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In this decision, Judge Roberts, nominee to the Supreme Ct., states why there was no infringement of the rights of a 12 year old girl in Washington DC, who was arrested, searched, cuffed, and taken to the police station for three hours till her parents came. Her crime: While entering the DC transit-system, in the station, she made the mistake of eating a single french fry; He explains why there was nothing wrong with the 'zero tolerance' law that provided for 'tickets' (written citations) for adult offenders and arrest for non adult offenders.
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200410/03-7149a.pdf
United States Court of Appeals
Hedgepeth v. Washington metropolitan area transit authority
Oct 26, 2004
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.
ROBERTS, Circuit Judge:
No one is very happy about the
events that led to this litigation. A twelve-year-old girl was
arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were
removed, and she was transported in the windowless rear
compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing
center, where she was booked, fingerprinted, and detained
until released to her mother some three hours later — all for
eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station.
The child
was frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the ordeal.
The district court described the policies that led to her
arrest as ‘‘foolish,’’ and indeed the policies were changed after
those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for
adults who make young girls cry. The question before us,
however, is not whether these policies were a bad idea, but
whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution. Like the district court, we conclude that
they did not, and accordingly we affirm.
I.
It was the start of another school year and the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was once
again getting complaints about bad behavior by students
using the Tenleytown/American University Metrorail station.
In response WMATA embarked on a week-long undercover
operation to enforce a ‘‘zero-tolerance’’ policy with respect to
3
violations of certain ordinances, including one that makes it
unlawful for any person to eat or drink in a Metrorail station.
D.C. CODE § 35-251(b) (2001).
‘‘Zero tolerance’’ had more
fateful consequences for children than for adults. Adults who
violate § 35-251(b) typically receive a citation subjecting them
to a fine of $10 to $50. Id. § 35-253. District of Columbia
law, however, does not provide for the issuance of citations
for non-traffic offenses to those under eighteen years of age.
[The law]
Instead, a minor who has committed what an officer has
reasonable grounds to believe is a ‘‘delinquent act’’ ‘‘may be
taken into custody.’’ Id. § 16-2309(a)(2). Committing an
offense under District of Columbia law, such as eating in a
Metrorail station, constitutes a ‘‘delinquent act.’’ Id. § 16-
2301(7). The upshot of all this is that zero-tolerance enforcement
of § 35-251(b) entailed the arrest of every offending
minor but not every offending adult.
The Facts of the Case
The undercover operation was in effect on October 23,
2000, when twelve-year-old Ansche Hedgepeth and a classmate
entered the Tenleytown/AU station on their way home
from school. Ansche had stopped at a fast-food restaurant on
the way and ordered a bag of french fries — to go. While
waiting for her companion to purchase a fare-card, Ansche
removed and ate a french fry from the take-out bag she was
holding. After proceeding through the fare-gate, Ansche was
stopped by a plainclothed Metro Transit Police officer, who
identified himself and informed her that he was arresting her
for eating in the Metrorail station.
The officer then handcuffed
Ansche behind her back while another officer searched
her and her backpack. Pursuant to established procedure,
her shoelaces were removed. Upset and crying, Ansche was
transported to the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Processing
Center some distance away, where she was fingerprinted and
processed before being released into the custody of her
mother three hours later.
The no-citation policy was not, it turned out, carved in
stone. The negative publicity surrounding Ansche’s arrest
prompted WMATA to adopt a new policy effective January
31, 2001, allowing WMATA officers to issue citations to
juveniles violating § 35-251(b). See Deposition of Capt. Mi-
4
chael Taborn at 28, 55. Zero tolerance was also not a policy
for the ages. Effective May 8, 2001, WMATA adopted a new
Written Warning Notice Program, under which juveniles
eating in the Metro are neither arrested nor issued citations,
but instead given written warnings, with a letter notifying
their parents and school.
Only after the third infraction over
the course of a year may a juvenile be formally prosecuted.
WMATA Written Notice Memorandum at 1–4.
