Great Depression Ii


An excerpt from the 1987 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation.
© Warren E. Buffett, 1987.
_________________________


Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.


Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.


Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you.


But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."


Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins?"


The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.


Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.


Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.


We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings just because they have appreciated or because we have held them for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be "You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory, management is competent and honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.

 
Last edited:
It may be the biggest game of political chicken in our lifetimes. Whoever queers the deal "owns" whatever bad things happen from that point on. If Bush had any balls he's say, "Hey, I'm a lame duck, and you've already demonized me as much as you can, so go ahead - make my day. This is the deal - take it or leave it." He's never shown those kind of balls, though.

Would I like that? The devil's in the details of this deal - if it's "clean" (no big special interest handouts tacked on), transparent and minimizes taxpayer exposure (those two things could be accomplished by creating a market for the funny paper through an auction that would allow multiple bids) then I think it's prudent and smart. If it turns into a Christmas tree then I hope that Bush does tell them to stuff it - but only if I know in advance so I can liquidate my 401k stock funds before the news (dream on, Rox).

As I've been watching this unfold, I can't help but remember a similar situation. As I recall,the last "big game of chicken" Bush orchestrated was the urgent need to eliminate Saddam and his huge arsenal of WMD's. Different "panic" but similar tactics.

What strikes me as being so similar is the fact that the entire Congress is being fed the "facts" from a few Administration officials, no one actually knows the facts for themselves, there is no time to consider the solution (e.g. the world as we know it is ending!), you must vote TODAY!!!.....Hmmmm.

I wonder if we'll all find out the "truth" in a year or so like we did with the WMD's? I guess I'd like Congress to take whatever time they need to make sure they and we are not getting screwed one last time by GWB. I mean think about it; if this thing goes off as planned, then lame-duck GWB has effectively spent all of the available resources the next Administration would have had - might as well be electing GWB for four more years (or more).

And if (for our own good) we must bail out these guys, it should hurt them so bad that it will force them to consider all other options first - in other words, using taxpayer $$$ to bail out the "free market" should really, really, really be the last option. I'd like to know what exactly the ones holding the bad debt have tried to do w/o a taxpayer bailout (they are after all the brightest financial minds in the world - no?). For example, why don't we give them time to try to find a way to "un-bundle" their own bad loan instruments? I haven't seen any world bankers conference to discuss/review options yet. Even if we must slowly work through a recession, perhaps that is just the normal cycle of a "free market". Perhaps they, like children, have just not yet faced the reality/consequences of their actions and simply want an easy way out?
 
INCUBUS

I'm reading a collection of essays Bogle (Vanguard) wrote back in the 90s and 2000. The fears he expressed are exactly whats happeing today.

That's not technically accurate, JBJ.

At bottom, what Bogle asserted back in 1998 was that the S&P 500 was overpriced. He did not address anything remotely connected with the specifics of "whats happeing today [sic]." He has also addressed issues of corporate governance and compensation in a number of his books, most particularly, The Battle For The Soul of Capitalism.

That's not to say that he didn't [ and continues to ] castigate "Wall Street" and ninety-nine percent of the investment management industry for practices conducive and amounting to a "casino mentality—" a charge that is both warranted and with which I am in wholehearted agreement.

The entire mutual fund industry long ago abrogated any semblance of fiduciary responsibility and metamorphasized into a gigantic snake oil manufacturing and marketing operation. I wouldn't put a dime anywhere within reach of T. Rowe Price or Fidelity or Federated or Putnam or any of the rest of 'em.

Hell, Bogle's even harshly criticized Vanguard for joining in the fray. I am a Vanguard customer for the simple reason that Vanguard is the only firm in the entire industry that competes on the basis of price. Because Vanguard is unique in the fact that it's the ONLY firm that is owned by its clients, there is no inherent conflict of interest between the interests of the client and the interests of the organization.

Every other financial service operation has an inherent, unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict of interest between third party ownership and clients. Vanguard may not be perfect but it's (by far) the least worst alternative.


ETA:
Buffett, on the other hand, nailed it in his 2002 annual report (pp. 14-15):

“Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction”
An Excerpt from the 2002 Annual Report of Berkshire Hathaway Corporation
By Warren E. Buffett © 2003


Derivatives

Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system.

Having delivered that thought, which I’ll get back to, let me retreat to explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts. Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices or currency values. If, for example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction – with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years) and their value is often tied to several variables.

Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses – often huge in amount – in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands.

The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem – at a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.

When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.

But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract – which may require a large payment decades later – you are usually stuck with it. True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability.

Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That’s true because today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.

Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on “earnings” calculated by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think about our contract involving twins) and “mark-to-model” is utilized. This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years. In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth.

Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but that’s no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at yearend (after ten months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding, involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions.

The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years, some huge-scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used derivatives and trading activities to report great “earnings” – until the roof fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related receivables on their balance sheets into cash. “Mark-to-market” then turned out to be truly “mark-to-myth.”

I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to report impressive “earnings” (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a sham.

Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate meltdown.

Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables, though we’ve been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances, though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate in a manner undreamed of in more tranquil times.

In banking, the recognition of a “linkage” problem was one of the reasons for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and unanticipated liquidity demands on previously-strong banks, causing them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction” threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we are exiting derivatives.

Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies.

Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.

Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM – a firm unknown to the general public and employing only a few hundred people – could well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words, the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled. And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario.

One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes.

Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements. Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.

The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.

Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal…
 
Last edited:
ALASKA

If we were serious we'd execute many of these people, so they dont thieve again. But what we'll do is replace the money and retire them with huge pensions.

The bailout will cost each of us $6000. I say give each of us the money and let us decide how to improve the economy. As it is, we'll get the bill for the fun and have nothing to show for it.

Only in America is the average Joe not invited to the party, but has to pay for it.

OK, who let JBJ play with the calculator?

If the actual losses come in around $250 billion - right in the middle of the range of plausibility, then the cost per capita would be $833. HOWEVER - only half of those who have income actually pay income tax (thanks to extraordinarily steeply progressive income tax code), and most of those taxes are paid by those in like the top 20 percent. So let's get real - most people here won't pay a dime, and few of the remainder here will pay anywhere near that per capita amount.

Hey folks - it's "the rich" who will pick up the tab on this one!
 
Jeez, trysail. Did you have to post Buffetts explanation of derivatives?

Until this the only thing I knew about derivatives was the Treasurer of Orange County Ca. invested hugh amounts in them a few years ago and forced the county into bankruptcy.

Sounds like playing roulette on a wheel with several hundred numbers and you only win when the ball hits double 0.

Thanks man. I really needed another thing to shake my faith in our financial system.

Mike S.
 
Back
Top