republicans" go together as well as "AJ and Facts" (or maybe "VatAss and personal responsibility"), i.e. there is an enormous disconnect between the two.

This sounds like a classic case of letting the techies manage the product roll-out, instead of professional project managers. I have no doubt that somewhere, there's a Byron-in-Exilesque hot shit programming type smugly saying "I did *MY* part, they simply failed in THEIRS".

Failure to beta-test, failure to train users, failure to stress-test. Classic recipe for a world class fuckup.
 
I guess "community organiser" is a harder job than the RWCJ would have us believe.
 
In theory, ORCA could have been the polling application of applications. At least in the short term. With things as real-time as they are with Facebook, Twitter and all the rest of it, it should have not been terribly difficult to develop to give the campaign that extra "edge". What makes the whole thing kind of funny is, the other team probably had a similar thing going.
 
"Technology and Republicans" go together as well as "AJ and Facts" (or maybe "VatAss and personal responsibility"), i.e. there is an enormous disconnect between the two.

This sounds like a classic case of letting the techies manage the product roll-out, instead of professional project managers. I have no doubt that somewhere, there's a Byron-in-Exilesque hot shit programming type smugly saying "I did *MY* part, they simply failed in THEIRS".

Failure to beta-test, failure to train users, failure to stress-test. Classic recipe for a world class fuckup.

And that is probably where things went wrong. In the heat of election night, the application probably DDoS'ed itself. Not uncommon.
 
I guess "community organiser" is a harder job than the RWCJ would have us believe.

What I find most interesting is how Romney's success in business translated into a failure for GOTV, when it is a business-like endeavor.

Things like communication, and using proven system implementation methodologies should be second nature.

Maybe there was a reason he used a small firm, but operating in a silo, not beta testing, not providing training, not stress testing and not successfully deploying it are inexcusable.

Even beyond the failure of Orca as a key component of his GOTV, the article shows how it failed in other areas on a collosal level.
 
And that is probably where things went wrong. In the heat of election night, the application probably DDoS'ed itself. Not uncommon.

I think it went wrong with failing to beta-test it. I've read other articles on this and there were a slew of problems with it, from incorrect passwords, inability to access the site, sending out a 60 page pdf training manual the night before, etc. etc. etc.

It was a complete and utter clusterfuck.
 
I think it went wrong with failing to beta-test it. I've read other articles on this and there were a slew of problems with it, from incorrect passwords, inability to access the site, sending out a 60 page pdf training manual the night before, etc. etc. etc.

It was a complete and utter clusterfuck.

Yeah, beta testing is very important.
 
Yeah, beta testing is very important.

Another issue is that you would think they that considering it hadn't been beta or stress tested, that they would have had a contingency plan for their volunteers if it failed.
 
Yeah, beta testing is very important.

My favorite bug was "re-send credentials".

If a lawyer had credentials as a poll-watch official, he could re-send credentials to a polling place with one touch of a button.

The problem?

Most Repub. lawyers held credentials for multiple polling places.

Pressing the resend button succesfully re-sent the credentials for the FIRST polling place on their authorization list....which worked fine if you were at your FIRST polling place.

Second, third, fourth or fifth? Oops...they got sent your credentials for the first place. DENIED!
 
Another issue is that you would think they that considering it hadn't been beta or stress tested, that they would have had a contingency plan for their volunteers if it failed.

Yes, a plan B or even C and D is not a bad idea. I suppose they hung their hat on that thing to have an edge, and lost sight of many other things. As been suggested here, being out in the field with dicks collectively in hand must of not been very fun.
 
Yes, a plan B or even C and D is not a bad idea. I suppose they hung their hat on that thing to have an edge, and lost sight of many other things. As been suggested here, being out in the field with dicks collectively in hand must of not been very fun.

It would have been fun being one of the Dem poll watchers at the same place, though, watching the growing looks of horror on their R counterpart's faces.
 
Prolly time to quit speculating on why Romney lost....HE LOST.

It doesn't really matter why he lost....
 
Another article with more details

As Republicans try to explain their Election Day losses in terms of policy, tactics, and strategy, one factor is emerging as the essential difference between the Obama and Romney campaigns on November 6: the absolute failure of Romney’s get-out-the-vote effort, which underperformed even John McCain’s lackluster 2008 turnout. One culprit appears to be “Orca,” the Romney’s massive technology effort, which failed completely.

A source within the Romney campaign agreed to share his reflections on Project Orca with Breitbart News:


It's easy to point fingers after a loss and I wouldn't normally do it, but consider what happened.


Project Orca was supposed to enable poll watchers to record voter names on their smartphones, by listening for names as voters checked in. This would give the campaign real-time turnout data, so they could redirect GOTV resources throughout the day where it was most needed. They recruited 37,000 swing state volunteers for this.

I worked on the Colorado team, and we were called by hundreds (or more) volunteers who couldn't use the app or the backup phone system. The usernames and passwords were wrong, but the reset password tool didn't work, and we couldn't change phone PINs. We were told the problems were limited and asked to project confidence, have people use pencil and paper, and try to submit again later.

