For Those Who Might Be Wondering Why We Might Be In Ukraine

[DeluxAuto]

2024 - "I'll stop this war in 24 hours!"

2025 - "It's a European thing. It's always been a European thing."

 

[ChloeTzang]

Russians being lazy the last couple of days. Putin’s casualties are mounting, even so, but his real loss is the time he wastes while Ukraine and the EU and other democracies such as Australia assist Ukraine in fighting back. Woth every week that passes, Ukraone grows stronger. Their military has flaws, and not every officer is perfect, but incfrementally, they are consistently improving and gaining strenhth ad capability, while the Russian military degrades. Every day Putin continues this war, he digs his own and Russia's grave deeper.

 

[SissyBrandi19]

I know 3 people who could tell you exactly why we are there - the CEOs of Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street.

 

[Rightguide]

Yes, Ukraine Started the War​

February 23, 2025


Donald Trump has been flayed alive by Western media and leaders for saying Ukraine started the war. Here are facts, not myths, says Joe Lauria.

On Feb 20, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych, who was elected president of Ukraine in 2010 in a popular vote certified by the OSCE, was violently overthrown.

Yanukovych’s base in the Russian-speaking parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine refused to recognize the unconstitutional government that took over, defending their democratic rights.

Majority ethnic-Russian Crimea, a huge base of Yanukovych’s support, voted little more than a month later, on March 16, 2014, to leave Ukraine and rejoin Russia. The Ukrainian government had also declared that it would not extend beyond 2017 Russia’s lease on a Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea.

Street violence broke out in other parts of Ukraine. Five days after extreme right-wing Ukrainian gangs burned alive 48 Russian speakers in a trades union building in Odessa, two of the Eastern provinces declared independence from Ukraine and took over government buildings.

With U.S. backing, the unconstitutional government on April 16, 2014 launched a military attack against those two provinces in the Donbass region.

This is how Ukraine stated the war and the date they did it on.

Trump didn’t mention the instrumental part the U.S. played in Yanukoych’s ouster and Kiev’s subsequent war on Donbass.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/02/23/yes-ukraine-started-the-war/

I encourage all who are interested in the war in Ukraine and are frustrated with the biased reporting in the legacy media to read this entire article. Like the Garyzone and Bellingcat, the Consortium News is a well known Independent open-source investigation group.

 

[ll74]

Yes, Ukraine Started the War​

February 23, 2025


Donald Trump has been flayed alive by Western media and leaders for saying Ukraine started the war. Here are facts, not myths, says Joe Lauria.

On Feb 20, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych, who was elected president of Ukraine in 2010 in a popular vote certified by the OSCE, was violently overthrown.

Yanukovych’s base in the Russian-speaking parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine refused to recognize the unconstitutional government that took over, defending their democratic rights.

Majority ethnic-Russian Crimea, a huge base of Yanukovych’s support, voted little more than a month later, on March 16, 2014, to leave Ukraine and rejoin Russia. The Ukrainian government had also declared that it would not extend beyond 2017 Russia’s lease on a Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea.

Street violence broke out in other parts of Ukraine. Five days after extreme right-wing Ukrainian gangs burned alive 48 Russian speakers in a trades union building in Odessa, two of the Eastern provinces declared independence from Ukraine and took over government buildings.

With U.S. backing, the unconstitutional government on April 16, 2014 launched a military attack against those two provinces in the Donbass region.

This is how Ukraine stated the war and the date they did it on.

Trump didn’t mention the instrumental part the U.S. played in Yanukoych’s ouster and Kiev’s subsequent war on Donbass.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/02/23/yes-ukraine-started-the-war/

I encourage all who are interested in the war in Ukraine and are frustrated with the biased reporting in the legacy media to read this entire article. Like the Garyzone and Bellingcat, the Consortium News is a well known Independent open-source investigation group.

Ukraine didn't start the war

 

[Rightguide]

Ukraine didn't start the war

It started the day they, with our help, overthrew the duly elected President of Ukraine, April 16, 2014. It didn't start on February 22, 2022. That was the day that Russia decided to do something about it.

 

[MajorRewrite]

It started the day they, with our help, overthrew the duly elected President of Ukraine, April 16, 2014. It didn't start on February 22, 2022. That was the day that Russia decided to do something about it.

