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Why Did Putin Become So Bold in Georgia?
Dr. Alexandr Nemets
Monday, Oct. 14, 2002
Chinese media gives the answer.
China Reacts to the New Situation in Central Asia:
October 2001 – April 2002
On Oct. 29, 2001, just several days after U.S. troops entered Uzbekistan and some other Central Asian republics, as part of the anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan, the Chinese Web site Chinavista published the article "Xinjiang Likely to Replace Daqing in 8 Years," which definitely reflected the official Beijing point of view.
The article's major theses were as follows:
In autumn 1997, China signed a package petroleum agreement totaling $9.5 billion with Kazakhstan, including rebuilding the Uzen Oil Field (close to the Caspian Sea) and Aktyubinsk Oil Field (in the north-central part of Kazakhstan), and laying two oil pipelines from Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region in the western part of China and to Iran.
Moreover, by mid-2001, China invested $325 million in obtaining a 60 percent stake in Aktyubinsk Field and committed to invest $4 billion in its development over a 20-year period.
By mid-2001, all formalities for construction of a 3,000-km oil pipeline from the Aktyubinsk region of Kazakhstan to Xinjiang had been completed. This project will cost $3 billion to $3.5 billion and will have an annual capacity of at least 20 million tons of oil. The project, by preliminary estimation, will enter service in 2005 and reach full capacity by 2008.
Also, China reached a preliminary agreement with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan about the large-scale export of locally produced natural gas to Xinjiang. From Xinjiang, Central Asian oil and gas will go, via new pipelines to be constructed by 2005, to eastern regions of China. Particularly, the mighty East-West gas pipeline, of very high through-put capacity, will connect Xinjiang and Shanghai in 2005. (end of theses)
Shortly after U.S. troops entered Central Asia, Chinese leaders recognized that the struggle for huge hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea had entered the decisive stage. And already by the end of 2001, China intensified the realization of its oil projects in Kazakhstan, primarily the construction of the Aktyubinsk-Xinjiang oil pipeline.
In April 2001, high-ranking executives of China National Petroleum Corp. held talks in Astana with Kazakh leaders and reached agreement about accelerating these projects.
China and Russia Will Act Together: August 2002
On Aug. 8, 2002, the influential "Beijing review" weekly magazine published the article "Surroundings Still Steady?" Very briefly:
U.S. infiltration in Central Asia aims to contain Russia and China as well as Iran, and simultaneously strengthen U.S.'s own strategic status in the region. The U.S.'s long-term military deployment in the region will pose converging threats to both China and Russia.
Achieving energy passage through the Caspian Sea area and controlling the energy resources in Central Asia is a vital part of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign. The hydrocarbon deposits of Central Asia and Caspian Sea region account for 16 percent of the world's total verified resources; they are second only to those in the Middle East.
U.S. large-scale exploitation of energy resources in this region would (a) maintain steady development of its economy, (b) break Russia's energy monopoly in the region and (c) effectively undermine China's energy security.
China became an energy importer in 1993. In 2001, it imported 81.71 million tons of crude oil and oil products, for a total of $15.1 billion. Experts estimate that China's demand for crude oil will grow by approximately 10 percent annually in the coming 15 years, due to its rapid economic development. Oil and gas resources in Central Asia will be of vital importance to China's energy supply.
In 2001, China imported 7.01 million tons of oil and oil products from Russia and Central Asia (for comparison: 3.1 million tons in 1999 and 4.7 million tons in 2000), accounting for 8 percent of its petroleum imports this year.
Most imports were transported by tankers and railway, due to the absence of pipelines. China can guarantee long-term energy supply through its pipeline program, which plans to construct a pipeline from Central Asia via Xinjiang to East China.
(ATTENTION!) The U.S. pipeline program poses a potential threat to China The first, from Azerbaijan to Turkey (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceihan pipeline) has been virtually halted because of limited output in Azerbaijan. The second, from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan, has been shelved due to the presence of the Taliban regime. Now the the U.S. is likely to resume the second pipeline program.
The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline project enjoys political superiority. The two countries complement each other, with Kazakhstan's rich petroleum resources and China's great demands. This 4,000-km pipeline would transport 20 million tons of oil a year for at least two decades. However, once the the U.S. finishes its pipeline program, Kazakhstan – and Turkmenistan as well – will consider exporting the lion's share of their oil and gas via the U.S. pipeline, which is shorter to the sea. Hence, China's program will be challenged.
