Why Kerry doesn't deserve your vote

[KenJames]

Karen,
In the June Atlantic, is an organizational diagram of Al Qaeda, showing its casualities. It's divided into several geographica areas, e.g, south east asia, middle east, europe. There is, or was a central unit linked with the others. The comment says it more resembles a spiderweb than a hierarchical organizational chart.

The article notes a number of killed and captured, particularly of the central unit.

But it argues that the smaller units have become more autonomous, carrying things out themselves, without direction of the central unit.

It raises the question whether at this point, getting Osama and some other central figures would have much impact on events.

There is a graph of al qaeda event for the last several years showing general intensification after 9-11.

----
Oh, and I repeat my question: has there been an example of removal of a gov by US agents, followed by successful rebuilding.

Perhaps we can agree that Bush's Japan and Germany parallels are no good.

-----
You said,
And in fact you do get license to topple the Taliban if they are harboring al-Qaeda, much as you can go to jail for protecting your brother, should he go and shoot up a schoolyard and you then threaten to kill any policeman who comes to arrest him.

Somehow I keep getting the impression that you want the US as world policeman.

Again you seemingly propose something rather open ended, since several countries have apparently harbored terrorists, and it's unclear why you don't go after them.

My proposal would be much simpler. If you want al qaeda, and theyre hiding in Afghanistan, you send in teams to kill (or grab) them, and anyone getting in the way. you destroy their camps. then you leave.

Besides having no moral right to topple a government with likely majority support, an attempt to do so just won't work.

Other means of pressure and the passage of time must be used, just as in Iran.

Because there is no 'takeover' or full scale invasion, under this plan, there are fewer Americans around to hate. (Almost none after a few mos.) A prudent, perhaps chastened Taliban would perhaps think twice about future harboring.

The Talibin were openly and actively supporting al-Qaeda. Before 9/11, most al-Qaeda terrorists trained at camps in Afghanistan. Clinton got a lot of flack from the Republicans for firing cruise missiles at some of the camps, after our embassies were bombed.

al-Qaeda would have grown more dangerous after 9/11 even without our invading Afghanistan. I think they'd be even more dangerous if they still had a secure base.

Covert operations on the scale you suggest just aren't feasible when you consider the terrain and logistics. Although I have no problem with such operations, many people consider them to be as immoral as overt military action.

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world, although I do feel the US is morally superior to a government which executes women for teaching little girls to read. We certainly don't have the resources. Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point.

There are cases when military action is justifiable. I feel Afghanistan is one of those cases.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

The Talibin were openly and actively supporting al-Qaeda. Before 9/11, most al-Qaeda terrorists trained at camps in Afghanistan. Clinton got a lot of flack from the Republicans for firing cruise missiles at some of the camps, after our embassies were bombed.

al-Qaeda would have grown more dangerous after 9/11 even without our invading Afghanistan. I think they'd be even more dangerous if they still had a secure base.

Covert operations on the scale you suggest just aren't feasible when you consider the terrain and logistics. Although I have no problem with such operations, many people consider them to be as immoral as overt military action.

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world, although I do feel the US is morally superior to a government which executes women for teaching little girls to read. We certainly don't have the resources. Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point.

There are cases when military action is justifiable. I feel Afghanistan is one of those cases.

I would argue that Iraq has not stretched us to the breaking point. In Rumsfield's lean mean military paradigm it perhaps has, but in over all capability the force in Iraq is really only a shadow force. By the simple expedient of calling up more national guardsmen to fill in for active duty units we could manage another invasion or two.

Remember our ability to fight in these places rests more on our navy and air force than on ground troops. Our navy is still easily able to support another invasion of mid sized scale and the FMF could supply a combat trained division from okinowa by calling up reserve units to replace them. The supply and logistics would be taxing, more men in the field would be expensive, but it isn't beyond our capability.

Remember each of the FMF divisions is designed to be self sustaining for a three month period of moderate to heavy fighting. This includes their own supply & logistics as well as transport, air moblie resources, aritllery, and tactical air support.

As long as a marine division remains in reserve, we have the ability to invade practically any nation on earth. The mission of the Corps is to provide amphib or air moble deployment of a division sized fighting force, within 72 hours of the need becoming apparent and that force is designed to operate independantly of reinforcement or help for up to three months.

We are not as thinly spread as many seem to believe. That perception only comes from the new idea of a very small military force being needed and relying on superior technology to make up the difference in quanatative force.

-Colly

 

[shereads]

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world, although I do feel the US is morally superior to a government which executes women for teaching little girls to read. We certainly don't have the resources. Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point.

I'd feel that way too, if we didn't have a consistent record of helping cruel governments when it suits our interests. We were asked to assist the Muhajadeen in their resistence to the Taliban's takeover, but we didn't think that a few incidents of stoning to death some pre-adolescent girls whose ankles showed beneath the hems of their robes was sufficient reason to interfere in a civil war. The Taliban were anti-communist, so the fact that they were anti-us and anti-sanity wasn't an issue.

There are cases when military action is justifiable. I feel Afghanistan is one of those cases.

You're probably right. I think that may be what Pure was getting at when he said we should have focused on getting Osama, his senior henchmen, and anyone who stood in our way. The Taliban would have protected him, so it's safe to assume they would have been in our way.

Whether we used Special Forces agents exclusively or ultimately had to occupy the country, we should have focused on the goal of getting justice for the victims of 9/ll and the Cole; of rebuilding whatever we broke on the way in; and then leaving. It would not have solved the unsolveable problem of global terrorism, but it would have solved the crimes against us, which should have been our goal.

A secondary goal, and one that people who were against the Iraq war used to think went without saying, should have been not giving Osama the credibility he sought. Every time we've done anything that wasn't essential to the task of bringing him to justice, we've aided his cause by appearing to be anti-Islamic instead of anti-Osama bin Laden.

He correctly predicted that we would bring an occupying army into the oil fields, and he was right. That our government was gullible enough not to see the stupidity of playing his game, is its own kind of evil. The evil of cultural ignorance and arrogance.

Yes, the Taliban executed innocents. But of the innocents who survived the Taliban, we must assume that some became "collateral damage" in our War on Terror. The distinction between evil killing and unnecessary killing is one I don't understand. The only justifiable killings by the U.S. in the middle east were those that might have resulted from a focused, single-minded effort to bring bin Laden and his associates to justice.

We'll never know what degree of effort that might have taken. It might have required a few years, or a few months. It would inevitably have cost some innocent lives. It might have taken a decade to rebuild Afganistan and help its new government secure its borders and rebuild its civil structure. It might even have taken the same number American lives and the same massive debt, as Bush/Cheney's big adventure in Iraq.

But at least we, and the world, would have known why we were doing it. We would have had nothing to be ashamed of, and we wouldn't be having this discussion.

The point of this which, for me, is that our failure to focus turned one horrible event - the attack on us - into a global crisis on a scale that even bin Laden couldn't have imagined.

 

[KenJames]

I would argue that Iraq has not stretched us to the breaking point. In Rumsfield's lean mean military paradigm it perhaps has, but in over all capability the force in Iraq is really only a shadow force. By the simple expedient of calling up more national guardsmen to fill in for active duty units we could manage another invasion or two.

Remember our ability to fight in these places rests more on our navy and air force than on ground troops. Our navy is still easily able to support another invasion of mid sized scale and the FMF could supply a combat trained division from okinowa by calling up reserve units to replace them. The supply and logistics would be taxing, more men in the field would be expensive, but it isn't beyond our capability.

Remember each of the FMF divisions is designed to be self sustaining for a three month period of moderate to heavy fighting. This includes their own supply & logistics as well as transport, air moblie resources, aritllery, and tactical air support.

As long as a marine division remains in reserve, we have the ability to invade practically any nation on earth. The mission of the Corps is to provide amphib or air moble deployment of a division sized fighting force, within 72 hours of the need becoming apparent and that force is designed to operate independantly of reinforcement or help for up to three months.

We are not as thinly spread as many seem to believe. That perception only comes from the new idea of a very small military force being needed and relying on superior technology to make up the difference in quanatative force.

-Colly

Hi Colly, it's good to see you again.

Your last paragraph seems inconsistent to me. I think you intended to say something like, "We are not as thinly spread as many seem to believe. That perception only comes from following the old paradigm that an overwhelming force is required for conducting successful military operations. The new idea is a very small military force being needed and relying on superior technology to make up the difference in quantitative force." Forgive me if I've gotten it completely wrong.

In some scenarios, we are stretched to the breaking point. In others, we are not.

In the original Bush / Rumsfeld scenario, our troop strength would have declined rapidly by now. Instead, it's increasing.

If we confine our military activities to quick "get in and get out" operations, the small force paradigm is valid. However, invading is not the same as holding territory. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that.

 

[shereads]

I assumed that KenJames meant we were stretched to the limit of what we can afford, and in fact we're stretched way beyond that. The debt that's being accrued by the war effort hasn't even been guesstimated, if it continues beyond this year. It's not even our debt to pay off; t's the debt of kids just now being born.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

Hi Colly, it's good to see you again.

Your last paragraph seems inconsistent to me. I think you intended to say something like, "We are not as thinly spread as many seem to believe. That perception only comes from following the old paradigm that an overwhelming force is required for conducting successful military operations. The new idea is a very small military force being needed and relying on superior technology to make up the difference in quantitative force." Forgive me if I've gotten it completely wrong.

In some scenarios, we are stretched to the breaking point. In others, we are not.

In the original Bush / Rumsfeld scenario, our troop strength would have declined rapidly by now. Instead, it's increasing.

If we confine our military activities to quick "get in and get out" operations, the small force paradigm is valid. However, invading is not the same as holding territory. Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that.

Actually, I meant by the new paradigm we seem stretched thin. Commanders in the field calling for more troops & Washington saying no. I was trying to say that it isn't a matter of the troops not being there or being avialable for use. It's a matter of the DOD trying to stay within the lean mean concept.

In the old school concept of almost Klauswitz like overwhelming force, we could still bring it to bear and do so without a draft. We have troops, highly trianed troops that haven't even seen combat yet in either theater.

We aren't stretched thin in any real sense in either theatre of operations, except in the aplication of the small force mentality at the pentagon. Would more troops make a difference in Iraq? The commanders seem to think so, but who knows if they would. Applying larger & larger formations to an asymetrical combat sitation dosen't always produce less contact, the more forces you have the easier it is for gureilla's to find smaller contingents to work against.

Theoritically we could apply significantly more manpower, with an appropriate increase in technological might to either theatre. I was just trying to point out that the idea we haven't the force neccessary was erroneous. It is fostered much more by the DOD's demands of keeping the actual ground force lean than it is by any connection to forces avialable.

-Colly

 

[Colleen Thomas]

I assumed that KenJames meant we were stretched to the limit of what we can afford, and in fact we're stretched way beyond that. The debt that's being accrued by the war effort hasn't even been guesstimated, if it continues beyond this year. It's not even our debt to pay off; t's the debt of kids just now being born.

I'm not really looking at the monetary cost, simply because it's as much a political tool as anything else. Depending on how you frame the monthly "costs" involved. Liberals are presenting cost figures that are eight to ten times greater than those of conservative rags. There is a huge, and I do mean huge disaprity and there is a significant amount of cooking the books going on, on both sides.

A simple example is troop pay. Conservatvies don't add it into their figures because, hey, the troops would be getting paid anyway, right? Liberals add it as a "cost" of the war since it's such a nice large figure. A fair & unbiased observer would most likely only include combat pay and hazard bonuses above & beyond regular pay as well as the extra monies paid to reservists called up as a "cost" of the war.

I don't have the time, nor inclination to examine all the estimates and see if they are working on real and fairly considered figures, or cooked figures. I simply assume it's a lot of money, but the monetary cost pales in comaprrison to the human cost.

Monetarily, we aren't over stretched in any real sense, since we have troops being paid now who are still sitting in bases far from combat. Their extra hazard and combat pay would not break the bank, nor would the money needed to replace them with called up reservists. Nor would their ammunition ussage. The fuel usage might, but even that's debateable.

-Colly

 

[KenJames]

Actually, I meant by the new paradigm we seem stretched thin. Commanders in the field calling for more troops & Washington saying no. I was trying to say that it isn't a matter of the troops not being there or being available for use. It's a matter of the DOD trying to stay within the lean mean concept.

Thanks for clearing up my questions about that paragraph.

My perception comes from seeing troops in Iraq having their tours of duty extended and National Guard units deployed in Iraq and unavailable for their missions in the United States, as well as Bush's almost-certainly lowballed requests for additional funds for the Iraq war. Perhaps all that is just mismanagement.

I assumed that KenJames meant we were stretched to the limit of what we can afford, and in fact we're stretched way beyond that. The debt that's being accrued by the war effort hasn't even been guesstimated, if it continues beyond this year. It's not even our debt to pay off; t's the debt of kids just now being born.

I actually was referring more to resources more than costs. As Colly points out, it's effectively impossible to accurately determine the costs of a military action. Is war more expensive than peace. Certainly. By how much? That really does depend on the agenda of the person doing the calculating.

Money isn't my biggest concern, anyway. It's primarily the lives of our troops and secondarily other important missions which are being neglected.

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world, although I do feel the US is morally superior to a government which executes women for teaching little girls to read. We certainly don't have the resources. Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point.

Perhaps I was overstating when I said, "Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point." I think Colly and I agree the Iraq misadventure is too expensive, in money and especially lives, for what we're getting.

Including that line about Iraq was probably a mistake. I was trying to give an example and ended up detracting from the statement I was trying to make.

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world (although military action is sometimes in our national interest). We certainly don't have the resources (to impose our values on the entire world).

 

[Colleen Thomas]

Thanks for clearing up my questions about that paragraph.

My perception comes from seeing troops in Iraq having their tours of duty extended and National Guard units deployed in Iraq and unavailable for their missions in the United States, as well as Bush's almost-certainly lowballed requests for additional funds for the Iraq war. Perhaps all that is just mismanagement.

I actually was referring more to resources more than costs. As Colly points out, it's effectively impossible to accurately determine the costs of a military action. Is war more expensive than peace. Certainly. By how much? That really does depend on the agenda of the person doing the calculating.

Money isn't my biggest concern, anyway. It's primarily the lives of our troops and secondarily other important missions which are being neglected.

Perhaps I was overstating when I said, "Iraq has stretched us to the breaking point." I think Colly and I agree the Iraq misadventure is too expensive, in money and especially lives, for what we're getting.

Including that line about Iraq was probably a mistake. I was trying to give an example and ended up detracting from the statement I was trying to make.

I don't feel the US has the moral authority to be policeman for the world (although military action is sometimes in our national interest). We certainly don't have the resources (to impose our values on the entire world).

I absolutely agree with you that Iraq is costing us more than is acceptable in both money and especially lives. I also agree that we can not afford to impose our will on the world.

I like wise feel Afgahnistan was neccessary to our national security and that of a lot of other countries.

My only real point was that we have the capability to mount another invasion if that is what the powers that be demand. I do however feel, another long term occupation might well be beyond the price we as a nation are willing to pay, in both lives and blood.

-Colly

 

[amicus]

You might notice the lack of political attacks on the Federal Budget Deficit.

The increased economic activity, the productivity that is taxed, has begun to function again, the deficit is declining. Even with the many billions lost on 9/11, even with the expenditures for Homeland Security, even with the tremendous outlay to fund military action in the middle east and around the world.

You go, free economy! (well...partially free, anyway)

amicus

 

[KarenAM]

Karen,
In the June Atlantic, is an organizational diagram of Al Qaeda, showing its casualities. It's divided into several geographica areas, e.g, south east asia, middle east, europe. There is, or was a central unit linked with the others. The comment says it more resembles a spiderweb than a hierarchical organizational chart.

The article notes a number of killed and captured, particularly of the central unit.

But it argues that the smaller units have become more autonomous, carrying things out themselves, without direction of the central unit.

It raises the question whether at this point, getting Osama and some other central figures would have much impact on events.

There is a graph of al qaeda event for the last several years showing general intensification after 9-11.

----

Interesting, and unsettling.

Oh, and I repeat my question: has there been an example of removal of a gov by US agents, followed by successful rebuilding.

Perhaps we can agree that Bush's Japan and Germany parallels are no good.

-----

I repeat my answer: Germany, 1918-1960. And I repeat that this is only an answer to your question, and that it is not particularly useful or relevent to the current situation.

You said,
And in fact you do get license to topple the Taliban if they are harboring al-Qaeda, much as you can go to jail for protecting your brother, should he go and shoot up a schoolyard and you then threaten to kill any policeman who comes to arrest him.

Somehow I keep getting the impression that you want the US as world policeman.

Again you seemingly propose something rather open ended, since several countries have apparently harbored terrorists, and it's unclear why you don't go after them.

My proposal would be much simpler. If you want al qaeda, and theyre hiding in Afghanistan, you send in teams to kill (or grab) them, and anyone getting in the way. you destroy their camps. then you leave.

Besides having no moral right to topple a government with likely majority support, an attempt to do so just won't work.

Other means of pressure and the passage of time must be used, just as in Iran.

Because there is no 'takeover' or full scale invasion, under this plan, there are fewer Americans around to hate. (Almost none after a few mos.) A prudent, perhaps chastened Taliban would perhaps think twice about future harboring.

Let's see. One: Your impression is mistaken. I have no desire for the USA to be the world's policeman. I do desire that the elected leadership of the USA use the military of the USA to defend the USA when the USA is attacked. I also expect the leadership of the USA to use common sense in when and where it uses military force, since war can easily spin out of control and result in a situation being made worse that it started (again, consider Iraq). I also believe that war cannot by itself be used as the sole instrument of foreign policy, and that economic and political avenues must be pursued as first options whenever possible, war being a last resort. If what I propose seems open-ended, this is understandable, since each situation must be evaluated on its own with pragmatic clear-headedness, not under some philosophy (whether this is pacifism or Neocon imperialism or whatever). It seems pointless to argue about hypothetical cases, or to argue that any two cases are the same.

Two: Your strategy for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is not a bad one, though it has the shortcoming that al-Qaeda, like most terrorist groups, operates by disappearing into civilian populations. With Taliban support, this would be particularly easy in Afghanistan, leading your special forces troops into conflict with the Taliban anyway, but without the heavy air support, etc. that they enjoyed in the actual war. That's awfully risky.

And I remind you that the Taliban never enjoyed majority support in Afghanistan. In fact, the fact that they let al-Qaeda people terrorize the Afghans is one reason they fell so quickly in the north. They were also unpopular because they had a habit of rolling into villages and killing everyone there as a method of stifling resistance.

The Iranian revolution, on the other hand, enjoyed widespread support because the Shah had been so repressive and so incompotent. And Iran is slowly moderating itself in large part because the Iranians themselves have had a taste of theocracy and have found that they don't like it as much as they used to. The Iranian government, unpleasant as it often is (they have a lot of blood on their hands for supporting terrorism against Israel, for example), has still managed to make the country function, something the Taliban were never able to do.

I mention as well that I feel we had a moral obligation to help the Afghans rebuild after we used their country in our geopolitical chess game with the Soviets, and that our failure to follow through on this moral obligation led to the Taliban.

