Is moral relativism in conflict with the West's "humanist project"?

I like John Ralston Saul's definition of humanism.

An exaltation of freedom, but one limited by our need to exercise as an integral part of nature and society.

We are capable of freedom because we are capable of seeking the balance which integrates us into the world. And this equilibrium in society depends on our acceptance of doubt as a positive force. The dignity of man is thus an expression of modesty, not of superior preening and vain assertions.

These simple notions are central to the Western idea of civilization. They are clearly opposed to the narrow and mechanistic certainties of ideology; those assertions of certainty intended to hide the fear of doubt.

***

We have always known that it is easier to run Sparta than Athens. Sparta had all the advantages of an enormous ancillary slave population, a society based on military obedience and the absence of debate. It was harder to be Athenian and in the end they failed themselves even by their own standards. But they succeeded for a long time and those standards still mark our path. We have added to them, embroidered upon and improved them. It isn't that we have progressed. But we have progressed in our knowledge of how we ought to act. Much of the time we fail to act up to our own standards. We fail ourselves. But if we know that, then we can also find ways to save ourselves. That is the essence of humanism.

The Doubter's Companion

There's actually a lot more. Maybe later I'll type in the whole thing.

But I like how he says humanism is about balance. A person, a society, needs to take advantage of all the traits available to it. These traits must support and restrain each other. A person or a society that becomes unbalanced doesn't last long.
 
moral relativism, mab,

here's my suggestion:

there are judments that are resolvable by objective invesigation, and those that are clearly not: first category: red bell peppers are vegetables; second category: red bell peppers (eaten raw) are a tasty treat.

moral relativism asserts that statements like "stealing is wrong" are more like the second than the first. in a word, dependent on individual taste, culture, and so on. ergo, not disputes not resolvable (de gustibus, non disputandum est).

of course some statements are very widely agreed, like a raw lemon (or potato) is inedible, but still seem in the second category.


there are, of course, statements that don't simply fall into category one or two, and many involve stipulations:

e.g. A virus is a living entity. A cashew is not a nut.

Some seem seem very much matters of abitrary social stipulation:

Marriages of first cousins are incestuous unions. A transfer of land, for money, but without paper documentation cannot be a (valid) sale.
 
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Pure said:
mab {ref. to summermorning deleted}, i don't really see why the golden rule supports or enunciates 'moral relativism,' (which you haven't defined).

the negative golden rule is found in Confucius** and imo, is not a bad little rule (Don't do the others what you don't want them to do to you) since it implies that others have similar vulnerabilities to oneself; none of us likes 'waterboarding'.

**Pinyin: Kongzi
W-G: K'ung Fu-Tzu

Well, positive or negative. It's all relative :D

No, I think of the Golden Rule as moral relativism because it admits that there may be more than one version of right and wrong and it's designed to let us operate in a world where there are no absolutes. It refers the question of morality back to the inidividual's moral sense rather than to some objective standard and assumes that what might be right for me might not be right for you. We can both be right and moral at the same time.

Without getting into the issue of the GR's origins, I think it's safe to say the it's on of the basic tenets of Christianity, and if Christ did anything, he brought moral relativism into the world, or into his teachings. Christianity in theory if not in praxis is all about moral relativism, aboyut following your own conscience and judging not lest ye be judged.

The Jewish world that Christ was born into was a suffocating and unwieldy mountain of moral absolutism, laws and regulations and opinions. Was carrying money on the sabbath work and thereby a violation of the Law? What if the money were intended for charity? What if it were intended for wine? The rabbis actually debated these questions and presented long and learned answers (they're still in the Talmud). But what good was this stuff to the man who wanted to live a moral life and was standing there on the sabbath wondering whether he should take his purse?

Jesus came along and said basically: this is all bullshit. Legalism is not what God wants. He wants you to obey your heart and be righteous in your own eyes or somesuch. The essence of the GR, as I see it, requires us to understand others' points of view and try to see how the world looks to them. It requires us to admit that there might be more than one answer to a moral question.

I happen to like the GR because it agrees with my own experience of morality, that it's an emotion we feel inside that we then generalize to the rest of the world. I think it describes perfectly what we actually do everytime we make a moral decision.

There's more to it than just the GR of course. As Summer said, the role that cultural anthropology has played in expanding our notion of what's considered normal and human has been way undervalued and underappreciated. It's done to etnocentrism what But it's only in that last 100 years or so that we've come to see all humans as human, and that's still up for debate in many parts of the world (and the USA).

I think a moral relatavist would think twice before telling some people that their religion was false or that it was unacceptable to live their lives the way they do, but I think that they'd be suitably horrified when those people started cutting the hearts out of other human beings or killing their daughters because they weren't born boys. Even relativism is relative.
 
The clearest and most useful expression of morality we have is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
The good Samaritan...
(Don't do the others what you don't want them to do to you)
Don't steal that, because you wouldn't want yours stolen...
********
ok, but what is the underlying motivation here behind either of these "golden rules"? Isn't it simply fear?

I don't want to follow a fear-based morality...

I want to follow one based in love, and unencumbered by the dogma of religion...

I think we CAN use either of these rules from that place... but I don't believe that most people do. Unfortunately. I think most people follow "rules" like these simply out of fear.

My golden rule would simply be: Do what love demands.

Sometimes that is the honorable, charitable thing. Sometimes it isn't. It says something in the Bhagavad-Gita... something like, you can take such firm action that 10,000 may fall but no "Karma" will be incurred if you are coming from a loving, centered place...

If a baby is eating bleach under the sink, are you going to allow it? Or are you going to step in, grab the baby, shake it, yell "NO! Don't DO THAT!"? Love doesn't necessarily have to be all light... love can sometimes demand firm, (seemingly) violent action too.
 
Ramblings of an ethical hedonist

I think that 'relativism' and 'objectivism' are better understood when used as modifiers of other philosophies, some of which pertain, however peripherally, to this discussion. Egoism, for example, is a philosophy which asserts that people always act in their own interests, even though they may disguise their motivations with altruistic references to helping others or doing their duty. Egoism also claims that the promotion of one's own interests is always in accordance with reason. It asserts that not only is it rational to pursue one's own interests, it is also irrational not to pursue them.

However, only in a world inhabited by a single entity is it possible for the pursuit of self-interest not to be in conflict with ethical behaviour. In complying with Egoism, the individual aims at his or her own greatest good. But what is 'one's own greatest good'? From the hedonistic point of view, the individual human being is conceived as the source of values and himself as the supreme value, and so 'good' might be defined as whatever our rational self-interest deems necessary to avoid non-essential pain while improving well-being.

Abandoning the attempt to define 'good' for the purpose of this monologue, it still follows that pursuing one's own greatest good can interfere with another's pursuit, thus creating a situation of conflict. While I am not the only being in the universe, I value my life and the pursuit of pleasure and happiness which are the fruit and goal of living. It happens that there are people who, by their pursuit of their own existence, get in my way. What to do? At some point each of us recognizes that our greatest interests are served more through co-operation than conflict. However, there is a caveat. We are willing to cooperate/compromise, so long as it still leaves room for each of us to logically pursue our own interests, even at the cost of another's.

Yet, can personal gain logically be in one's best interests if it entails harm to another? This is the dilemma. If one accepts the principle of causing harm to others as being ethical (ie, in one's own best interests), then one must accept the end result: might is right. If one person manipulates another to further one's own interests at the cost of another's, one eventually finds that others will do harm in return, and in this cycle it is not rationalization or morality what wins, but might.

So, is it best to accept that cooperation with others is a more successful approach to pursuing one's interests? This is a type of ethically conditional (or 'moral') egoism, that is, egoism is morally acceptable or right if it leads to morally acceptable ends. For example, self-interested behavior can be accepted and applauded if it leads to the betterment of society as a whole; the ultimate test rests not on acting in one's own self-interest, but rather on whether society is improved as a result. Thus, if one accepts the principle of causing harm to another being acceptible if it is in pursuit if a morally superior goal, one again comes around to the awareness that in doing so, one also accepts that 'the means are justified by the end.'

I think, in the case of most of humanity's social ills, the judgement of ethics is relative to the individuals doing the judging. Just let me life my hedonistic life with all the ethics and enthusiasm I can muster. You can live your moralist or egoist or objectivist or relativist lives. Just don't get between me and my pursuit of happiness and pleasure. I might knock you down and give you forced orgasms until you die ;)
 
not convinced, mab

first look at some predecessors to the golden rule in Matt/Luke


· http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity

· ~1970-1640 BCE "Do for one who may do for you, / That you may cause him thus to do." - The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant 109-110, Ancient Egypt, tr. R.B. Parkinson.

· ~1280 BCE "You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen. Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD." - Tanakh, new JPS translation, Leviticus 19:18, Judaism.

· ~700 BCE "That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for its own self." - Dadistan-i-Dinik 94:5, Zoroastrianism.
· ? BCE "Whatever is disagreeable to yourself do not do unto others." - Shayast-na-Shayast 13:29, Zoroastrianism.
· ~500 BCE "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful." - Udana-Varga 5:18, Buddhism.

· ~500 BCE "The Sage...makes the self of the people his self." Tao Te Ching Ch 49, tr. Ch'u Ta-Kao, Unwin Paperbacks, 1976. Daoism
· ~500 BCE "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." Analects of Confucius 15:24, Confucianism, tr. James Legge.[1]
· ~500 BCE "Now the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others. To be able to judge of others by what is nigh in ourselves;? this may be called the art of virtue." Analects of Confucius 6:30, Confucianism, tr. James Legge. [2]

· ~500 BCE "Therefore, neither does he cause violence to others nor does he make others do so." - Acarangasutra 5.101-2, Jainism.
· ~400 BCE "Do not do to others what would anger you if done to you by others." - Socrates.
· ~200 BCE "What you hate, do not do to anyone." - Deuterocanonical Bible, NRSV, Tobit 4:15, Roman Catholic Church and Judaism.
·
· ~150 BCE "This is the sum of duty: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you." - Mahabharata 5:1517, Brahmanism and Hinduism.

· ~100 CE "What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man. This is the law: all the rest is commentary." - Hillel the Elder; Talmud, Shabbat 31a, Judaism.

· ~100 CE "In everything, do unto others as you would like them to do unto you; that is the meaning of the law and the prophets." - Sermon on the Mount, NRSV, Gospel of Matthew 7:12, Christianity
·
· ~100 CE "What you would avoid suffering yourself, seek not to impose on others." - Epictetus.

· ~7th century "Do unto all men as you would wish to have done unto you; and reject for others what you would reject for yourself." - Hadith, Islam.
·
-----
Now consider your statement:

and if Christ did anything, he brought moral relativism into the world, or into his teachings. Christianity in theory if not in praxis is all about moral relativism, about following your own conscience and judging not lest ye be judged.