Comrade RightGuide is now directly sharing Russian propaganda.

 

[Lazaran]

Yes, Ukraine Started the War​

February 23, 2025


Donald Trump has been flayed alive by Western media and leaders for saying Ukraine started the war. Here are facts, not myths, says Joe Lauria.

On Feb 20, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych, who was elected president of Ukraine in 2010 in a popular vote certified by the OSCE, was violently overthrown.

Yanukovych’s base in the Russian-speaking parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine refused to recognize the unconstitutional government that took over, defending their democratic rights.

Majority ethnic-Russian Crimea, a huge base of Yanukovych’s support, voted little more than a month later, on March 16, 2014, to leave Ukraine and rejoin Russia. The Ukrainian government had also declared that it would not extend beyond 2017 Russia’s lease on a Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea.

Street violence broke out in other parts of Ukraine. Five days after extreme right-wing Ukrainian gangs burned alive 48 Russian speakers in a trades union building in Odessa, two of the Eastern provinces declared independence from Ukraine and took over government buildings.

With U.S. backing, the unconstitutional government on April 16, 2014 launched a military attack against those two provinces in the Donbass region.

This is how Ukraine stated the war and the date they did it on.

Trump didn’t mention the instrumental part the U.S. played in Yanukoych’s ouster and Kiev’s subsequent war on Donbass.

https://consortiumnews.com/2025/02/23/yes-ukraine-started-the-war/

I encourage all who are interested in the war in Ukraine and are frustrated with the biased reporting in the legacy media to read this entire article. Like the Garyzone and Bellingcat, the Consortium News is a well known Independent open-source investigation group.

Russiaguide needs to read and comprehend this report:

https://warsawinstitute.org/yanukovych-facilitated-annexation-crimea/



And Trump is Russia’s Yanukovych in America.



We. Told. Then. So.

 

[ll74]

It started the day they, with our help, overthrew the duly elected President of Ukraine, April 16, 2014. It didn't start on February 22, 2022. That was the day that Russia decided to do something about it.

It started on with the Russian invasion and will end when Russia stops their invasion.

You can parrot all of the Russian pretext horseshit that you want.

 

[ChloeTzang]

It started the day they, with our help, overthrew the duly elected President of Ukraine, April 16, 2014. It didn't start on February 22, 2022. That was the day that Russia decided to do something about it.

Russian propaganda again. Yanukovych first ran for president in the 2004 election, where he was declared the winner against Viktor Yushchenko. However, allegations of electoral fraud and voter intimidation caused widespread protests, in what became known as the Orange Revolution. The Ukrainian Supreme Court nullified the election and ordered a rerun, which Yanukovych lost to Yushchenko. Yanukovych ran for president again in 2010, this time beating Yulia Tymoshenko in an election deemed free and fair by international observers. In November 2013, Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from signing an association agreement with the EU, amidst economic pressure from Russia. Ukraine's parliament had overwhelmingly approved finalizing the agreement. This sparked massive protests against him, known as the Euromaidan.The unrest peaked in February 2014, when almost 100 protesters were killed by government forces.

An agreement was signed by Yanukovych and the opposition on 21 February 2014, but he secretly fled the capital that evening. The next day, Ukraine's parliament voted to remove him and schedule early elections on the grounds that he had withdrawn from his constitutional duties. Some of his own party voted for his removal. Ukraine's new government issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych, accusing him of responsibility for the killing of protesters. He fled to Russia, claiming to still be the head of state. In 2019, he was sentenced in absentia to a thirteen-year prison term for high treason by a Ukrainian court.

Under the 2004 Constitution, which was again in force, the President's powers would transfer to the chairman of Parliament in case the President should resign or be unable to fulfill his duties. Yanukovych had fed and was unable to be found. In the afternoon, the Rada voted 328–0 (about 73% of its 447 members) to remove Yanukovych from his post and to schedule an early presidential election for 25 May. The resolution stated that Yanukovych had withdrawn from fulfilling his constitutional duties, "which threatens the governance of the state, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine", and cited "circumstances of extreme urgency".[209] The resolution to remove Yanukovych was supported by all opposition parties: 86 deputies of Batkivshchyna (Fatherland Party), 41 deputies of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), 36 deputies of Svoboda (Freedom Party), 30 deputies of the Communist Party, as well as 99 independents. Furthermore, 36 deputies of Yanukovych's Party of Regions voted for his removal. There were no votes against. Under the 2004 constitution, parliament chairman Turchynov became acting president.