(The article is accompanied by the photo: "China-Kazakhstan petroleum project under construction": sophisticated mechanism makes a deep trench in the ground.) It seems that no comments are necessary here.
The same magazine, on Aug. 15, published the article "Russia's Different Tune From the West," with the following major theses:
Serious changes took place in Russian foreign policy during the last several months:
Russia firmly opposes a U.S. attack on Iraq.
Russia promised recently to provide Iran with conventional weapons and to help Iran in building a nuclear power station.
In late July, Russian Foreign minister Igor Ivanov visited North Korea and promised support.
The reasons for all these actions are as follows:
Russia doesn't want to be the junior partner of the West, opposes U.S. unilateral actions and supports a multi-polar world structure. And this is the policy of President Putin himself, who upgraded the military influence of Russia inside the USSR and stresses the role of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in maintaining security in Asia. Russia doesn't subordinate to U.S. pressure in the "axis of evil" area, as with other important problems. (end of theses)
During the first months of 2002, Beijing was a little upset by the "Western inclinations" of Moscow. However, after two summits of Jiang Zemin and Putin in Petersburg and Kazakhstan's capital of Astana, as well as the visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to Beijing at the beginning of June, the two countries resumed their full-scale strategic-geopolitical cooperation.
"Puti-Put" makes as much trouble for America and its close allies as possible. Remarkably, the Chinese-Russian "strategic-hydrocarbon" cooperation in Central Asia became very close.
On Aug. 18, Renmin Ribao published the following comments about Russian large-scale military maneuvers on the Caspian Sea in the first half of August. More than 10,000 people, 60 warships and 30 reconnaissance and fighter jets participated in the largest exercises on the Caspian since disintegration of the USSR. Purposes of the maneuvers:
Russia included the Caspian region in its strategic security area, together with the southern Caucasus region and Central Asia, its traditional backyard. Enhanced military capability in this area is a long-term and important task for the Russian government.
Moscow intends to exercise its influence over the resource-rich Caspian Sea, which holds up to 200 billion barrels of oil reserves, by reinforcing its military presence there.
Russian exercises are considered a response to the economic and military infiltration by the U.S.-led West in the former Soviet republics. The the U.S. deployed its troops in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, sent military instructors to Georgia, and strengthened military and economic cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
The exercise is a de facto Russian declaration to oppose the West's further invasion and to protect its strategic interests. (end of comment)
No doubt Russian received Beijing's blessing for the Caspian exercises.
Finally, Beijing Declares Its Ultimate Goals
The most interesting article, however, was published on Sept. 26 by Beijing-based Zhongguo Qinnian Bao, the official publication of the China Communist Youth League. Worth mention, this paper often voices the "secret thoughts" of Beijing leaders. Briefly:
Work officially began on Sept. 18 on the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and the heads of states from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey were present at the launching ceremony, and a congratulatory letter from President George W. Bush was read.
Without question, this was an important "milestone" in a new round of the international "great game" surrounding the oil resources in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea regions. This crucial development may help explain the series of high-pressure diplomatic measures that were taken by Russia and directed at Georgia.
After Bush issued his "ultimatum" to Iraq at the U.N. General Assembly, President Putin stole the thunder from Bush by also issuing his "ultimatum" to Georgia under the guise of fighting terrorism. Putin denounced Georgia for conniving with Chechnya's armed separatists and also declared that Russia would take the "appropriate [military] action" on Georgian territory. Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov openly stated that the Russian military had already completed preparations for offensive action in Georgia.
This move by Putin was a brilliant diplomatic stroke. He deliberately used the U.S. Iraq policy in order to ease the dilemma faced by Russia in the Caucasus – despite opposition of the U.S. government.
Moreover, Russia organized the north-south axis of the "vertical three states cooperation" of Russia, Armenia and Iran aimed against the east-west axis of the "horizontal four-state collaboration" of the U.S., Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Shortly, in the new round of the "great game" – continuation of the old British "great game" in this zone – Russia found the proper response to the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
The U.S. economic goals in this great game are very clear: to establish control over vast, still-undeveloped oil deposits of the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics, which exceed the total resources from the oilfields of the northern Alaskan shores and the North Sea. Motivated by this economic goal, the geopolitical strategy of the U.S. targets Russia, China and Iran. In particular, with respect to Russia, the U.S. wants to eliminate Russia's influence in Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus.