Looking at the list above, all subscribe to the Golden Rule, but hardly any are 'relativists.' Here are clear NONrelativists: the Leviticus writer, Confucius, Socrates, Hillel.

Jesus first asked an inquirer about salvation if he had 'kept the commandments' and he also spoke of the fate of those who broke the 'least' of the commandments. [see refs, below]

I think "Judge not, lest ye be judged" is an excellent rule, somewhat short of the Golden Rule, which is a bit to vague for me.

Consider any of a number of 'equality' principles, such as A) All humans are morally equivalent ; B) All humans will be judged by God, by the same standard; C) Every human has the same basic sensitivities and vulnerabilities as every other (to fear, pain, feeling of betrayal, etc.).

If any of these 'equality principles,' A, B, C, or others is taken as true, the Golden Rule, applied as the prime moral directive, will not give different results according to who's applying it (i.e., subjective or 'conscience' morality). A, B, or C together with the Golden Rule imply and objective and universal standard. I think the persons named above (Leviticus writer, Socrates, Jesus, Hillel, Confucius(?)) mostly subcribed to one (or more) of the equality principles.

To lead the Golden Rule toward relativism, you'd have to deny one of the principles of equality. Then I'd have to ask why?

====
Some refs that suggest that Jesus was not an ethical relativist, indeed suggesting that all persons are subject to the same standards--a basic teaching of Judaism, incidentally:

Matt.5
1. [19] Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.


Mark.10
[What shall I do, that I may inherit eternal life?]
1. [19] Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Defraud not, Honour thy father and mother.


Matt.19
1. [17] And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.
 
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Pure said:
'moral relativism,' (which you haven't defined).

Moral relativism to me means that there are local moral contexts that have to be taken into account in judging morality. It says that it's wrong for me to go and impose my values on other people without taking into account what it is they might want and need. It's wrong to assume that my system is susperior to yours, and that everyone in the world should be just like me.

Moral relativism certainly has its downside and difficulties and pitfalls, and at times it does seem to lead to amorality, but that's only if you look at morality as a logical and rational system rather than an emotional one. You can argue backwards from moral relativism to end up at a spot where you've proved that all morality is subjective and therefore non-existent, but that's only because of our slavish worship of logic to the detriment of emotional truth, the kind of thing Rob's always talking about when he cites Voltaire's Bastards.

The roots of morality are emotional, and so it's possible to entirely moral without having an explicit "system of morality" at all, just guided by your own feelings.

We always ignore this emotional side of ourselves as if it's something to be ashamed of--logic's ugly and deformed half-brother--but the truth is, we're part logic and part emotion and neither can survive without the other. To stand up and say that something's wrong because it feels wrong is a perfectly valid argument and ultimately the only moral argument any of us trusts, whether we know it or not.
 
Pure, I honestly don't know what the fuck you're talking about. If you're arguing that Jesus didn't say it first, then I plead no contest, but I'm really not interested in discussing the history of religion.

My point was that the Golden Rule switches moral authority from an external standard like the 10 commandments to one's inner emotional compass, specifically to allow for variations in how we assay morality. Jesus brought it forth at a time when the moral absolutism of the Pharisees was not working. Whether he heard it first from a Chinese traveller or from the mouth of God I have no idea.

As for the equality statement that "all humans are morally equivalent", well if that were the case then there wouldn't even be a moral relativism, would there? I mean, relative to what?
 
relativism, reason, feeling

you make some good points mab (in your posting of 6:04 pm, regarding relativism).

To say morality flows from or is based on feeling is not Platonic, Christian (say, Aquinas), or Kantian, etc. But that position has a noble ancestry, e.g., in David Hume, and other writers who stress the relevance of 'sympathy', my willingness to feel and susciptibility to another's pain.

As to whether 'follow your feelings' leads to relativism, you'd have to show significant differences of feelings, e.g., that you [of one group of husbands] don't can't{should be: care} about your wife's adultery, whereas I[of another group of husbands] do.

As to whether 'follow your feelings' is a good moral teaching, I wonder mab; wouldn't you be a little worried about teaching that to a Gacy or Jeffry Dahmer, or even some of the Puritan luminaries of the US past
(Jonathan Edwards, say), or Pat Robertson. Only where feeling are trained in accordance with some common human practices is it sufficient (for morality) to 'follow them'. That's my view.

===
as to your post of 6:22 pm,

As for the equality statement that "all humans are morally equivalent", well if that were the case then there wouldn't even be a moral relativism, would there? I mean, relative to what?

You hit the nail on the head. With a NONrelativist premise, when these people had (e.g. , Leviticus author and Socrates, plainly), in general, the GR does not lead to relativism. To put it the other way, if you're a relativist to begin with [you, mab, for instance], using and applying the GR will be relativistic.
 
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My response (1,000 words - just a long-ish op-ed)

I am just a thoughtful layperson, well educated but no scholar or philosopher. Here's a quote from a review of a new book about Adam Smith that approximates my point of view: “Smith is not overly concerned with theory, but he does not reject it altogether; instead, he is concerned to elicit general (ethical) rules, protocols and mores from empirical observations . . . tentative and ever subject to revision . . .”

