Plan B

[Pure]

further sophistry

Yes, BS is right, one wouldn't take even a one in a hundred chance, backing out of one's driveway and not looking. it might be one's child.

However, if a woman has had sex two days ago, and is considering Plan B, she need NOT be so careful of this zygote, and would, perhaps, ensure its noncontinuance (taking the pill) since her date, its father, is a jerk.

BUT, says BS, SUPPOSE IT'S A PERSON. Then clearly she'd need all kinds of VERY substantial reasons--like life endangerment--to end its life.

Critic: Supposing it were a person, you would be right. But I don't suppose that, that is the question up for debate.

BUT, says BS, suppose there's 1/2 chance it's a person.

Critic: I don't suppose that either, but if so, she'd do well to be careful.

But howsay we pick a different number if you want me to consider things: say one in a million. That I'd agree to. And I'd say one in a million is negligeable. It's like the odds of someone jumping in front of my car, today. It can't stop me from driving.

BUT, says BS, I SUPPOSE IT'S ONE IN TWO, since we don't know, yes or no, if it's a person (according to this approach).

Critic: given no evidence, 1/2 is purely arbitrary. we don't know the chances, and if you like I'll give you one in a million, take it or leave it.

BS: In fact, I KNOW it's a person.

Critic: (shrugs).

 

[Colleen Thomas]

Oooh! Oooh! Can we talk about those next?

(Actually, I think that's "can you talk about those?" as my knowledge of black holes could fit into a thimble and leave room for a thumb. But I'd love to hear yours.)



I don't think this is a good analogy (if you'll pardon me for saying that) because it doesn't deal with the same issues. First, imprisoning the woman has no potential to directly prevent a death; it's already occurred. Secondly, it's not clear that she caused or would ever attempt to cause the death in question; the question is "did she or did she not take kill?" rather than "was what she killed human?" Third, her incarceration for murder would be likely to continue for years whereas a pregnancy has a finite limit of roughly nine months.

In the case of abortion, curtailing the woman's rights does address the issues of prevention and immediacy. That is, while still granting that the action may or may not kill a human being, by preventing the action one removes any chance that that actor will kill someone (prevention) by an action that itself is directly intended to destroy this indeterminately-human fetus (immediacy). That's why I went with the astronaut analogy; in that case, the direct result of the decision to aid the liberties of the first pilot is the 50/50 chance that one is killing the other.

I don't deny that there is doubt as to whether another party's rights are or are not being infringed, but they are also rights of a much greater magnitude - life rather than temporary liberty. Because magnitudes of rights are at stake in the question, the duration of the curtailment liberties is significant. If I've got a 50/50 chance of killing another human being by an action that will save me an hour of my time, I think most people would agree that the choice is fairly straightforward. If I had to condemn myself to slavery for the rest of my life in order to prevent a 50/50 chance of killing someone, that would be a very difficult decision; the magnitudes of loss are much more similar. There's no easy answer there, but I think that the most straghtforward route is to ask what one would choose if both potentials were to be enacted to onself. Would I rather definitely suffer nine months or take a 50/50 gamble that I would die? I'd certainly take the nine months.

That's my point on the curtailment of rights issue. By taking a 50/50 gamble that one might be killing someone in order to definitely avoid the nine months of lost liberty, one is enacting a bargain that I doubt anyone would take if s/he was the person with the potential to be killed. No one wants to lose either, but I think most people, if faced with that choice and absolutely convinced that if the coin flip went the wrong way, death would be immediate, would take the nine months.

Again, that's only applicable to those to whom the status of the fetus is in doubt. Those who feel it's not a human will quite logically support liberties; if there's no chance of a human life to protect, the liberties obviously win. But if there is a chance that it's a human life, and a good chance - an even odds chance - then by aborting it, we're saying that it's better to take a 50/50 chance of killing someone than to require someone else to accept curtailed liberties for nine months. Of course the person whose liberties are curtailed would be more likely to prefer that choice; it's human nature to prefer that bad things find someone else to happen to. But if we look at the totality of the question - is definitely curtailing one person's liberties for nine months a worse abridgement of freedoms than taking a 50/50 chance of killing someone else? - I can't see that most people would, if given the choice, want to play the odds on the second option.

With all due respect, and much is due, I think your assumption of life is coloring your thought process much more than my asumption of ignorance is coloring mine. If the question were not life and death, but let us say something less drastic, would you rationaly demand I adopt a position of working on apriori assumptions?[/quote]

I don't think so, but I do think that the chunk you quoted from me just before this wasn't worded as well as it could have been, and I apologize for that. I hope the piece above puts it better. It was a bit late on that earlier post and my brain didn't kick in to address the issue of odds vs/ certainty as clearly as it should have.

Basically, I'm not asking you to work on a priori assumptions about life (although that 3 AM chunk does rather look it); I agree that that would be unreasonable. What I am trying to say is that I can't see that definitely saving nine moths would, for most people, be worth a 50/50 chance of dying. I put it that way because I think that the only reasonable method by which anyone can weigh up potential conflicts of rights or consequences - by their nature not a mathematically quantifiable issue - is to try to decide what someone would be likely to choose if the same person had to choose between the two results. I say this because I think it helps weed out the natural tendency to prefer those consequences that least affect us personally. My goal is not to ask you to assume that there is an actual person facing a chance of death, but rather to say that if one is uncertain whether a fetus is or is not a person, abortion is effectively a 50/50 chance of killing someone, and that that is a threat few people would see as lesser than a certainty of nine months of curtailed liberty.



No, I promise, it's really not. Actually I like sticking to logic on this sort of thing because I think it helps people to recognize that each side is at least attempting to work with logic and that differences are not of a hateful nature. I also enjoy logic. My objection is to your definition of terms and not the choice of math as a means of expressing the situation.

Here's what I see as missing in your equation. I'm with you on A and B, with the value of B (not curtailing a known quantitity of the mother's rights) being greater than A. In fact, I think that saying that A = -B works well. I see a problem, however, with your use of X. I don't think that X would be "life or nonlife of fetus with unknown value," but rather, "X = known quantity of curtailed rights (entire life); unknown if X is present." It's not that we can't set a general value on an entire life as opposed to nine months of it; it's that we don't know if that life is there or not.

If we take the average human lifespan to be about seventy years, then X would have a value of roughly 93B - 93 nine-month spans in which to exercise all of the rights one grants in B. That's the problem, from my point of view. Even if we ignore any gains made by a baby - i.e., we don't automatically add +93B to the decision not to abort - then our equations still show a big skew in the risks associated with aborting. The no-human-life scenario - there is no X - means that the equation for aborting - [B - (X?)] - comes up with an outcome of B (no X so no subtraction), while the scenario for not aborting - [-B] - does come out to -B - a bad result. But if X is present, then the first equation - [B - (X?)] comes out to -92B, and the decision not to abort to -B. The consequences of X being present make the losses ninety-two times more severe. If X is equally likely to be present or not present, and if this is my retirement money I'm plugging into the equation, I would never risk losing ninety-two times as much on the flip of a coin.



The problem with this is that the pilot, in this example, is not the mother but the child. It's not the mother who is the potentially lost life. You choosing to send or not send the pilot is, essentially, the mother choosing to abort or not abort what might be a human. Whether it's human or not human, it takes the consequences of the actions but has no role in the decision.

This demonstrates, of course, the problem with analogies. They inevitably break down because they are not exact matches to what they attempt to describe. For example, a pilot could, as you observe, discover and reveal new information in time to avoid imminent death; a fetus cannot. If this analogy is to correctly represent the thing it attempts to represent, then we must accept the limitations present in the thing it represents. If death is to occur, it must occur to someone who had no control over the decision. It must also be unavoidable, as abortion generally is unavoidable death for the fetus, whether human or not.

In that case, to go back to the analogy, let's try reshaping it in a (probably doomed) attempt to make it better fit the thing it represents. Imagine that our ship's crewmember is in cryogenic suspension during the flight. Central command is directing her ship. Imagine, too, that her ship has had problems, there's no direct communication, and her life support has a 50/50 chance of having already failed. Now she's a closer approximation to what she represents - possibly a life, possibly not, wholly under the control of someone else. Should we, in this example, send her ship through a radiation cloud that will absolutely, positively kill anyone aboard the ship in order to send it to help the other pilot who is still safe but facing an extra nine months added to her journey home? If we know that the pilot is dead, it's a simple answer. If we know that she is alive, it's a simple answer. But if we're not sure which she is, why would we risk killing her in order to trim her comrade's journey by nine months? The potential loss is catastrophic compared to the potential gain, even if the loss is only potential and the gain is definite.



I'm not saying that you must assume that it's a human life; what I am saying is that if you don't know whether it is or not and you consider either equally possible, then logically any action that kills it has, from that perspective, about a 50/50 chance of having killed a human being. The only way that a human life is not potentially at stake at all is if one is sure that an embryo is not a human life. That works, but that involves an assumption about the embryo. The only way that a human definitely dies is if one is sure that it is a human being; then it's a 100% probability of killing it, but that also involves an assumption about the embryo. If one can make not assumption about the embryo, neither that it is or is not a human being, then it could be either, and therefore killing it could be killing a human being.

And yes, that means that the stakes are life and death. It's more complex, of course, than a simple 50/50 coin toss, because the answer will always be the same; that is, in reality it's either 100% or 0% of abortions that kill humans, but so long as we have no way of knowing whether the embryo is a human, either possibility seems equally likely. For that reason, the question "did that action kill a human?" would have to be answered with the acknowledgement that it might have and that it might not have. Yes, there is a difference between a 50% chance of killing something you know is human and a definite kill of something that has a 50% chance of being human, but in terms of whether you've killed a human as the end result, the odds are the same - 50/50.



Yes, but again, this seems to default to the assumption that there is a person - one person - who will deal with the results. As a math problem, it acknowledges B and -B, but not the fact that a potential for X, or 93B, exists, a loss which - while potential and not actual - is also enormously greater. It's one thing to say that M stands to gain or lose B, so let M make the decision; it's another to say that M will gain or lose B, but if M gains it, there's a 50/50 chance that a person F, who had no role in the decision, will lose 93B. M's maximum potential loss is much smaller, and if the loss occurs, it's not M who has to bear the burden. It's true that F's loss is only potential, but the differential between results is vastly larger than the differential between the odds - which are equal for either outcome.



All right, but how does that square with the math? Why risk a 50/50 chance that the results will be 92 times worse? I might offer someone double-or-nothing on a 50/50 chance, but who would offer multiply-by-ninety-two-or-nothing?



I'm hoping I've addressed this above. Statistically, it has to be unless one has decided that an embryo is not a human life. So long as there is a chance that it's a human life, than there is a chance that each abortion is killing a human being. That is a life or death situation.



I'm sorry. I'm not trying to move you there, and I do wholly respect the stance that one does not know what a fetus is and wishes to withold judgement on that topic until better information is available. I think it's a perfectly good choice, and I accept that you have made it.

I do, however, question some of your claims because they don't appear to acknowledge potential - which is, of course, different from acknowledging actuality or definitive presence, but which is part of the middle position of acknowledging that a fetus may or may not be a human life. I think much of this is probably down to both of us grasping about for examples; it's very difficult to discuss abstractions without analogies, but of course the analogies themselves can become problems when the inevitable disconnects cause confusion. However, I do struggle to see that middle position in your claims, for instance, that this is only a life and death situation if one believes a life to be definitely present. If one acknowledges any potential that a life exists, then one acknowledges that this may be a life and death situation, and that one cannot know which actions might take a life. It's not clear to me how one can describe a 50/50 chance of killing someone as not being a life or death situation.

But it's your syllogisms I'm picking at. I'm tugging at what look to me like weak links in your chain of reasoning, trying to figure out if they are actually stronger than I think or if the chain of reasoning isn't actually what I thought it was. I know you to be a deeply honest, honorable, generous, and noble person; on the topic of how you feel or what you believe about anything, your word is all the proof I will ever need. What I'm tugging at are what appear to me on first glance like disconnects between belief and practice; how does belief X relate to practice Y? Are these two consistent? If they are, what's the connection? I'm hoping that you'll show me the connections; I would never dream of doubting the beliefs.

I'll work on expressing that better. Looking back, I am ashamed, for it is not what I have said, whatever I was thinking. I am very sorry for that. I have a very bad habit of saying "you're claiming X" or "your position entails belief in Y" when what I ought to be saying is "if I look at this as a chain of logic, it seems to me that it has to include claiming X or believing Y; is that how you got there, or is there some other way?" I'm sorry I haven't said that more often. It is honestly what I mean.

Shanglan[/QUOTE]


I asumed no slight. Thus the word distressing rather than hurtful as I wasn't hurt because I knew there was no intent to wound.

I'm at the point where I really would rather discuss astrophyisics, it's much more fun and there is not so much trouble in finding the right wrods.

I'll try again. The middle position to me has to be devoid of trying to quantify X. Whether x is a potential for life, a possibility for life or just a plausible speculation on their being life, it has to be immaterial. If I enter into any attempt to answer the question there, I have stepped right back into the realm of subjective assumptions.

In case one: Your subjective assumption that there is a life, presents me with a simple answer should I accept it. We can't allow murder of innocents.

In case two: The subjective assessment that there is no life, I am presetned with an equally simple answer should I accept it. We can't deny a person her human rights because she is pregnant.

Niether case one nor case two operates in a vaccum. They are, in the case of abortion, interrelated. And unfortuneatly, they are mutually exclusive. It cannot be alife and not a life. So while I would readily accept both conclusions as staements of policy, I can't in this case beacuse they are mutually exclusive.

If I reject case one as having inssficeint proof and I reject acase two as having equally insuffient proof what am I left with?

Case three: I don't know.

The question then becomes how do I balance an inconclusive case one with an inconclusive case two, to arrive at a position that rejects both? The middle ground.

If I agree to ban abortion, I have defacto accepted case one. No one will be allowed to exercise their own judgement. No one will be allowed to follow any path legally, but the now defacto view that a fetus or embryo is a life. Wheter you believe it or not, you have no option when you are presented with an unwanted pregnancy, but to acept the moral decision of others. Even if your own belief is diametrically opposed. That position does not seem to embrace any middle ground to me.

If I agree abortion should be allowed, I am not defacto acepting the conclusion that a fetus is not alive. Each person then, has the freedom to decide the question as they see fit. If a person sees case one as correct, they are free to carry the pregancy to term. If, however, a person does not see case one as being correct, they are free to terminate it, embracing case two, to whatever degree they feel is warranted.


I emphatically reject case one. I also emphatically reject case two. Neither has suffiecient eveidentary strength to be taken as an objective conclusion.

If you can, for a moment, stand with me on my rapidly disappearing plot of middle ground and think about it. Is there a position that I could assume, that embraces neither to any degree, short of simply declaring myself an unfit jusge and washing my hands of it? Can I in good concience do that, being a woman when there is a very strong argument that the rights of women are being assaulted intermingled in the resolution of the debate? Where can I stand, between the two rising tides and still hope to be on the middle ground when they crest?

If you can see a position, that does not embrace either argument and is more cogent than mine, I am all ears.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

Anyone care to speculate on how I keep screwing up the quotes?

 

[Pure]

every quotation has to start with [X] and end with [/X], where X is replaced by the word "QUOTE".

these commands are always in pairs. they disappear when properly used

there may be nesting, of course.

when things go wrong, it's obvious, for one sees [/QUOTE] floating about in the text--as I see in this case, Colly.

 

[BlackShanglan]

I asumed no slight. Thus the word distressing rather than hurtful as I wasn't hurt because I knew there was no intent to wound.

You are wonderfully kind and generous, as always.

I'm at the point where I really would rather discuss astrophyisics, it's much more fun and there is not so much trouble in finding the right wrods.

I would love to hear you discuss it, although I would probably have to look up the words.

(Boldface added)

I'll try again. The middle position to me has to be devoid of trying to quantify X. Whether x is a potential for life, a possibility for life or just a plausible speculation on their being life, it has to be immaterial. If I enter into any attempt to answer the question there, I have stepped right back into the realm of subjective assumptions.

I think that this must be the root of disagreement between us. I can't reconcile saying "X is immaterial" with "X may or may not exist." To go back to the black hole example, I can argue that the black hole exists or doesn't, but I can't imagine charting a course and assuming that since I don't know what X is, it's immaterial and shouldn't be considered despite my course taking me right past it. I've got to consider the possibility and think what the best course of action is given that I can't assume that it does exist, but also can't assume it doesn't. I can't leave the possibility that it's there out of my equations any more than I can ignore the possibility that it isn't.

Going to abortion, I can see that X is immaterial if a fetus clearly isn't a human life, but can't see how it could be immaterial if it's not clear which it is. That's not to say that one must accept that it is a life, but rather that if one accepts that it could be a life, one can't treat that potential as totally immaterial because the factors involved in the decision become more complex.

To go back to our equations, we can only make an equation with no X (as "value of life") if we're sure that no life could be involved. If there's no other life and we're sure of that, then it's the simple one of allowing abortion = B and not allowing abortion = -B. But if we acknowledge a possibility of the fetus being human, then that possible loss has to figure into the equation somehow. It shouldn't figure in as something that is definitely there, because we don't think it definitely is. But it shouldn't be figured like something that's definitely not there, because we're not assuming that either. I can't see any way to handle that other than the one in the last post - abortion = B -(X?), in which X is a very much larger number than B and the question mark indicates that it may or may not figure into the equation. It may or may not be subtracted, and our equation should express that; it must express that the presence of X is not a certainty, but the absence of it is not either. As a result, we end up with four possible outcomes that would map well into one of those little box thingies:

If fetus is not human and we do allow abortion, then in B - (X?) X does not figure and we get B.

If fetus is not human and we don't allow abortion, then we just have -B.

If fetus is human and we do allow abortion, then in B - (X?) X does figure and we get something like -92B (loss of 70 years vs. 9 months)

If fetus is human and we don't allow abortion, then again we just have -B.

My point is that your argument that the X should be immaterial would limit us to the first set of equations - the ones that assume that the fetus doesn't exist. An argument that the fetus is definitely a human would limit us to the second set. An argument that the fetus can't be proved to be either, though, would have to take all four equations into account - all possibilities of X both existing and not existing. That's not stating that any one of them is true; it's allowing that each of them could be true and is roughly equally likely to be so.

The question then becomes how do I balance an inconclusive case one with an inconclusive case two, to arrive at a position that rejects both? The middle ground.

If I agree to ban abortion, I have defacto accepted case one. No one will be allowed to exercise their own judgement. No one will be allowed to follow any path legally, but the now defacto view that a fetus or embryo is a life. Wheter you believe it or not, you have no option when you are presented with an unwanted pregnancy, but to acept the moral decision of others. Even if your own belief is diametrically opposed. That position does not seem to embrace any middle ground to me.

If I agree abortion should be allowed, I am not defacto acepting the conclusion that a fetus is not alive. Each person then, has the freedom to decide the question as they see fit. If a person sees case one as correct, they are free to carry the pregancy to term. If, however, a person does not see case one as being correct, they are free to terminate it, embracing case two, to whatever degree they feel is warranted.

But by denying the fetus any different protection to a thing that is definitely not human, you are de facto assigning it non-human status. You are treating it in a way indistinguishable from something that has no potential to be human. Of course, as you've observed elsewhere, that's the devil of this argument - one ends up with a position that looks just like one of the two groups who have already made up their minds. We're stuck with only two real physical options.

However, I have this issue with taking your action as a middle ground action: the risk of harm is immensely greater. Going back to looking at equations, it's the difference between definitely losing B and taking a 50/50 (assumed as a representation of the undecided mind's consideration of the relative likelihood of either interpretatin being true) chance on either keeping B or losing 92B. I can't see how taking the option that entails much greater risk of loss could be the right one. Yes, it's risk and not definite presence, and if one was sure that a fetus was not human there would be no risk at all. But if one is uncertain, then the calculations of potential gains and losses must incorporate both what would be gained and lost if the fetus wasn't human and what would be gained and lost if it was, as well as the odds of it being either.

That is, I think, logically the only way to deal with a situation in which one has a variable that may or may not be true. One must calculate the effects as if it was and as if it wasn't, then choose the course that does least harm in total. One can't simply ignore the variable; that would only be appropriate if one was sure it couldn't figure in. Rather, one has to consider that both might be true and work out what will do least harm if both were and if neither were.

If you can, for a moment, stand with me on my rapidly disappearing plot of middle ground and think about it. Is there a position that I could assume, that embraces neither to any degree, short of simply declaring myself an unfit jusge and washing my hands of it? Can I in good concience do that, being a woman when there is a very strong argument that the rights of women are being assaulted intermingled in the resolution of the debate? Where can I stand, between the two rising tides and still hope to be on the middle ground when they crest?

I think it's the position of least potential harm. I think it's the only way to deal with this sort of problem, in which one cannot determine whether a variable exists or not. One has to calculate what will happen for each course of action if it does exist, and then what will happen if it doesn't. Then, looking at all of the calculations, one tries to pick the course with the least total risk of harm across all possibilities.

In our black hole example, for instance, I'd calculate four things: what happens if it's there and I send a ship through, what happens if it's not and I send a ship through, what happens if it's there and I don't send a ship through, and what happens if it's not there and I don't send a ship through. I'll then look at how the results for sending and not sending stack up as totals, and I will pick the one with the least potential to do harm. I wouldn't treat the possible presence of the black hole as immaterial by not adding it into my calculations; it might be there. I wouldn't treat the potential presence of the black hole as absolute and true by always adding into my equations; it might not be there. Instead, I would figure it each way for each possible course of action, then add my risks and see what course has the least risk attached.

That's basically what I am saying above with abortion. I give the best relative weights I can to the results of aborting if the fetus is not human, aborting if it is, not allowing abortion if it's not human, and not allowing abortion if it is. I work out the gains and risks for each course of action (abort / don't abort) for each of the possibilities that I can't rule out - in this case, human and not human. I work out all four results and include all four in my calculations because it's the only way to incorporate both assumptions - that it's alive and that it isn't. I solve for both. Then I look at the balance of potential losses and try to work out which has the lowest potential for harm.

In this case, what I come to is that the loss to the mother will definitely occur if I don't allow abortion, and it's a substantial loss. However, if I do allow abortion, the potential for loss is much higher. It's not absolute loss; it might or might not occur. However, its maximum potential is massively greater than the loss the first course would entail. It can't be taken as definitely occuring, because I don't know that the fetus is human, but it can't be taken as definitely not occurring either, because I don't know that it isn't. My calculations would reflect this by adding the potential losses for both outcomes; I add what is lost for allowing abortion with and without a human fetus, and I add what is lost for not allowing abortion with and without a human fetus. That gives me, working from above, a total of -2B for not allowing abortion (-B for each case, whether the fetus is human or not) and -91B for allowing abortion (B if the fetus is human and -92B if it's not). What that tells me is that if the odds of fetus being human are even (it's equally likely to be human or not human), the second course of action entails enormously more risk of loss.

If I was going further, I would consider odds and probabilities. If I have a belief to one side or the other - that is, if I believe a fetus is more likely to be human or not human, but am not 100% certain - then I can weight the potential damage by odds. A very large loss that is extremely unlikely to occur, or that I think will never occur, might be worth the risk. If, however, I am dead middle of the road and think that either possibility is equally likely, then risking massive losses would not be as wise a choice as limiting potential losses. Typically, I would weight those odds by multiplying my numerical outcomes from above by the percentage likelihoods. If I think that a fetus is only 1% likely to be a human, for instance, I would multiply the -2B by .99 and the -93B by .1 and compare the answers for my best estimate of the relative potential for harm.

Basically, I'm saying that one of those four-square box-thingies that we used to do in high schools and that I can't draw on here anyway is a method that allows us to calculate potential harm from our actions without privileging either position. Remember them from genetics and that old "what to do if you're not sure God exists" puzzle? By calculating each potential outcome for each combination of variables and weighting them by their likelihood, we can arrive at a best guess at which course of action has least or greatest potential for harm. The nice thing is that that system allows us to consider whatever variables we like and to weight them any way we wish. It doesn't tell us what to believe and it doesn't establish what is true; it lets us compare the outcomes of actions for all expressions of an existing variable and figure out which course of action offers the least potential for harm throughout those possible expressions.

Shanglan

 

[Colleen Thomas]

You are wonderfully kind and generous, as always.

I would love to hear you discuss it, although I would probably have to look up the words.



I think that this must be the root of disagreement between us. I can't reconcile saying "X is immaterial" with "X may or may not exist." To go back to the black hole example, I can argue that the black hole exists or doesn't, but I can't imagine charting a course and assuming that since I don't know what X is, it's immaterial and shouldn't be considered despite my course taking me right past it. I've got to consider the possibility and think what the best course of action is given that I can't assume that it does exist, but also can't assume it doesn't. I can't leave the possibility that it's there out of my equations any more than I can ignore the possibility that it isn't.

Going to abortion, I can see that X is immaterial if a fetus clearly isn't a human life, but can't see how it could be immaterial if it's not clear which it is. That's not to say that one must accept that it is a life, but rather that if one accepts that it could be a life, one can't treat that potential as totally immaterial because the factors involved in the decision become more complex.

To go back to our equations, we can only make an equation with no X (as "value of life") if we're sure that no life could be involved. If there's no other life and we're sure of that, then it's the simple one of allowing abortion = B and not allowing abortion = -B. But if we acknowledge a possibility of the fetus being human, then that possible loss has to figure into the equation somehow. It shouldn't figure in as something that is definitely there, because we don't think it definitely is. But it shouldn't be figured like something that's definitely not there, because we're not assuming that either. I can't see any way to handle that other than the one in the last post - abortion = B -(X?), in which X is a very much larger number than B and the question mark indicates that it may or may not figure into the equation. It may or may not be subtracted, and our equation should express that; it must express that the presence of X is not a certainty, but the absence of it is not either. As a result, we end up with four possible outcomes that would map well into one of those little box thingies:

If fetus is not human and we do allow abortion, then in B - (X?) X does not figure and we get B.

If fetus is not human and we don't allow abortion, then we just have -B.

If fetus is human and we do allow abortion, then in B - (X?) X does figure and we get something like -92B (loss of 70 years vs. 9 months)

If fetus is human and we don't allow abortion, then again we just have -B.

My point is that your argument that the X should be immaterial would limit us to the first set of equations - the ones that assume that the fetus doesn't exist. An argument that the fetus is definitely a human would limit us to the second set. An argument that the fetus can't be proved to be either, though, would have to take all four equations into account - all possibilities of X both existing and not existing. That's not stating that any one of them is true; it's allowing that each of them could be true and is roughly equally likely to be so.



