Michael Lind analyzes the GOP's history since the 1950s in considerable depth. He warns that even if the Pubs win Congress in 2022 and the WH in 2024, the gains will only be ephemeral, not something that will make them a hegemonic majority party in the long run -- citing the failure of the party's opportunities to do that under Reagan/GHWB, W and Trump.
He identifies four "strands" that have made up the modern GOP:
New England Liberal Republicans, heirs of the Abolitionist and Progressive traditions, who have now migrated over to the Democrats.
Northeastern and Midwestern "Stalwarts." "The other old Republican faction, sometimes called the Stalwarts and rooted in the Northeast and the Midwest, was neither liberal nor reactionary. The Stalwarts were pro-business, but they were not necessarily opposed to all government social programs or civil rights, and some acknowledged a role for organized labor in the modern economy. They tended toward anti-interventionism in foreign policy and protectionism in trade."
Neo-Confederate Dixiecrats who migrated over to the GOP in the wake of the Democrats supporting the civil rights movement. "They combined hostility to desegregation with shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later militarism, hostility to organized labor, and the support for free trade that was traditional in the commodity-exporting, nonindustrial South."
Nixon Democrats and Reagan Democrats -- working-class "rust belt" whites. "Many were “white ethnic” Catholics—Irish, Italian, German, and Polish—at the bottom of the intrawhite social and economic hierarchy, which had white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) at the top. Like their Southern white partners in the old Jacksonian Democratic coalition, the Northern white working class often viewed Black Americans as competitors for jobs, housing, and public services. But they were typically pro-union if not union members themselves, and cared more about crime in their neighborhoods than about contraception, abortion, or gay rights. The Nixon and Reagan campaigns won over these voters with the “law and order” theme while downplaying anti-union rhetoric."
Note that none of these align with Movement Conservatism -- the radical economic libertarianism, the Religious Right social agenda, or the neconservative warhawkery that have largely defined the party as a party ever since 1964.
He concludes:
He identifies four "strands" that have made up the modern GOP:
New England Liberal Republicans, heirs of the Abolitionist and Progressive traditions, who have now migrated over to the Democrats.
Northeastern and Midwestern "Stalwarts." "The other old Republican faction, sometimes called the Stalwarts and rooted in the Northeast and the Midwest, was neither liberal nor reactionary. The Stalwarts were pro-business, but they were not necessarily opposed to all government social programs or civil rights, and some acknowledged a role for organized labor in the modern economy. They tended toward anti-interventionism in foreign policy and protectionism in trade."
Neo-Confederate Dixiecrats who migrated over to the GOP in the wake of the Democrats supporting the civil rights movement. "They combined hostility to desegregation with shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later militarism, hostility to organized labor, and the support for free trade that was traditional in the commodity-exporting, nonindustrial South."
Nixon Democrats and Reagan Democrats -- working-class "rust belt" whites. "Many were “white ethnic” Catholics—Irish, Italian, German, and Polish—at the bottom of the intrawhite social and economic hierarchy, which had white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) at the top. Like their Southern white partners in the old Jacksonian Democratic coalition, the Northern white working class often viewed Black Americans as competitors for jobs, housing, and public services. But they were typically pro-union if not union members themselves, and cared more about crime in their neighborhoods than about contraception, abortion, or gay rights. The Nixon and Reagan campaigns won over these voters with the “law and order” theme while downplaying anti-union rhetoric."
Note that none of these align with Movement Conservatism -- the radical economic libertarianism, the Religious Right social agenda, or the neconservative warhawkery that have largely defined the party as a party ever since 1964.
He concludes:
