Objective Demonstration Thread

[Roxanne Appleby]

Free will does exist. We are not billiard balls.

Response to assertions that "free will" is an illusion. This from the blog of a person I have come to respect:


Free will does exist. We are not billiard balls.

Those who doubt this are confused. The confusion arises because of an assumption about causality which leaves out a key element of reality: Things act according to their nature. Billiard balls respond in certain ways because of what they are.

Most people assume that all causality is of the "one event in time causes another" variety, or "event-event" causality. This describes a great deal of causality, but it is an error to assume that it describes all of causality.

People start their thinking by primarily considering the event, which they think will cause other events. They need to realize the essential determinant of how a thing will act is "what is the nature of the things involved?". A soap bubble has a different nature from a billiard ball. If it is hit by a billiard ball, it will act differently. A plant will get run over by a car, an animal will probably jump out of the way, and a human will do whatever he chooses to. Those are their respective natures.

We learn about types of causality from observing reality: some things only react, and some things initiate action. We experience this all the time. There is no paradox there, it's just the way the world is.

It would be a mistake to assume otherwise, to assume that all actions are caused by a previous event, i.e., that all things only react, and that all causality is action, or event-event causality. Your chair is supporting you – that is an instance of causality, and it is not an action, or an instance of event-event causality.

Actions are caused by the nature of the entities involved. Period. If someone wanted to assert that there is only "event-event" causation, which is contrary to our experience, they would need to present an argument for that. The burden of proof is on them.

This discussion belongs to the realm of metaphysics, one of the two fundamental branches of philosophy. Epistemology is the other. The point we have just reached in metaphysics is analogous to this point in epistemology:

"You say there is a god? Interesting. What is your evidence? I am very interested in seeing it. Of course, if you expect me to believe it you will have to make an argument and present evidence - the burden of proof is on you. If you think the burden is on me to prove the negative (that there is no god), you have made an error in logic, and we can not advance the discussion of god-ness until you have acknowledged that error and corrected it. (Which of course you cannot do and still believe in god, so this conversation is over.)

The analogy of a “there is free will” discussion to a “evidence for god” discussion is not exact, because it is those who assert free will’s existence who are asserting a positive, and therefore the ball starts in their court. But, unlike the god-people, they quickly can cite their evidence - experience. Free will is a fact that is directly experienced, even if it is possible to misconceive it by adding a bunch of pseudo-scientific junk (nobody thinks they do not have free will until they have heard arguments that they do not!)

At this point the burden of proof shifts to the determinists: "Do you say it is an illusion? Do you say it is impossible? Do you say that only event-event causation works, and therefore the human mind works that way? How are you going to back that up?" This is where the analogy to the god thing is correct. The burden is on them, and if they are unwilling to pick it up, or insist the burden is on you, the conversation is over.

If it is not quite over, or they don’t believe you when you say it is, here is a bit more:

"You say there is no free will? Interesting. That is contrary to my experience (and yours). So if you expect me to believe it you will have to make an argument and present contrary evidence - the burden of proof is on you.

“Be warned, we have shown that event-event causality is not the only kind. If you think the mind must be deterministic because event-event is the only ‘scientific way of examining nature,’ or some other pseudo-scientific junk, you will come smack-up against our experience that this is not the only kind of causality. So why do you assume that it is? There is no evidence for that.

“Causality is about how things act, not about actions, and therefore to explain anything causally, the only way to go is to pay attention to the thing’s nature. Do not doubt your instruments (direct experience, perception) unless you have reason to. If you ask me to doubt my instruments, let’s hear your arguments. Once again, the burden is on you, pal. The wrong conception of causality says that free will is impossible. The right one implies no such impossibility.”

 

[rgraham666]

'Scarcity' is only an issue because our mindset and current use of technology make it so.

Our thinking on this is mostly linear, like the production lines we use to produce the goods we consume. It starts 'here' and ends 'there'.

But many resources are recyclable and reusable. We could easily make use of these resources if we wished.

There's also a question of psychology involved. I often have trouble feeding myself. So when I look at the very wealthy, it's with rather a bit of puzzlement. These people often have far more than they can use or consume in a lifetime. My thought is that their excessive lifestyles have more to do with ego than actual want or need.

But that's just my perspective.

 

[Roxanne Appleby]

'Scarcity' is only an issue because our mindset and current use of technology make it so.

Our thinking on this is mostly linear, like the production lines we use to produce the goods we consume. It starts 'here' and ends 'there'.

But many resources are recyclable and reusable. We could easily make use of these resources if we wished.

There's also a question of psychology involved. I often have trouble feeding myself. So when I look at the very wealthy, it's with rather a bit of puzzlement. These people often have far more than they can use or consume in a lifetime. My thought is that their excessive lifestyles have more to do with ego than actual want or need.

But that's just my perspective.

You must have missed the gloss on that point: "The ultimate scarce resource is time - every person has a finite amount of it before they die."

Like I said - existential reality.



Edited to add: With regard to material resources, I grasp the sense of what you are saying, and to certain extent agree with you. But even there you quickly come up against limits. For example, health care: The demand is virtually unlimited. The supply always will fall short - there is only so much of any society's GDP that can go toward this. Double that amount, quadruple it - demand will still exceed supply.

 

[Roxanne Appleby]

Originally Posted by Roxanne Appleby: PS. Shang, I think your tongue was in cheek when you said that last bit. People aren't always noble, but neither are they always savage.