But by denying the fetus any different protection to a thing that is definitely not human, you are de facto assigning it non-human status. You are treating it in a way indistinguishable from something that has no potential to be human. Of course, as you've observed elsewhere, that's the devil of this argument - one ends up with a position that looks just like one of the two groups who have already made up their minds. We're stuck with only two real physical options.

However, I have this issue with taking your action as a middle ground action: the risk of harm is immensely greater. Going back to looking at equations, it's the difference between definitely losing B and taking a 50/50 (assumed as a representation of the undecided mind's consideration of the relative likelihood of either interpretatin being true) chance on either keeping B or losing 92B. I can't see how taking the option that entails much greater risk of loss could be the right one. Yes, it's risk and not definite presence, and if one was sure that a fetus was not human there would be no risk at all. But if one is uncertain, then the calculations of potential gains and losses must incorporate both what would be gained and lost if the fetus wasn't human and what would be gained and lost if it was, as well as the odds of it being either.

That is, I think, logically the only way to deal with a situation in which one has a variable that may or may not be true. One must calculate the effects as if it was and as if it wasn't, then choose the course that does least harm in total. One can't simply ignore the variable; that would only be appropriate if one was sure it couldn't figure in. Rather, one has to consider that both might be true and work out what will do least harm if both were and if neither were.



I think it's the position of least potential harm. I think it's the only way to deal with this sort of problem, in which one cannot determine whether a variable exists or not. One has to calculate what will happen for each course of action if it does exist, and then what will happen if it doesn't. Then, looking at all of the calculations, one tries to pick the course with the least total risk of harm across all possibilities.

In our black hole example, for instance, I'd calculate four things: what happens if it's there and I send a ship through, what happens if it's not and I send a ship through, what happens if it's there and I don't send a ship through, and what happens if it's not there and I don't send a ship through. I'll then look at how the results for sending and not sending stack up as totals, and I will pick the one with the least potential to do harm. I wouldn't treat the possible presence of the black hole as immaterial by not adding it into my calculations; it might be there. I wouldn't treat the potential presence of the black hole as absolute and true by always adding into my equations; it might not be there. Instead, I would figure it each way for each possible course of action, then add my risks and see what course has the least risk attached.

That's basically what I am saying above with abortion. I give the best relative weights I can to the results of aborting if the fetus is not human, aborting if it is, not allowing abortion if it's not human, and not allowing abortion if it is. I work out the gains and risks for each course of action (abort / don't abort) for each of the possibilities that I can't rule out - in this case, human and not human. I work out all four results and include all four in my calculations because it's the only way to incorporate both assumptions - that it's alive and that it isn't. I solve for both. Then I look at the balance of potential losses and try to work out which has the lowest potential for harm.

In this case, what I come to is that the loss to the mother will definitely occur if I don't allow abortion, and it's a substantial loss. However, if I do allow abortion, the potential for loss is much higher. It's not absolute loss; it might or might not occur. However, its maximum potential is massively greater than the loss the first course would entail. It can't be taken as definitely occuring, because I don't know that the fetus is human, but it can't be taken as definitely not occurring either, because I don't know that it isn't. My calculations would reflect this by adding the potential losses for both outcomes; I add what is lost for allowing abortion with and without a human fetus, and I add what is lost for not allowing abortion with and without a human fetus. That gives me, working from above, a total of -2B for not allowing abortion (-B for each case, whether the fetus is human or not) and -91B for allowing abortion (B if the fetus is human and -92B if it's not). What that tells me is that if the odds of fetus being human are even (it's equally likely to be human or not human), the second course of action entails enormously more risk of loss.

If I was going further, I would consider odds and probabilities. If I have a belief to one side or the other - that is, if I believe a fetus is more likely to be human or not human, but am not 100% certain - then I can weight the potential damage by odds. A very large loss that is extremely unlikely to occur, or that I think will never occur, might be worth the risk. If, however, I am dead middle of the road and think that either possibility is equally likely, then risking massive losses would not be as wise a choice as limiting potential losses. Typically, I would weight those odds by multiplying my numerical outcomes from above by the percentage likelihoods. If I think that a fetus is only 1% likely to be a human, for instance, I would multiply the -2B by .99 and the -93B by .1 and compare the answers for my best estimate of the relative potential for harm.

Basically, I'm saying that one of those four-square box-thingies that we used to do in high schools and that I can't draw on here anyway is a method that allows us to calculate potential harm from our actions without privileging either position. Remember them from genetics and that old "what to do if you're not sure God exists" puzzle? By calculating each potential outcome for each combination of variables and weighting them by their likelihood, we can arrive at a best guess at which course of action has least or greatest potential for harm. The nice thing is that that system allows us to consider whatever variables we like and to weight them any way we wish. It doesn't tell us what to believe and it doesn't establish what is true; it lets us compare the outcomes of actions for all expressions of an existing variable and figure out which course of action offers the least potential for harm throughout those possible expressions.

Shanglan

So you're basically suggesting a form of pascal's wager?

Two options Ban abortion or don't
Two possible cases for each

Ban: if X is life, then no one is harmed
Ban: If X is not life, th emother is only inconcvienedned for nine months

Don't ban: If X is life: You're sanctioning murder
Don't ban: If X is not life, no harm no foul

?

 

[LadyJeanne]

Having a child against one's wishes has a psychological and emotional impact on the rest of one's life, not just a nine month physical thing. It could have other consequences as well that will impact her for far longer than nine months. It doesn't sound like that harm is being calculated into the balance here.

 

[BlackShanglan]

So you're basically suggesting a form of pascal's wager?

Two options Ban abortion or don't
Two possible cases for each

Ban: if X is life, then no one is harmed
Ban: If X is not life, th emother is only inconcvienedned for nine months

Don't ban: If X is life: You're sanctioning murder
Don't ban: If X is not life, no harm no foul

?

Yes, Pascal! That is the very person whose name was stubbornly refusing to come to mind, because Jeremy Bentham for some reason kept trying to jam himself in. I knew very well it wasn't Mr. Bentham, but he was rudely persistent in his attempts to insist that it was.

I think Pascal's wager a poor work of reasoning on the issue of God because sincerity of belief comes into play if one thinks that there is a God. However, for issues like this one, I think it a forthright way of working out one's course of action.

I would tweak a little up there; I think that a dead middle position should list the first "ban" option as also having the disadvantage of curtailing the mother's liberties for nine months, as it would still entail that loss even if the fetus was a human. But what I like about that model (the calculate-all-outcomes setup) is that it allows us to include any issues we like. We can choose, for instance, to change the values that we assign to "B" to include financial and social repercussions as well as nine months of lost liberty. We can view the birth of a child as a positive bonus, or simply a neutral event neither good nor bad in itself. We can, in short, use the model to reflect our own values and assumptions; it just helps us see what the outcomes of our actions are in relation to those values.