In this essay I will discard as many abstract terms and concepts like 'moral,' 'humanism,' 'relativism,' 'objective,' as possible, because they denote and connote different things to each of us, and we waste energy in arguments where no real disagreement may exist.

However, I will make a handful of assertions, and I ask that you read them in a generous spirit of trying to appreciate the "meta-message" behind the words, rather than immediately seeking to pick them apart or devise extraordinary scenarios where they might not apply.

I start with the Holocaust, which we all agree was a very, very bad thing.

I assert that if you ask any sane human in any society whether the mass murder of other human beings is a bad thing, he or she will agree that it is.

Your minds are already leaping to “counter-examples” : “There are Jew-haters, Ibo-haters, Hutu-haters who would disagree . . .” Hold that thought, but note how I worded the assertion: “Agree mass-murder of humans is bad.”

Summer observed that anthropology opened “a perspective of humanity which transcended the ethnocentric view.” Here’s my version: In hunter-gatherer societies “human being” was often synonymous with the group’s name for itself, suggesting that others aren’t fully human, so killing them is not bad per se (though dangerous). As society evolved “human being” widened to encompass the tribe, the nation, the faith, the state, and ultimately, the whole world.

Probably most of the Jew-haters, Ibo-haters, Hutu-haters, etc., are convinced out of ignorance that “the other” is not fully human. So even they would concur with “the mass murder of other humans is bad.” A portion of the hater-murderers are deranged. There is a third category I will come back to.

Moving forward, Summer pointed out that anthropology (or sociology) also crossed a “second epistemological divide, (that) replaced nature with society.” I think he's referring to the “all human behavior is a social construct” idea, which I address next.

It’s true that all kinds of things are social constructs that we never imagined. Yet evolution equipped us with certain physical features like two arms and legs, a big brain, etc. It seems absurd to conclude that it did not also “hard-wire” a few very basic psychological elements. And so the next assertions, which involve that “hard wiring”:

It is the nature of man to want to live.
It is the nature of man to want to enjoy life.

The first is demonstrated by the fact that we are here. Life was tough for the first 2.5 million years since we “came down from the trees,” and this desire had to be strong to overcome its exigencies. Suicide and other counter-examples don’t disprove it, just as babies born with missing parts don’t disprove our physical nature.

The second proposition is a admittedly dicier, because “enjoy life” is subject to wildly different interpretations, so I won’t try to push the implications very far. But here is one that seems clear: Evolution “hard wired” the fact that we feel pain when we see our children starved or murdered. Our nature is to prefer that this not happen, or in my formulation, to want to enjoy life.

Same plea – don’t leap to “counter-examples” involving bizarre scenarios. Please just stick with the gist of what I am saying.

Therefore, to a very limited extent there are some things beyond our purely physical nature that are not just “social constructs.” I named two, and from these I believe that certain “rules, protocols and mores” can be derived that we humans can all sign on to, or already have signed on to. I think this is the basis on which all societies condemn the mass murder of humans – even societies that don’t yet share our consensus about who is human. I think it can take us somewhat further than that, but once the basic principle is accepted, how much further are fun details we can hash out, with conclusions "tentative and ever subject to revision," and nothing that anyone kills for.

And that's it. Pure says this “value of human life” premise can’t generate anything “beyond a few 'prosocial' nostrums.” "Nostrum" has the connotation of "quackery," but the word's root is "remedy" and I think having a few prosocial remedies that all humans can agree on is significant, and it’s all I’ve been trying to say from the start.

Back to that third category of genocides - the ones who are neither ignorant nor deranged. I believe these simple assertions about the nature of man are the standard by which we can and do condemn them with certainty as bad men, and know that good men in every society will concur, and that there is nothing “imperialistic” about our condemnation.

One final thought. I described the process by which we identified with ever larger groups and eventually all humans. I think it a mistake to assume that the next logical step is to expand this to identifying with the birds, the fish, the rocks, “Gaia.” Or with the universe (intelligent aliens excepted), as in Carl Sagan’s, “We are star-stuff, and just perhaps we are the universe’s way of contemplating itself.”

Well, perhaps; I don’t think so, and I don’t believe in “Gaia” either, but that's an issue for the epistemology thread, and this is the ethics thread. The danger in this form of transcendentalism is the same as the “traditional” forms: It can be used to “justify” murder and cruelty. The thing that is “transcended” in every such mysticism is humanity, and before long someone concludes that to save “Gaia” we must wipe out a few billion humans.
 
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No one's going to argue with that, Roxanne. The aversion to murder is pretty much universal. To suicide less so (thinking about the Samurai code.)

I'm not sure what your point is though. If you're saying that we're more than our social conditioning, then you've certainly got my vote. If you're saying that you can go from those two axioms into deriving morality that covers things like marital fidelity or child-rearing practices, I've got to wonder about that.
 
mab, you nailed it.
i would add, if someone, to prove some sort of universal morality has to argue from the biggest crime of the 20 century, and our agreement about it, they are not in a strong position.

it is as if someone, in an example I gave earlier, said "foods really are, objectively, 'tasty' or not. it is not a subjective or cultre-bound judgment. Consider that none of us likes to eat dead rats."

Among obvious cases, already mentioned, that RA cannot handle with so few premises are A) exposure of the newborn who are weak or deformed.

