Pookie
Chop!! Chop!!
- Joined
- Aug 25, 2002
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I applaud BOTH your research on the specific language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 AND your application of U. S. v Hofus to the required element of a "substantial step" stipulated in the statute.
I am serious about that. You did well. And it certainly seems that the language applied by the Hofus court from its variously cited precedents supported the conclusion of a substantial step by the defendant Hofus in that case of sexual assault, including that the jury's factual determination of what constitutes a substantial step need not be unanimous.
So the only question remaining is, would that same language satisfy the substantial step required in the third element of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 in an attempted bank robbery?
Fortunately, we don't have to go far to find out. In discussing the substantial step element and extracting the language which comprised the legal standard which it applied to that element, the Hofus court cited three primary case precedents: Braxton v. United States, United States v. Acuna, and United States v. Nelson. Two of those cases were overturned on appeal in part because the substantial step requirement was not satisfied.
Hold onto your seat.
Braxton was appealed all the way up to the Supreme Court wherein a UNANIMOUS court reversed a Fourth Circuit Court sentence consistent with the "factual premise of" an attempted killing (the defendant had shot at entering police officers on the other side of a door) despite the fact that Braxton had only plead guilty to assault and not guilty to attempt to kill.
Nelson was convicted for attempting and conspiring to structure a money laundering transaction. Undercover government agents posing as drug dealers came to the car dealership where Nelson worked, proposing to buy a car with cash. Nelson suggested ways to structure the cash purchase of a car to avoid the dealership's requirement under federal law to report cash transactions over $10,000. Despite that activity, Nelson's conviction on the attempt was reversed on the basis of lack of a substantial step while his conspiracy conviction was upheld.
Acuna was a manufacture of methamphetamine case affirmed on appeal as to the substantial step.
So what, you may ask, has any of this to do with the substantial step element articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 2113?
In citing its precedent for the substantial step standard, the Nelson court cited the cases of United States v. Still and United States v. Buffington. The Acuna court also cited Buffington. Both Still and Buffington were cases where defendants were convicted of attempted bank robbery and whose convictions were overturned on appeal for lack of the substantial step. Ultimately, the legal standard for a substantial step in Still and Buffington found its way up to Acuna, Braxton and, finally, Hofus. But you're not going to like how that substantial step standard was applied in either attempted bank robbery case.
The Nelson court summarized those principles succinctly. Ready? Still sitting down?
In short, intent to commit armed robbery does NOT equate to a substantial step to attempt to commit armed robbery, and while I fully appreciate how your very excellent research led you to sincerely conclude that "going to the bank prepared to rob it" satisfies "the substantial step" mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2113, two fundamental case law precedents serving as the foundation for that specific legal standard have held otherwise.
If you can find specific attempted bank robbery case law which clearly refutes my analysis of the substantial step standard, I would gladly reconsider my position, but I am not optimistic of your chances.
Until then, I would hope this settles the matter and would further hope, once again, that you will accept my affirmation that I should NEVER have made the analogy between attempted bank robbery and alleged violations of campaign finance or election laws or criminal conspiracies with foreign nationals to violate those laws.
It was a stupid move on my part and, if anything, I trust our discussion in just the last two or three posts emphasizes the importance of examining individual statutes and legal standards specifically germane to their potential violation INDIVIDUALLY and necessarily apart from inappropriate reliance on other statutes, cases and crimes no matter how "apparently" similar.
Thanks for your patience.
I applaud your research on the specific language of Braxton v. United States, United States v. Acuna, and United States v. Nelson as to the required element of a "substantial step" stipulated in the statute.
I am serious about that. You did well.
Hold onto your seat.
First, Braxton isn't applicable since there wasn't even an attempt to go to any bank to rob it.
Now let's deal with Nelson.
As for Buffington, from your quote: In Buffington, the defendants drove past a bank twice. One defendant entered a store nearby and observed the bank, while two others, one disguised as a woman, exited their car in the bank parking lot and focused their attention on the bank. All were armed. Nevertheless, because there was no movement toward the bank and no indication that defendants planned to enter, this court found insufficient evidence of attempted bank robbery.
The scenario is substantially different. The bank was open. The robbers made NO attempt to enter an OPEN bank, thus aborting the substantial step they had initiated. In Hogan v Pookie, the robber is at a CLOSED bank, for which he hadn't planned on. But unforeseen things typically happen during a crime. However, based on the wording of Hogan v Pookie, nothing has been aborted at this point. What the robber does after would indicate if he were going home or breaking through the bank door to continue the attempted robbery or waiting for the bank to reopen or whatever other action he may take. So I reject the use of Buffington in Hogan v Pookie.
Ready? Still sitting down?
As for Still, from your quote, A witness saw the defendant putting on a long blonde wig while sitting in his van with the motor running, about two hundred feet from a bank. The defendant put the van into reverse and drove off when the police arrived. Again, the substantial step was aborted by their choice. Again, in Hogan v Pookie, your robber is still sitting in the parking lot. He may or may not abort his robbery attempt. But the substantial step is still in play, based on your words. So I reject the use of Still in Hogan v Pookie.
In short, the two cases you can only attempt to depend on deal with attempted robberies that were aborted by the choice of the defendants, and while I fully appreciate how your very excellent research led you to sincerely conclude that "going to the bank prepared to rob it but voluntarily aborting the robbery" doesn't satisfy "the substantial step" mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 2113, your two fundamental case law precedents serving as the foundation for that specific legal standard do not apply to Hogan v Pookie.
I agree that you should've never made the analogy. You compounded that error by trying to defend it.
Thanks for your patience.