I'm not a thorough cynic, but honestly, I'm only partly joking there. That people are not always savage is a joyful reality of life that I gladly embrace. That it's not difficult to find quite a few people who are savage is an ugly reality that I must nonetheless accept. In my heart of hearts, I honestly believe that if we allowed people to seperate themselves into like-minded groups and live as they wished, there would be some Manson families, Nazi cells, buccaneers and slave-traders amongst them. History, from my point of view, tells us that when people have the power to do as they wish, some of them - not just individuals but larger groups - will choose to do evil.

In fact, I think that's an inevitable result of the very three realities you mention. All people are different - and some prefer violence more than others. Scarcity is ultimately an issue, and self-interest dictates getting as much for as little as possible. Inevitably, some humans will solve that equation in a short-term and violent fashion.

Shanglan

But Shang, if that was true, wouldn't we already live in the Hobbesian war of all against all? The fact that we do not exist in a world that looks like some uber-violent post-apocalypse nightmare futurist movie suggests at very least that your analysis is incomplete.

 

[BlackShanglan]

i tend to agree that there are no natural rights. my piece was intended to indicate that if i had to concede any, they would be those recognized by Hobbes. and as you say, they are definitely peculiar as rights, e.g. the right to take whatever i want for my own benefit. according to a modern conception, if person A asserts a moral right, this is not such as would endanger his life when another person B, asserts the same right.

Yes, I think that's where quite a lot of discussions of rights get bogged down, and I think it's part of why, like you, I don't really see "rights" as natural things. There are hardly any conceptions of rights (in fact I can only think of the right to think as one wishes) that can exist as unabrogated, absolute rights if one is to come into contact with other individuals who have rights. Inevitably they conflict, and if the resolution is to be anything but "the strongest individual wins" (which seems to me to knock out the "rights" of the weaker), some sort of reasoned judgement must be made. The application of reason to the problem seems to me automatically to restrict the idea of rights to human social convention rather than a naturally occuring thing.

it follows then, that any 'right to life' is a social product. (iow, a part of all social compacts is some sort of prohibition against arbitrary or indiscriminate murder.) but here is where it gets sticky: almost every society has been *less* than universal in bestowing this right*of life. (iow, it has created loopholes in its murder prohibition.) in the initial example of this thread, many human societies have not fully recognized a 'right to life' of the newly born, including some of those that the 'rights' people say they admire, e.g., ancient Greece and Rome. likewise a 'right to life' of a slave or a child is commonly quite circumscribed in the case of disobedience [see the death penalty prescribed in the OT, for example].

I agree with you. I think, really, that any "right" can exist as only one of two things: a socially determined standard created by humans, or a divinely decreed absolute. The latter I think possible to exist, but at the moment impossible to prove to anyone, which leaves us with the former and with various people's guesses at the latter.

As for the tendency to restrict rights to life, there the Marxist in me wakes up and starts dragging Roxanne's three existential principles in to play - or more particularly, the self interest principle. If we look historically at the persons whose right to life - or to liberty or other very commonly granted rights - have commonly been restricted, I'd argue that we'd nearly always find two things at the bottom of it: it's comparatively easy to take that right from that individual, and it's to someone's practical advantage to do so. When another person is in a position of radically less power - is an infant, is a member of a technologically weaker culture, is a member of a despised minority group - it's both practically easier to remove that person's rights and intellectually easier to invent a justification. That justification seems to me generally to be along the lines of "this person is not a person in the same way that I am," and it works equally well using a number of reasons for that assumption - gender, race, religion, mental capacity, etc. Ultimately, when one of two people must make a sacrifice, cultural mores have a way of ensuring that it's usually the physically, economically, politically, and/or socially weaker of the two.

PS. If the singer as great an offender against Nature as the sodomist, what a moral monster is the singing sodomist!

Especially when engaging in both at once. Torches and pitchforks!

Shanglan

 

[Pure]

yes, a vast area of agreement

Pure: //it follows then, that any 'right to life' is a social product. (iow, a part of all social compacts is some sort of prohibition against arbitrary or indiscriminate murder.) but here is where it gets sticky: almost every society has been *less* than universal in bestowing this right*of life. (iow, it has created loopholes in its murder prohibition.) in the initial example of this thread, many human societies have not fully recognized a 'right to life' of the newly born, including some of those that the 'rights' people say they admire, e.g., ancient Greece and Rome. likewise a 'right to life' of a slave or a child is commonly quite circumscribed in the case of disobedience [see the death penalty prescribed in the OT, for example]. //


Black: I agree with you. I think, really, that any "right" can exist as only one of two things: a socially determined standard created by humans, or a divinely decreed absolute. The latter I think possible to exist, but at the moment impossible to prove to anyone, which leaves us with the former and with various people's guesses at the latter.