The U.S. military used the Sept. 11 incident as a heaven-sent opportunity to enter en masse into Central Asia, in order to control oil resources in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea regions. Now the U.S. intends to replace the oil-exporting facilities of Iran to the south and Russia to the north with the "central line" originating from Azerbaijan, crossing into Georgia and ending at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey.
For this reason, the U.S. has continued to contain and demonize Iran, while the Caucasus region inside Russia has continued to be plagued with troubles, the chaos in Chechnya only a part of it.
(ATTENTION! The Beijing paper de facto claims that turmoil in the Russian Northern Caucasus is fueled by the U.S.)
In autumn 1999, when plans for a 1,750-km long "central line" were finally completed under U.S. auspices, Russia tried to stop this project but failed. In 1999-2002, Georgia, as the U.S. pawn in this region, spared no effort to ensure that the fighting in Chechnya continues without end and to provide the "most feasible argument" for the costly "central line project" realization. Now Putin has forced Georgia into a showdown over the Chechnya issue and there may be more to come.
China's interests are affected by the new round of the "Great Game."
After the Sept. 11 incident, "anti-terrorism" became the diplomatic spindle of the U.S. The U.S. State Department continues contacts with Islamic extremists in Chechnya and "East Turkestan" (Chinese Xinjiang region). This shows more clearly than ever that the U.S. would not undermine its basic geopolitical strategy simply because of its "anti-terrorism" banner. Furthermore, the oil resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea are closely related to China's future development, particularly, to Western China's development. (end of article's briefs)
The final comment is very short:
In the "great game," including Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Trans-Caucasian republics of the USSR, China and Russia are "working together" against America and the West.
Both countries will do their best to break the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, and China will support Russia in its strike at Georgia.
Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."
Dr. Alexandr Nemets
Monday, Oct. 14, 2002
Chinese media gives the answer.
China Reacts to the New Situation in Central Asia:
October 2001 – April 2002
On Oct. 29, 2001, just several days after U.S. troops entered Uzbekistan and some other Central Asian republics, as part of the anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan, the Chinese Web site Chinavista published the article "Xinjiang Likely to Replace Daqing in 8 Years," which definitely reflected the official Beijing point of view.
The article's major theses were as follows:
In autumn 1997, China signed a package petroleum agreement totaling $9.5 billion with Kazakhstan, including rebuilding the Uzen Oil Field (close to the Caspian Sea) and Aktyubinsk Oil Field (in the north-central part of Kazakhstan), and laying two oil pipelines from Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region in the western part of China and to Iran.
Moreover, by mid-2001, China invested $325 million in obtaining a 60 percent stake in Aktyubinsk Field and committed to invest $4 billion in its development over a 20-year period.
By mid-2001, all formalities for construction of a 3,000-km oil pipeline from the Aktyubinsk region of Kazakhstan to Xinjiang had been completed. This project will cost $3 billion to $3.5 billion and will have an annual capacity of at least 20 million tons of oil. The project, by preliminary estimation, will enter service in 2005 and reach full capacity by 2008.
Also, China reached a preliminary agreement with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan about the large-scale export of locally produced natural gas to Xinjiang. From Xinjiang, Central Asian oil and gas will go, via new pipelines to be constructed by 2005, to eastern regions of China. Particularly, the mighty East-West gas pipeline, of very high through-put capacity, will connect Xinjiang and Shanghai in 2005. (end of theses)
Shortly after U.S. troops entered Central Asia, Chinese leaders recognized that the struggle for huge hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea had entered the decisive stage. And already by the end of 2001, China intensified the realization of its oil projects in Kazakhstan, primarily the construction of the Aktyubinsk-Xinjiang oil pipeline.
In April 2001, high-ranking executives of China National Petroleum Corp. held talks in Astana with Kazakh leaders and reached agreement about accelerating these projects.