The vote came an hour after Yanukovych said in a televised address that he would not resign. He subsequently declared himself to still be "the legitimate head of the Ukrainian state elected in a free vote by Ukrainian citizens", and maintained that his removal was a coup d'état. Political scientist Maria Popova says that "the solution that took place within the Rada was more legitimate than any strictly legal solution that could have come from the Constitutional Court". Parliament did not vote to impeach the President, which would have involved formally charging Yanukovych with a crime, a review of the charge by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and a three-fourths majority vote in parliament—at least 338 votes in favor. The Ukrainian Constitution at this time (like many other constitutions) did not provide any stipulation about how to remove a president who is neither dead nor incapacitated, but is nonetheless absent or not fulfilling his duties. The lack of such provisions was a lacuna. Viktor Yanukovych fled from Ukraine to Russia.

The only coup was in his own mind. He opted for Putin rather than the Ukrainian people, and the Ukrainian people tossed his corrupt ass out the door.

 

[ll74]

Russian propaganda again. Yanukovych first ran for president in the 2004 election, where he was declared the winner against Viktor Yushchenko. However, allegations of electoral fraud and voter intimidation caused widespread protests, in what became known as the Orange Revolution. The Ukrainian Supreme Court nullified the election and ordered a rerun, which Yanukovych lost to Yushchenko. Yanukovych ran for president again in 2010, this time beating Yulia Tymoshenko in an election deemed free and fair by international observers. In November 2013, Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from signing an association agreement with the EU, amidst economic pressure from Russia. Ukraine's parliament had overwhelmingly approved finalizing the agreement. This sparked massive protests against him, known as the Euromaidan.The unrest peaked in February 2014, when almost 100 protesters were killed by government forces.

An agreement was signed by Yanukovych and the opposition on 21 February 2014, but he secretly fled the capital that evening. The next day, Ukraine's parliament voted to remove him and schedule early elections on the grounds that he had withdrawn from his constitutional duties. Some of his own party voted for his removal. Ukraine's new government issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych, accusing him of responsibility for the killing of protesters. He fled to Russia, claiming to still be the head of state. In 2019, he was sentenced in absentia to a thirteen-year prison term for high treason by a Ukrainian court.

Under the 2004 Constitution, which was again in force, the President's powers would transfer to the chairman of Parliament in case the President should resign or be unable to fulfill his duties. Yanukovych had fed and was unable to be found. In the afternoon, the Rada voted 328–0 (about 73% of its 447 members) to remove Yanukovych from his post and to schedule an early presidential election for 25 May. The resolution stated that Yanukovych had withdrawn from fulfilling his constitutional duties, "which threatens the governance of the state, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine", and cited "circumstances of extreme urgency".[209] The resolution to remove Yanukovych was supported by all opposition parties: 86 deputies of Batkivshchyna (Fatherland Party), 41 deputies of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), 36 deputies of Svoboda (Freedom Party), 30 deputies of the Communist Party, as well as 99 independents. Furthermore, 36 deputies of Yanukovych's Party of Regions voted for his removal. There were no votes against. Under the 2004 constitution, parliament chairman Turchynov became acting president.

The vote came an hour after Yanukovych said in a televised address that he would not resign. He subsequently declared himself to still be "the legitimate head of the Ukrainian state elected in a free vote by Ukrainian citizens", and maintained that his removal was a coup d'état. Political scientist Maria Popova says that "the solution that took place within the Rada was more legitimate than any strictly legal solution that could have come from the Constitutional Court". Parliament did not vote to impeach the President, which would have involved formally charging Yanukovych with a crime, a review of the charge by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and a three-fourths majority vote in parliament—at least 338 votes in favor. The Ukrainian Constitution at this time (like many other constitutions) did not provide any stipulation about how to remove a president who is neither dead nor incapacitated, but is nonetheless absent or not fulfilling his duties. The lack of such provisions was a lacuna. Viktor Yanukovych fled from Ukraine to Russia.

The only coup was in his own mind. He opted for Putin rather than the Ukrainian people, and the Ukrainian people tossed his corrupt ass out the door.