As for the tendency to restrict rights to life, there the Marxist in me wakes up and starts dragging Roxanne's three existential principles in to play - or more particularly, the self interest principle. If we look historically at the persons whose right to life - or to liberty or other very commonly granted rights - have commonly been restricted, I'd argue that we'd nearly always find two things at the bottom of it: it's comparatively easy to take that right from that individual, and it's to someone's practical advantage to do so. When another person is in a position of radically less power - is an infant, is a member of a technologically weaker culture, is a member of a despised minority group - it's both practically easier to remove that person's rights and intellectually easier to invent a justification. That justification seems to me generally to be along the lines of "this person is not a person in the same way that I am," and it works equally well using a number of reasons for that assumption - gender, race, religion, mental capacity, etc. Ultimately, when one of two people must make a sacrifice, cultural mores have a way of ensuring that it's usually the physically, economically, politically, and/or socially weaker of the two.

being likewise of marxist training, i think you're right as to the explanation of why some folks 'right to life' or 'right to property', etc have been contrained. to use an old approach, we ask "who benefits?" (cui bono). marxists have no trouble with the concept of "interests" or "self interest", since the self interest of the rich help explain, for instance why income from owned stocks is treated differently from the income from digging ditches.

there is debate on the metaphysical claim about 'self interest' as an immutable principle; rather the point of view of human sciences is to recognize that the *shape* and *character* and *extent/predominance* of self interest, as people understand it, is socially conditioned.

it might be noted that the Randians have a little twist here which I was not aware of for a long time. they do not affirm 'self interest' in the sense of Adam Smith or in the sense that Hobbes clearly recognized--getting what I want for my benefit. they affirm 'rational self interest,' as inhering in all of us rational (human) beings. this 'rational self interest' operates in an essentially Kantian manner. they hold it contrary to 'reason' to assert MY interest to the grave detriment of yours. IOW, reason and rationality dictate equal treatment of others.

this differs subtly from the position you give:

When another person is in a position of radically less power - is an infant, is a member of a technologically weaker culture, is a member of a despised minority group - it's both practically easier to remove that person's rights and intellectually easier to invent a justification. That justification seems to me generally to be along the lines of "this person is not a person in the same way that I am," and it works equally well using a number of reasons for that assumption - gender, race, religion, mental capacity, etc.

essentially you're saying that justifications are invented to justify my interest as a white person taking precedence of Joe Black's interest as a Black person, while saying he's not as motivated, or whatever.

your objection, i believe, here, is largely empirical. there is no good evidence that Black people, our example, are innately less motivated to (let say) material success; all the motivational evidence regards the actuall motivation in a given social setting, given the histories of the various groups.

and there is a derivative moral princinple, "it's morally wrong to treat members of any group as inferior, in the absence of good evidence as to such alleged inferiority and in the presence of good evidence that they feel, in many ways, as we do." further there is no reasons for thinking the various ideological projects will succeed. historically we know that previous attempts at find 'evidence' have turned out to be laughable.

now here is the crux, as i see it. the objective moralists of the group we're discussing--Aristotle, the Pope, Rand--hold that rationality is key; this is the stoic conception of rational conformity to (rational) Nature.

they hold that it's *contrary to reason* to do such things to others, e.g. those in alleged inferior groups, AND those in my own group whose interests differ.

IOW, taking the latter case, Rand held that it's *irrational* (an offense against my nature) for me to take advantage of you; steal your goods whether by stealth or fraudulent transaction. The *immorality* flows from that. (Because it's irrational, that can be demonstrated to any rational being.)

following Hobbes, here, i don't think that the above action or generally the actions of those in a 'state of nature' are irrational, for instance, those of blatant, narrowly defined self interest. i think the results of 'police strikes' in the big cities give a clue as to 'state of nature' (looting etc.)

of course the setting up of the Sovereign through a social compact is rational, in a sense--forward looking individuals see its advantages, esp. as did Hobbes, in the midst of a civile war. And it will, *thenceforth* be rational for subjects NOT to break the murder law. but that is a quite different set of claims than that the looter, per se, is irrational (i.e. my looting your house for your silveware is alleged to be 'irrational', by Rand).

probably i can't make things any clearer by continuing. so perhaps you'll get the drift, and see these points about how 'objective morality,' that conforming to human nature, links itself to concepts of rationality. the 'objective moralist', of course is right about many of his conclusions--say about murder, as opposed to singing sodomy. but he is not right, i say, in his reasoning: which leads him to maintain that the action being judged is an offense to rationality. such reasoning only goes so far, i say, and the conclusion is actually and mainly supported by our decision to give to decent respect for the feelings of others and, lacking that, for the law.

 

[Pure]

partial reply to roxanne.

i affirmed 'choice' as a presumption we make in moral reasoning.

you've trotted out a representation of my position, and a stock rebuttal (alleged) by an anomymous blogger, whose identity you feel you must protect. (he has a blog, how private does he want his thoughts to be?!)

on the face of it, there is no obvious connection of 'free will' and 'objective morality,' though we DO FIND the frequent combination, e.g., in Aquinas, the Pope, and Rand.
i will say that *even if there is 'free will', a unique blessing to mankind, as is Reason, this does not, so far as I know, help the objective moralist establish any of his positions; e.g. on infanticide; maybe ami or roxanne can show us.


your blogger's screed takes a facile and well known line that's dissected in many a first-year philsophy course. essentially he says that something's true because that's his experience.

Roxannes' authority: The analogy of a “there is free will” discussion to a “evidence for god” discussion is not exact, because it is those who assert free will’s existence who are asserting a positive, and therefore the ball starts in their court. But, unlike the god-people, they quickly can cite their evidence - experience. Free will is a fact that is directly experienced, even if it is possible to misconceive it by adding a bunch of pseudo-scientific junk (nobody thinks they do not have free will until they have heard arguments that they do not!)