Shanglan

 

[BlackShanglan]

Goodness - having a child against one's wishes has a psychological and emotional impact on the rest of one's life, not just a nine month physical thing. It could have other consequences as well that will impact her for far longer than nine months. It doesn't sound like that harm has been calculated into the balance here.

Took the words right out of my mouth. I was trying to address that above; using the "calculate least harm" model would let each individual person work out that balance. You could also add things like, for instance, a value indicating the potential impact on women's rights or social position, or - for the other side - a value indicating a potential to affect social valuation of human life in other contexts. You can put all of the variables you like; so long as you weight them appropriately, you've got a decent idea of the total issue.

You've also got a handy way to identify your issues for yourself and others. If Colly and I sit down and compare our results, we'll be able to see the variables each person took into account, how severe each person thought each effect might be, and where we diverge. If Colly has the chance of a fetus being human as 50/50 but the social, psychological, financial, and emotional losses to the mother and to society as a whole as so massive that they outweigh all potential loss on the "allow abortion" side, then I can see why we diverge on what should be done if we're not sure if the fetus is human. If she looks at mine and sees that I've weighted the odds of a fetus being human at 90%, then she knows what perspective I bring to my own arguments.

Ideally, in my hopeful little world, we also see things in the other person's reasoning that open up new ideas or at least new understanding or respect. We see all of the compelling reasons the other person has.

Shanglan

 

[Pure]

weird stuff-- 50/50?

coming along the sidewalk, a fellow rushes up to me and says, "Stop, if you cross that next line in the concrete, someone will die."

well i might indulge him and possibly there is a sniper who's using that as an indication to shoot.

however, if it happens again, or i see a routine in these acts, I become skeptical.

at this point he says, "You don't have to believe. But just accept some possibility. So either the crossing matters as I say, or it doesn't. Well, since there's a life at stake, at 50-50 odds, you must never cross that line."

rubbish. i could be saddled with the wierdest of injunctions just because someone claims life at risk and wants 50/50 consideration of that possibility. unless there are independent supporting reasons for the claim, it generally will not merit 50/50 consideration.

---
incidentally, the demolition of pascals wager is well known, for similar reasons. the cell structure of the table is actually not known, and the payoff values therein cannot reasonably be assigned. one might speculate that God sends to Hell everyone who takes pascal's wager. or that it's actually offered by a junior God whose practical jokes are famous up on Olympia.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

coming along the sidewalk, a fellow rushes up to me and says, "Stop, if you cross that next line in the concrete, someone will die."

well i might indulge him and possibly there is a sniper who's using that as an indication to shoot.

however, if it happens again, or i see a routine in these acts, I become skeptical.

at this point he says, "You don't have to believe. But just accept some possibility. So either the crossing matters as I say, or it doesn't. Well, since there's a life at stake, at 50-50 odds, you must never cross that line."

rubbish. i could be saddled with the wierdest of injunctions just because someone claims life at risk and wants 50/50 consideration of that possibility. unless there are independent supporting reasons for the claim, it generally will not merit 50/50 consideration.

---
incidentally, the demolition of pascals wager is well known, for similar reasons. the cell structure of the table is actually not known, and the payoff values therein cannot reasonably be assigned. one might speculate that God sends to Hell everyone who takes pascal's wager. or that it's actually offered by a junior God whose practical jokes are famous up on Olympia.

I tend to agree with you J. Probability, is really going to be dependant on the evidence. And if we sink to presenting supporting evidence for either side, we have entered into a discussion that will go on for a very long time, and even then, as we will weight different evidence differently, the proportionate probability would be diferent for each of us.

 

[Colleen Thomas]

Yes, Pascal! That is the very person whose name was stubbornly refusing to come to mind, because Jeremy Bentham for some reason kept trying to jam himself in. I knew very well it wasn't Mr. Bentham, but he was rudely persistent in his attempts to insist that it was.

I think Pascal's wager a poor work of reasoning on the issue of God because sincerity of belief comes into play if one thinks that there is a God. However, for issues like this one, I think it a forthright way of working out one's course of action.

I would tweak a little up there; I think that a dead middle position should list the first "ban" option as also having the disadvantage of curtailing the mother's liberties for nine months, as it would still entail that loss even if the fetus was a human. But what I like about that model (the calculate-all-outcomes setup) is that it allows us to include any issues we like. We can choose, for instance, to change the values that we assign to "B" to include financial and social repercussions as well as nine months of lost liberty. We can view the birth of a child as a positive bonus, or simply a neutral event neither good nor bad in itself. We can, in short, use the model to reflect our own values and assumptions; it just helps us see what the outcomes of our actions are in relation to those values.

Shanglan

But isn't it true Shang, that with each condition you add, the wager becomes more and more subjective as each of us would weight the different considerations differently? I have life. I have loss of liberty. I have emotional distress. I have long term economic efffects. I have the possibility of major social rmifiications in the case of unwed mothers. Etc.

In the end, dosen't this particular tack lead you right back to making a totally subjective decision? With the only difference being in this case the weight you give to various outcomes forming the basis rather than the weight you give to supporting evidence?

 

[Pure]

50-50 ad ignorantiam

colly, it's worth noting that the 50-50 argument from lack of evidence can be deployed for any number of ends:

against birth control:

Mr 50-50: Suppose there's a God, and he pretty much wants things the way the Pope says. And he's designed the universe with 'natural laws,' as per Aquinas, and that one law is that intercourse normally be associated with possible pregnancy. And that violating such a law gets you into deep caca.

Colly: But I don't believe it.

50-50: But it's possible, surely.

Colly: OK.

50-50: Ok, given the *possibility*, then either contraception's a crime against Nature and God, or it's not. So let's say, FTSOA, it's 50-50 either way. In the first case you get into deep caca, in the second you're OK. And there's a 50% chance of this. Surely it's rational--given that strong possibility and the dire consequences-- to avoid contraception.

Colly: Well, I don't believe in this kind of God who's after condom users.

50-50: But you must say there's a possibilty

Colly: OK, slender, but yes.

50-50: Well, let's just say, FTSOA, we don't know. So either there exists this Thomist God or not? right?

Colly: I should have seen this coming...

 

[BlackShanglan]

But isn't it true Shang, that with each condition you add, the wager becomes more and more subjective as each of us would weight the different considerations differently? I have life. I have loss of liberty. I have emotional distress. I have long term economic efffects. I have the possibility of major social rmifiications in the case of unwed mothers. Etc.

