I told you the DEI "pilot" did it, you denied it

Wait. Am I the only one here confused and frustrated with the hypocrisy that a supposed Asian woman is complaining about how another person is operating a vehicle of transportation???
 
Wait. Am I the only one here confused and frustrated with the hypocrisy that a supposed Asian woman is complaining about how another person is operating a vehicle of transportation???
Depends on whether or not you believe Chloe really is an Asian woman. I'm 95% sure "she" is neither.
 
The DEI cunt REFUSED

REFUSED

POS
Your OP says “the DEI-era pilot”, which could actually mean anything.
The photo labels Lobach as a captain which implies experience and progression through the ranks.
So why are you so certain she’s a “DEI pilot”, is that merely because she’s a woman?
And why is your rhetoric so appalling?
 
I can’t pig pile on this one, here is the truth.

This is a CREW failure. The IP (instructor pilot) is ultimately in command of that aircraft. There is a two strike rule in aviation. If you challenge a crew member twice and they don’t respond you TAKE the controls. NO third strikes.

I haven’t seen anything other than the initial report. I’d like to see where the NYT is getting their info? I have my theories on this accident and while the Army Helo crew is going to bear the brunt of blame, there were mistakes made by all involved.

Sadly, this accident will be a case study in aviation safety courses for the next 50yrs…much like the Eastern L-1011 that had controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) in ‘72 in the Everglades. That case is studied today for much the same reasons, command and control, not delegating authority, and complacency.
A good, objective opinion.
 
I can’t pig pile on this one, here is the truth.

This is a CREW failure. The IP (instructor pilot) is ultimately in command of that aircraft. There is a two strike rule in aviation. If you challenge a crew member twice and they don’t respond you TAKE the controls. NO third strikes.

I haven’t seen anything other than the initial report. I’d like to see where the NYT is getting their info? I have my theories on this accident and while the Army Helo crew is going to bear the brunt of blame, there were mistakes made by all involved.

Sadly, this accident will be a case study in aviation safety courses for the next 50yrs…much like the Eastern L-1011 that had controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) in ‘72 in the Everglades. That case is studied today for much the same reasons, command and control, not delegating authority, and complacency.
It comes down to this imo - people want to blame DEI and so everything is about that to them.

If you've ever been trained, the instructor has the control. Whether she was a woman or a black or trans person is irrelevant to that fact

I'll add one more thing - whether the instructor is a woman or black or trans also is irrelevant to that fact. People are hired to positions that do or do not deserve them based on a much larger pool of candidates

(When Barron becomes an AG, for example)
 
There's a lot of anger and politicking in this thread and I think the point is being overlooked that 67 people perished. 64 of them civilians.

Yes the helo was at the wrong altitude and could've moved further east, over the river bank. Yes the aircraft commander could've taken control or been more forceful with his instruction. But, unfortunately mistakes were made, and we weren't there.

I've operated in and out of that airspace multiple times and it's very technical. Overwhelming for someone that hasn't done it in the previous 2 years.

I'm trying to bring accuracy to the speculation. But, with all the whining about DEI this and that, keep in mind that all 5 pilots involved in the accident were previously trained on their equipment, the airspace is very challenging and this happened at night at low altitude when city lights and lights from a ferris wheel and bridge may have played a part.

67 people died. That is extremely tragic and putting myself in their shoes gives me chills.
Well said.
 
What mistake did the flight deck crew of the RJ make?
I read downstream and see you’re an aviation professional. You know as well as I that the NTSB Causal Factors will exhaustively examine the Human Factors on this mishap. BTW, I can’t agree more with your post downstream. Accidents happen in aviation and you know the saying. We all learn from the blood of those that came before. It’s a sad reality in this profession.

I’ll focus on Human Factors from the RJ crews perspective. A couple of things come to mind. First they were on a circling approach from RWY 1 to RWY 33. They were cleared for the circle and then cleared to land.*

*I haven’t seen the transcript from the tower in six months so feel free to correct me on this.

So they assumed visual separation from other traffic at that point. The tower at some point had to call the Helo traffic out to them, so, putting my NTSB hat on here, they should have had one eye out for the Hawk. I know the crew had probably shot this approach many times before with traffic call outs. So the confirmation bias would have been strong to maybe not be as vigilant.

Remember. This isn’t placing blame. This is finding the root cause of what happened…from all angles.

My second observation would have been to drive the TCAS down to its lowest range setting. The RA would have been inhibited below 1000’AGL, so this is just me speculating, but if they had it out to even 5 mile range, the screen would have been cluttered. It could have been the difference between the mishap and a possible go around? We’ll never know.

I did see where the Data Recorder did show an abrupt maneuver at the last second from the RJ crew.

That approach is very technical as you said. It takes a lot of concentration and I can easily see how compressed the crews and ATC were.

It’s easy to sit back and sharp shoot with the 20/20 hindsight, but ultimately that is what the NTSB does.

———————————EDIT———————————————

OK…It’s been a few months and a few G&T’s between. I went back and listened to the NTSB initial report. I need to do some housecleaning.

They were on the Mount Vernon Visual approach to RWY 1, then asked to take and circle to RWY 33….I’ll make the correction above so not to confuse. Also, as we talked about, the compression of time and juggling traffic, ATC NEVER called out traffic to the RJ and NEVER cleared them to land…at least in this transcript. They did receive a TA (Traffic Advisory) but at lower than 500’ they would have been focused on landing and I assume only one set of eyes were looking for traffic…

 
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It comes down to this imo - people want to blame DEI and so everything is about that to them.

If you've ever been trained, the instructor has the control. Whether she was a woman or a black or trans person is irrelevant to that fact

I'll add one more thing - whether the instructor is a woman or black or trans also is irrelevant to that fact. People are hired to positions that do or do not deserve them based on a much larger pool of candidates

(When Barron becomes an AG, for example)
I’ll take it one step further. People want answers. Our 24/7 news cycle demands it. The NTSB will take as much time as they need (usually a year or more) as they should. There should be no rush to judgement.

Just to be clear, I’ve never insinuated anything about the crews other than what I feel the investigators will look at.

Not sure what you’re jabbering on about Barron? What does that have to do with this accident?
 
I’ll take it one step further. People want answers. Our 24/7 news cycle demands it. The NTSB will take as much time as they need (usually a year or more) as they should. There should be no rush to judgement.
As I mentioned - the comments have.shown that many will say it's DEI regardless of the outcome of investigation.

If you aren't one of those people, good on you.

Not sure what you’re jabbering on about Barron? What does that have to do with this accident?
It has to do with my comment about corruption.
 
I read downstream and see you’re an aviation professional. You know as well as I that the NTSB Causal Factors will exhaustively examine the Human Factors on this mishap. BTW, I can’t agree more with your post downstream. Accidents happen in aviation and you know the saying. We all learn from the blood of those that came before. It’s a sad reality in this profession.

I’ll focus on Human Factors from the RJ crews perspective. A couple of things come to mind. First they were on a circling approach from RWY 4 to RWY 1. They were cleared for the circle and then cleared to land.*

*I haven’t seen the transcript from the tower in six months so feel free to correct me on this.

So they assumed visual separation from other traffic at that point. The tower at some point had to call the Helo traffic out to them, so, putting my NTSB hat on here, they should have had one eye out for the Hawk. I know the crew had probably shot this approach many times before with traffic call outs. So the confirmation bias would have been strong to maybe not be as vigilant.

Remember. This isn’t placing blame. This is finding the root cause of what happened…from all angles.

My second observation would have been to drive the TCAS down to its lowest range setting. The RA would have been inhibited below 1000’AGL, so this is just me speculating, but if they had it out to even 5 mile range, the screen would have been cluttered. It could have been the difference between the mishap and a possible go around? We’ll never know.

I did see where the Data Recorder did show an abrupt maneuver at the last second from the RJ crew.

That approach is very technical as you said. It takes a lot of concentration and I can easily see how compressed the crews and ATC were.

It’s easy to sit back and sharp shoot with the 20/20 hindsight, but ultimately that is what the NTSB does.
Inevitably the NTSB will say that pilot error (on the part of the RJ crew) was a contributing factor because they failed to see and avoid, but FFS.

Anyhow, they did everything they could. The box showed the thrust levers were full forward and the elevator was fully deflected. They knew they were going to be hit and they had zero time to do more than they did. Scary.

I read a report that 18 months, or so, before the accident, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced a bill to raise helicopter altitudes near the city because of the noise. Never saw that on the news.

I also think all aircraft, in a terminal area, should be on the same frequency (civilian should be able to hear military, and vice versa, not just ATC), but that's just my opinion. Take that for what it's worth.

Again, very tragic accident.
 
As I recall ..,
The fucking White House called it DEI
So
?
Crawl up the giant POTUS ass

I’ll find the link later. He called out shit with NO INFORMATION!!! That’s not fair to all the lives lost

What’s changed since then???
 
Inevitably the NTSB will say that pilot error (on the part of the RJ crew) was a contributing factor because they failed to see and avoid, but FFS.

Anyhow, they did everything they could. The box showed the thrust levers were full forward and the elevator was fully deflected. They knew they were going to be hit and they had zero time to do more than they did. Scary.

I read a report that 18 months, or so, before the accident, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton introduced a bill to raise helicopter altitudes near the city because of the noise. Never saw that on the news.

I also think all aircraft, in a terminal area, should be on the same frequency (civilian should be able to hear military, and vice versa, not just ATC), but that's just my opinion. Take that for what it's worth.

Again, very tragic accident.
Exactly. The crews will bear this cross. I totally agree with all points. Especially in the terminal area, everyone should be on Victor, unless it’s for some true operational need.

There is going to be so much to unwrap on this mishap. Nobody is going to come out untainted I’m afraid. I agree with your assessment. I try to put myself in the RJ crews place. I’m not sure I’d of done anything different? Again, easy for us to pick nits but damn…you’re on short final…less than 500’…that’s the last place you think you’re going to have a midair.
 
As I recall ..,
The fucking White House called it DEI
So
?
Crawl up the giant POTUS ass

I’ll find the link later. He called out shit with NO INFORMATION!!! That’s not fair to all the lives lost

What’s changed since then???
It didn’t help. Everything doesn’t need a comment.
 
The New York Times waited until the very end of its lengthy story about the January collision between a U.S. Army helicopter and a passenger jet in Washington, D.C., to reveal that the female copter pilot failed to follow her flight instructor's direction, leading to the tragedy. "Captain Lobach was the highest-ranking soldier on the helicopter, but Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Loyd Eaves, who was acting as her instructor, had flown more than twice as many hours over time," the outlet added.

Warrant Officer Eaves told the tower that the Black Hawk saw the traffic: “PAT two-five has the aircraft in sight. Request visual separation,” meaning they would avoid the airline jet. “Vis sep approved,” the controller responded. At this point, the Blackhawk was 15 seconds away from crossing paths with Flight 5342. Eaves told Lobach to turn left, toward the east bank of the Potomac. She did not follow his instructions, and the two aircraft collided, killing 64 passengers and crew on Flight 5342, as well as Lobach, Eaves, and a crewmember on their helicopter. At the time, the Blackhawk was flying well over the mandated maximum altitude;

Cockpit voice recordings revealed that sometime after assuming control, Lobach announced an altitude of 300 feet. Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Lloyd Eaves, her instructor, responded within a space of 39 seconds that they actually had an altitude of 400 feet — not only double the maximum height permissible near Runway 33 but 100 feet over the altitude mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration for that part of the route. The Times indicated that as the helicopter approached the Key Bridge, from which the Army aircraft would head south along the river, Eaves indicated the helicopter was at 300 feet and descending to 200 feet. Eaves apparently saw the need to repeat his instruction, telling Lobach that the chopper was at 300 feet and needed to descend. While Lobach reportedly said she would comply, over two and half minutes later, she still had the helicopter at an altitude of over 200 feet — "a dangerously high level" according to the Times.

Nearly 20 seconds before impact — as doomed Flight 5342 made its turn toward Runway 33, flying at roughly 500 feet and now within a mile of the helicopter — the tower asked the Army crew, "PAT two-five, do you have the CRJ in sight?" There was no response from the Black Hawk. The controller then told the helicopter crew to "pass behind" the airplane, but Lobach kept flying directly at the inbound jet. Two seconds after the controller's "pass behind" directive, Eaves said, "PAT two-five has the aircraft in sight. Request visual separation." Inside the helicopter, Eaves told Lobach 15 seconds before the collision that air traffic control wanted her to turn left, toward the river — which would open more space between the Black Hawk and the jet, now at an altitude of approximately 300 feet. Lobach reportedly did not heed the instruction, thereby guaranteeing the deaths of 66 people and herself. At the time of the collision, one air traffic controller can reportedly be heard in a recording taken at the time saying, "Crash, crash, crash, this is an alert three."