At this point the burden of proof shifts to the determinists: "Do you say it is an illusion? Do you say it is impossible? Do you say that only event-event causation works, and therefore the human mind works that way? How are you going to back that up?" This is where the analogy to the god thing is correct. The burden is on them, and if they are unwilling to pick it up, or insist the burden is on you, the conversation is over

P: Your arguer has entirely shot himself in the foot, or maybe the head, in drawing a parallel with the 'existence of God' claim. S/he fatally errs in
saying

But, unlike the god-people, they [free will proponents] quickly can cite their evidence - experience.

P: If he or she had ever read James "Varieties of Religious Experience," or any quaker or evangelical literature he would know that the appeal to 'experience of God' is perhaps the most common, and sometimes convincing way of support the claim of God's existence. it's found in every 101 textbook.

P: So the move

RA's authority At this point the burden of proof shifts to the determinists: "Do you say it is an illusion? Do you say it is impossible? Do you say that only event-event causation works, and therefore the human mind works that way? How are you going to back that up?"

P: is clever, but largely mistaken. The 'free will' person arguing for a special kind of causality remains in parallel to the one asserting God exists, and retains the burden of proof.

In fact, of course, there are positive arguments for including human choices in the natural world, not floating above in some 'moral sphere.' Assuming causation is an axiom of science; it's done in phsyics, biology and the study of human behavior. It cannot be proven, but it gradually overpowers all contrasting positions. In the history of science, all attempts to privilege certain phenomena--e.g. transmundane or heavenly ones-- have failed.

So there is no reason to privilege human choices, and exclude them from scientific accounts of psychology. This is the assumption of any number of psychologists; Freud being a prime example. Scientists on human-related topics--and psychotherapists-- have succeeded in their endeavors based on the assumption that human choices are parts of patterned behavior --causal chains and networks.

 

[BlackShanglan]

But Shang, if that was true, wouldn't we already live in the Hobbesian war of all against all? The fact that we do not exist in a world that looks like some uber-violent post-apocalypse nightmare futurist movie suggests at very least that your analysis is incomplete.

Our society does not fulfill the circumstance I suggested above - one in which we freely allow people to split into self-governed groups following any ideology or organizational structure they like. Instead, those of us living in the more settled states of the world are born into societies in which people are not free to set up any sort of state they want or to opt out of the control of their central government. In places where people are - in, for example, parts of the world in which the destruction or gross corruption of the central government has left a power vacuum leaving people essentially free to organize themselves as they like - life tends to look quite a lot like a post-apocalyptic nightmare.

Shanglan

 

[BlackShanglan]

there is debate on the metaphysical claim about 'self interest' as an immutable principle; rather the point of view of human sciences is to recognize that the *shape* and *character* and *extent/predominance* of self interest, as people understand it, is socially conditioned.

it might be noted that the Randians have a little twist here which I was not aware of for a long time. they do not affirm 'self interest' in the sense of Adam Smith or in the sense that Hobbes clearly recognized--getting what I want for my benefit. they affirm 'rational self interest,' as inhering in all of us rational (human) beings. this 'rational self interest' operates in an essentially Kantian manner. they hold it contrary to 'reason' to assert MY interest to the grave detriment of yours. IOW, reason and rationality dictate equal treatment of others.

I'm familiar with those principles of enlightened self-interest moving beyond the short-term immediate consequences of an action, and as far as they go I think them good. I believe the chief problem is that while humans can perceive self-interest in either fashion (narrow short-term or broad long-term) or in a variety of intermediary positions, they cannot reliably be counted upon to reference any specific framework for any specific decision. That is, there are some humans who will choose the very narrow short-term gain of mugging someone, others who will choose the very broad long-term gain of taking a vow of poverty and charity, and thousands of other mid-way positions, and it's impossible to predict who will choose which option on any given day or trial.

To that extent, I very much recognize this -

... the *shape* and *character* and *extent/predominance* of self interest, as people understand it, is socially conditioned ...

- as a key addition to Ronxanne's comments on self-interest, although I don't think she'd deny it. That is, I read her comments on the existential realities as meaning that self-interest is always a force to be reckoned with and will eventually be expressed in some fashion, but that it doesn't have to be as narrow short-term self interest. Indeed, I would add that much of what makes it so difficult to work with self interest is its ... mutable immutability, if you like. It will nearly always be there somewhere, but where, how, and in what expression is very difficult to predict.

probably i can't make things any clearer by continuing. so perhaps you'll get the drift, and see these points about how 'objective morality,' that conforming to human nature, links itself to concepts of rationality. the 'objective moralist', of course is right about many of his conclusions--say about murder, as opposed to singing sodomy. but he is not right, i say, in his reasoning: which leads him to maintain that the action being judged is an offense to rationality. such reasoning only goes so far, i say, and the conclusion is actually and mainly supported by our decision to give to decent respect for the feelings of others and, lacking that, for the law.

I do understand you, and I think I come to roughly the same conclusions. That is, I agree with much of what they think moral and immoral, but I cannot agree that it's purely objective reason and observation that have gotten them there. I chose singing and sodomy as my examples not only because of the lovely alliteration, but because they seem to me to show that when purely consistent logic says one thing and our gut instincts and desire to enjoy harmless pleasures says another, we tend really to listen to the latter. I have no difficulty with the conclusion that singing (and sodomy) is perfectly harmless in the moral sense; I only object to someone claiming that the conclusion is the result of rigorous logic and purely objective analysis, when in fact I think it cannot consistenty be shown to be so.