Then at 6PM they admitted they had issued the wrong PINs to every volunteer in Colorado, and reissued new PINs (which also didn't work). Meanwhile, counties where we had hundreds of volunteers, such as Denver Colorado, showed zero volunteers in the system all day, but we weren't allowed to add them. In one area, the head of the Republican Party plus 10 volunteers were all locked out. The system went down for a half hour during peak voting, but for hundreds or more, it never worked all day. Many of the poll watchers I spoke with were very discouraged. Many members of our phone bank got up and left.

I do not know if the system was totally broken, or if I just saw the worst of it. But I wonder, because they told us all day that most volunteers were submitting just fine, yet admitted at the end that all of Colorado had the wrong PIN's. They also said the system projected every swing state as pink or red.

Regardless of the specific difficulties, this idea would only help if executed extremely well. Otherwise, those 37,000 swing state volunteers should have been working on GOTV...

Somebody messaged me privately after my email and told me that North Carolina had the same problems -- every pin was wrong and not fixed until 6PM -- and was also told it was localized to North Carolina.

The problems with Orca appear to have been nationwide, and predated Election Day itself. At Ace of Spades, John Ekdahl reported his frustrations as a volunteer in the field:


From the very start there were warning signs. After signing up, you were invited to take part in nightly conference calls. The calls were more of the slick marketing speech type than helpful training sessions. There was a lot of "rah-rahs" and lofty talk about how this would change the ballgame.

Working primarily as a web developer, I had some serious questions. Things like "Has this been stress tested?", "Is there redundancy in place?" and "What steps have been taken to combat a coordinated DDOS attack or the like?", among others. These types of questions were brushed aside (truth be told, they never took one of my questions). They assured us that the system had been relentlessly tested and would be a tremendous success.
Ekdahl describes how volunteers were expected to print their own materials, and were mistakenly not told to bring their poll watching credentials to polling places. Attempts to communicate with the Romney campaign to ask for assistance were unsuccessful:


By 2PM, I had completely given up. I finally got ahold of someone at around 1PM and I never heard back. From what I understand, the entire system crashed at around 4PM. I'm not sure if that's true, but it wouldn't surprise me. I decided to wait for my wife to get home from work to vote, which meant going very late (around 6:15PM). Here's the kicker, I never got a call to go out and vote. So, who the hell knows if that end of it was working either.

Likewise, Twitchy recorded widespread real-time complaints and criticisms on Twitter by Project Orca volunteers. At one point during Election Day, the system had malfunctioned so badly that desperate volunteers wondered if the program had been hacked.

Romney volunteers in Virginia confirmed that the campaign had relied entirely on Project Orca to turn out the vote in key areas such as Roanoke, where Romney and Ryan had made appearances. Volunteers who had driven to Virginia from safely-Republican Tennessee were shocked at the disorganization they encountered.

While the Romney campaign waited for Orca to function as planned, the Obama campaign had placed signs outside every one of the city's thirty-three polling places, and was fully staffed with two volunteers outside each polling place, and a strike list volunteer inside, all day long from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. The best that the short-handed Tennessee volunteers could manage was 40% coverage of polling places; the local GOP, they said, had relied entirely on the campaign's centralized Orca system in Boston to turn out the local vote.

Ekdahl concludes his account by hoping that the failures of Orca did not cost Romney the election:


We lost by fairly small margins in Florida, Virginia, Ohio and Colorado. If this had worked could it have closed the gap? I sure hope not for my sanity's sake.

In fact, Orca diverted scarce resources that would have been better used physically moving voters to polling places. By a rough calculation, Romney lost the election by falling 500,000 to 700,000 votes short in key swing states. If each of the 37,000 volunteers that had been devoted to Orca had instead brought 20 voters to the polls in those states over the course of the day, Romney would have won the election.

Before the election, there was much fear-mongering on the Democratic side about the Republicans’ supposed plans to suppress turnout among Obama voters. After the election, GOP strategist Karl Rove accused the Obama campaign of “suppressing the vote” by running a negative campaign against Romney that kept voters at home.

The truth is much worse. There was, in fact, massive suppression of the Republican vote--by the Romney campaign, through the diversion of nearly 40,000 volunteers to a failing computer program.

There was no Plan B; there was only confusion, and silence.
 
As Republicans try to explain their Election Day losses in terms of policy, tactics, and strategy, one factor is emerging as the essential difference between the Obama and Romney campaigns on November 6: the absolute failure of Romney’s get-out-the-vote effort, which underperformed even John McCain’s lackluster 2008 turnout. One culprit appears to be “Orca,” the Romney’s massive technology effort, which failed completely.

A source within the Romney campaign agreed to share his reflections on Project Orca with Breitbart News:


It's easy to point fingers after a loss and I wouldn't normally do it, but consider what happened.


Project Orca was supposed to enable poll watchers to record voter names on their smartphones, by listening for names as voters checked in. This would give the campaign real-time turnout data, so they could redirect GOTV resources throughout the day where it was most needed. They recruited 37,000 swing state volunteers for this.