In the end, dosen't this particular tack lead you right back to making a totally subjective decision? With the only difference being in this case the weight you give to various outcomes forming the basis rather than the weight you give to supporting evidence?

Yes and no. (Lord, I am getting sleepy - I typed that "yes and know" to start with). My point is not that the structure allows us to determine objective empirical truth. It doesn't. If we know that, we don't need it. Rather, it's that it does direct us to a framework for handling the problem of a variable that the individual thinker cannot resolve - a yes/no issue for which she does not have a yes or a no. This approach will not generate a wholly objective answer, nor a universal one - every person will come to different conclusions. It is, however, a good model for people who are undecided on a central issue (like life of the fetus) because it offers a way to order and compare courses of action for which some variables cannot be determined. Rather than having to assume one way or the other on the variable and derive a course of action from it, thus inherently only considering one of the two possible realities, one can instead weight the combined results of both possibilities for each course of action.

No, it won't generate objectivity where it doesn't exist. I will, however, argue that it is an aid to objectivity where it is sought. I could, of course, fill in the cells and arbitrarily make everything on the "losses if you abort" side ten times as heavily weighted as the ones on the "losses if you outlaw abortion" side. But if I was going to be that deliberately biased about it, I doubt I'd trouble myself with trying to work out individual complexities. If, on the other hand, I'm really striving be objective about it, then I might do what I was doing earlier this evening on my own just before LadyJeanne posted - recognizing that my model was simplistic in that it only included time values and working to try to expand the number of ideas and effects that it takes into account. What if having a law against abortion does reduce societal perceptions of women's rights and equality across the board? How serious of an effect would that have? How much loss might be entailed? How does it balance against the tendency to abort female fetuses and the possible erosion of the rights of the pregnant to remain pregnant or have their unborn children protected from violence? If I'm serious about trying to use the tool objectively, then it can help me to recognize and include more elements that need consideration and work out to the best of my ability what effect they have on the question of which option does least harm.

Some of it will always be subjective. One strives to be objective - that's part of my point, for instance, in saying that when weighing how negative an outcome is, one has to imagine oneself receiving both outcomes and having to choose. It's just a way of cutting back the inherent tendency to see things that happen to other people as less serious a matter than things that happen to oneself. But there will always be subjectivity so long as that variable is in doubt. If we know what the fetus is, the course of action is clear; if we don't, it will always be a judgement call. I think "least harm" is a good goal, but what causes the least harm is to some extent a judgement call.

What's useful in the cell structure when considering the tenet of "least harm" is that it brings us to recognize that the decision is a subjective one and to question carefully the means by which we can both apply as much objectivity as possible and recognize the subjective in our own arguments. I actually think it's important that, as you note, it moves the subjective nature to how we weigh the outcomes rather than how we weigh the evidence; it helps everyone recognize that, if the evidence is not objectively clear, all outcomes have subjective elements. With that in mind, the structural framework of weighing the losses and gains for each possible outcome helps reinforce the need to consider each outcome and examine each possible expression of the variable. It helps us make sure that we are weighing (in this case) all four possible action/variable combinations and looking at them as a whole rather than focusing only on the ones most immediate to our own lives or instincts. If one is sincerely interested in doing that, it's useful.

Shanglan

 

[BlackShanglan]

Probability, is really going to be dependant on the evidence. And if we sink to presenting supporting evidence for either side, we have entered into a discussion that will go on for a very long time, and even then, as we will weight different evidence differently, the proportionate probability would be diferent for each of us.

Oh yes. I wasn't trying to establish or suggest actual probability. The reason I used 50/50 was that I imagined that to be the best representation of what the odds would appear to be to someone who had no leaning at all to one side or another. That is, I imagined that if I had no opinion on whether a fetus was human or not, I would essentially be saying that the evidence on each side seemed equally good, and so it seemed equally likely to me - 50/50 - that it was human or nonhuman. I quite agree that any sort of split is possible; I'd really characterize my own point of view as more 90/10 than 100/0, and within the realm of doubt there must be many people leaning 40/60 or 30/70 one way or another. I only picked 50/50 because you'd described your position as a middle position and I was trying to make it very ... middle-ish. That's also why I included the comments on weighting outcomes by probability when using the Pascal format; I wanted to make clear that I didn't think 50/50 was the only way to see it.

I agree that debates on evidence would go on for a very long time, and as you say, under the debate about what facts exist is the much trickier debate about what weight each fact should be given. Happily (I suspect for all of us) I have no desire to debate that issue. I haven't been trying to argue that anyone needs to see that question from any particular view, whether 100% in favor of a fetus being a human, 100% in favor of it not being a human, or anywhere in between. My interest is in the logical consistency of each position's suggested actions and in the ways in which decisions about actions spring from that central question about personhood. I began my participation in this thead attempting, not to persuade others that a fetus is a person, but to show them that it is a logical chain of reasoning from first premises and not a hatred of human liberty or a zealous desire to dictate the morals of others that leads to my actions. I do not feel that a person who is convinced by empirical evidence that a fetus is a person has any other logical alternative - just as I feel that a person who is convinced by empirical evidence that a fetus is not a human has no logical alternative but to support abortion rights. Similarly, my interest in the question of what to do when one is uncertain about the status of the fetus lies not in convincing people to become certain about the status of the fetus, but in working out what a thoroughly consistent and reasoned strategy for dealing with that uncertainty would be. I'm happy thus far with the least harm / weigh and combine variables approach, but always pleased to learn more.

When evidence is contradictory, it is natural that people should disagree. I can respect an opposing stance, however much I disagree with it, if it is grounded on some reasonable evidence, is internally consistent, and makes serious and earnest efforts at objectivity. I respect as well anyone who recognizes where and when some subjectivity is unavoidable and uses that recognition to work toward a better understanding of others. These are important matters to me with this debate in particular because it is, at least at the moment, inherently incapable of compromise. There is no action that will not leave large numbers of people feeling that a terrible injustice has been done. That has the potential to be terribly devisive and to fuel hatred and viciousness between people who come to see each other as the enemy. If there is no solution to the conflict of desired actions, the only thing we can do is to work to recognize in each other the strong reasons people have for their beliefs, and to see those as clearly as possible and acknowledge their presence rather than teaching ourselves to hate and scorn the opposition. It is necessary, at the moment, that someone swallow a very bitter loss on this matter, and it is likely that each side will continue for a long time to strive to advance its own cause. It is not necessary that we should divide ourselves into two warring camps who cannot respect each other or acknowledge decency and good will in the other side - not if we're willing to examine both ourselves and others, to follow the best reasoning we can with honest sincerity, and to recognize when and how others are doing the same, even if they come to different conclusions.

Shanglan

 

[Pure]

No to partial b'th abortion; no to abortion;no to RU 486;no to Plan B;no to condoms?