And as to a "prudent, perhaps chastened Taliban", the very idea is one I have no more belief is possible than a prudent, perhaps chastened Nazi.

In short, I worry that your approach is like doing medicine but not wanting to inflict pain. Some medicine requires pain.

 

[KarenAM]

You might notice the lack of political attacks on the Federal Budget Deficit.

The increased economic activity, the productivity that is taxed, has begun to function again, the deficit is declining. Even with the many billions lost on 9/11, even with the expenditures for Homeland Security, even with the tremendous outlay to fund military action in the middle east and around the world.

You go, free economy! (well...partially free, anyway)

amicus

I wouldn't pop open the bubbly just yet. The long-term prognosis for the American economy is not good. In addition to the deficit, the $6 trillion federal debt, and several open-ended military commitments, we have a dangerously low personal savings rate, a high level of personal indebtedness, an ever-widening gap between rich and poor, a failing education system, and a society that equates status with spending and material possessions.

Match this with the fact that we have poor relations with several major trading partners just now, along with a high level of political polarization at home, and you have a situation that at best is scary.

 

[Pure]

Hi Karen,

And I remind you that the Taliban never enjoyed majority support in Afghanistan. In fact, the fact that they let al-Qaeda people terrorize the Afghans is one reason they fell so quickly in the north. They were also unpopular because they had a habit of rolling into villages and killing everyone there as a method of stifling resistance.

1) Supply evidence that the Taliban 'never enjoyed majority support in Afghanistan.'

2) You own example hints at the truth. IT's the NORTH area--something like a quarter of the country, where the Taliban was unpopular.

3) Further, it's not just a question of 'majority', but of having the most support *among the alternatives*-- esp. when these include handpicked flunkies, as in Iraq. I.e., [[the question is]]could the Taliban beat the Flunkies in an election. I think yes; and if not now, in a couple years.

An example that I believe is suggestive: Islamist groups have gained popular support in a number of countries; as you know, in Algeria, they were prevented from winning and forming a govt.., by the military. And that is a case where the military at NOT US-picked or tainted.

4) Lastly, the US did pick a logical and plausible alternative, in Karzai; but --as you know, and some others may not-- he's not exactly a Gandhi or a male supporter of women's liberation. He does not favor civil, political, or religious equality for women.

-----

So I grant that maybe the US have the best available alternative in the Northern group. But that is not to say Northern-based governance is workable.

5) I would like you to cite any evidence that that Northern group can govern the whole country, or be part of a US picked 'coalition' that does-- and which passes your test of 'majority support.'

Most observers cite a lack of central gov in Afgh'n, and this belies the view that there is or will be majority support.
----

I think it's pretty clear that the US has rarely if even done the sort of nation building you imagine and wish for. It's surprising that you don't mention the halfway plausible example of Phillipines, and vaguely plausible example of South Korea.

In any event, the US *needed* a strong Germany, to ally against the soviets; that's a backbone of cold war strategy. There is no such need for Afghanistan; at most it could be a semi friendly vaguely pro-US dictatorship like (iirc) Uzbekistan (iirc, without the oil).

----
As to your:
KAM: //In short, I worry that your approach is like doing medicine but not wanting to inflict pain. Some medicine requires pain.//

I'd liken 'your' approach (take over and make it a better place) to practicing psychiatry on an unwilling or incarcerated patient. And I'd remind you that in such case, 'willingness to inflict pain' is not necessarily productive of positive outcome (from the psychiatrist's pov).

 

[KenJames]

My only real point was that we have the capability to mount another invasion if that is what the powers that be demand. I do however feel, another long term occupation might well be beyond the price we as a nation are willing to pay, in both lives and blood.

I agree.

We definitely have the capability for invasions and short-term military victories.

Being "policeman to the world" generally requires long-term occupations. We can't do a lot more of those without dramatically increasing the size of our military, as well as accepting the financial and human costs.

 

[KarenAM]

This argument is becoming circular, an argument for the sake of an argument.

Hi Karen,

And I remind you that the Taliban never enjoyed majority support in Afghanistan. In fact, the fact that they let al-Qaeda people terrorize the Afghans is one reason they fell so quickly in the north. They were also unpopular because they had a habit of rolling into villages and killing everyone there as a method of stifling resistance.

1) Supply evidence that the Taliban 'never enjoyed majority support in Afghanistan.'

Please supply evidence that they did. I would prefer that you include in your evidence testimony from women and those people in villages that were killed for resisting Taliban directives.

2) You own example hints at the truth. IT's the NORTH area--something like a quarter of the country, where the Taliban was unpopular.

I had no idea that you knew the truth, Pure. Why are we having this discussion if you already have it? Some statistics to back up your truth would be most helpful.

3) Further, it's not just a question of 'majority', but of having the most support *among the alternatives*-- esp. when these include handpicked flunkies, as in Iraq. I.e., [[the question is]]could the Taliban beat the Flunkies in an election. I think yes; and if not now, in a couple years.

An example that I believe is suggestive: Islamist groups have gained popular support in a number of countries; as you know, in Algeria, they were prevented from winning and forming a govt.., by the military. And that is a case where the military at NOT US-picked or tainted.

4) Lastly, the US did pick a logical and plausible alternative, in Karzai; but --as you know, and some others may not-- he's not exactly a Gandhi or a male supporter of women's liberation. He does not favor civil, political, or religious equality for women.

Again, the data to support your contention that the Taliban were popular and will again be popular would be much appreciated.

I beleived that the Islamists in Algeria should have been given power, since they won it in an election. Then they would have to do what the Iranian mullahs have had to do: run the country. The Taliban came to power by force, maintained their power by force, and failed to provide even the most basic of governmental functions. When the outside world responded with aid, they kept this for themselves and their followers, letting large numbers of people go without.

Why is it you are bothered by Karzi's treatment of women but not, so far as I can tell, the Taliban's?

So I grant that maybe the US have the best available alternative in the Northern group. But that is not to say Northern-based governance is workable.

5) I would like you to cite any evidence that that Northern group can govern the whole country, or be part of a US picked 'coalition' that does-- and which passes your test of 'majority support.'

Most observers cite a lack of central gov in Afgh'n, and this belies the view that there is or will be majority support.

I have not argued that the northern group can govern the whole country. I have not argued that anyone can govern the whole country. Afghanistan is highly tribal and has always been. What I have argued (and am getting tired of repeating) is that the Taliban needed to be destroyed by military means (a war) following their involvement with al-Qaeda after 9-11. I also argued that it was the moral responsibility of the coalition who destroyed the Taliban to rebuild Afghanistan, which the international community should have done after the superpowers used the country as a battleground in the 1980's. I never said it would be easy, or that it was even being done now. I never laid out a comprehensive plan for doing so, though one is clearly sorely needed.