China and Russia Will Act Together: August 2002
On Aug. 8, 2002, the influential "Beijing review" weekly magazine published the article "Surroundings Still Steady?" Very briefly:
U.S. infiltration in Central Asia aims to contain Russia and China as well as Iran, and simultaneously strengthen U.S.'s own strategic status in the region. The U.S.'s long-term military deployment in the region will pose converging threats to both China and Russia.
Achieving energy passage through the Caspian Sea area and controlling the energy resources in Central Asia is a vital part of the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign. The hydrocarbon deposits of Central Asia and Caspian Sea region account for 16 percent of the world's total verified resources; they are second only to those in the Middle East.
U.S. large-scale exploitation of energy resources in this region would (a) maintain steady development of its economy, (b) break Russia's energy monopoly in the region and (c) effectively undermine China's energy security.
China became an energy importer in 1993. In 2001, it imported 81.71 million tons of crude oil and oil products, for a total of $15.1 billion. Experts estimate that China's demand for crude oil will grow by approximately 10 percent annually in the coming 15 years, due to its rapid economic development. Oil and gas resources in Central Asia will be of vital importance to China's energy supply.
In 2001, China imported 7.01 million tons of oil and oil products from Russia and Central Asia (for comparison: 3.1 million tons in 1999 and 4.7 million tons in 2000), accounting for 8 percent of its petroleum imports this year.
Most imports were transported by tankers and railway, due to the absence of pipelines. China can guarantee long-term energy supply through its pipeline program, which plans to construct a pipeline from Central Asia via Xinjiang to East China.
(ATTENTION!) The U.S. pipeline program poses a potential threat to China The first, from Azerbaijan to Turkey (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceihan pipeline) has been virtually halted because of limited output in Azerbaijan. The second, from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan, has been shelved due to the presence of the Taliban regime. Now the the U.S. is likely to resume the second pipeline program.
The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline project enjoys political superiority. The two countries complement each other, with Kazakhstan's rich petroleum resources and China's great demands. This 4,000-km pipeline would transport 20 million tons of oil a year for at least two decades. However, once the the U.S. finishes its pipeline program, Kazakhstan – and Turkmenistan as well – will consider exporting the lion's share of their oil and gas via the U.S. pipeline, which is shorter to the sea. Hence, China's program will be challenged.
(The article is accompanied by the photo: "China-Kazakhstan petroleum project under construction": sophisticated mechanism makes a deep trench in the ground.) It seems that no comments are necessary here.
The same magazine, on Aug. 15, published the article "Russia's Different Tune From the West," with the following major theses:
Serious changes took place in Russian foreign policy during the last several months:
Russia firmly opposes a U.S. attack on Iraq.
Russia promised recently to provide Iran with conventional weapons and to help Iran in building a nuclear power station.
In late July, Russian Foreign minister Igor Ivanov visited North Korea and promised support.
The reasons for all these actions are as follows:
Russia doesn't want to be the junior partner of the West, opposes U.S. unilateral actions and supports a multi-polar world structure. And this is the policy of President Putin himself, who upgraded the military influence of Russia inside the USSR and stresses the role of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization in maintaining security in Asia. Russia doesn't subordinate to U.S. pressure in the "axis of evil" area, as with other important problems. (end of theses)
During the first months of 2002, Beijing was a little upset by the "Western inclinations" of Moscow. However, after two summits of Jiang Zemin and Putin in Petersburg and Kazakhstan's capital of Astana, as well as the visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to Beijing at the beginning of June, the two countries resumed their full-scale strategic-geopolitical cooperation.
"Puti-Put" makes as much trouble for America and its close allies as possible. Remarkably, the Chinese-Russian "strategic-hydrocarbon" cooperation in Central Asia became very close.
On Aug. 18, Renmin Ribao published the following comments about Russian large-scale military maneuvers on the Caspian Sea in the first half of August. More than 10,000 people, 60 warships and 30 reconnaissance and fighter jets participated in the largest exercises on the Caspian since disintegration of the USSR. Purposes of the maneuvers:
Russia included the Caspian region in its strategic security area, together with the southern Caucasus region and Central Asia, its traditional backyard. Enhanced military capability in this area is a long-term and important task for the Russian government.
Moscow intends to exercise its influence over the resource-rich Caspian Sea, which holds up to 200 billion barrels of oil reserves, by reinforcing its military presence there.
