It's an idea.
However, there is still one missing piece, in what might be called a Henry Kissinger or John F. Kennedy multidimensional approach to crisis management: Show strength and resolve on the one hand, while offering the potential adversary a way out of the crisis that saves some face. Kennedy threatened war and carried out a naval blockade to prevent the Soviets from strengthening their nuclear-armed missile force in Cuba, but he privately promised Premier Nikita Khrushchev that he would eventually pull U.S. nukes out of Turkey if the Soviets removed their weapons from Cuba. Kennedy also pledged not to invade Cuba if the Soviets met his terms. Since the U.S. weapons in Turkey were obsolescent, and the appetite for invading Cuba in the United States was low, these were modest and reasonable concessions.
An analogous approach today might keep our economic threats, and commitment to current NATO allies, on the table while offering Russian President Vladimir Putin a dialogue on Ukraine's future. This would not be a concession to his threats and demands, because we would not unconditionally promise to deny Ukraine membership in NATO forever. The dialogue would look for an interim concept to shore up Ukraine's security without NATO membership that we could all accept in the short term. That could be offered publicly. Privately, we would tell Putin that if any such concept emerged and became effective in protecting Ukraine (as well as Georgia and other states in Eastern Europe), NATO likely would be content to live with that kind of system indefinitely. NATO membership for Ukraine no longer would be needed.
This approach would make a virtue out of what is already a reality: Ukraine is not going to be offered the chance to join NATO anytime soon. In 2008, when George W. Bush was president, the alliance promised Ukraine and Georgia that they someday would be invited to join NATO - yet with no timeline or interim security guarantee. That was a regrettable half-pregnant compromise if ever there was one. It effectively painted a bullseye on the backs of Ukraine and Georgia; Russia attacked Georgia a few months later and attacked Ukraine in 2014.
We needed a better plan then. Recognizing as much, no one has seriously promoted the idea of expediting Ukrainian or Georgian membership since 2008 - until Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky did so last year. Perhaps that is why Putin is forcing the issue now - though the moral blame is all on Russia's side, not Ukraine's, of course.