I think it's pretty clear that the US has rarely if even done the sort of nation building you imagine and wish for. It's surprising that you don't mention the halfway plausible example of Phillipines, and vaguely plausible example of South Korea.

In any event, the US *needed* a strong Germany, to ally against the soviets; that's a backbone of cold war strategy. There is no such need for Afghanistan; at most it could be a semi friendly vaguely pro-US dictatorship like (iirc) Uzbekistan (iirc, without the oil).

----
As to your:
KAM: //In short, I worry that your approach is like doing medicine but not wanting to inflict pain. Some medicine requires pain.//

I'd liken 'your' approach (take over and make it a better place) to practicing psychiatry on an unwilling or incarcerated patient. And I'd remind you that in such case, 'willingness to inflict pain' is not necessarily productive of positive outcome (from the psychiatrist's pov).

The fact that the US has rarely if ever done what I would like to see done in Afghanistan does not mean that we should do nothing.

At this point, Pure, certain things about our discussion are becoming clear to me.

1) Apart from one suggestion of strategy, the weaknesses of which I pointed out (I also said it was not an intrinsically bad strategy), you have taken no real stand on the issue yourself, but merely enjoy the advantaged debating position of attacking mine, which you can do forever with no risk to yourself.

2) A big part of your attacks on my position consists of reducing my ideas and statements to simple quotes like "I'd liken 'your' approach (take over and make it a better place)", which you can then attack more easily. In so doing, you have created a "Straw Karen" which you can easily knock down, and whose positions I have to constantly explain are not my own. If I believed that this situation was simple, Pure, I'd use the simple quotes myself.

You do this all quite well, by the way, but I don't see how this is productive. So now I will turn the tables on you a bit and ask you to:

Take a position. Not a criticism of what has been done in Afghanistan, but a real, honest to God position on what happened there and why, and what should be done about it.
And...
Support that position. Again, not with criticism over what other people have done, but with what you think would work in the best interests of those whose best interests you feel should be served, and why.

I argued what I argued. You have failed to convince me that my position is flawed largely because you have provided no real alternative. It's easy to criticize when your only opinion is that other people are wrong; I've done it and I know.

Here's a little incentive if you're up for this challenge, too: in a few days I'll be going away for a while and won't be able to attack you. Best of luck!

 

[Pure]

Hi Karen,

I'm sorry you're feeling exasperated or unfairly criticized.

In fact your postings are very well informed, and your personal compassion does show.

Unfortunately these forums are not good places for posting and reviewing evidence, and making detailed arguments and refutations.

In one sense it was unfair, therefore, to ask you for evidence.
Neither of us can present mountains of it here.

OTOH, there is no lack of evidence that the Taliban had some popularity in Afghanistan,

http://www.infoplease.com/spot/taliban.html

Who Are the Taliban?
Afghanistan's ruling faction
-----

They had some popularity elsewhere, esp. in Pakistan-- which is to say, many Arab/Islamic countries did not approve of US going to to topple it.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1721663.stm

Friday, 21 December, 2001, 02:49 GMT

Pakistan poll reveals Taleban support

{poll just before the Taliban fell}

------


There is evidence that they are undergoing a resurgence

http://www.cursor.org/stories/secondcoming.html

The Taliban's
Second Coming

by Marc W. Herold
Departments of Economics and Women's Studies
Whittemore School of Business & Economics
University of New Hampshire

POSTED FEBRUARY 29, 2004
-----

There is evidence that the present group, northern alliance based, is unable to govern; see, e.g., in the above article.

====

Yet somehow none of this matters, I think. We're dealing with your ideals. They have plusses as ideals. IF the US doesn't practice them, so what?

To consider some of your points:

I have not argued that the northern group can govern the whole country. I have not argued that anyone can govern the whole country. Afghanistan is highly tribal and has always been. What I have argued (and am getting tired of repeating) is that the Taliban needed to be destroyed by military means (a war) following their involvement with al-Qaeda after 9-11.

This claim isn't clear, as I said. It *sounds like, "Al queda struck the US, so the US ought to take down their pals and main state source of support." Presumably as protection, if not retribution. (Call this: 'take down as protection'.)

OTOH, your main drift is that the Taliban are bad guys, and the Afghans 'needed' to be rid of them. From there you jump to "The US ought to go in and do it." (Cal this 'take down to free of evil, and establish the good.')

Neither line has been sustained.

Without dilating on it, the impact on al qaeda may be much less than imagined, even though comfy camps are gone.

Now I'd say that if you want to intervene with 10,000 soldiers and spend billions, you should should some results or likely results. It would be up to you to produce evidence. I'm not compelled to give evidence against such an undertaking. But the daily news, eventually, supplies some pretty good stuff, as to whether it's working.

Oddly enough you seemingly agree it's not {see the bolded phrase below}, but that evidence doesn't count, somehow.

I also argued that it was the moral responsibility of the coalition who destroyed the Taliban to rebuild Afghanistan, which the international community should have done after the superpowers used the country as a battleground in the 1980's. I never said it would be easy, or that it was even being done now. I never laid out a comprehensive plan for doing so, though one is clearly sorely needed.

Essentially this is a kind of 'ought to have done' arguement {'should have done,' in your words}. It kind of floats in the air, born upon your moral idealism. It's out of range of facts, and the course of history. It's a bit like saying "George Washington ought to have (should have) abolished slavery." Well, indeed he should, I guess. Lots of noble things should have been done.

The fact that the US has rarely if ever done what I would like to see done in Afghanistan does not mean that we should do nothing.

But if it's rarely been done, this suggests what the US does isn't likely to work (to build a nation that suits the US).

Who is 'we', by the way?

At this point, you'll say, "well, 'do nothing,' isn't morally acceptable." Maybe not, but evils of the world are pretty rampant. Maybe supporting UN efforts with usual and extraordinary donations is sufficient.

At this point, Pure, certain things about our discussion are becoming clear to me.

1) Apart from one suggestion of strategy, the weaknesses of which I pointed out (I also said it was not an intrinsically bad strategy), you have taken no real stand on the issue yourself, but merely enjoy the advantaged debating position of attacking mine, which you can do forever with no risk to yourself.