Looks very much like an inexperienced pilot who was out of her expereience envelope, along with an instructor who failed to take over the controls. In an environment with that amount of air traffic that was a recipe for disaster alright. My totally biased guess is a DEI pilot with insufficient training (I believe she'd just comeoff a few months in the White House) with a instructor who was reluctant to take over control, likely for fear of repercussions.
No, Captain Lobach did not appear to ignore an instruction to turn; the transcript suggests she responded "Sure" to her instructor's interpretation of a garbled air traffic control request to turn left, but the command was late and the turn was not made before the crash. The incident was marked by poor communication, including difficulty hearing the controller and potential confusion about the location of nearby traffic, which ultimately led to the fatal midair collision.

Key Details from Transcripts
  • Garbled Communication:
    The Black Hawk crew had trouble understanding instructions from the control tower due to garbled audio.

  • Instructor's Interpretation:
    In the final moments, the instructor, Andrew Loyd Eaves, told Captain Lobach, "kinda come left for me, ma'am, I think that's why he's asking," believing it was the controller's request for a turn.

  • Captain Lobach's Response:
    Captain Lobach replied, "Sure," indicating she heard and understood the command from her instructor.

  • Timing:
    The turn was not executed before the collision with the American Airlines regional jet, as the crash occurred seconds later.
Contributing Factors
  • Miscommunication:
    The primary issue was the lack of clear and understood communication between the air traffic controller and the helicopter crew.

  • Missed Opportunities:
    Mr. Eaves had the opportunity to verify the location of the traffic and pause the helicopter in a safer spot but instead allowed the flight to continue, according to the N.T.S.B. transcript.

  • Other Factors:
    The flight also experienced difficulty maintaining altitude, and the helicopter's altimeter may have provided incorrect readings, further complicating the situation.
 
No, Captain Lobach did not appear to ignore an instruction to turn; the transcript suggests she responded "Sure" to her instructor's interpretation of a garbled air traffic control request to turn left, but the command was late and the turn was not made before the crash. The incident was marked by poor communication, including difficulty hearing the controller and potential confusion about the location of nearby traffic, which ultimately led to the fatal midair collision.

Key Details from Transcripts
  • Garbled Communication:
    The Black Hawk crew had trouble understanding instructions from the control tower due to garbled audio.

  • Instructor's Interpretation:
    In the final moments, the instructor, Andrew Loyd Eaves, told Captain Lobach, "kinda come left for me, ma'am, I think that's why he's asking," believing it was the controller's request for a turn.

  • Captain Lobach's Response:
    Captain Lobach replied, "Sure," indicating she heard and understood the command from her instructor.

  • Timing:
    The turn was not executed before the collision with the American Airlines regional jet, as the crash occurred seconds later.
Contributing Factors
  • Miscommunication:
    The primary issue was the lack of clear and understood communication between the air traffic controller and the helicopter crew.

  • Missed Opportunities:
    Mr. Eaves had the opportunity to verify the location of the traffic and pause the helicopter in a safer spot but instead allowed the flight to continue, according to the N.T.S.B. transcript.

  • Other Factors:
    The flight also experienced difficulty maintaining altitude, and the helicopter's altimeter may have provided incorrect readings, further complicating the situation.
Again good, OBJECTIVE and factually driven take on this terrible accident.

As this poster had indicated, there are a lot of variables that went into this. And @HumpDayHoratio, mentioned in an earlier post, this will be a case study on air traffic safety for years to come… unfortunately.
 
Missed Opportunities:
Mr. Eaves had the opportunity to verify the location of the traffic and pause the helicopter in a safer spot but instead allowed the flight to continue, according to the N.T.S.B. transcript.
Pause the helicopter? OK, that’s a new one on me. You can tell we’re in the age of gamers…

Using the Swiss cheese model, there are so many that line up to contribute to the eventual outcome. Communication will be THE focus along with what was going on with altimetry issues in the 60.