To be fair, I think the same thing of Aquinas and Descartes. It frustrates me when people attempt to prove matters of faith, for they inevitably seem to me to do so in ways that do justice neither to logic nor to faith, being a broken-backed amalgamation of incongruent principles. But then, I think that's just me.

Shanglan

 

[Pure]

one small quibble about an otherwise admirable post.

[P] //they [Randians] affirm 'rational self interest,' as inhering in all of us rational (human) beings. this 'rational self interest' operates in an essentially Kantian manner. they hold it contrary to 'reason' to assert MY interest to the grave detriment of yours. IOW, reason and rationality dictate equal treatment of others. //

BS I'm familiar with those principles of enlightened self-interest moving beyond the short-term immediate consequences of an action, and as far as they go I think them good.

===
I'm ready to be corrected, should any Randian post documents to the contrary, but 'rational self interest' is not the same as 'enlightened, long range self interest.' Here is the difference as I understand it. If you, my neighbor, are weak, including social connections, and friendless, without brothers and sisters or kids to avenge, and haven't long to live, I [hypothetical "I"]can help myself to your silverware, said to be worth thousands. My interest is informed; I know your state. Society, for reasons you've said, will take no interest in your feeble complaints. In the longrun you will be forgotten and I'll have 'my' silverware.

"I" (hypothetical) have no problem seeing that many cases of grabbing goods, like buglarizing Hillary C or Mayor Guiliani, or even the most respected and beloved elderly member of the local Catholic church. Because of the 'many cases', "I" indeed favor a law against burglary, 'on the books,' though of course enforced with some discretion and finesse and a view to the local papers.

===
Now, Rand says I'm both irrational and immoral in grabbing your stuff. Here she agrees with Kant. It's not just that widespread stealing is a pain in everyone's ass, it's that I'm failing to treat you--however weak-- as a rational being like myself, failing in the test "never as a means only, but always as an end" (a phrase endorse by Rand).

If I may hazard a very rough parallel: consider a small lie which will never be detected--that I LOVE the gaudy diamond broach my wife picked up at the antique show. it will have good effects and no ill ones, we hypothesize. the good effects are her feeling good about spending $500. since i never lie about anything significant, and won't, there are no ill effects. and in fact we may hypothesize that the broach is lost after a week and so the subject never comes up again.

Well, your objective moralist, Kant or Rand is going to say to me--surprise--"A lie's a lie. It violates rationality for you, in several respects, but one respect is in not treating the other as a rational being." For i can't rationally say i want others to do this generally, including to me; 'white lies' is not a possble universal and rational policy, because it insulates people against reality, and morals are based in truth.

==
One sees that this is a system, which has and economical number of principles; it makes do with few, iow. You, Shanglan, have to bring in other principles to account for deviations from self interest, e.g. that it's good for everyone to be a bit 'socially minded,' that we have duties to 'weak' others, not merely to avoid exploiting but to assist in some manner (possibly through social agencies, if not directly).
==

Rand labels such as 'sacrifice,' which she had made dirty word in their lexicon. It is never rational for a rationally selfish being to compromise[abate] assertion of his 'rational interests,' to accept less for himself than he can get "in the open market."

===
PS, if you've ever read Sartre's "Existentialism is a Humanism" lecture, he made similar arguments to 'objectivists' in his defense of existentialism agains the charge of excessive self absorption.

 

[CharleyH]

This thread is for objective demonstrations in the area of morality.

I must ask first before answering - what is morality? No one else did and it's certainly a good start for a definition.

If you can't answer that - then you have no argument with a big scope. You ask about objectivity. Define "OBJECTIVE" in your rules.

 

[Roxanne Appleby]

Our society does not fulfill the circumstance I suggested above - one in which we freely allow people to split into self-governed groups following any ideology or organizational structure they like. Instead, those of us living in the more settled states of the world are born into societies in which people are not free to set up any sort of state they want or to opt out of the control of their central government. In places where people are - in, for example, parts of the world in which the destruction or gross corruption of the central government has left a power vacuum leaving people essentially free to organize themselves as they like - life tends to look quite a lot like a post-apocalyptic nightmare.

Shanglan

Alright, but where did "our society" come from, by which I actually mean the U.S., but it could include all liberal democracies, and some other systems as well. The U.S. is a better for my purpose, though, which is to say that "we" made "our society." In other words, people tend to organize in certain ways that do not look like "post apocalyptic sci-fi," and that is a fact that your analysis must incorporate. I'm not trying to be cute, but just point out a possible gap.

 

[CharleyH]

Alright, but where did "our society" come from, by which I actually mean the U.S., but it could include all liberal democracies, and some other systems as well. The U.S. is a better for my purpose, though, which is to say that "we" made "our society." In other words, people tend to organize in certain ways that do not look like "post apocalyptic sci-fi," and that is a fact that your analysis must incorporate. I'm not trying to be cute, but just point out a possible gap.

How democratic do you feel right now, as an American?

 

[BlackShanglan]

Alright, but where did "our society" come from, by which I actually mean the U.S., but it could include all liberal democracies, and some other systems as well. The U.S. is a better for my purpose, though, which is to say that "we" made "our society." In other words, people tend to organize in certain ways that do not look like "post apocalyptic sci-fi," and that is a fact that your analysis must incorporate. I'm not trying to be cute, but just point out a possible gap.