Whoever wants to send soldiers abroad had better do some convincing. I'm sorry you feel it's 'disadvantageous' to have to give some reasons, and show some results, but that's how it is.

I did state, as you say, what might me done, as regards al Qaeda, in Afgh'n. Go in and get them, and anyone protecting them. Then leave. I'm sorry if you find that too simple, or unambitious (or not 'real'). Why not create a democracy while we're there? (is that more 'real'?) Well, is anyone asking us to? Or is that a minor detail.

Your objection was that the Taliban would get in the way; would hide these arabs (disguised as pashtuns, I guess). I believe I already said what to do if they get in the way. Maybe condoning off areas, or controlling airspace would be necessary, for a time.
What happens shows the US did not lack power, since destroyed the government, governing structure and infrastructure.

2) A big part of your attacks on my position consists of reducing my ideas and statements to simple quotes [...]

You do this all quite well, by the way, but I don't see how this is productive. So now I will turn the tables on you a bit and ask you to:

Elaborate quoting just doesn't work. No one wants to read 5000 word postings.

Take a position. Not a criticism of what has been done in Afghanistan, but a real, honest to God position on what happened there and why, and what should be done about it.
And...

Support that position. Again, not with criticism over what other people have done, but with what you think would work in the best interests of those whose best interests you feel should be served, and why.

There are a number of non military 'aid' modalities that can be activatived if the Afghans ask for it --e.g., for food, medical supplies. To be channelled through Int'l and UN orgs.

But in general I reject your request. Many of us who opposed Vietnam ran into that argument, to produce a way to 'fix' the situation in the late 60s and early 70s. But it was specified that there shouldn't be 'defeat.'

In general, a country should keep its army within its borders. I feel no necessity to describe a fix, esp. a US one, for Afghanistan, or for Bhutan or Bolivia.

The liberal and neoconservative meddlers need to show their ambitious plans are needed, AND might work.

The genuine conservatives, I think, have it right, along with many radicals: don't get involved as world policeman, or as 'fixer' of evils (beyond the borders), in general. deal with foreign 'evils' only insofar as they impact on US interests. all other approaches lead to a slippery, expensive slope that's wasteful of US lives.

The evidence is that the Afghan project is, at best, pretty dicey, and at worst, in a helluva mess. Oddly, you seem to agree.
That means the project, as it stands, is a bad one. That you may have an ideal project in your mind, or want to see me produce one is neither here nor there.

It further means, as with Iraq, that the troups should come out soon, perhaps in phases.

It (the US effort) is broke. It can't be fixed. That why I can't tell you how.

It's reasonably analogous to Vietnam in the mid 70s.
After the US leaves, the nation can pick itself up, seek international help etc. Godzilla's tender helping hand is not to be there any more.

The US can be a *part* of international or Arab supported efforts to help the country. I know the US fucked it up, so I do agree there's some special 'duty', if such exists, in international politics.
That could be satisfied, however, by disproportionately large donations (of money and civilians) to the 'fix Aghanistan' cause.

This is kind of rambly, so thanks if you've read it. I appreciate the compassion of your views, and would certainly rather have your people around *in general* [But a liberal like Johnson, on the loose, has been known to create lotsa body bags.]

Best,
J.

 

[KarenAM]

But in general I reject your request. Many of us who opposed Vietnam ran into that argument, to produce a way to 'fix' the situation in the late 60s and early 70s. But it was specified that there shouldn't be 'defeat.'

In general, a country should keep its army within its borders. I feel no necessity to describe a fix, esp. a US one, for Afghanistan, or for Bhutan or Bolivia.

Best,
J.

I thought you would reject my suggestion, though I admit I was hoping you would take up the challenge, since you have a sharp mind.

For me, however, the discussion is over. You have proven that you can be critical but not that you desire to use your considerable talent to create anything.

I'm sorry to hear that your experience in the Vietnam era dampened your willingness to take a risk, and I apologize if I offended you with my suggestion. I would like to think that in the current world climate that most everyone would feel a neccessity to describe a fix, regardless of how impractical or kooky, but perhaps that is unfair of me.

Best,
K.

 

[Pure]

The 'fix' process begins with the US soldiers leaving. Repeated requests have not gotten from you, on the part of the US, any *relevant examples of succesful 'nation building' or 'democracy installation' or even 'ending of women's oppression'

Hunting terrorists is generally best done in the way described by Sher and others; no armies. Small scale police-type or paramilitary type actions; infiltration of terrorist units.

It's a rare and *brief* case where you can do much against terrorists with bombs and armies (e.g., where there is a clear 'host' state, obvious 'training camps' etc.). That time long passed in Afgh'n.

The US efforts you commend sometimes (or partly), or want helpful suggestions on, are now simply making matters worse-- for the US (more Taliban recruitment) and for the Afghanis (more civilian deaths.)

This is a simple, plausible position backed up with a number of factual observations and references, esp. the "Taliban's Second Coming."
http://www.cursor.org/stories/secondcoming.html

That Omar is alive and well, if a little blustery, is confirmed in a recent interview published under the byline and excerpt: "We are hunting the Americans like pigs."

http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/apr/12inter.htm

See also:
Taliban planning offensive against US Report Date: 02-13-2004

http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/13pak.htm
{[In]battle against US-led forces in Afghanistan, Taliban is regrouping in the Khyber Agency region}

----
I can't satisfy your request for 'how do we fix evil' in the numerous pockets of it, in the world. I say the armies (US) and the thousand pound bombs not only do not work, but produce more of the evils you're intent on fighting.

For me, however, the discussion is over. You have proven that you can be critical but not that you desire to use your considerable talent to create anything.

That's a snappy debating point (and there are a couple others, below), but the axiom of Hippocrates applies. "First of all, do no harm." **

Going abroad with 'fix it' schemes backed by the US army and air force, generally increases harm to all involved (whether it's a liberal or a neo con project).

And it doesn't 'fight terrorism,' if that's the priority.

Getting the US out, while not 'creative' or 'risk taking' enough for you, might give some humans breathing space, and allow a few more Afghani women and children to survive, who won't under your ill founded nation building schemes.

J.

**A corollary is: "If you're already doing it, stop."

-----
Karen said,

I thought you would reject my suggestion, though I admit I was hoping you would take up the challenge, since you have a sharp mind.

For me, however, the discussion is over. You have proven that you can be critical but not that you desire to use your considerable talent to create anything.

I'm sorry to hear that your experience in the Vietnam era dampened your willingness to take a risk, and I apologize if I offended you with my suggestion. I would like to think that in the current world climate that most everyone would feel a neccessity to describe a fix, regardless of how impractical or kooky, but perhaps that is unfair of me.

 

[Pure]

http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/
http://www.cursor.org/stories/archivistan.htm

AfghaniScam:
Livin' Large Inside Karzai's Reconstruction Bubble

by Marc W. Herold

Departments of Economics and Women's Studies
Whittemore School of Business & Economics
University of New Hampshire

POSTED SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 --

In mid 2003, Domenic Medley, the British author of Kabul's first tourist guidebook since 1972, noted that aside from opium production, which has soared since the Taliban were tossed-out by U.S. bombs, serving foreigners is "the only real economy."1
"Even though the British didn't call it a conquest, they were there in support of the shah - just as we're in support of Karzai - the Afghans realized this was a conquest, this was an occupation for all practical purposes....the thing that we have over the British is airpower. We won't have an army wiped out in the passes."2
-- Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban, Peter Tanner [De Capo Press, 2002]

In a forthcoming book, I argue that the descent from a predictable, frugal existence for the average Afghan before 1950, into an uncertain condition of modern impoverishment by the late 70s, has been exacerbated by periodic droughts and two decades of war.3

In effect, three forces --modernization, war and drought -- explain the misery of contemporary Afghanistan. Certainly drought, landmines and the destruction of Afghanistan's traditional irrigation system have deepened rural misery. But the most important factor has been a failed modernization which, predictably, has gotten the least attention in the West [and its local allies whether King Zahir or Karzai] given that it is precisely this import from the West which has been the prime culprit.

Modernization has meant the uprooting of age-old tribal-peasant, rural, village communities which gave way to the isolated, individualism of the cities. With modernization, large-scale rural-to-urban migration took place, with the new city dwellers unable to find gainful employment. The impoverished rentier state was unable to garner sufficient resources to launch a profound process of capital accumulation.

I shall argue herein that social class might just have a tad to do with what an observer "sees." Little hope for the future is warranted as the Karzai regime is inspired by an upper middle class, urbanite, westernized "vision." The brief Taliban interlude [1996-2001] represented the brutal imposition of a particular, distorted interpretation of rural mores and vision upon a handful of urban centers and given the dearth of state resources simply resulted in a socialization of poverty [especially felt by westernized urban women]. One could construe it as the revenge of the village clerics, or mullahs, not the resurgence of Pashtun tribal codes and power.4

The successor, U.S-handpicked Karzai regime merely acts as a toll-gate for some of the foreign resources which have flowed into Afghanistan during 2002-3. The foreign community recognizes this and has wisely preferred so-called project aid, which frustrates the Karzai clique insofar as it has a dearth of resources with which to buy allegiance and build up its internal forces of repression [police and military].


The only vibrant element in Afghanistan today is the bustling informal market---epitomized by the endless cheery accounts in the West of Kabul's Chicken Street--- which exists notwithstanding and outside of, the Karzai "vision." As Andrew Bushell caustically wrote in the Boston Phoenix, "The new government of Afghanistan is a failure, but you wouldn't know it by listening to the U.S. and U.N. spinmeisters."5 Add the U.S. corporate press, although it took about a year after Bushell's article for it to raise many of the same misgivings.

In September 2003, Paul Watson of the Los Angeles Times wrote about mismanaged projects, graft, "Mafia NGOs", luxury hotels in Kabul arising amidst absence of sewers and clean water, though the author could not admit the class bias of so-called reconstruction.6

Another "economy" exists in the urban centers, primarily Kabul (which today accounts for 40-50% of Afghanistan's urban population). This economy is indulging in a huge consumption bubble, fueled by massive foreign "aid" inflows which in 2002, amounted to over 40% of Afghanistan's gross domestic product [as I have calculated elsewhere7].

Granted much of the aid has been in-kind relief. Add to that the $1.2 billion in gross income from heroin sales in 2002.8 In other words, the money inflow from drugs production just about matched all reconstruction aid flows in the year 2002. Such funds lubricate the numerous mafias openly operated in the Karzai bubble economy: the timber, housing, drugs, fur and NGO mafias.
This is the bubble economy of the wealthy and the wannabees, including the returned 'necktie' Afghans and the proliferating 'expat' community.

They populate the state and services sectors, earn high incomes which are spent on consumption of imports and local services catering only to this strata, e.g., beauty salons, hotels, foreign travel, gardeners and security personnel, weekend parties, golf clubs, Toyota Land Cruisers [the vehicle of choice] , the Excelnet Cafe - the Intercontinental Hotel's cyber-cafe9, bars and restaurants (like B's Place where a pizza costs $12, when the average daily wage in urban areas is $110).

On Christmas Day 2001, Variety Magazine carrolled, "In Kabul, Hooray for Bollywood." An article in the Boston Globe, announces "Hotel Critical to Rebirth of Kabul."11 For whom, when rooms at the refurbished Kabul Hotel will cost $125/night single occupancy?

Popular nightspots now include an Afghan-Italian pizza and kebab joint, an Iranian restaurant, and a couple Chinese places [including one where waitresses dress in miniskirts, though in April 2003 these were replaced with sarongs slit to the thigh]. Another article in the New York Times breathlessly announced how Vogue was rushing to Afghanistan to assist Afghan women "to be beautiful again." Hip Kabulis are now donning "skin-tight jeans and waist-high tops with short sleeves....as young people adopt the clothing they see in the movies from India and Hollywood," but the bluejeans for sale in the Jemhoriat Market sell for $5 - $25 a pair.12 Income in Afghanistan for most people today is $30 - $50 a month.

Thousands of well-heeled foreign "aid" workers and Afghan expats partake in raucous weekend parties, their Landcruisers parked in a smart Kabul street. Imported alcohol flows and Madonna echoes in the street outside.13 Peter Essen, German owner of the giant Supreme Food Service warehouse which initially supplied only the international ISAF force [whose members can only eat imported food for security reasons], caters to diplomats. Foreign aid workers, international journalists, etc.14

Essen said, "we've got beer, wine, whiskey, pork - anything you want." Reuters reported some locals in Kabul mentioning foreign women engaging in solicitation on street corners near foreign offices in downtown Kabul.15

Mrs. Lalita Thongngmkam's new Thai restaurant is the fashionable place to be seen in Kabul,
"at Lai Thai, in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood once preferred by al-Qa'ida leaders and Taliban commanders, slim waitresses in silk sarongs help guests out of their bulletproof vests and dish up green seafood curry under fairy lights in the walled garden. Bulky bodyguards wait patiently in dozens of foreign 4x4s parked outside."16

Sean McQuade who had worked in Afghanistan as an engineer, opened the Irish Club on St. Patrick's Day 2003, in the posh Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood of Kabul. The bar is located in a mock Tudor house surrounded by high walls. Several soldiers paid for by McQuade prowl the street in front armed with AK-47s. The Karzai regime licensed the bar to sell alcohol, but only to foreigners. Inside, hosts crowd around a wooden bar with a top made of green marble imported from, yes, Ireland.