He consistently misrepresents the Ukranian people based on Putin's bullshit. The Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly for their independence from Russia and the USSR. Parliament has had a say in every major decision, like the continuation of martial law. Their Parliament, like our Congress, represents the Ukranian people. But they actually do their job.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Ukraine War, 2025: Outline Of Putin's Last Summer Campaign

Moscow's battered military machine is incapable of putting together a truly effective military offensive. A series of short-range lunges in a bid to get into urban Donbas is what he's down to now.
Andrew Tanner
May 22

Well, the diplomatic theater in Istanbul went pretty much as predicted. Putin failed to show, publicly demonstrating that he hasn’t the slightest interest in any peace he doesn’t dictate. The minor delegation he sent to keep up the Trump-serving illusion of Putin actually wanting a deal short of Ukraine’s surrender was instructed to play it like Putin isn’t losing the war, which he now most certainly is. According to sources near Trump, who held calls with both Zelensky and Putin after Istanbul, Putin is sure that he’s winning. The old conman is pulling out all the stops to bluff his way through the endgame. As is Trump, who has reverted to playing Putin’s game in public again, acting like the US is somehow an impartial party in the Ukraine War lacking a vested interest in the outcome. This after promising to solve the whole thing in a day. Fortunately, the con is mainly directed at Trump’s base, which is apparently full of easy marks driven by wishful thinking.

Even according to the twisted version of so-called “realist” international relations theory the lesser con artists surrounding Trump embrace, giving Putin an inch is just plain stupid. You’ll never find a more effective means of broadcasting weakness of the kind that diehard Team Trump fans normally reject. If America is supposed to be the biggest bully in a land of monsters - Team Trump’s obvious view - then letting China’s pet in Moscow continue this futile assault on Ukraine is tantamount to begging for World War Three over Ukraine. Which is why the members of Team Trump with presidential ambitions - Rubio and Vance - are so circumspect in their rhetoric. Both have to maintain the impossible, fan-serving bluff that America is both invincible and all too easily castrated by the mere threat of Muscovite escalation. The net policy vector emerging from this political reality is ongoing material support for Ukraine paired with public claims that Trump wants peace but Zelensky is crazy and the whole affair is Europe’s problem. Basically, the past six months of worrying about what Trump will do to Ukraine have been a gigantic waste of time and energy. Media attention has been fixed on the so-called peace process, with its failure creating the necessary narrative space for Europe to dramatically boost military spending.

If I’m correct, and Ukraine has been building up reserves while improving the efficiency of the defense, Moscow’s desperate crawl towards urban Donbas this summer will culminate in a devastating Ukrainian counteroffensive. The first necessary step is absorbing the combat power that Putin is foolishly sending into a death march on Sloviansk. Most of the Soviet inventory has been used up, with Moscow’s import of North Korean ammunition about all that is keeping the front from crumbling. At this point, some ruscist mouthpiece insisting that Moscow can go on like this forever because Peter the Great fought Sweden for over two decades is the height of self-satire. So is the truly broken idea that somehow, after a year and a half of throwing everything the orcs had at Ukraine’s lines and still only managed to bend them in a couple areas, Putin’s troops are on the verge of launching an effective grand campaign - a competent offensive is now beyond the orcs’ means. Pretty much all they have left in most cases are desperate Zerg-rush madcap lunges on motorcycles that Ukraine can counter with an equally simple defense-in-depth approach. The fact that Putin’s soldiers are still advancing a few meters every day here and there is being mistaken for evidence of effective strategy, when if the goal is the rapid destruction of Muscovite combat power he’s playing right into his enemies hands.

Muscovite forces can certainly achieve tactical gains, but every new dent in Ukraine’s line comes at the cost of extreme casualties and equipment losses, with the task of supplying newly seized positions making it almost impossible to do anything with the ground gained before new defenses are erected. Motorcycle swarms can sometimes overwhelm the thin front held by small Ukrainian groups at the edge of the gray zone, but aside from the atrocious human cost the tactic itself can be countered with engineering obstacles - moats, razor wire, and dragon’s teeth all beat dirt bikes. The astonishing degradation of Muscovite military power over the past three and a quarter years is a real-time case study in abject policy failure, the cost of seizing a square kilometer of Ukrainian farmland or block of ruined homes only rising, never leading to a true collapse on any front that would allow the orcs to seize a target of real strategic importance.