As a new example, B) Consider revenge, using the 'all men want to live' premise. Mab has killed my friend Jones. Shall I kill him (Mab).
1) Yes, because Jones, as do humans universally, wanted to live, and Mab frustrated that primal and crucial want, and eliminated any future enjoyment of life by Jones, and deserves to pay the highest price. Mab thus forfeited a right to life
2) No. Because Jones is gone and that's very unfortunate, but nothing will bring him back. Humanity is one less. But killing that murderer, now, nullifies his desire to live, and potential to enjoy life; it coldbloodedly makes humanity *another* human being less, and we want to keep as much of 'live' humanity as possible, alive (because of potential future happiness of all).

Even more obvious are that C) there is no way to deal with cruelty to animals, not to say, D) wiping out a whole species of them. (most of contemporary defs as I quoted have tried to fix this obvious gap).

NOTE: as to 'nostrums' derivable from Roxannes' premises, I didn't mean to suggest quakery, perhaps I should have said well known, almost simplistic directives (reminiscent of 'everything I know about morality, I learned in kindergarten'). Examples are 'Don't kill your children or your work associates.' (directives that apply to all animals living socially).
 
Roxanne Appleby said:
It’s true that all kinds of things are social constructs that we never imagined. Yet evolution equipped us with certain physical features like two arms and legs, a big brain, etc. It seems absurd to conclude that it did not also “hard-wire” a few very basic psychological elements. And so the next assertions, which involve that “hard wiring”:

It is the nature of man to want to live.
It is the nature of man to want to enjoy life.

This is the only thing I really have any "quibbles" with. Mab and Pure have pretty much covered the rest. I contend that there are practically no human behaviours (i.e. psychological elements) that are "hard-wired." So there will be no misunderstanding, here is how I understand your reference to "hard-wired":

Human behaviours/psychological elements that are entirely determined by the physical make up of humans and owe nothing to human socialization.

One such psychological element is the fight or flight response which floods the body with adrenalin in the presence of certain stimuli regardless of previous exposure - for example spiders and snakes. However, as soon as you get to a conscious response, that is no longer "hard-wired."

Now, to your post about it being the "nature" of man to want to live and enjoy life. I feel there is no such thing as a "natural" desire, since all our desires are culturally (i.e. socially) transmitted and constructed. Yes, there may be a certain emphasis on self preservation, but how then do you explain kamikaze, zealots, suicide bombers and so forth? Would you consider their actions unnatural? Further, when you say it is natural to want to live, do you consider reproduction within that scope? If not: What then of parents sacrificing themselves for their children? If yes: What of homosexual and asexual and other-sexual individuals who do not desire to reproduce? As to enjoying life, you've already pointed out yourself that "enjoy" is subject to interpretation - precisely. There is *no* natural way of enjoying life. Because you can only enjoy something through your cultural apparatus, particularly through your pleasure matrix (cf. psy. anthr.).

Does that make any sense?
 
Moral Relativism as per wikipedia

In philosophy, moral relativism is the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute and universal moral truths but instead are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references, and that there is no single standard by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or the context of individual preferences. An extreme relativist position might suggest that it is meaningless for the moral or ethical judgments or acts of one person or group to be judged by another, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.

Some moral relativists—for example, the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre—hold that a personal and subjective moral core lies or ought to lie at the foundation of individuals' moral acts. In this view, public morality is a reflection of social convention, and only personal, subjective morality is truly authentic.

Moral relativism is not the same as moral pluralism, or value pluralism, which acknowledges the co-existence of opposing ideas and practices, but does not require that they be equally valid. Moral relativism, in contrast, contends that opposing moral positions have no truth value, and that there is no preferred standard of reference by which to judge them.

In the end, the only absolute for me is....

"Will you stand up when your moral code becomes incovenient or painful to live by?"

It's interesting to me how so many people believe moral relativism is a moral code when it's actually a philosophical stance about morality.

Sincerely,
ElSol





Sincerely,
ElSol
 
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I couldn't help but chuckle of this little passage, which continues in some detail

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

A common objection, though probably more so outside philosophy than within it, is that MMR [Metaethical Moral Relativism] cannot account for the fact that some practices such as the holocaust in Germany or slavery in the United States are obviously objectively wrong. This point is usually expressed in a tone of outrage, often with the suggestion that relativists pose a threat to civilized society (or something of this sort).
 
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The aversion to murder is pretty much universal. To suicide less so (thinking about the Samurai code.)

The Samurai were interested in killing (others or self) only when it was consistent with their moral codes( bushido, the way of the warrior.) The samurai's only purpose in life was to serve his lord. Honor dictated "right behavior" -- doing what was expected regardless of personal desire. There was no "relativity" in the samurai's code. And a samurai never killed a man when he was angry. There is a story of a Samurai who was avenging his master's death. He found the man, raised his sword, and was about to strike. The man spit in his face. He lowered his sword and walked away. He knew he could no longer avenge his masters death in that moment because he was angry, because it had suddenly become personal, and would have been reactive.

And here at the core of moral relativism... is the question... are you following your own internal compass (as a Ronin, "wave man"--masterless, cast upon the waves to be tossed aimlessly and without direction) or are you a Samurai and following "a lord"? They followed their human lord, but they metaphorically followed "a lord"... something greater than themselves.
 
And yet bushido ended up being corrupted into a form that allowed the rape of Nanking and the hideous mistreatment of prisoners in WWII.

And before that it resulted in the 'double patriotism' of the people who assassinated politicians who were not 'acting in the Emperor's wishes'.

