Settle Ukraine by compromise, like the Cuban Missile Crisis?

pecksniff

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It's an idea.

However, there is still one missing piece, in what might be called a Henry Kissinger or John F. Kennedy multidimensional approach to crisis management: Show strength and resolve on the one hand, while offering the potential adversary a way out of the crisis that saves some face. Kennedy threatened war and carried out a naval blockade to prevent the Soviets from strengthening their nuclear-armed missile force in Cuba, but he privately promised Premier Nikita Khrushchev that he would eventually pull U.S. nukes out of Turkey if the Soviets removed their weapons from Cuba. Kennedy also pledged not to invade Cuba if the Soviets met his terms. Since the U.S. weapons in Turkey were obsolescent, and the appetite for invading Cuba in the United States was low, these were modest and reasonable concessions.

An analogous approach today might keep our economic threats, and commitment to current NATO allies, on the table while offering Russian President Vladimir Putin a dialogue on Ukraine's future. This would not be a concession to his threats and demands, because we would not unconditionally promise to deny Ukraine membership in NATO forever. The dialogue would look for an interim concept to shore up Ukraine's security without NATO membership that we could all accept in the short term. That could be offered publicly. Privately, we would tell Putin that if any such concept emerged and became effective in protecting Ukraine (as well as Georgia and other states in Eastern Europe), NATO likely would be content to live with that kind of system indefinitely. NATO membership for Ukraine no longer would be needed.

This approach would make a virtue out of what is already a reality: Ukraine is not going to be offered the chance to join NATO anytime soon. In 2008, when George W. Bush was president, the alliance promised Ukraine and Georgia that they someday would be invited to join NATO - yet with no timeline or interim security guarantee. That was a regrettable half-pregnant compromise if ever there was one. It effectively painted a bullseye on the backs of Ukraine and Georgia; Russia attacked Georgia a few months later and attacked Ukraine in 2014.

We needed a better plan then. Recognizing as much, no one has seriously promoted the idea of expediting Ukrainian or Georgian membership since 2008 - until Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky did so last year. Perhaps that is why Putin is forcing the issue now - though the moral blame is all on Russia's side, not Ukraine's, of course.
 
Short answer is no. It's a bad idea.

I would say that to be ignorant pontificating of a distant outsider, not even wrong in the principle, but inapplicable in actual circumstances. More, this situation should not be seen in isolation, an error the West makes incredibly often, it's a part of much longer game, just a stepping stone.

There's nothing to compromise about. Any compromise is seen by them as a weakness, and they have come forth with demands that are by design unacceptable. Then they mock base NATO treaty documents as "so called principles" and "political dogma." The worst thing that you can do is take what Russians say literally when they communicate in hyperbaric shouts. You will only appear afraid and weak if you listen.

There's very little concessions to be offered that couldn't be seen as betrayal by allies -- and that is by design. That's what Russia is aiming for, first and foremost, dismantling NATO so they could blackmail its neighbors one by one. As they also just expressed outrage when EU sent the unified official response instead of each country separately as they tried to insist on.

The one -- and perhaps only -- thing they would actually be appeased by for now, and what Putin has signaled repeatedly and rather crudely as his actual demand in this artificial crisis of his own design (while it of course isn't the throw out "document" they produced), would be to recognize Crimea as legal Russia's property, and force Ukraine to do the same.

Of course, that would be a colossal victory for them, and in the minds that see world as zero sum game, a crushing defeat for the West. Sure, in their understanding that would also mean also lifting all the existing sanctions (although those doesn't bother them all that much). So while it may be a "fact on the ground" (not unlike the inability of Ukraine to actually join NATO anytime soon) it's somewhat unlikely that situation to be reviewed, it's a non starter for Ukraine, and doing so unilaterally by U.S. or even Germany behind Ukraine's back would be rather treacherous.

Similarly, there's no way NATO could "scale back" in the east, the presence is token as it is, and the "rockets threatening Moscow" the Russians are screaming in apparent panic about are the two token ballistic missile defense complexes (Aegis Ashore facility, in Poland and Romania).

At this point, I would say, let's call their bluff. Sure, then it would require to stand by own bluff and actually enact the proposed sanctions. And of course, everyone would lose, economically if not... yes, the risk of spillover of that war is high. Say, it's just about matter of time till Russians would down a recon plane (they are already outraged those planes fly over "their" territory in Ukraine and Baltic (up to ten flights are in air daily currently)).

But there's actually very little real appetite for taking the ongoing war with Ukraine big and open in Russia itself. If Putin or his inner circle are indeed went so far delusional and irrational and decide to indeed attack, there's literally nothing to be done, either than physical engagement in the situation. But it isn't actually in their interest.

And sure, in few years time Ukraine could be better able to defend herself, Finland received their F35 and so on... but nobody ever is fully ready for a war, those needs are unfulfillable. However as longer it can be postponed, the better, and that's what we most likely are looking at, this level of tension kept up for years.

Prolonged tensions may well be the minimum goal by Russia as it suits the short term goals best even if in expense of long term . But if it may damage Biden and Democrats lose midterms, and U.S. is destroyed and done for as a world power by that... such a gambit alone is worth almost anything. Closer to home and more real, it is already damaging to Ukraine economically, and will continue to be. And I guess the current U.S. course with highlighting the threat are they way to "call the bluff" designed to potentially force decision by Russians, but it is not helpful to Ukraine currently exactly for the collateral economic effects it's having immediately (and chance it may effectively prevent the tension staying long term is in my opinion small).
 
