John Judis, co-author of The Emerging Democratic Majority (2004), now writes about "The Emerging Republican Advantage." Interview here. In Judis' view, the main reason is that the Dems are losing the middle-class vote (defined as persons with college degrees but no post-graduate ed).
Funny thing, though -- if the middle class votes Pub because of economic self-interest, that means they are misperceiving their economic self-interest, as economic data show.
One of the distinctive elements of the piece is that instead of focusing as much on the white working class, which tends to get a lot of attention when it comes to Democrats’ woes, you examine the white middle class. What do their politics look like?
A lot of [the white middle class] is in the office economy. A lot of them are in the for-profit rather than the public sector. That group has historically been pretty Republican, but it started moving in the ’90s toward the Democrats … One of the things that’s happened since 2008 is that [the white middle class] really shifted sharply to the Republicans. It had a big role, those shifts, in some of the key races of 2014 — for example, the Senate races in both Colorado and Virginia, where the results really surprised people…
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Besides the obvious demographic factors, though, is there anything that distinguishes the white working class from the white middle class?
The other thing I’ll say about this group that’s different from the white working class is that there isn’t as much of a populist strain. There isn’t as much of an anti-Wall Street strain as you would find among the white working class. A lot of these voters said they liked Romney because he was a businessman and they thought he could run the economy well, for example. You wouldn’t find those kind of sentiments as much among white working-class voters…
Even though we’re talking in both cases about people who work for wages and salaries — who don’t own the means of production, who are dependent upon the companies — what you find more among middle-class than among working-class voters in an identification with the company, with business, and with the profit motive … This is a growing part of the electorate. They also vote; they vote 10 percentage points more than the white working class.
Funny thing, though -- if the middle class votes Pub because of economic self-interest, that means they are misperceiving their economic self-interest, as economic data show.
In the run-up to the 2016 election, Republicans are trying to position themselves as the party of the middle class. In a recent essay, Thomas Edsall writes, “The Republican appropriation of leftist populist rhetoric (and even policies) poses a significant threat to liberal prospects in 2016.” It may well work, but not because Republicans are in fact reformist, but rather because voters and pundits eschew data and instead focus on rhetoric. When it comes to actual empirical evidence, the answer is indisputable: Democrats preside over far more income growth for the middle class than Republicans.
Princeton University’s Larry Bartels has two studies on politics and income distribution, and together they encompass almost a century. His finding: under Republicans, the poor and middle class see almost no income growth, while under Democrats, they see dramatic growth (see charts). As he notes elsewhere, even after numerous controls, these partisan differences remain. “Every Republican president in the past 60 years has presided over increasing income inequality, including Dwight Eisenhower in the midst of the ‘Great Compression’ of the post-war decades,” Bartels writes. “And every Democratic president except one (Jimmy Carter) has presided over decreasing or stable inequality.”
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In another recent study, Alan Blinder and Mark Watson find that on a number of economic indicators, the country fares far better when a Democrat is in office. GDP growth is 1.8 point higher under a Democratic presidency, unemployment is lower, corporate profits are higher, the S&P grows faster and wages grow faster. This difference is not found in other countries, suggesting that the particularly rabid nature of American conservatism may be an important factor. It could also be that the effect is purely luck (although there is evidence to suggest that left-wing governments can facilitate growth). But the fact that the economy grows faster under Democrats is not enough to explain why the middle-class fares better. As the chart below shows, much of the distribution leg-work occurs after taxes and transfers. This isn’t to say Democrats don’t shape the pre-tax distribution (they do), but rather that simple differences in market distributions of income can’t explain the difference.