One interesting facet of bushido was that it recognised the conflict between giri, duty, and ninjo, human feelings or empathy.

Too often only the duty was remembered and the human feelings forgotten.

Also rarely known was a form of seppuku where a samurai killed himself to admonish a lord for the lord forgetting his duty. The samurai was saying, "I cannot in good conscience follow your orders."

Not sure what I'm trying to say here. Except maybe to show that all moral codes can be corrupted. And that all are deeper and more subtle than we often acknowledge.
 
dr_mabeuse said:
I'm not sure what your point is though. If you're saying that we're more than our social conditioning, then you've certainly got my vote. If you're saying that you can go from those two axioms into deriving morality that covers things like marital fidelity or child-rearing practices, I've got to wonder about that.

Yes to the first, no to the second. I am “concerned to elicit general (ethical) rules, protocols and mores from empirical observations.” Your examples of marital fidelity and child rearing practices being included in a system of “morality” are precisely what I meant when I swore off terms like “morality” that have different connotations and denotations for all of us. My system is not concerned with how raise your kids (as long as you don’t abuse them – on “abuse,” see jury discussion below).

I added this to my essay four hours after posting: “I think (agreeing on these assertions regarding the nature of man) can take us somewhat further than (a condemnation of mass murder), but once the basic principle is accepted, how much further are fun details we can hash out, with conclusions ‘tentative and ever subject to revision’." The great and elegant thing about this system is that we never kill each other over the disagreements that arise under it, as we do with “morality” derived from “transcendental” systems, because we all have the same empirical starting point and standard of value.

As I said in the opening post of this thread I am not a “Randroid,” so won’t make any claim about whether she got the details right, but she did provide an example of how you can derive a whole lot from those axioms. On them she built an internally logical ethical system that derives the virtues of honesty, justice, independence, rationality, pride, productiveness, and integrity, all with very precise definitions. Philosopher David Kelley has filled in an important blank by deriving one more, “benevolence,” also precisely defined. Again, we can quibble over these derivations or others, and have fun doing so, with no risk of bloodshed.

Pure said:
Mab, you nailed it.

I would add, if someone, to prove some sort of universal morality has to argue from the biggest crime of the 20 century, and our agreement about it, they are not in a strong position.

Among obvious cases, already mentioned, that RA cannot handle with so few premises are
A) exposure of the newborn who are weak or deformed.
B) revenge
C) there is no way to deal with cruelty to animals
D) wiping out a whole species of them.

Pure, I deliberately started with the easiest one – mass murder is bad – just to establish a standard upon which we can assert with certainty and without any “cultural imperialism” that a particular thing is good or bad. Once we can agree on the standard we can move forward and see how much more we can derive from it. I think we can derive a lot; others may think only a little. Same point as above – the details of how much or how little are not the kind of thing we end up killing each other over.

Regarding your “obvious cases.” Don’t confuse the system I offer with an equation where you plug in a few terms and out pops the answer. In the common law we deal with this challenge through a jury system, where ’12 men good and true’ sort out all the details, mitigating circumstances, etc. They may judge that you are guilty of killing your husband, Mrs. Smith, but seeing that he smacked you around for 15 years, your sentence is a $5 fine and to bake a batch of cookies for the orphanage. Or she may get 30 years in the hole.

She exposed her baby – was it to save the rest, or because she wanted more crack? The jury decides, and judges.

Cruelty to animals? It is their nature to feel pain – mine too. I don’t want to feel it, so I should not inflict it on another creature. I may kill the animal and eat it, but humanely.

Wiping out a whole species? Let me expand that to destroying the environment. In economic-speak that’s “imposing (intergenerational) externalities,” or stealing from our descendents. I think one of the “general (ethical) rules, protocols and mores” my system can derive is that stealing is wrong. Then turn it over to the jury.

But here’s the thing about juries: To make these judgments the members must have a common standard of good and bad. My system offers a standard that I think juries in any society could use.

SummerMorning said:
“It seems absurd to conclude that it did not also ‘hard-wire’ a few very basic psychological elements.”
This is the only thing I really have any "quibbles" with. I contend that there are practically no human behaviours (i.e. psychological elements) that are "hard-wired." . . . I feel there is no such thing as a "natural" desire, since all our desires are culturally (i.e. socially) transmitted and constructed.
. . . Does that make any sense?
Um, no? But I will follow my own counsel and try to read this in a “generous spirit” of trying to understand your “meta-message.”

First, though, you offer some “counter-examples,” like kamikazes. They don’t disprove that it is man’s nature to want to live. They didn’t grow up thinking, “Oh boy, when I’m 21 I can buy a drink and fly a plane into a carrier!” Do humans act contrary to their nature sometimes? Of course, just as some babies are born with just one arm. That does not disprove that our physical nature is to have two arms.

You also cited parents sacrificing for their children. Having children in the first place is not rational, so it’s an example of there being more to man than just pure reason. I could glibly assert “it is the nature of man to want to have kids,” but unlike those other assertions I can’t demonstrate that this is true, and it may not be. In the old days it wasn’t an issue – if you wanted to fuck, you had to accept the consequences: kids. Here’s an example of where this “toddler species” is still trying to find its way in a new world we’ve created. Edit: Once we do have them it does seem that our nature is to sacrifice, even die in some instance for them. It's not hard to see an evolutionary basis for this behavior.