The social structures we have now arose from a series of structures previous to them, each of which for quite some time back had very limited opportunities for people to create individually run or aligned states. Before democracy, a united kingdom; before a united kingdom, a collection of smaller kingdoms; before kingdoms, tribes with tribal rulers - and there things are already beginning to look quite a lot like a post-apocalytic scenario, because the tribes spent a good deal of time attacking each other and stealing any portable goods.

The United States as a political and social entity did not arise out of nothing. It had the governing structures of England in place to begin with, and then developed its own. There was no period at which the government dissolved itself entirely and allowed citizens to band together in scores of individual countries or entities with radically differing governmental structures and ideologies. Even when the states were operating as individual colonies, they preserved an essentially English system of government - and to the extent that they didn't, as in some of the colonies in what is now Surinam, one might well argue that they descended into barbarism.

Part of the reason we haven't seen many times in human history in which people did attempt an "everyone make up your own political system" movement is almost certainly technological/ecnomic; for most of human history, people have needed the help of other humans to survive, and they had very limited ability to communicate with or move to distant locations. Under those sorts of circumstances, you end up with roughly what we had: first small tribes with few options other than "obey or become the leader," then increasingly more complex political structures with a sense of unity over broader areas, which became the new factor preventing a free-for-all of individual societies.

The larger social units tend to be dominated by people who don't want a post-apocalyptic free-for-all, because for most people it's not a good state of affairs. If, however, you remove the centrally organizing and controlling government that keeps everyone under the same laws and rules and instead let all of the violent and unpleasant people arm themselves and make their own state, you get roughly the state of affairs we see now in quite a lot of Africa - heavily armed warbands preying upon the groups attempting to live peacefully. It's not clear to me, really, how any group operating under those three existential rules you cited could possibly resolve the situation otherwise; the self-interest and scarcity are going to at least suggest the possibility of stealing from others, and the human mutability will mean that some people decide that's a good idea. Without a force preventing those actions, what else could be expected to happen?

Shanglan

 

[BlackShanglan]

Pure -

Hmmm. I think I'm still not seeing a clear distinction between the Randian position as you describe it and that of enlightened long-term self interest. Assuming that it's moral to treat other rational creatures as we would ourselves wish to be treated seems to me simply a rephrasing of "do unto others." I can't see any rational/objective support for that other than long-term self-interest, i.e., I would like to be treated that way, so I support a society in which people are treated/behave that way. Am I missing a link?

Shanglan

 

[CharleyH]

The social structures we have now arose from a series of structures previous to them, each of which for quite some time back had very limited opportunities for people to create individually run or aligned states. Before democracy, a united kingdom; before a united kingdom, a collection of smaller kingdoms; before kingdoms, tribes with tribal rulers - and there things are already beginning to look quite a lot like a post-apocalytic scenario, because the tribes spent a good deal of time attacking each other and stealing any portable goods.

The United States as a political and social entity did not arise out of nothing. It had the governing structures of England in place to begin with, and then developed its own. There was no period at which the government dissolved itself entirely and allowed citizens to band together in scores of individual countries or entities with radically differing governmental structures and ideologies. Even when the states were operating as individual colonies, they preserved an essentially English system of government - and to the extent that they didn't, as in some of the colonies in what is now Surinam, one might well argue that they descended into barbarism.

Part of the reason we haven't seen many times in human history in which people did attempt an "everyone make up your own political system" movement is almost certainly technological/ecnomic; for most of human history, people have needed the help of other humans to survive, and they had very limited ability to communicate with or move to distant locations. Under those sorts of circumstances, you end up with roughly what we had: first small tribes with few options other than "obey or become the leader," then increasingly more complex political structures with a sense of unity over broader areas, which became the new factor preventing a free-for-all of individual societies.

The larger social units tend to be dominated by people who don't want a post-apocalyptic free-for-all, because for most people it's not a good state of affairs. If, however, you remove the centrally organizing and controlling government that keeps everyone under the same laws and rules and instead let all of the violent and unpleasant people arm themselves and make their own state, you get roughly the state of affairs we see now in quite a lot of Africa - heavily armed warbands preying upon the groups attempting to live peacefully. It's not clear to me, really, how any group operating under those three existential rules you cited could possibly resolve the situation otherwise; the self-interest and scarcity are going to at least suggest the possibility of stealing from others, and the human mutability will mean that some people decide that's a good idea. Without a force preventing those actions, what else could be expected to happen?

Shanglan

Hm. Hm.

 

[Pure]

Hi Charley,

As to your question to define morality and objective.

We're not speaking Chinese, here, and i defined 'objective' in my first post, off the top of my head. However, if you want more, the Merriam Webster dictionary online gives the following.

Morality:
2 a : a doctrine or system of moral conduct
b plural : particular moral principles or rules of conduct

[not too informative, but depending on what 'moral' means]
====

moral
1 a : of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior : ETHICAL <moral judgments>

b : expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior <a moral poem>
c : conforming to a standard of right behavior

===

objective
1 a : relating to or existing as an object of thought without consideration of independent existence -- used chiefly in medieval philosophy

b : of, relating to, or being an object , phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind <objective reality> <our reveries...are significantly and repeatedly shaped by our transactions with the objective world -- Marvin Reznikoff> --

more simply, an 'objective statement,' is one where suitable evidence and reasoning--acceptable to all informed and rational persons--can establish it with high probability (if not certainty). the example 'objective statements' are, for example, those found in science books, as opposed, say, to Sunday Sermons, or Rush Limbaugh speeches.