No, Russia will not invade Ukraine

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/9/no-russia-will-not-invade-ukraine

A full-scale war in Ukraine does not really fit into how the Kremlin has used hard power in its geopolitical games. The examples of Georgia, Syria, Libya, and (so far) Ukraine, show that it pursues a cost-efficient policy.

In each case, the Russian government has had a clear understanding of the risks on the ground. It has made a careful cost-benefit analysis and established clear and limited goals for the use of hard power. The cost-effective policy is a conscious choice because the Russian decision-makers know well that they do not have the means to maintain a large-scale war.

Instead, to punish and subdue the new government in Kyiv, it set up separatist forces in the eastern part of the country, funded and armed them and sent some troops for support. It relied heavily on mercenaries and Russian soldiers not wearing insignia in order to deny its involvement and present the events on the ground as a spontaneous uprising. Thus, Moscow earned leverage over Ukraine at a minimum cost.

Today, eight years after the start of the conflict, Russia is amassing a large number of troops along the border. Has it changed its approach? That is unlikely. Despite Western predictions of an imminent invasion, it is questionable that the intended target of the Russian military mobilisation is Ukraine.

Moscow has not lost its leverage over Kyiv in the Donbas region, as it is nearly impossible for the Ukrainian army to end the separatist movement there while it enjoys Russian support. If the Kremlin wants to pressure the Ukrainian government, it could simply do so by escalating the conflict in the east, which does not necessitate a large deployment of Russian troops.

Therefore, the amassing of troops along the Russia-Ukraine border is not targeting Kyiv, but the West. Moscow wants to force Western countries to finally sit down for negotiations on issues of European security. And this strategy seems to be working. Since 1991, this is the first time the West has engaged seriously with Russia to discuss European security.

Until the Kremlin feels that it has received the necessary security guarantees, it will likely continue to keep military pressure on the Ukraine border. It might deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Belarus or even escalate in other hotspots in its immediate neighbourhood, such as Georgia. It may organise war games closer to Western Europe, as it did with recent naval exercises near Ireland. It could even show off military capabilities closer to US borders, by deploying hypersonic missiles on its submarines or setting up long-range missiles in Venezuela, for example.

All these measures, however, will fall within Russia’s cost-effective calculations. That means that a large-scale invasion or war is highly unlikely.
 
Trying to compromise with Putin would be as successful as compromising with Trump. Never gonna happen.
 
Ukraine-Russia crisis: What is the Minsk agreement?

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/9/what-is-the-minsk-agreement-and-why-is-it-relevant-now

The Minsk II deal set out military and political steps that remain unimplemented.

A major blockage has been Russia’s insistence that it is not a party to the conflict and therefore is not bound by its terms.

In general, Moscow and Kyiv interpret the pact very differently, leading to what has been dubbed by some observers as the “Minsk conundrum”.

Ukraine sees the 2015 agreement as an instrument to re-establish control over the rebel territories.

It wants a ceasefire, control of the Russia-Ukraine border, elections in the Donbas, and a limited devolution of power to the separatists – in that order.

Russia views the deal as obliging Ukraine to grant rebel authorities in Donbas comprehensive autonomy and representation in the central government, effectively giving Moscow the power to veto Kyiv’s foreign policy choices.

Only then would Russia return the Russia-Ukraine border to Kyiv’s control.

The Minsk II deal offers a vehicle for direct talks between Ukraine and Russia and, due to France’s mediating role in the agreement, provides Macron with the opportunity to play the peacemaker on the world stage as he gears up for re-election at home.

Moscow may see Minsk II as a way to guarantee its central security demand – that Ukraine is never allowed to join NATO. Washington and NATO have already rejected that demand.

For ex-Soviet state Ukraine, the deal could present an opportunity to wrest back control of its border with Russia and end the threat of Moscow ordering another invasion, at least for now.

Kyiv says it will never allow Russia to have a de facto veto on Ukrainian foreign policy decisions, and many in Ukraine see the fulfilment of Minsk II as a concession to Russian aggression. But there may be room for compromise – all parties have expressed willingness for dialogue.
 
You cannot negotiate or compromise with an autocrat who routinely murders those who disagree with him. It will never work; Putin will just take the concession and put the next outrageous demand.

The Baltic States, the 'Stans,' Moldova. He will never stop until he is dead.
 
More, this situation should not be seen in isolation, an error the West makes incredibly often, it's a part of much longer game, just a stepping stone.

To what? Getting the whole territory of the USSR back? Making Russia a world power once again? Putin must know none of that is going to happen, and who else in Russia even wants it?
 
To what? Getting the whole territory of the USSR back? Making Russia a world power once again? Putin must know none of that is going to happen, and who else in Russia even wants it?

Russia has plenty of nut jobs who think they should restore the Russian empire before WW1.
And also, they don’t want to make Russia a world power again, they think it still is a great power.
 
Russia has plenty of nut jobs who think they should restore the Russian empire before WW1.
And also, they don’t want to make Russia a world power again, they think it still is a great power.

Great power? It's Third World. It has an economy the size of Nebraska's.
 
Great power? It's Third World. It has an economy the size of Nebraska's.

Only because the enemies are so relentlessly attacking it. In their own mind it's the world's most powerful country only denied its rightful leadership by wide conspiracy.

Yes, they are delusional conspiracy wacko paranoids on country level.
 
Only because the enemies are so relentlessly attacking it. In their own mind it's the world's most powerful country only denied its rightful leadership by wide conspiracy.

The French think the same about France. What does it matter?
 
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