“All our desires are socially transmitted and constructed.” Here’s my effort to appreciate your “meta-message.” This may be one of those areas where the different connotations of words causes argument where there is no disagreement. You may be thinking of those wild-child examples where they don’t want to fuck after puberty, and so you conclude that wanting to fuck is not a natural desire, but is “socially constructed.” I respond by saying man is a social being, that too is part of his nature, so the desire to fuck is natural, demonstrated by the fact that in every society people have the desire to fuck (which does not mean that some don’t behave contrary to their nature). In one sense I might agree that the desire to fuck is “socially transmitted,” but the statement has no meaning since we are social creatures, and if you mix society with individuals in their upbringing the result is a desire to fuck. Like if you mix cement powder and water the result is hard substance that is “water-transmitted.”

We could go round-and-round about the meanings of words and the precise transmission mechanisms, and over many pints of stout eventually come to complete agreement.
 
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In the common law we deal with this challenge through a jury system, where ’12 men good and true’ sort out all the details, mitigating circumstances, etc. They may judge that you are guilty of killing your husband, Mrs. Smith, but seeing that he smacked you around for 15 years, your sentence is a $5 fine and to bake a batch of cookies for the orphanage. Or she may get 30 years in the hole.

She exposed her baby – was it to save the rest, or because she wanted more crack? The jury decides, and judges.


In Greek and Roman law, there was no crime as defined, and, supposing there was a jury, it would have found no crime, as there was a social consensus. (You may not postulate a crime, for that is to argue in a circle.)

Infanticide for deformed or weak newborn is a good example because Christians have, some say, been responsible for pointing to the immorality of this 'pagan practice,' making it a civil crime, and partly eliminating it. The Objectivists--or quasi's like yourself-- are arguably merely riding on the Christian bandwagon, with far fewer express premises, but the same--hence derivative-- subtle value allegiances.

---
It may follow 'objectively' from the value of human life (people wanting it) and reason that humans *generally* look to the welfare of the newborn (to keep the species going [=having life]), but it does not follow for every single case (since that is not necessary).
 
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Pure said:
In the common law we deal with this challenge through a jury system, where ’12 men good and true’ sort out all the details, mitigating circumstances, etc. They may judge that you are guilty of killing your husband, Mrs. Smith, but seeing that he smacked you around for 15 years, your sentence is a $5 fine and to bake a batch of cookies for the orphanage. Or she may get 30 years in the hole.

She exposed her baby – was it to save the rest, or because she wanted more crack? The jury decides, and judges.


In Greek and Roman law, there was no crime as defined, and, supposing there was a jury, it would have found no crime, as there was a social consensus.

Infanticide for deformed or weak newborn is a good example because Christians have, some say, been responsible for pointing to the immorality of this 'pagan practice,' making it a civil crime, and partly eliminating it. The Objectivists--or quasi's like yourself-- are arguably merely riding on the Christian bandwagon, with far fewer express premises, but the same--hence derivative-- subtle value allegiances.
Come on, Pure - how about a little bit of that "generosity of spirit" in interpreting my words? I am not riding on anyone's bandwagon. I am simply asserting what appear to be some emprically demonstrable facts about the nature of man, and suggesting that from these can be derived a few "general (ethical) rules, protocols and mores . . . tentative and ever subject to revision . . .”
 
Roxanne Appleby said:
Um, no? But I will follow my own counsel and try to read this in a “generous spirit” of trying to understand your “meta-message.”

First, though, you offer some “counter-examples,” like kamikazes. They don’t disprove that it is man’s nature to want to live. They didn’t grow up thinking, “Oh boy, when I’m 21 I can buy a drink and fly a plane into a carrier!” Do humans act contrary to their nature sometimes? Of course, just as some babies are born with just one arm. That does not disprove that our physical nature is to have two arms.

I just have to speak very loudly on this one. Young males acting suicidally in combat are not, repeat, not an aberration. It is a very common and very rational result for a society in certain situations of extreme stress. Also, I don't see what drinking and flying has to do with kamikaze. Your example of armless babies is also completely irrelevant to a discussion of suicidal combatants.

You also cited parents sacrificing for their children. Having children in the first place is not rational, so it’s an example of there being more to man than just pure reason. I could glibly assert “it is the nature of man to want to have kids,” but unlike those other assertions I can’t demonstrate that this is true, and it may not be. In the old days it wasn’t an issue – if you wanted to fuck, you had to accept the consequences: kids. Here’s an example of where this “toddler species” is still trying to find its way in a new world we’ve created. Edit: Once we do have them it does seem that our nature is to sacrifice, even die in some instance for them. It's not hard to see an evolutionary basis for this behavior.

Having children is irrational only if you live in a very strange society and you don't plan to grow old sometime. From the perspective of a society it is UTTERLY SUICIDAL if people do not want to have children. Societies with lots of people who don't have children tend to not survive in the long run.

“All our desires are socially transmitted and constructed.” Here’s my effort to appreciate your “meta-message.” This may be one of those areas where the different connotations of words causes argument where there is no disagreement. You may be thinking of those wild-child examples where they don’t want to fuck after puberty, and so you conclude that wanting to fuck is not a natural desire, but is “socially constructed.” I respond by saying man is a social being, that too is part of his nature, so the desire to fuck is natural, demonstrated by the fact that in every society people have the desire to fuck (which does not mean that some don’t behave contrary to their nature). In one sense I might agree that the desire to fuck is “socially transmitted,” but the statement has no meaning since we are social creatures, and if you mix society with individuals in their upbringing the result is a desire to fuck. Like if you mix cement powder and water the result is hard substance that is “water-transmitted.”

