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No word
If they will prosecute those that post anti Trump messages
Does your state have an extradition treaty with the State of California?
If he would have kept his anti-Islam postings on his own page, there would have been no problems. The problems come in when you specifically target an Islamic Facebook page.
from the Daily Caller
ICSC Communications Coordinator Kristin Stangas blocked Feigin soon after he made the final post, but also kept copies of the comments to pursue legal action. The Los Angeles Police Department arrested Feigin Oct. 19 and interviewed him. Feigin is now arguing that his charges should be dismissed because they are based on an unconstitutional application of the law.
Specifically, Cal. Penal Code § 653m(b) states that “every person who, with intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an electronic communication device … to another person is … guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith or during the ordinary course and scope of business.”
BB that law could protect even you.
As long as the NRA, GOP, Christian orgs do not report harassment to the authorities, what will be done? Nothing. If nothing is done after they complain, then we have something to discuss. Right now you have jackshit to complain about.
Go on now. Have a nice day!![]()
As long as the NRA, GOP, Christian orgs do not report harassment to the authorities, what will be done? Nothing. If nothing is done after they complain, then we have something to discuss. Right now you have jackshit to complain about.
Go on now. Have a nice day!![]()
If he would have kept his anti-Islam postings on his own page, there would have been no problems. The problems come in when you specifically target an Islamic Facebook page.
from the Daily Caller
ICSC Communications Coordinator Kristin Stangas blocked Feigin soon after he made the final post, but also kept copies of the comments to pursue legal action. The Los Angeles Police Department arrested Feigin Oct. 19 and interviewed him. Feigin is now arguing that his charges should be dismissed because they are based on an unconstitutional application of the law.
Specifically, Cal. Penal Code § 653m(b) states that “every person who, with intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an electronic communication device … to another person is … guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith or during the ordinary course and scope of business.”
BB that law could protect even you.
If you live in California, don't post shit on someone else's Facebook page!
If they decide they've had enough, they can report you to the police. We are a nation of laws.
If you don't report to the police, NO JUSTICE FOR YOU!!!
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is very difficult to establish under Maryland personal injury law.
In order to prove a prima facie case of IIED in Maryland, the Plaintiff must show:
1. That the conduct was intentional or reckless;
2. The conduct is extreme and outrageous;
3. There is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress;
4. The emotional distress is severe.
To meet the fourth element, the emotional distress must be “severely disabling,” such that “no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Being “upset” and “embarrassed” is not sufficient to show severe emotional distress. Evidence that the Plaintiff could continue with his normal life activities or that he did not seek professional treatment can show that the distress is not “severe.”
https://www.marylandaccidentattorneyblog.com/2010/09/intentional_infliction_of_emot.html
The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.
Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989). Indeed, “the point of all speech protection … is to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574 (1995).
The jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a finding that Westboro’s picketing was “outrageous.” “Outrageousness,” however, is a highly malleable standard with “an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.” Hustler, 485 U. S., at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case such as this, a jury is “unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech,” posing “a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of … ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t]’ ” expression. Bose Corp., 466 U. S., at 510 (quoting New York Times, 376 U. S., at 270). Such a risk is unacceptable; “in public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 322 (1988) (some internal quotation marks omitted). What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to “special protection” under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.
For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/562/443/opinion.html
In respondent's view, and in the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State's interest in preventing emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.
Generally speaking, the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most, if not all, jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently "outrageous." But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), we held that, even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill-will, his expression was protected by the First Amendment:
"Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth."
its ALWAYS one sided