On April 9, 2001, Ansche’s mother Tracey Hedgepeth
brought this action as Ansche’s next friend in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. The
complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named
WMATA, its General Manager, the arresting officer, and the
District of Columbia as defendants.
It alleged that Ansche’s
arrest violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment, because adults eating in the Metro were not
arrested. The complaint also alleged that the arrest was an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
enforcement policies leading to Ansche’s arrest, and expungement
of Ansche’s arrest record.1
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
ruled in favor of the defendants. Hedgepeth v. Washington
Metro Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2003).
Addressing the equal protection claim, the court applied ‘‘the
highly deferential rational basis test,’’ id. at 156, because it
found that age is not a suspect class, id. at 152–53, and that
there is no fundamental right to be free from physical restraint
when there is probable cause for arrest. Id. at 155.
The court then ruled that both the District’s no-citation policy
for minors and WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy survived rational
basis review. Id. at 156–58. The district court next
rejected Ansche’s Fourth Amendment claim, relying on Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), for the
1 The complaint also sought damages from the arresting officer in
his individual capacity. That claim has been dismissed and is not
before us on appeal.
5
proposition that ‘‘ ‘...if an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender.’ ’’ 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160
(quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354). Given that it was undisputed
that Ansche had committed the offense in the presence
of the arresting officer, the district court concluded it was
‘‘without discretion or authority to reject the standards enunciated’’
in Atwater, despite the minor nature of the offense
and the harshness of the response. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
Hedgepeth now appeals.
II.
We are confronted at the outset with two jurisdictional
objections. First, Ansche’s complaint seeks only prospective
relief,2 and — even in the absence of WMATA’s change in
policy — we are not willing to indulge the assumption that
she will violate D.C. CODE § 35-251(b) in the future and
thereby again be subject to the policies about which she
complains. This suggests the lack of an ongoing case or
controversy under Article III. See City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (plaintiff subject to illegal arrest
procedure lacked standing to seek prospective relief because
2 At several points in the proceedings, plaintiff’s counsel referred
to a request for damages from the District. See, e.g., Transcript of
June 19, 2003 Summary Judgment Hearing at 32–33, 109. The
Second Amended Complaint, however, contains no such demand.
While that complaint concludes with the standard request for ‘‘such
other relief TTT as this Court deems just and proper,’’ id. at 7, and
while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a court
shall award a party relief to which it is entitled even if the party has
not demanded it, the law is settled in this circuit that ‘‘Rule 54(c)
‘comes into play only after the court determines it has jurisdiction.’
’’ NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. United States Sugar
Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dellums v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 975 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). Accordingly, even if damages could be awarded pursuant to
judicial discretion under Rule 54(c), the possible availability of such
relief would not establish standing or defeat mootness objections.
6
he made no showing that he was likely to be arrested and
subjected to illegal procedure again); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (‘‘Past exposure to illegal conduct
does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief’’).
Second, WMATA argues that its new policy for juvenile
offenders renders the case moot. There is no need for the
court to assess the legality of the policy to which Ansche was
subjected, WMATA argues, because that policy — a combination
of a no-citation rule for minors and zero-tolerance enforcement
— is no longer in effect.
The answer to both objections is found in the precise relief
sought by Ansche. In the complaint, Ansche sought not only
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the nocitation
and zero-tolerance policies, but also the expungement
of her arrest record. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 32(c).
She
clarified in her summary judgment papers that this last
request included a judicial declaration deeming her allegedly
unlawful arrest a ‘‘detention.’’ See Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Feb. 21, 2003) at 23.
Such an order would relieve Ansche of the burden of having
to respond affirmatively to the familiar question, ‘‘Ever been
arrested?’’ on application, employment, and security forms.
This court has approved such relief in the past. See Carter v.
District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Ansche accordingly has Article III standing, and her effort to
secure such relief has in no way been affected by WMATA’s
policy change.3
3 WMATA also argues that, as a state-level governmental entity
with sovereign immunity, it is not a ‘‘person’’ subject to liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Ansche, however, has also named as
a defendant WMATA’s General Manager in his official capacity, and
‘‘[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.’ ’’ Id. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
7
This action is justiciable with respect to both the District of
Columbia and WMATA. Although each tries to blame the
other, Ansche alleges that neither defendant’s policies alone
would suffice to cause the alleged violation: but for
WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy, there likely would have been
no enforcement of § 35-251(b) against Ansche; but for the
fact that District of Columbia law did not authorize citations
to minors, the zero-tolerance enforcement of § 35-251(b)
would not have required Ansche’s arrest.4 Cf. Machesney v.
Larry Bruni, 905 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (D.D.C. 1995) (‘‘ordinarily
when two tortfeasors jointly contribute to harm to a
plaintiff, both are potentially liable to the injured party for
the entire harm’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
By the same token, it appears that both WMATA and the
District would be implicated in the relief that confers standing
and defeats mootness. Ansche was arrested by a
WMATA officer and detained and processed in a District
facility. Records concerning the episode have been generated
by both WMATA and the District. See Transit Police
Event Report at J.A. 304–07; Metropolitan Police Dept.
Delinquency Report at J.A. 308–09. If redress in the form of
an order of expungement and a declaration that Ansche’s
arrest was a detention were appropriate, such an order would
properly run against both WMATA and the District.
III.
Ansche first contends that her arrest violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). Adults eating in the
Metrorail station during the undercover operation could be,
and almost uniformly were, given citations; similarly situated
4 It would be inaccurate to refer to the District’s law as one of
‘‘mandatory arrest.’’ The statute itself says a minor violating the
law ‘‘may be taken into custody.’’ D.C. CODE § 16-2309(a)(2) (2001)
(emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute allows an officer
discretion to warn or even to look the other way. The arrest
provision only becomes mandatory when paired with a zerotolerance
enforcement policy.
8
minors could only be and were subjected to the far more
intrusive invasion of arrest. During zero-tolerance week,
twenty-four adults violating § 35-251(b) at WMATA facilities
were issued citations, whereas fourteen juveniles were arrested.
WMATA’s Answers to Interrogatories at 7.
The first step in analyzing Ansche’s claim that this disparate
treatment violated equal protection is to determine the
proper level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny demands that classifications
be narrowly targeted to serve compelling state interests
and is reserved for suspect classifications or classifications
that burden fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutiny
requires that classifications be substantially related to important
governmental interests; it is applied to so-called ‘‘quasisuspect’’
classifications.
Under rational basis review, a classification
need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000).
Ansche argues for heightened scrutiny — strict scrutiny or,
more plausibly, intermediate scrutiny — for two distinct
reasons: first, classifications based on status as a minor are
‘‘quasi-suspect’’; and second, her arrest burdened her fundamental
right to be free of physical restraint by the government.
The district court correctly held that neither theory
supported heightened scrutiny.
A.
Ansche acknowledges that the Supreme Court ‘‘has said
repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification,’’ Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (citing cases), and instead
has analyzed equal protection challenges to age-based classifications
under rational basis review.
She argues that those
cases are distinguishable, however, because they concerned
classifications discriminating against the elderly, as opposed
to the young. Youth, according to Ansche, bears many of the
hallmarks of a suspect classification: a history of discrimination,
immutable characteristics, and political disenfranchisement.
See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). Thus,
she concludes, there should be heightened scrutiny of distinc-
9
tions burdening the young, even if there generally is not of
distinctions based on age.
This court has noted in passing that youth is not a suspect
classification. See United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 135
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); see also Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion). Other circuits have reviewed classifications
based on youth under a rational basis standard. See
Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1990); Douglas v.
Stallings, 870 F.2d 1242, 1247 (7th Cir. 1989); Williams v.
City of Lewiston, 642 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981). We agree with
the conclusions of these circuits.
Although Ansche is correct that the Supreme Court cases
applying rational basis review to classifications based on age
all involved classifications burdening the elderly, see Ramos v.
Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003), she has
presented us with no persuasive reasons to conclude that
classifications burdening children should be treated differently.
Heightened scrutiny is reserved for classifications based
on factors that ‘‘are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.’’
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Youth is not such a factor — young age
is quite often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution
itself attests. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (minimum age
for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for
Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President). Minimum
age requirements for voting, marriage, driving, drinking,
employment, and the like cannot be dismissed as reflecting
‘‘prejudice and antipathy’’ toward the young. Youth is
not ‘‘so seldom relevant’’ to legitimate state concerns that we
should assume that any law singling out the young is probably
the result of anti-youth animus. Youth is more often
relevant than old age, which we know does not trigger
heightened scrutiny.
Nor are the characteristics that define the young markedly
more obvious or distinguishing than those that define the old.
10
In fact, the characteristics are simply opposite sides of the
same coin — age. Youth is also far less ‘‘immutable’’ than old
age: minors mature to majority and literally outgrow their
prior status; the old can but grow more so.
Ansche does point to one relevant difference between old
age and youth: political power. Older Americans can vote;
children cannot. A finding of ‘‘political powerless[ness],’’
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, however, even if defined solely in
terms of voting rights, is not enough to trigger heightened
scrutiny. Compare City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (applying
rational basis scrutiny to distinctions based on mental
retardation) with id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (observing that in most states the
mentally retarded cannot vote). Political powerlessness is
also not measured solely in terms of access to the ballot box,
for the broad array of laws and government programs dedicated
to protecting and nurturing children — combined with
the large numbers of voters who are parents or otherwise
concerned about children — belies the argument that children
and their needs cannot attract the attention of the legislature.
See id. at 445. We are rightly skeptical of paternalistic
arguments when it comes to classifications addressing adults,
see, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982), but the concern that the state not
treat adults like children surely does not prevent it from
treating children like children. WMATA’s haste to abandon
its challenged policy in the wake of adverse publicity confirms
that the interests of children are not lightly ignored by the
political process.
For all these reasons, we conclude that classifications based
on youth — like those based on age in general — do not
trigger heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200410/03-7149a.pdf
United States Court of Appeals
Hedgepeth v. Washington metropolitan area transit authority
Oct 26, 2004
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.
ROBERTS, Circuit Judge:
No one is very happy about the
events that led to this litigation. A twelve-year-old girl was
arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were
removed, and she was transported in the windowless rear
compartment of a police vehicle to a juvenile processing
center, where she was booked, fingerprinted, and detained
until released to her mother some three hours later — all for
eating a single french fry in a Metrorail station.
The child
was frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the ordeal.
The district court described the policies that led to her
arrest as ‘‘foolish,’’ and indeed the policies were changed after
those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for
adults who make young girls cry. The question before us,
however, is not whether these policies were a bad idea, but
whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution. Like the district court, we conclude that
they did not, and accordingly we affirm.
I.
It was the start of another school year and the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) was once
again getting complaints about bad behavior by students
using the Tenleytown/American University Metrorail station.
In response WMATA embarked on a week-long undercover
operation to enforce a ‘‘zero-tolerance’’ policy with respect to
3
violations of certain ordinances, including one that makes it
unlawful for any person to eat or drink in a Metrorail station.
D.C. CODE § 35-251(b) (2001).
‘‘Zero tolerance’’ had more
fateful consequences for children than for adults. Adults who
violate § 35-251(b) typically receive a citation subjecting them
to a fine of $10 to $50. Id. § 35-253. District of Columbia
law, however, does not provide for the issuance of citations
for non-traffic offenses to those under eighteen years of age.
[The law]
Instead, a minor who has committed what an officer has
reasonable grounds to believe is a ‘‘delinquent act’’ ‘‘may be
taken into custody.’’ Id. § 16-2309(a)(2). Committing an
offense under District of Columbia law, such as eating in a
Metrorail station, constitutes a ‘‘delinquent act.’’ Id. § 16-
2301(7). The upshot of all this is that zero-tolerance enforcement
of § 35-251(b) entailed the arrest of every offending
minor but not every offending adult.