The window of this accident is just shy of two minutes. That was the first call to the Hawk of “traffic at 1200’ circling to RWY 33”. That call went unanswered, which should have produced a follow up far earlier than 10 SECONDS before impact when the Hawk was asked to “pass behind the RJ.”

I stated upstream there will be blame to share in the making of this pie. Some will have bigger slices, but ATC will have a seat at that table.
 
Pause the helicopter? OK, that’s a new one on me. You can tell we’re in the age of gamers…

Using the Swiss cheese model, there are so many that line up to contribute to the eventual outcome. Communication will be THE focus along with what was going on with altimetry issues in the 60.

The window of this accident is just shy of two minutes. That was the first call to the Hawk of “traffic at 1200’ circling to RWY 33”. That call went unanswered, which should have produced a follow up far earlier than 10 SECONDS before impact when the Hawk was asked to “pass behind the RJ.”

I stated upstream there will be blame to share in the making of this pie. Some will have bigger slices, but ATC will have a seat at that table.

And the solution will involve millions of taxpayer dollars. Whether the solution turns out to actually be a solution after being implemented and the money spent remains to be seen. I have my doubts because stupid always finds a way.
 
I can’t pig pile on this one, here is the truth.

This is a CREW failure. The IP (instructor pilot) is ultimately in command of that aircraft. There is a two strike rule in aviation. If you challenge a crew member twice and they don’t respond you TAKE the controls. NO third strikes.

I haven’t seen anything other than the initial report. I’d like to see where the NYT is getting their info? I have my theories on this accident and while the Army Helo crew is going to bear the brunt of blame, there were mistakes made by all involved.

Sadly, this accident will be a case study in aviation safety courses for the next 50yrs…much like the Eastern L-1011 that had controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) in ‘72 in the Everglades. That case is studied today for much the same reasons, command and control, not delegating authority, and complacency.
I get that.

I also get that qualified applicants were denied in favor of promoting people less experienced based on their sex and skin color.
 
I can’t pig pile on this one, here is the truth.

This is a CREW failure. The IP (instructor pilot) is ultimately in command of that aircraft. There is a two strike rule in aviation. If you challenge a crew member twice and they don’t respond you TAKE the controls. NO third strikes.
I know and you know and we all know

Had the MALE IP taken control from the female

He woulda lost his JOB...sexist etc etc

So stop saying stupid shit
 
I get that.

I also get that qualified applicants were denied in favor of promoting people less experienced based on their sex and skin color.
No doubt. I know of a case where a candidate washed out of flight school, went back and lodged a complaint, was given a second shot due in no small part to being a DEI protected class type, and promptly went out and killed himself and sadly his stick buddy.

This kid not only took two qualified seats but then took another’s life along with his own. In a totally preventable accident. All on the alter of inclusion.

Aviation can be the most unforgiving of endeavors. This sign hangs in many ready rooms across the fruited plain.

IMG_2509.jpeg
 
I know and you know and we all know

Had the MALE IP taken control from the female

He woulda lost his JOB...sexist etc etc

So stop saying stupid shit
Slow your roll there junior. He would NOT have lost his job. Taking the controls IS HIS JOB!

As was pointed out upstream in the transcripts, the female Cpt. ACKNOWLEDGED his command to turn. She didn’t make that turn, for whatever reason. He didn’t take the controls, for whatever reason…we’ll never know unless the CVR tells us something different. That’s why I say this is a CREW failure and will be tagged as such by the NTSB. I already mentioned what will be Human Causal Factors for the RJ crew and ATC in my opinion were.
We can speculate all day, and to a certain extent, that’s what the investigation team will do. I’ll add again, this whole scenario was approx 1:29 and the fatal mistake of not turning/seeing and avoiding/ was less than 10 seconds.

You bring up a valid point in that Cpt outranked the IP in military rank, but he is the PIC (Pilot in Command) of that aircraft and ultimately has the final say. Did he hesitate because he was worried about her rank or position above him? It’s possible, but I highly doubt it. We’d be fools to believe it couldn’t happen, but that scenario has long been addressed and studied, and professional aviators should be prepared for it.

You might think this is “saying stupid shit,” but keep in mind…someone may have actually been on a couple of Accident Investigation Teams in a prior life…😉

I’ll wait for the final NTSB report though. The initial report leaves a lot out in my mind…but it is only the initial report.
 
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