 

[Oblimo]

Hmmm. I think I'm still not seeing a clear distinction between the Randian position as you describe it and that of enlightened long-term self interest. Assuming that it's moral to treat other rational creatures as we would ourselves wish to be treated seems to me simply a rephrasing of "do unto others." I can't see any rational/objective support for that other than long-term self-interest, i.e., I would like to be treated that way, so I support a society in which people are treated/behave that way. Am I missing a link?

Positive law (and morals) rather than negative law (and morals), for one thing.

In the Randian formulation of enlightened-self interest, you don't go around shooting people because you don't want to get shot yourself, so you assign the police the power to stop people, including yourself, from shooting other people.

Enlightened-self interest as formulated by Mill, however, also upholds positive law and morality in the form of welfare and charity, for example. It is in your self-interest to invest in social programs because you never know when you might need them some day.

There'a also the famous Veil of Ignorance hypothetical, wherein everyone is given amnesia, given no clue to their former identities, and is asked to democratically design a body of governance, with the caveat that they will be placed right back where they were before the experiment started. The argument following the hypothetical is that any rationally, self-interested agent would want to have a welfare system in place, in case that, when everything starts up again, they find themselves homeless, uneducated, and chronically ill.

 

[rgraham666]

I hadn't heard of that 'Veil of Ignorance' idea before, Ob. Brilliant!

It brings to mind one of my observations one of the ways to spot ideologues.

An ideologue always occupies an important position in the ideology they espouse. They are never concerned with the people that don't fit into their system as the consequences of not fitting in will not happen to the ideologue.

Convenient, isn't it?

 

[Pure]

ref

the 'veil of ignorance' is from John Rawls, i believe.

he is a brilliant social and political philosopher, and ethicist. he proposed a liberal state incorporating his theory of justice.

a key point was the issue of the degree of inequality permitted. here he differed from moderate right wing 'liberal' Adam Smith, but, contra the socialists argued for such inequalities as would be chosen 'behind the veil of ignorance.'

 

[Pure]

further clarifications; Rand on rationality and ethics; note to Charley

Shanglan Pure -

Hmmm. I think I'm still not seeing a clear distinction between the Randian position as you describe it and that of enlightened long-term self interest. Assuming that it's moral to treat other rational creatures as we would ourselves wish to be treated seems to me simply a rephrasing of "do unto others." I can't see any rational/objective support for that other than long-term self-interest, i.e., I would like to be treated that way, so I support a society in which people are treated/behave that way. Am I missing a link?

Pure: I think my silverware example addressed this point, to some extent, and I stand by those statements now, even after a bit of refreshing myself as to Rand's approach.

She makes a rather nice statement, the proper set of moral principles for man, is the requirements of his survival qua man. The last words are intended to suggest the primary virtue of rationality. Note the assertion of *principles*, i.e. rules, not judging by individual cases.

Peikoff's summary: "The ultimate value is life. The primary virtue is rationality. The proper beneficiary is oneself." (p. 206.) This last principle of (rational) egoism is said to follow from the first two basic axioms.

"Every man, according to Objectivism, should live by his own mind and for his own sake; every man should pursue the values and practice the virtues that man's life requires. Since man survives by thought and production, every man should live and work as an independent, creative being, acquiring goods and services from others only by means of trade, when both parties agree that the trade is profitable."

"People often ask if there are not conflicts of interest among men, e.g., in regard to work or romantic love--which require somebody's sacrifice. Objectivism answer that there are no conflicts of interest among *rational* men, [those] who live by production and trade, who accept the responsibility of earning any value they receive. There is a 'conflict of interest', if one wants to call it that, between a banker and a bank robber; but not among men who do not allow robbery or any equivalent into their view of their interests." (Peikoff, p. 236.)

As to objectivity, there is a nice quote from Rand:

##"The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of things in themselves, nor of man's emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value. (Rational is this context means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process or reason.) The objective theory holds that 'the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man'--and it must be discovered, not invented, by man." (What is Capitalism, p. 22; cited in Peikoff)

A food metaphor is used at one point. What's 'good for you' by way of food is an objective question. Nuts, not rocks. In parallel, what's good for your life, the set of requirements of your rational life, is similarly objective. Principles are relevant.

Returning to the food, example, obviously one doughnut doesn't kill you; but doughnuts, we know, are not proper nutrition; they harm you in the long run. So a health person follows the principle, 'Do not eat doughnuts." Similarly, morals, one goes by principles; small moral lapses are significant. (Consider the person who says, "In 95% of the times where I can steal, I don't; so I'm not a thief.")

This clearly embraces a long range view, indeed one's whole life.

So does 'enlightened self interest' capture what Rand is saying? IF YOU WERE ENLIGHTENED IN THE SAME WAY AS RAND, yes.