Anyone see a pattern here? Check this article, today's NY TImes

Colly, you're always asking if the ban on assault rifles is part of a compaign to totally disarm the citizens. In discussing one issue, one has a right to ask, "Is this the foot in the door? the thin edge of the wedge. What is your agenda."

For many Catholics and Baptists, the concern for 'tiny persons' is part of a larger concern, which--surprise--has to do with actual women. They are fucking around far too much, esp. outside of marriage, and there are no consequences--so they think, at least. Sometimes they're right, but the "anti-life" attitude is still there. As the evangelical Dr. Mohler says, below, this dire situation of rampant sexual irresponsibility is because the link between sex and procreation has been broken, in a major way, since the pill.

So it turns out my joking reference to a 50-50--ignoratiam style-- anticontraception argument was prescient; from protecting tiny persons, one logically moves to protect the 'natural' role of tiny "pre persons," or the ovum and sperm cells. Their purpose and potential is to generate persons within the marital union. Easy availability of birth control is part of the problem. Protecting the 'natural role' prepersons, is of course, part of a larger agenda.

Contra-Contraception

By RUSSELL SHORTO

New York Times Magazine
Published: May 7, 2006

The English writer Daniel Defoe is best remembered today for creating the ultimate escapist fantasy, "Robinson Crusoe," but in 1727 he sent the British public into a scandalous fit with the publication of a nonfiction work called "Conjugal Lewdness: or, Matrimonial Whoredom." After apparently being asked to tone down the title for a subsequent edition, Defoe came up with a new one — "A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed" — that only put a finer point on things. The book wasn't a tease, however. It was a moralizing lecture.

After the wanton years that followed the restoration of the monarchy, a time when both theaters and brothels multiplied, social conservatism rooted itself in the English bosom. Self-appointed Christian morality police roamed the land, bent on restricting not only homosexuality and prostitution but also what went on between husbands and wives.


It was this latter subject that Defoe chose to address. The sex act and sexual desire should not be separated from reproduction, he and others warned, else "a man may, in effect, make a whore of his own wife." To highlight one type of then-current wickedness, Defoe gives a scene in which a young woman who is about to marry asks a friend for some "recipes."

"Why, you little Devil, you would not take Physick to kill the child?" the friend asks as she catches her drift.

"No," the young woman answers, "but there may be Things to prevent Conception; an't there?"

The friend is scandalized and argues that the two amount to the same thing, but the bride to be dismisses her: "I cannot understand your Niceties; I would not be with Child, that's all; there's no harm in that, I hope."

One prime objective of England's Christian warriors in the 1720's was to stamp out what Defoe called "the diabolical practice of attempting to prevent childbearing by physical preparations."

The wheels of history have a tendency to roll back over the same ground. For the past 33 years — since, as they see it, the wanton era of the 1960's culminated in the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 — American social conservatives have been on an unyielding campaign against abortion. But recently, as the conservative tide has continued to swell, this campaign has taken on a broader scope.

Its true beginning point may not be Roe but Griswold v. Connecticut, the 1965 case that had the effect of legalizing contraception. "We see a direct connection between the practice of contraception and the practice of abortion," says Judie Brown, president of the American Life League, an organization that has battled abortion for 27 years but that, like others, now has a larger mission. "The mind-set that invites a couple to use contraception is an antichild mind-set," she told me. "So when a baby is conceived accidentally, the couple already have this negative attitude toward the child. Therefore seeking an abortion is a natural outcome. We oppose all forms of contraception."

The American Life League is a lay Catholic organization, and for years — especially since Pope Paul VI's "Humanae Vitae" encyclical of 1968 forbade "any action which either before, at the moment of or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation" — being anti-contraception was largely a Catholic thing. Protestants and other non-Catholics tended to look on curiously as they took part in the general societywide acceptance of various forms of birth control.

But no longer. Organizations like the Christian Medical and Dental Associations, which inject a mixture of religion and medicine into the social sphere, operate from a broadly Christian perspective that includes opposition to some forms of birth control. Edward R. Martin Jr., a lawyer for the public-interest law firm Americans United for Life, whose work includes seeking to restrict abortion at the state level and representing pharmacists who have refused to prescribe emergency contraception, told me: "We see contraception and abortion as part of a mind-set that's worrisome in terms of respecting life. If you're trying to build a culture of life, then you have to start from the very beginning of life, from conception, and you have to include how we think and act with regard to sexuality and contraception."

Dr. Joseph B. Stanford, who was appointed by President Bush in 2002 to the F.D.A.'s Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee despite (or perhaps because of) his opposition to contraception, sounded not a little like Daniel Defoe in a 1999 essay he wrote: "Sexual union in marriage ought to be a complete giving of each spouse to the other, and when fertility (or potential fertility) is deliberately excluded from that giving I am convinced that something valuable is lost. A husband will sometimes begin to see his wife as an object of sexual pleasure who should always be available for gratification."

As with other efforts — against gay marriage, stem cell research, cloning, assisted suicide — the anti-birth-control campaign isn't centralized; it seems rather to be part of the evolution of the conservative movement. The subject is talked about in evangelical churches and is on the agenda at the major Bible-based conservative organizations like Focus on the Family and the Christian Coalition.

It also has its point people in Congress — including Representative Roscoe Bartlett of Maryland, Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey, Representative Joe Pitts and Representative Melissa Hart of Pennsylvania and Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma — all Republicans who have led opposition to various forms of contraception.

R. Albert Mohler Jr., president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, is considered one of the leading intellectual figures of evangelical Christianity in the U.S. In a December 2005 column in The Christian Post titled "Can Christians Use Birth Control?" he wrote: "The effective separation of sex from procreation may be one of the most important defining marks of our age — and one of the most ominous. This awareness is spreading among American evangelicals, and it threatens to set loose a firestorm.. . .A growing number of evangelicals are rethinking the issue of birth control — and facing the hard questions posed by reproductive technologies."

 

[Pure]

BS What's useful in the cell structure when considering the tenet of "least harm" is that it brings us to recognize that the decision is a subjective one and to question carefully the means by which we can both apply as much objectivity as possible and recognize the subjective in our own arguments. I actually think it's important that, as you note, it moves the subjective nature to how we weigh the outcomes rather than how we weigh the evidence; it helps everyone recognize that, if the evidence is not objectively clear, all outcomes have subjective elements. With that in mind, the structural framework of weighing the losses and gains for each possible outcome helps reinforce the need to consider each outcome and examine each possible expression of the variable. It helps us make sure that we are weighing (in this case) all four possible action/variable combinations and looking at them as a whole rather than focusing only on the ones most immediate to our own lives or instincts. If one is sincerely interested in doing that, it's useful.

Beyond mapping someone's 'payoff matrix' and respecting their argument is respecting their right to act upon their argument and its conclusion.