The Facts of the Case
The undercover operation was in effect on October 23,
2000, when twelve-year-old Ansche Hedgepeth and a classmate
entered the Tenleytown/AU station on their way home
from school. Ansche had stopped at a fast-food restaurant on
the way and ordered a bag of french fries — to go. While
waiting for her companion to purchase a fare-card, Ansche
removed and ate a french fry from the take-out bag she was
holding. After proceeding through the fare-gate, Ansche was
stopped by a plainclothed Metro Transit Police officer, who
identified himself and informed her that he was arresting her
for eating in the Metrorail station.
The officer then handcuffed
Ansche behind her back while another officer searched
her and her backpack. Pursuant to established procedure,
her shoelaces were removed. Upset and crying, Ansche was
transported to the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Processing
Center some distance away, where she was fingerprinted and
processed before being released into the custody of her
mother three hours later.
The no-citation policy was not, it turned out, carved in
stone. The negative publicity surrounding Ansche’s arrest
prompted WMATA to adopt a new policy effective January
31, 2001, allowing WMATA officers to issue citations to
juveniles violating § 35-251(b). See Deposition of Capt. Mi-
4
chael Taborn at 28, 55. Zero tolerance was also not a policy
for the ages. Effective May 8, 2001, WMATA adopted a new
Written Warning Notice Program, under which juveniles
eating in the Metro are neither arrested nor issued citations,
but instead given written warnings, with a letter notifying
their parents and school.
Only after the third infraction over
the course of a year may a juvenile be formally prosecuted.
WMATA Written Notice Memorandum at 1–4.
On April 9, 2001, Ansche’s mother Tracey Hedgepeth
brought this action as Ansche’s next friend in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. The
complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and named
WMATA, its General Manager, the arresting officer, and the
District of Columbia as defendants.
It alleged that Ansche’s
arrest violated the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment, because adults eating in the Metro were not
arrested. The complaint also alleged that the arrest was an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
enforcement policies leading to Ansche’s arrest, and expungement
of Ansche’s arrest record.1
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
ruled in favor of the defendants. Hedgepeth v. Washington
Metro Area Transit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2003).
Addressing the equal protection claim, the court applied ‘‘the
highly deferential rational basis test,’’ id. at 156, because it
found that age is not a suspect class, id. at 152–53, and that
there is no fundamental right to be free from physical restraint
when there is probable cause for arrest. Id. at 155.
The court then ruled that both the District’s no-citation policy
for minors and WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy survived rational
basis review. Id. at 156–58. The district court next
rejected Ansche’s Fourth Amendment claim, relying on Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), for the
1 The complaint also sought damages from the arresting officer in
his individual capacity. That claim has been dismissed and is not
before us on appeal.
5
proposition that ‘‘ ‘...if an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, arrest the offender.’ ’’ 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160
(quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354). Given that it was undisputed
that Ansche had committed the offense in the presence
of the arresting officer, the district court concluded it was
‘‘without discretion or authority to reject the standards enunciated’’
in Atwater, despite the minor nature of the offense
and the harshness of the response. 284 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
Hedgepeth now appeals.
II.
We are confronted at the outset with two jurisdictional
objections. First, Ansche’s complaint seeks only prospective
relief,2 and — even in the absence of WMATA’s change in
policy — we are not willing to indulge the assumption that
she will violate D.C. CODE § 35-251(b) in the future and
thereby again be subject to the policies about which she
complains. This suggests the lack of an ongoing case or
controversy under Article III. See City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (plaintiff subject to illegal arrest
procedure lacked standing to seek prospective relief because
2 At several points in the proceedings, plaintiff’s counsel referred
to a request for damages from the District. See, e.g., Transcript of
June 19, 2003 Summary Judgment Hearing at 32–33, 109. The
Second Amended Complaint, however, contains no such demand.
While that complaint concludes with the standard request for ‘‘such
other relief TTT as this Court deems just and proper,’’ id. at 7, and
while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a court
shall award a party relief to which it is entitled even if the party has
not demanded it, the law is settled in this circuit that ‘‘Rule 54(c)
‘comes into play only after the court determines it has jurisdiction.’
’’ NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. United States Sugar
Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dellums v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968, 975 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1988)). Accordingly, even if damages could be awarded pursuant to
judicial discretion under Rule 54(c), the possible availability of such
relief would not establish standing or defeat mootness objections.
6
he made no showing that he was likely to be arrested and
subjected to illegal procedure again); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (‘‘Past exposure to illegal conduct
does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief’’).
Second, WMATA argues that its new policy for juvenile
offenders renders the case moot. There is no need for the
court to assess the legality of the policy to which Ansche was
subjected, WMATA argues, because that policy — a combination
of a no-citation rule for minors and zero-tolerance enforcement
— is no longer in effect.
The answer to both objections is found in the precise relief
sought by Ansche. In the complaint, Ansche sought not only
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the nocitation
and zero-tolerance policies, but also the expungement
of her arrest record. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 32(c).
She
clarified in her summary judgment papers that this last
request included a judicial declaration deeming her allegedly
unlawful arrest a ‘‘detention.’’ See Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Feb. 21, 2003) at 23.
Such an order would relieve Ansche of the burden of having
to respond affirmatively to the familiar question, ‘‘Ever been
arrested?’’ on application, employment, and security forms.
This court has approved such relief in the past. See Carter v.
District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Ansche accordingly has Article III standing, and her effort to
secure such relief has in no way been affected by WMATA’s
policy change.3
3 WMATA also argues that, as a state-level governmental entity
with sovereign immunity, it is not a ‘‘person’’ subject to liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Ansche, however, has also named as
a defendant WMATA’s General Manager in his official capacity, and
‘‘[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued
for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State.’ ’’ Id. at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
7
This action is justiciable with respect to both the District of
Columbia and WMATA. Although each tries to blame the
other, Ansche alleges that neither defendant’s policies alone
would suffice to cause the alleged violation: but for
WMATA’s zero-tolerance policy, there likely would have been
no enforcement of § 35-251(b) against Ansche; but for the
fact that District of Columbia law did not authorize citations
to minors, the zero-tolerance enforcement of § 35-251(b)
would not have required Ansche’s arrest.4 Cf. Machesney v.
Larry Bruni, 905 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (D.D.C. 1995) (‘‘ordinarily
when two tortfeasors jointly contribute to harm to a
plaintiff, both are potentially liable to the injured party for
the entire harm’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
By the same token, it appears that both WMATA and the
District would be implicated in the relief that confers standing
and defeats mootness. Ansche was arrested by a
WMATA officer and detained and processed in a District
facility. Records concerning the episode have been generated
by both WMATA and the District. See Transit Police
Event Report at J.A. 304–07; Metropolitan Police Dept.
Delinquency Report at J.A. 308–09. If redress in the form of
an order of expungement and a declaration that Ansche’s
arrest was a detention were appropriate, such an order would
properly run against both WMATA and the District.
III.
Ansche first contends that her arrest violated the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). Adults eating in the
Metrorail station during the undercover operation could be,
and almost uniformly were, given citations; similarly situated
4 It would be inaccurate to refer to the District’s law as one of
‘‘mandatory arrest.’’ The statute itself says a minor violating the
law ‘‘may be taken into custody.’’ D.C. CODE § 16-2309(a)(2) (2001)
(emphasis added). A plain reading of this statute allows an officer
discretion to warn or even to look the other way. The arrest
provision only becomes mandatory when paired with a zerotolerance
enforcement policy.
8
minors could only be and were subjected to the far more
intrusive invasion of arrest. During zero-tolerance week,
twenty-four adults violating § 35-251(b) at WMATA facilities
were issued citations, whereas fourteen juveniles were arrested.
WMATA’s Answers to Interrogatories at 7.
