Colleen Thomas
Ultrafemme
- Joined
- Feb 11, 2002
- Posts
- 21,545
Pure said:That's not a bad little summary, esp. if it's the result of just a year or so or research.
This thread is not a tutorial on "insurgency' or 'counterinsurgency,' but I'll make a couple comments.
Classic expositions of guerrilla warfare are found in Mao, and Gen Giap, both of whom were on the winning side.
Your point three about 'victory' is generally a good one.
3. Vicotry conditions are so variable, that both sides might legitimately claim victory from the same encounter. This is best illustrated by the Tet offensive in Vietnam, where the US scored a crushing military victory, but the VC and NVA claimed the political victory they had long sought. An insurgency force does not claim many victories in military terms, it isn't trying to. If th Ci force iss till looking for victory in military terms, they will eventually lose.
It is not quite true that both side can 'legitimately' claim victory. As you suggest the larger goal has to be considered. Hence the US 'military victiory' at Tet is part of its LOSING war effort. You imply this in your last line, in that a string of 'military vilctories' may result in a loss. Indeed this was the case in Vietnam: there were, if you looked at battles, mostly instance where the US soldiers were said to 'win.' Yet the overall effort can only be called a loss.
Mao's famous summary is apt, and it flies in the face of the Western 'macho' approach eptomized in Gen Foch's famous line J'attacque, meaning in all cases. Mao said "When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy is stationary, we harass; when the enemy retreats, we advance." He also said the well known line, "the guerrilla is to the population as the fish is to water."
This last line does suggest one way to win. Drain the pond, elimiinate the water. Yet unless you ruthlessly kill most civilian in an area, 'draining' is not going to work. Relocating villagers to 'strategic hamlets' (concentration points) is not that effective, for they resent it.
Mao, in a historical view, looked at the end of coloniialism as a victory for 'the people', meaning the majority in such places as China, Vietnam, Algeria, etc. Your point 8 is correct, yet you don't seem to realize its implications:
8. In CI, the population's allegance is the goal.
You imply a kind of symmetrical tug of war, waged for the people's allegiance. But it is asymmetrical. A colonial army or an occupying one is generally NOT welcome. In Vietnam and Iraq, the Westerners talk of 'hearts' and 'minds' and think that candy bars and some medicine are going to win them. It is not too much to say that, given the people's rising awareness and 'national spirit', it was impossible for either the French or Americans, even if Colly herself were at the helm, to win the people's hearts. Nationailism is a very strong force in the 20th century.
In the Iraq case, it may not be much of a nation, yet, ironically, the US is making one-- a hostile one.
This brings us to your points 6. through 8.
6. Ci is ugly, it's brutal, and it is not for the sqeamish. This isn't Kansas, there is no toto, and if you plan to win, you toss your moral and ethical concerns aside and operate as the insurgency does, on a bottom line loss/gain scale. You cannot fight Ci with lofty ideals and high moral tone. You can't because the people you are fighting are not going to play by the rules, any rules, except the bottom line rule of winning at any cost. If your morals and ethics are too strong for you to over come, then you should never get involved in a CI war.
7. An insurgency will try to squeeze the population, between two forces.[...]
8. In CI, the population's allegance is the goal. They are the ones who know who the insurgants are. They are the ones who know when an IED is going to go off. they are the ones providing the enemy with intel on the occupation forces. It is all about intelligence and the side that has the population's support will win the intelligence battle.
That's Ci the clean way, for the long haul, if any kind of Ci warfare can be said to be clean. There is a dirty way to do it, that is much more effective in the short run, but it requires a level of ruthlessness that few governments have nowadays. This wasn't the case in times past. And the dirty method was the method of chocie, because it worked. The clean way is always iffy.
Your last line betrays the problem. This ideal clean, Pentagon-inspired way is in fact 'iffy.' One reason, aside from the historical fact that peoples like to control their own countries, is stated in your 6. You seem to suggest to 'toss one's moral and ethical concerns aside.' That means your hands are dirty, with lots of blood on them. How then do you stand in front of the 'people' and win 'hearts and minds.'
In fact the opposite is true, as the Abu Ghraib scandal showed. Funny how the Iraqis did not applaud the jailers who tossed asided their morals. They hated them more, are more resolved to get rid of them.
The Battle of Algeirs, used by the Pentagon, shows this issue nicely. Yet you and the Pentagon try to extract a victory formula from it.
The French paras exactly 'tossed aside morals' and torture as much as they liked, and broke number of terror cells, and got low level people to name the higher ups. The effort, for a while, seemed to succeed. But the end of the movie (reflecting history) shows the entire Algerian populace up in arms. New recruits are found. Alferians 'won,' and France lost, leaving after they said, "Algeria is part of France. One cannot leave."
This brings us back to the thread theme colly. You want the wife of the terrorist in for a couple days questioning, and put a very civilized veneer on it. In fact humiliation or rape may well 'work' to get her to betray her husband or brothers, at least in part. So, following your advice, morals are 'tossed aside.' If she emerges, not after a day or two, but a month or sxi months, her family is dishonored. Her story is on Al Jazeera and Iraqui and sobsister US liberals are horrified.
It's not hard to see what the upshot is going to be. Counterinsurgency by the book, be it Colly or the Pentagon's, is most likely a failure.
I could continue, with the issue of the 'home front', which you raise. Indeed it's key, as in Vietnam. Here the 'toss aside' approach is particularly deadly. But enough for now.
Nice dialoguing with you. Your knowledge is impressive.
CI, by the book, can work. It has worked int he past. That goes for the ruthless kind, like the Brits vs. the Boers or the "wining of hearts and minds" kind, Hatti or the Phillipenes would be good examples. What will never work is mixing and matching.
It's kind of like this, if you are doing it the ruthless way, you can never show kindness. You are ruling through fear and kindness will be seen as weakness.
If you are trying to do it the kind way, you can't have an Abu Grahib or soldier's blasting crowds of demonstrators.
In iraq, there is also the wild card of Islam.
My point, in the main though, wasn't that we could or couldn't win a ci war in Iraq. It was just that you can't really understand what's going on there, if you don't recognize the "ground rules" of the war that is being fought.
If you recognize what is happening, you don't need a flimsy little exercise in hypocracy with a sexist flavor to get riled over. There is plenty there to get upset about without such. Of course, if you are anti war, the real problem is, nobody seems to care about the real failures and problems. So maybe I just didn't give the proagandists who are making it a big deal enough credit. If it takes unsubstantiated allegations of hostage taking to get the publics interest, maybe this was the way to go.