Pure
Fiel a Verdad
- Joined
- Dec 20, 2001
- Posts
- 15,135
An approach which is not paranoid and Big Brotherish
Toronto, Canada, is developing a traffic monitoring system AND trying to protect privacy [i.e., not use it to check for crimes], see this interesting story below:
Toronto experience in limiting use of CCTV for law enforcement.
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/PLBIN/2000/43.html
{excerpt}
TRAFFIC MONITORING BECAME A THREAT TO PRIVACY
The Toronto traffic monitoring system was set up primarily to check traffic flows, modify traffic signal cycles, detect accidents and guide the response of emergency services. Cameras were mounted on high poles and their output was made available to TV stations so that motorists could avoid congested areas. However, when it became apparent that the cameras were also capable of following individual vehicles and recording numberplates and facial images, law enforcement authorities expressed an interest in using the system for other purposes - a classic example of the ability of technology to exceed the purpose for which it was acquired, and the natural inclination to use it to its full potential.
Rita Reynolds took the view that, since local government staff controlled the cameras, they would be contravening privacy law if they allowed the system to be used in more invasive ways: the original authorisation by the City Council did not allow it, and covert surveillance would in any case require a judicial warrant. She therefore developed a protocol under which cameras would normally remain in the high-level (wide-field) viewing mode unless a life-threatening event was observed. If a traffic accident occurred and it was necessary to zoom in to determine the appropriate emergency response, the feed to the TV stations would be cut. Tapes containing personal data were to be sealed and securely stored for at least one year. If the police wished to make use of such tapes they would have to obtain a warrant to do so.
The protocol made it clear that the City Council does not have a law-enforcement mandate. It does, like all public authorities, have a duty of care. It is therefore appropriate to use its CCTV cameras to respond to life-threatening events, but not for the routine observation of all individuals passing a given point on the presumption that they might commit a crime. This is regarded as an unjustified invasion of privacy. In five years of operation, the 37 cameras in the system have not in fact detected any instances of a crime in progress.
POLICE USE OF CCTV NOT ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE
A crucial test of the protocol (and of the City Council's support for it) arose in the 1990s when, at a period of political controversy over welfare cuts by the government of Ontario, there were plans for a 10,000-strong protest march to the legislature in Toronto. The police, concerned about possible violence, asked to take over the system of traffic cameras to conduct surveillance of the march.
They intended to obtain as many individual images as possible in order to identify known criminals, likely offenders, protest organisers, and potential witnesses to incidents. Rita Reynolds asked the police to obtain a judicial warrant, citing a Canadian Supreme Court decision in which this had been held necessary.
The police were unable to produce a warrant, but insisted that they had sufficient authority. Rita Reynolds pointed out that the City Council could not legally comply. After further exchanges and some media publicity, the police reluctantly accepted an agreement under which Council staff would remain in control of the cameras; these would normally stay in their high-level viewing positions, and would be used to direct emergency services if required. The police could view the output of the system to facilitate crowd control. If an incident occurred, Council staff would cut the external video link and zoom cameras to determine the service required. If a law-enforcement matter was involved, the police would be free to view the tape on production of a sub poena.
In the event there were no incidents requiring intervention. The episode served to establish the principle that a public authority should not, under the guise of traffic control, conduct electronic surveillance of citizens exercising their democratic right of peaceful assembly. A basic argument for this principle is that if CCTV is used to collect personal data without stringent justification and controls, it becomes a mechanism for undermining the civil society which it is supposed to serve.
Toronto, Canada, is developing a traffic monitoring system AND trying to protect privacy [i.e., not use it to check for crimes], see this interesting story below:
Toronto experience in limiting use of CCTV for law enforcement.
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/PLBIN/2000/43.html
{excerpt}
TRAFFIC MONITORING BECAME A THREAT TO PRIVACY
The Toronto traffic monitoring system was set up primarily to check traffic flows, modify traffic signal cycles, detect accidents and guide the response of emergency services. Cameras were mounted on high poles and their output was made available to TV stations so that motorists could avoid congested areas. However, when it became apparent that the cameras were also capable of following individual vehicles and recording numberplates and facial images, law enforcement authorities expressed an interest in using the system for other purposes - a classic example of the ability of technology to exceed the purpose for which it was acquired, and the natural inclination to use it to its full potential.
Rita Reynolds took the view that, since local government staff controlled the cameras, they would be contravening privacy law if they allowed the system to be used in more invasive ways: the original authorisation by the City Council did not allow it, and covert surveillance would in any case require a judicial warrant. She therefore developed a protocol under which cameras would normally remain in the high-level (wide-field) viewing mode unless a life-threatening event was observed. If a traffic accident occurred and it was necessary to zoom in to determine the appropriate emergency response, the feed to the TV stations would be cut. Tapes containing personal data were to be sealed and securely stored for at least one year. If the police wished to make use of such tapes they would have to obtain a warrant to do so.
The protocol made it clear that the City Council does not have a law-enforcement mandate. It does, like all public authorities, have a duty of care. It is therefore appropriate to use its CCTV cameras to respond to life-threatening events, but not for the routine observation of all individuals passing a given point on the presumption that they might commit a crime. This is regarded as an unjustified invasion of privacy. In five years of operation, the 37 cameras in the system have not in fact detected any instances of a crime in progress.
POLICE USE OF CCTV NOT ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE
A crucial test of the protocol (and of the City Council's support for it) arose in the 1990s when, at a period of political controversy over welfare cuts by the government of Ontario, there were plans for a 10,000-strong protest march to the legislature in Toronto. The police, concerned about possible violence, asked to take over the system of traffic cameras to conduct surveillance of the march.
They intended to obtain as many individual images as possible in order to identify known criminals, likely offenders, protest organisers, and potential witnesses to incidents. Rita Reynolds asked the police to obtain a judicial warrant, citing a Canadian Supreme Court decision in which this had been held necessary.
The police were unable to produce a warrant, but insisted that they had sufficient authority. Rita Reynolds pointed out that the City Council could not legally comply. After further exchanges and some media publicity, the police reluctantly accepted an agreement under which Council staff would remain in control of the cameras; these would normally stay in their high-level viewing positions, and would be used to direct emergency services if required. The police could view the output of the system to facilitate crowd control. If an incident occurred, Council staff would cut the external video link and zoom cameras to determine the service required. If a law-enforcement matter was involved, the police would be free to view the tape on production of a sub poena.
In the event there were no incidents requiring intervention. The episode served to establish the principle that a public authority should not, under the guise of traffic control, conduct electronic surveillance of citizens exercising their democratic right of peaceful assembly. A basic argument for this principle is that if CCTV is used to collect personal data without stringent justification and controls, it becomes a mechanism for undermining the civil society which it is supposed to serve.