Russian exercises are considered a response to the economic and military infiltration by the U.S.-led West in the former Soviet republics. The the U.S. deployed its troops in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, sent military instructors to Georgia, and strengthened military and economic cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
The exercise is a de facto Russian declaration to oppose the West's further invasion and to protect its strategic interests. (end of comment)
No doubt Russian received Beijing's blessing for the Caspian exercises.
Finally, Beijing Declares Its Ultimate Goals
The most interesting article, however, was published on Sept. 26 by Beijing-based Zhongguo Qinnian Bao, the official publication of the China Communist Youth League. Worth mention, this paper often voices the "secret thoughts" of Beijing leaders. Briefly:
Work officially began on Sept. 18 on the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and the heads of states from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey were present at the launching ceremony, and a congratulatory letter from President George W. Bush was read.
Without question, this was an important "milestone" in a new round of the international "great game" surrounding the oil resources in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea regions. This crucial development may help explain the series of high-pressure diplomatic measures that were taken by Russia and directed at Georgia.
After Bush issued his "ultimatum" to Iraq at the U.N. General Assembly, President Putin stole the thunder from Bush by also issuing his "ultimatum" to Georgia under the guise of fighting terrorism. Putin denounced Georgia for conniving with Chechnya's armed separatists and also declared that Russia would take the "appropriate [military] action" on Georgian territory. Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov openly stated that the Russian military had already completed preparations for offensive action in Georgia.
This move by Putin was a brilliant diplomatic stroke. He deliberately used the U.S. Iraq policy in order to ease the dilemma faced by Russia in the Caucasus – despite opposition of the U.S. government.
Moreover, Russia organized the north-south axis of the "vertical three states cooperation" of Russia, Armenia and Iran aimed against the east-west axis of the "horizontal four-state collaboration" of the U.S., Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Shortly, in the new round of the "great game" – continuation of the old British "great game" in this zone – Russia found the proper response to the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
The U.S. economic goals in this great game are very clear: to establish control over vast, still-undeveloped oil deposits of the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian republics, which exceed the total resources from the oilfields of the northern Alaskan shores and the North Sea. Motivated by this economic goal, the geopolitical strategy of the U.S. targets Russia, China and Iran. In particular, with respect to Russia, the U.S. wants to eliminate Russia's influence in Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus.
The U.S. military used the Sept. 11 incident as a heaven-sent opportunity to enter en masse into Central Asia, in order to control oil resources in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea regions. Now the U.S. intends to replace the oil-exporting facilities of Iran to the south and Russia to the north with the "central line" originating from Azerbaijan, crossing into Georgia and ending at the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey.
For this reason, the U.S. has continued to contain and demonize Iran, while the Caucasus region inside Russia has continued to be plagued with troubles, the chaos in Chechnya only a part of it.
(ATTENTION! The Beijing paper de facto claims that turmoil in the Russian Northern Caucasus is fueled by the U.S.)
In autumn 1999, when plans for a 1,750-km long "central line" were finally completed under U.S. auspices, Russia tried to stop this project but failed. In 1999-2002, Georgia, as the U.S. pawn in this region, spared no effort to ensure that the fighting in Chechnya continues without end and to provide the "most feasible argument" for the costly "central line project" realization. Now Putin has forced Georgia into a showdown over the Chechnya issue and there may be more to come.
China's interests are affected by the new round of the "Great Game."
After the Sept. 11 incident, "anti-terrorism" became the diplomatic spindle of the U.S. The U.S. State Department continues contacts with Islamic extremists in Chechnya and "East Turkestan" (Chinese Xinjiang region). This shows more clearly than ever that the U.S. would not undermine its basic geopolitical strategy simply because of its "anti-terrorism" banner. Furthermore, the oil resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea are closely related to China's future development, particularly, to Western China's development. (end of article's briefs)
The final comment is very short:
In the "great game," including Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Trans-Caucasian republics of the USSR, China and Russia are "working together" against America and the West.
Both countries will do their best to break the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, and China will support Russia in its strike at Georgia.
Dr. Alexandr V. Nemets is co-author of "Chinese-Russian Military Relations, Fate of Taiwan and New Geopolitics."