The male staff is Afghan, but all have been given Irish names - Kevin, Jimmy, George, etc.. Outside, Afghan drivers slump in four-wheel drive vehicles waiting for aid workers and diplomats to finish their evenings, hoping it won't be very late. McQuade observed,
"we're the first people to stick our necks out and say this can be a cosmopolitan city."17

In July 2003, Atlanta-based World Airways Inc. got a $102 million, two-year contract to run twice-a-week flights from Washington D.C. to Kabul, with a coach round-trip fare costing $3,500 and business class going for $7,500. The drug, fur and timber mafias are doing a raging business. Dozens of new shops have sprung up in central Kabul selling furs of wild animals - like wolves, lynxes, and the endangered snow leopard - to foreigners.18 The export of timber to Pakistan from the forests of Kunar and Nangarhar is soaring despite calls from Kabul to desist.

Mercedes cars proliferate on Kabul's old Soviet-paved thoroughfares. Tawdry Pakistani-style mansions covered with marble and fake Roman pillars are sprouting up. In early September 2003, Karzai's chief of police in Kabul led officers in bulldozing away homes that some thirty poor Afghan families had built for themselves on open land in the posh Wazir Akbar Khan area, to make way for houses for high-ranking Karzai officials. Even the United Nations felt obliged to issue a mild protest against the new "housing mafia." The preferences of the "Gucci guerrilla", Hamid Karzai, are revealed in actions, again.\

[end excerpts]

Sound a little like 60s Saigon.... or early 50s Hanoi or Havana ?

 

[Pure]

Kerry is pretty weak on Afghanistan, as far as I can search the topic right now. That's a reason, per the thread question, he doesn't deserve one's vote:

He seems to see things aren't going well; i.e., he faults Bush's prioritizing. Oddly he seems to call for something like Bush's original "Marshall Plan."

One reason it's odd, is that this proposal accepts Bush's thoroughly discredited analogy (also used for Iraq) of Afghanistan with a West European nation, e.g., Germany, after the last war.

It's too bad the liberal idea floats unchallenged: that Afghanistan was a well conceived project that's going pretty well, and just needs a few more allies, and some or lots more $$$. Striking too, as stated, is that this plan is vintage.... George W Bush! (Cheney, Perle, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, etc.).

J.


Speech, Feb 27, 2004

http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0227.html

Assessment:

In Afghanistan, the area outside Kabul is sliding back into the hands of a resurgent Taliban and emboldened warlords.

Proposals

In Afghanistan, we have some NATO involvement, but the training of the Afghan Army is insufficient to disarm the warlord militias or to bring the billion dollar drug trade under control. This Administration has all but turned away from Afghanistan. Two years ago, President Bush promised a Marshall Plan to rebuild that country. His latest budget scorns that commitment.

We must – and if I am President, I will – apply the wisdom Franklin Roosevelt shared with the American people in a fireside chat in 1942, “it is useless to win battles if the cause for which we fight these battles is lost. It is useless to win a war unless it stays won.” This Administration has not met that challenge; a Kerry Administration will.

 

[dr_mabeuse]

Latest estimate by some think tank sets current Al Qaida membership at 18,000 and estimates it'll take 500,000 troops to really subdue Iraq.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&e=6&u=/ap/20040525/ap_on_re_eu/al_qaida_6

I think that figure for AQ 'membership' is absurdly high. I mean, it's not like they have a standing army or a payroll that big.

The article admits that AQ ranks have swollen as a result of the Iraq invasion. In fact, it says just about every bad thing that was predicted about Operation Enduring Freedom has come to pass.

I wonder if the terrorists in Iraq are actually trying to keep the US there in order to keep their recruitment up. Why else would they have killed the head of the governing council two weeks ago? If they wanted the US out, wouldn't it make more sense to do everyuthing they could to facilitate the transfer of power?

---dr.M.

 

[Pure]

dr., there's a nice recent article i'll try to post saying that the 'terrorist' alqaeda would shrivel and disappear, but for the 'errorist' activities of GWB.

likewise, under either Bush OR KERRY, i predict the taliban or something like it will emerge as the dominant force in the present Afg'n described earlier in the thread. i guess there's a prayer in radical islamist-land: Thank Allah for George W. Rummy, Cheney, and others who watch over the welfare of our cause.

PS: 18,000 is absurdly high. Most estimates are under 5000. BUT there are countless inspired (spin off) groups now, based, among other places, in Iraq. NOW, due to gwb, a hotbed of recruitment for radical islamist mvts. The radical mvt in Islam is NOT synonymous with 'al qaeda' though perhaps the us 'war' will draw them all together!!!

 

[dr_mabeuse]

The entire 9/11 attack was specifically intended to goad the US into a launching a massive, unfocused response that would serve to drive Muslims into the arms of Al Qaida, and that's exactly what's happened. We did just what Osama hoped we would do.

And yeah, I think al Qaida will just become the banner for all and any sort of terrorist group. It doesn't have 18,000 members. It surely has 18,000 potential members though.

In 5 or 10 years I look for there to be ganagster rappers named Osama.

---dr.M.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

The entire 9/11 attack was specifically intended to goad the US into a launching a massive, unfocused response that would serve to drive Muslims into the arms of Al Qaida, and that's exactly what's happened. We did just what Osama hoped we would do.

And yeah, I think al Qaida will just become the banner for all and any sort of terrorist group. It doesn't have 18,000 members. It surely has 18,000 potential members though.

In 5 or 10 years I look for there to be ganagster rappers named Osama.

---dr.M.

Maybe we could get them

-Colly

 

[cantdog]

Al Qaida did five major bombing attacks worldwide in the eight years up to and including the World Trade Center.

Since then, in two years, nineteen major bombing attacks.

These are figures which are a good deal less speculative than 18,000 members. Rumsfeld has said there is no "metric" for how well we are doing on the war. He means "measure," of course, but he is once again saying something which is simply not true. There it is. We are losing it. What we've done has increased the effectiveness of al Qaida and isolated us diplomatically.

cantdog