The first step in analyzing Ansche’s claim that this disparate
treatment violated equal protection is to determine the
proper level of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny demands that classifications
be narrowly targeted to serve compelling state interests
and is reserved for suspect classifications or classifications
that burden fundamental rights. Intermediate scrutiny
requires that classifications be substantially related to important
governmental interests; it is applied to so-called ‘‘quasisuspect’’
classifications.
Under rational basis review, a classification
need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000).
Ansche argues for heightened scrutiny — strict scrutiny or,
more plausibly, intermediate scrutiny — for two distinct
reasons: first, classifications based on status as a minor are
‘‘quasi-suspect’’; and second, her arrest burdened her fundamental
right to be free of physical restraint by the government.
The district court correctly held that neither theory
supported heightened scrutiny.
A.
Ansche acknowledges that the Supreme Court ‘‘has said
repeatedly that age is not a suspect classification,’’ Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (citing cases), and instead
has analyzed equal protection challenges to age-based classifications
under rational basis review.
She argues that those
cases are distinguishable, however, because they concerned
classifications discriminating against the elderly, as opposed
to the young. Youth, according to Ansche, bears many of the
hallmarks of a suspect classification: a history of discrimination,
immutable characteristics, and political disenfranchisement.
See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). Thus,
she concludes, there should be heightened scrutiny of distinc-
9
tions burdening the young, even if there generally is not of
distinctions based on age.
This court has noted in passing that youth is not a suspect
classification. See United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 135
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc); see also Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 536 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(plurality opinion). Other circuits have reviewed classifications
based on youth under a rational basis standard. See
Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1990); Douglas v.
Stallings, 870 F.2d 1242, 1247 (7th Cir. 1989); Williams v.
City of Lewiston, 642 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981). We agree with
the conclusions of these circuits.
Although Ansche is correct that the Supreme Court cases
applying rational basis review to classifications based on age
all involved classifications burdening the elderly, see Ramos v.
Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003), she has
presented us with no persuasive reasons to conclude that
classifications burdening children should be treated differently.
Heightened scrutiny is reserved for classifications based
on factors that ‘‘are so seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.’’
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Youth is not such a factor — young age
is quite often relevant to valid state concerns, as the Constitution
itself attests. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (minimum age
for House of Representatives); id. § 3 (minimum age for
Senate); id. art. II, § 1 (minimum age for President). Minimum
age requirements for voting, marriage, driving, drinking,
employment, and the like cannot be dismissed as reflecting
‘‘prejudice and antipathy’’ toward the young. Youth is
not ‘‘so seldom relevant’’ to legitimate state concerns that we
should assume that any law singling out the young is probably
the result of anti-youth animus. Youth is more often
relevant than old age, which we know does not trigger
heightened scrutiny.
Nor are the characteristics that define the young markedly
more obvious or distinguishing than those that define the old.
10
In fact, the characteristics are simply opposite sides of the
same coin — age. Youth is also far less ‘‘immutable’’ than old
age: minors mature to majority and literally outgrow their
prior status; the old can but grow more so.
Ansche does point to one relevant difference between old
age and youth: political power. Older Americans can vote;
children cannot. A finding of ‘‘political powerless[ness],’’
Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, however, even if defined solely in
terms of voting rights, is not enough to trigger heightened
scrutiny. Compare City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (applying
rational basis scrutiny to distinctions based on mental
retardation) with id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (observing that in most states the
mentally retarded cannot vote). Political powerlessness is
also not measured solely in terms of access to the ballot box,
for the broad array of laws and government programs dedicated
to protecting and nurturing children — combined with
the large numbers of voters who are parents or otherwise
concerned about children — belies the argument that children
and their needs cannot attract the attention of the legislature.
See id. at 445. We are rightly skeptical of paternalistic
arguments when it comes to classifications addressing adults,
see, e.g., Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982), but the concern that the state not
treat adults like children surely does not prevent it from
treating children like children. WMATA’s haste to abandon
its challenged policy in the wake of adverse publicity confirms
that the interests of children are not lightly ignored by the
political process.
For all these reasons, we conclude that classifications based
on youth — like those based on age in general — do not
trigger heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
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