I worked on the Colorado team, and we were called by hundreds (or more) volunteers who couldn't use the app or the backup phone system. The usernames and passwords were wrong, but the reset password tool didn't work, and we couldn't change phone PINs. We were told the problems were limited and asked to project confidence, have people use pencil and paper, and try to submit again later.

Then at 6PM they admitted they had issued the wrong PINs to every volunteer in Colorado, and reissued new PINs (which also didn't work). Meanwhile, counties where we had hundreds of volunteers, such as Denver Colorado, showed zero volunteers in the system all day, but we weren't allowed to add them. In one area, the head of the Republican Party plus 10 volunteers were all locked out. The system went down for a half hour during peak voting, but for hundreds or more, it never worked all day. Many of the poll watchers I spoke with were very discouraged. Many members of our phone bank got up and left.

I do not know if the system was totally broken, or if I just saw the worst of it. But I wonder, because they told us all day that most volunteers were submitting just fine, yet admitted at the end that all of Colorado had the wrong PIN's. They also said the system projected every swing state as pink or red.

Regardless of the specific difficulties, this idea would only help if executed extremely well. Otherwise, those 37,000 swing state volunteers should have been working on GOTV...

Somebody messaged me privately after my email and told me that North Carolina had the same problems -- every pin was wrong and not fixed until 6PM -- and was also told it was localized to North Carolina.

The problems with Orca appear to have been nationwide, and predated Election Day itself. At Ace of Spades, John Ekdahl reported his frustrations as a volunteer in the field:


From the very start there were warning signs. After signing up, you were invited to take part in nightly conference calls. The calls were more of the slick marketing speech type than helpful training sessions. There was a lot of "rah-rahs" and lofty talk about how this would change the ballgame.

Working primarily as a web developer, I had some serious questions. Things like "Has this been stress tested?", "Is there redundancy in place?" and "What steps have been taken to combat a coordinated DDOS attack or the like?", among others. These types of questions were brushed aside (truth be told, they never took one of my questions). They assured us that the system had been relentlessly tested and would be a tremendous success.
Ekdahl describes how volunteers were expected to print their own materials, and were mistakenly not told to bring their poll watching credentials to polling places. Attempts to communicate with the Romney campaign to ask for assistance were unsuccessful:


By 2PM, I had completely given up. I finally got ahold of someone at around 1PM and I never heard back. From what I understand, the entire system crashed at around 4PM. I'm not sure if that's true, but it wouldn't surprise me. I decided to wait for my wife to get home from work to vote, which meant going very late (around 6:15PM). Here's the kicker, I never got a call to go out and vote. So, who the hell knows if that end of it was working either.

Likewise, Twitchy recorded widespread real-time complaints and criticisms on Twitter by Project Orca volunteers. At one point during Election Day, the system had malfunctioned so badly that desperate volunteers wondered if the program had been hacked.

Romney volunteers in Virginia confirmed that the campaign had relied entirely on Project Orca to turn out the vote in key areas such as Roanoke, where Romney and Ryan had made appearances. Volunteers who had driven to Virginia from safely-Republican Tennessee were shocked at the disorganization they encountered.

While the Romney campaign waited for Orca to function as planned, the Obama campaign had placed signs outside every one of the city's thirty-three polling places, and was fully staffed with two volunteers outside each polling place, and a strike list volunteer inside, all day long from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. The best that the short-handed Tennessee volunteers could manage was 40% coverage of polling places; the local GOP, they said, had relied entirely on the campaign's centralized Orca system in Boston to turn out the local vote.

Ekdahl concludes his account by hoping that the failures of Orca did not cost Romney the election:


We lost by fairly small margins in Florida, Virginia, Ohio and Colorado. If this had worked could it have closed the gap? I sure hope not for my sanity's sake.

In fact, Orca diverted scarce resources that would have been better used physically moving voters to polling places. By a rough calculation, Romney lost the election by falling 500,000 to 700,000 votes short in key swing states. If each of the 37,000 volunteers that had been devoted to Orca had instead brought 20 voters to the polls in those states over the course of the day, Romney would have won the election.

Before the election, there was much fear-mongering on the Democratic side about the Republicans’ supposed plans to suppress turnout among Obama voters. After the election, GOP strategist Karl Rove accused the Obama campaign of “suppressing the vote” by running a negative campaign against Romney that kept voters at home.

The truth is much worse. There was, in fact, massive suppression of the Republican vote--by the Romney campaign, through the diversion of nearly 40,000 volunteers to a failing computer program.

There was no Plan B; there was only confusion, and silence.

lol, as in pretend everything is OK, within their own camp?
 
What this all means is, the GOP managed to suppress their own vote.
 
What this all means is, the GOP managed to suppress their own vote.

LOL, it certainly does seem that way.

I'm still shocked at the incompetent approach to it. From lack of testing something of that scope (over 30,000 end users) to not have beta (some sort of UAT) and stress testing and they sent them training manuals the night before is staggering.

How could they think it would be successful?
 
Back
Top