We could go round-and-round about the meanings of words and the precise transmission mechanisms, and over many pints of stout eventually come to complete agreement.

No? I'm not being clear? OK ... let me put it very simply:

You only get people through socialization. There is no other way of getting people.

But the very fact that socialization is required to get people means that those people are going to be very different depending on their society. And you are not going to get anything resembling a single natural response or natural foundation for morals.
 
SummerMorning said:
SummerMorning said:
But the very fact that socialization is required to get people means that those people are going to be very different depending on their society.
Summer, I agree with that statement completely. Humans and their societies are amazingly plastic, but not infinitely so, and to say that they are is just not a tenable position.

When I say that it is the nature of man to want to live and pursue happiness I have no simplistic illusions. I fully understand that this leaves room for an amazing variety of societies and behaviors, including many that I find bizarre, and yet have no right to condemn. I fully appreciate the limitations of what can be derived from these assertions. But there is a huge difference between “limited” and “none at all.”

I offered an example of what I mean by “desire to enjoy life”: The desire to avoid the pain we feel when our children are starved or murdered. Can you cite a single society in the history of humankind where this was not true? Can you cite a single society that raised children to not want to live? It’s such a contradiction it makes the head hurt just to think it.

I will not play games and respond to every bizarre or extraordinary scenario involving particular situations or circumstances whomped up as a “counter-examples” Those particulars no more disprove man’s desire for happiness than the child born with one arm disproves that it is our nature to have two.

“Young males acting suicidally in combat are not, repeat, not an aberration.”

You’re right, and it’s very disturbing that the world is in such a state. I referred in an earlier post to how recent is this experience of living outside of small hunter-gatherer bands. One of the consequences is that our potential to undertake behaviors which might have had survival value previously, like interspersing yourself between a child and a charging sabretooth, can be twisted into anti-survival behaviors. We are an adolescent species, trying to find our way in a new world we have created. We have fucked up many, many ways. My whole project is try to make it better by finding a few “general (ethical) rules, protocols and mores from empirical observations . . . tentative and ever subject to revision . . .”

“Radical uncertainty” is very popular in western intellectual circles, and I have no doubt that its adherents also think they are seeking a way “to make it better.” It’s a dead end, though, if for no other reason than that its internal contradictions make it empirically untenable. Did you know that in academic philosophy departments “postmodernism” founded on radical uncertainty has been all but dismissed for this reason? I am not waving that fact as an “authority club,” but as evidence that philosophically you are on very shaky ground.

My starting point is two very simple, empirical observations about the nature of man. For some reason, the response is a seemingly desperate, sometimes hostile effort to deny the reality of these observations. Maybe at this point we have gone as far as we can on ethics, and need to dive into epistemology, meaning to apply logic and standards of evidence to determine what we can and cannot know. If so then someone else will have carry on, because I am intellectually not up to that game.
 
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Well ... look, the number of possible permutations of human society is infinite. Within the limits of biology, granted - humans need things like air, water, food, yadda yadda - the catch is that we can not know the limits of biology. We can only know what are *not* the limits of biology. The whole "falsification of hypotheses" thing. (so I guess what I'm saying is - yes, I guess we agree on this matter, we just have different ways of saying it so let's let it rest. :p)

Sorry if I appeared hostile here* and there ... lack of sleep and indigestion make me testy. ;) The only point I am trying to make is that your empirical observations - though well they may hold in the vast majority of cases - are still empirical observations of humans in a certain culture, concretely in your culture (I may be wrong, correct me if I am). This means that what you refer to as "natural" is in fact nothing of the sort. Calling it "natural" is a political position emphasizing the status quo and legitimacy of the current ethical stance. Not saying there is anything wrong with that - just that you cannot base a universal ethic on a parochial "nature".

You ask for examples of child murdering societies? Ok, what about India and China where female infants were regularly (and possibly often still are) exposed to die because they represented too great a burden to the family. That's a society that simply chose not to raise its children. The concept of a society raising its children into suicidal maniacs is, I admit, rather bizarre ... though the levels of teenage suicide in the west may well be food for thought.

You've explained your project - the search for "general rules to help make things better" (paraphrasing most brutally). I would describe my project as - a probably quixotic attempt to get people to realise that there may very well be no general rules applicable in all case and at all times and that rather than pursuing RULES people should pursue a (self)critical and intelligent point of view that allows them to make reasonable and RESPONSIBLE choices in matters.

I think what we need are not more rules of behaviour (and, in the end, science is concerned with probabilities, not the absolutes that could be translated into ethics or law) but more responsible behaviour.

L.

*and neither am I postmodernist in the "anything goes" sense.
 
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The only point I am trying to make is that your empirical observations - though well they may hold in the vast majority of cases - are still empirical observations of humans in a certain culture, concretely in your culture (I may be wrong, correct me if I am). This means that what you refer to as "natural" is in fact nothing of the sort.


It may be that the "rules book" you are imagining has already been written... sort of..

The entire DSM (Diagnostics and Statistics Manual) that psychologists and psychiatrists use to diagnose mental illness is nothing but a set of "empirical observations" about human behavior.

Normal and natural may only be what we agree it is. Reality, too, perhaps... the minute you label something as "normal" or "natural" you label something else "abnormal" or "unnatural"...
 
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