For instance, arguably a principle flowing from 'enlightened self interest', conceived in one way, is "Take only from the weak or from those you can overcome, where they have--and will have--no effective allies, defenders, or avengers; or where the taking can be adequately concealed indefinitely."
or "Take only minor items [whose loss isn't disastrous to the owner] in contexts--and amounts-- where they will never be missed or, if missed, no effective course of recovery or justice exists." Examples: paper and rolls of scotch tape, from the office; or newspapers from an isolated newsstand."

Is it in one's 'enlightened self interest' to "con" one or more people [defraud them, for one's financial gain], assuming either it won't be discovered or that they will have no effective recourse?

Rand and Peikoff have extended arguments that such a course of action is not rational--and hence not moral. Maybe I'll discuss them in another post. The argument is reminiscent of the Republic (book vii?) where it's argued that the unjust man (robber, killer, exploiter) does grave harm to himself.

===
Note to Charley:
The paragraph above, marked ##, is one of Rand's definitions of objectivity. Objective statements or principles are grounded in reality.

 

[Oblimo]

the 'veil of ignorance' is from John Rawls, i believe.

That's the man! (Couldn't think of the name when I wrote the post.)

he is a brilliant social and political philosopher, and ethicist. he proposed a liberal state incorporating his theory of justice. a key point was the issue of the degree of inequality permitted. here he differed from moderate right wing 'liberal' Adam Smith, but, contra the socialists argued for such inequalities as would be chosen 'behind the veil of ignorance.'

His theory of justice is "justice = fairness" (a pretty big departure from most philosophies of law, and one that makes me uncomfortable from a semantic standpoint). The big difference between Rawls and Libertarian (capital L) thinking is Rawls' "principle of difference" -- inequalities should be arranged to give the greatest benefit to the least advantaged (just in case that least advantaged person winds up being you).

Libertarians (again, capital L), of course, operate from the axiom of self-ownership -- you own yourself and what you produce -- which prioritizes autonomy over resolving inequities. That is, Libertarians still recongize that social inequities should be resolved, but believe that letting autonomy play itself out is the best way to ensure actual long term resolution of injustice.

I have never quite grokked how you can arrive at the axiom of self-ownership through objective reasoning, however, because it seems to be an irrational self-interest, almost a belief in a capitalistic divine grace ("I will come out on top.")

 

[Oblimo]

"Every man, according to Objectivism, should live by his own mind and for his own sake; every man should pursue the values and practice the virtues that man's life requires. Since man survives by thought and production, every man should live and work as an independent, creative being, acquiring goods and services from others only by means of trade, when both parties agree that the trade is profitable."

"People often ask if there are not conflicts of interest among men, e.g., in regard to work or romantic love--which require somebody's sacrifice. Objectivism answer that there are no conflicts of interest among *rational* men, [those] who live by production and trade, who accept the responsibility of earning any value they receive. There is a 'conflict of interest', if one wants to call it that, between a banker and a bank robber; but not among men who do not allow robbery or any equivalent into their view of their interests." (Peikoff, p. 236.)

What does Peikoff say about microeconomics and game theory? He seems to be skipping over the core principles of economic interaction.

 

[Pure]

Peikoff/Rand

he says that the properly understood (self) interests of rational men (persons) do not ever conflict. (the is Rand's doctrine).**

an interesting parallel claim i'd like to get your and Shang's opinion on is: The enlightened, very long-term interests of two persons never conflict. i say, in the usual sense of 'enlightened', not true.

I define 'enlightened' as having all possible relevant knowledge and making reasonable use of it; i.e. "as fully aware of circumstances and consequences as any human can be, and fully aware of the relevant moral principles, and laws." 'Aware' does NOT necessarily mean 'in compliance with.'

===
**it would be very interesting to figure out why Rand took this position, which is not found in Adam Smith or the Libertarian thinkers
afaik. NOTE that this is not the "invisible hand" of Smith; that suggests that if i and others pursue our respective (self) interests, the society as a whole benefits. IOW, a free market benefits society as a whole.

 

[Pure]

i'm indebted to Shang for this point. Rand's idea that the principles of morality are the requirements of survival as a human being (i.e. fully using the specifically human capacities), seems a bit extreme.

I.e., assuming procreation is a requirement, then we have the command 'fuck for procreation' AND presumably NOT for anything else unconnected with procreation (IOW, following the Pope, a little mooshi-mooshi on the side [with each other], by a procreating couple is fine, but that's it.)**

so what about singing. I suppose song writing is an act of creativity, and that's 'human.' Song singing? not so much, usually.
so maybe, the singer, on Rand's view should take up something serious like growing corn or making babies.

how about Gauguin. was he 'moral' in quitting his good job, and going to the south seas to paint? his family fell into dire straits, and i'd suppose leaving kids like that is NOT, on its face, conducive to human flourishing (essentially, child abandonment; or abandonment of a spouse with the kids). HOWEVER, he made great paintings, which contribute to the 'great art' of humanity, and hence its flourishing, in the broad sense.

here, besides the problem of doing what's unnecessary to survival, there is the problem of the whole and the parts, which Rand elides.
humanity as a whole benefitted, but NOT mrs. gauguin and the kids. indeed Gauguin himself came close to suicide.

===
i thought of a fiendish little example of applying the Pope's directive.
let the two people fucking for fun, mostly, and with birth control, be putting on a sex show intended to get the audience all hot and bothered --it's in an area where contraception is unlikely (say, Ireland a few decades back), so the show is designed to encourage fucking, which will be procreative. hence the sex show is moral.