HeavyStick
Anti-M 0derator
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2002
- Posts
- 47,301
In today's day and age, society is demanding information at their fingertips.
The more open the society the faster we want it and we want it unfiltered.
When 9/11 happened it was a finger pointing game of who was to blame.
Draw your own conclusions.
Here are some of the intellgience failures that were disclosed today in a PUBLIC hearing from Congress to America.
1. Air Security: In a report to Congress in December 2000, the FBI and Federal Aviation Administration assessed the prospects of a terrorist incident targeting domestic civil aviation in the United States as relatively low.
2. Planes as Weapons: Beginning in 1994 and continuing through August 2001, U.S. intelligence was aware that international terrorists “had seriously considered the use of airplanes as a means of carrying out terrorist attacks.” Intelligence agencies learned of at least a dozen separate plots to use aircraft as weapons prior to Sept. 11, including a purported bin Laden-led plot in the fall of 1998 to target the New York and Washington areas. Despite this, there was little, if any, analysis of terrorists using aircraft as weapons.
3. U.S. Terror Cells: Intelligence obtained in October 1998 indicated that al-Qaida was trying to establish an operative terror cell in the United States and might be attempting to recruit Islamic U.S. citizens and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle East and North Africa.
4. Osama Bin Laden: In recognition of the growing threat posed by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network, CIA Director George Tenet, in a December 1998 memorandum distributed to his deputies, in effect “declared war” on the Saudi exile. But despite Tenet’s declaration that “no resources or people (be) spared,” investigators said there was no significant shift of resources or personnel to counterterrorism, and members of both the CIA and FBI units charged with assessing and disrupting al-Qaida reported being “seriously overwhelmed by the volume of information and workload” prior to Sept. 11.
5. Sept. 11 Planner: Information obtained since Sept. 11 “suggests that a particular al-Qaida leader may have been instrumental in the attacks.” U.S. intelligence experts have known about the individual since 1995, but “did not recognize his growing importance to al-Qaida … and did not anticipate his involvement in a terrorist attack of Sept. 11’s magnitude.” The individual is not identified in the report because the CIA declined to declassify material referring to him.
6. Warning Signs: Analysts had “general indications” during the spring and summer of 2001 that a possible terrorist attack against the United States or U.S. interests overseas was being planned, and internal warnings were circulated in the government. In a July 2001 briefing for senior administration officials, intelligence officials said that bin Laden was planning to launch a “spectacular (attack) … designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests” in the coming weeks. But no information has been uncovered that specifically indicated that attacks were planned on Sept. 11 or identified the targets to be hit.
7. Fragmentation: There were large blocks of information suggesting that terrorist attacks were in the offing, but the pieces of information were not effectively shared by the 14 agencies and military branches that make up the U.S. intelligence community and therefore could not be assembled into a greater whole that could have led to prevention of the Sept. 11 attacks.
Overall in my opinion I believe the fault to be too much intelligence gathered by too many agencies with no central coordination or analyzation.
Your thoughts?
The more open the society the faster we want it and we want it unfiltered.
When 9/11 happened it was a finger pointing game of who was to blame.
Draw your own conclusions.
Here are some of the intellgience failures that were disclosed today in a PUBLIC hearing from Congress to America.
1. Air Security: In a report to Congress in December 2000, the FBI and Federal Aviation Administration assessed the prospects of a terrorist incident targeting domestic civil aviation in the United States as relatively low.
2. Planes as Weapons: Beginning in 1994 and continuing through August 2001, U.S. intelligence was aware that international terrorists “had seriously considered the use of airplanes as a means of carrying out terrorist attacks.” Intelligence agencies learned of at least a dozen separate plots to use aircraft as weapons prior to Sept. 11, including a purported bin Laden-led plot in the fall of 1998 to target the New York and Washington areas. Despite this, there was little, if any, analysis of terrorists using aircraft as weapons.
3. U.S. Terror Cells: Intelligence obtained in October 1998 indicated that al-Qaida was trying to establish an operative terror cell in the United States and might be attempting to recruit Islamic U.S. citizens and U.S.-based expatriates from the Middle East and North Africa.
4. Osama Bin Laden: In recognition of the growing threat posed by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network, CIA Director George Tenet, in a December 1998 memorandum distributed to his deputies, in effect “declared war” on the Saudi exile. But despite Tenet’s declaration that “no resources or people (be) spared,” investigators said there was no significant shift of resources or personnel to counterterrorism, and members of both the CIA and FBI units charged with assessing and disrupting al-Qaida reported being “seriously overwhelmed by the volume of information and workload” prior to Sept. 11.
5. Sept. 11 Planner: Information obtained since Sept. 11 “suggests that a particular al-Qaida leader may have been instrumental in the attacks.” U.S. intelligence experts have known about the individual since 1995, but “did not recognize his growing importance to al-Qaida … and did not anticipate his involvement in a terrorist attack of Sept. 11’s magnitude.” The individual is not identified in the report because the CIA declined to declassify material referring to him.
6. Warning Signs: Analysts had “general indications” during the spring and summer of 2001 that a possible terrorist attack against the United States or U.S. interests overseas was being planned, and internal warnings were circulated in the government. In a July 2001 briefing for senior administration officials, intelligence officials said that bin Laden was planning to launch a “spectacular (attack) … designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests” in the coming weeks. But no information has been uncovered that specifically indicated that attacks were planned on Sept. 11 or identified the targets to be hit.
7. Fragmentation: There were large blocks of information suggesting that terrorist attacks were in the offing, but the pieces of information were not effectively shared by the 14 agencies and military branches that make up the U.S. intelligence community and therefore could not be assembled into a greater whole that could have led to prevention of the Sept. 11 attacks.
Overall in my opinion I believe the fault to be too much intelligence gathered by too many agencies with no central coordination or analyzation.
Your thoughts?