Ukraine, on the other hand, while hamstrung by its own Soviet legacy every step of the way, has managed to reach effective parity with the orcs in nearly every military domain, superiority in several. Ukraine’s challenge now is leveraging new capabilities appropriately. Coordination is key, which means being able to manage complexity and constantly evolve without wandering into ecological dead ends. While European support is set to rapidly increase now that the necessary diplomatic ritual has run its course, inefficient use of the kit scheduled to flow can all too easily negate its impact. What I’ve called Ukraine’s Military Reboot is entering a critical stage. The last vestiges of Soviet thinking must be discarded - and also the misguided NATO approach that has unfortunately taken root in parts of Ukraine’s forces. This process will naturally generate tension in the command structure. A high-profile resignation of one of Ukraine’s celebrity officers from 47th Mechanized - the brigade that was basically put together to showcase how great 80’s level NATO tech and training degraded by years of grappling with counterinsurgency are magically expected to be - illustrates the uglier side of this process. People with strong feelings that appear well validated by their perspective and experience are bound to butt heads, and not everyone will be satisfied with the results.

Overall, Ukraine has managed this better than Moscow. But now comes the real test: Ukraine’s window for striking back hard enough to begin the total unraveling of the orc occupation looks to be open from around late July through late September. Over the next two months, Ukrainian forces will have to tie down and absorb the bulk of Moscow’s combat power in Donbas while preparing for a major counteroffensive push to begin once Moscow’s latest attempt at a big push peters out.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Overview of the Fronts: Week 20

I’m terming Moscow’s post-Istanbul efforts as Putin’s final summer campaign, because in reality Moscow’s strategic effort in Ukraine has degenerated into a simple forever war with little real distinction between phases. There will be no grand offensive on a new axis or march on Kyiv, just Moscow trying to ramp up pressure on one front or another to keep up the illusion that the advance is ongoing and means anything. Despite Putin’s laughable posturing, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia are not genuinely under threat of occupation. From here, Moscow is focused on advancing into free urban Donbas by any means necessary, for as long as Putin’s regime stands. Supporting efforts on the flanks will continue, because the orc generals have chosen to believe that this divides Ukrainian strength more than their own. But aside from threatening Sumy, Kharkiv, Kupiansk, Huliaypole, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson with constant low-level attacks and even a bigger one now and again, without a substantial concentration of reserves Moscow manifestly does not have any more, the threat is purely theoretical.

And were I in Ukraine’s position, this is exactly what I would want the orcs to try. The first step towards a military victory sufficient to force Moscow into actual honest peace talks is creating and exploiting a vulnerable front in a critical location. After that, momentum must be maintained to outpace the Muscovite response. It’s a risky move, but if successful stands to generate a chain reaction that allows Ukraine to begin unraveling the occupation sector by sector, avoiding major urban areas and instead targeting rail junctions the orcs must have to sustain their fight.

How Putin’s summer plot may end in defeat - even if it looks like victory is in sight.

The counteroffensive has to be timed just right, and in the meantime defensive operations must minimize losses. Offensive operations around Kursk, as satisfying as they might be, probably don’t accomplish very much now, unless they’re part of an unfolding plan to draw orc troops away from Belgorod. Similarly, attacking Muscovite oil infrastructure with drones is now less desirable than hitting any and all links in the logistics chain connecting orc factories to the front. Something to keep in mind is that traditional plans and planning cycles run at a high level are highly suspect in this kind of war. It is the responsibility of senior command echelons to push resources down to units that need them and have proven that they can handle them well, but leave all matters of implementation to the fighters in the field. This rule flows right down to the individual level, with effective coordination made possible through closely-bonded teams built through highly realistic training, a good deal of it simulation based. At the moment, Putin’s last campaign is already in full swing and has been for a couple weeks, talks about peace talks notwithstanding. Unable to tolerate being called to heel, he predictably fell back into his usual pattern of blaming those scheming NATO countries for Ukraine’s ongoing existence. He will keep on coming until he dies. Dude is all-in, likely because he knows that to stop now is to court with assassination.

Northern Theater

Despite a lot of talk from Putin about Kursk being fully liberated and Ukraine insisting that operations on ruscist soil are ongoing, the reality is that nothing has really changed on the Sumy front this past week. Ukrainian troops are still fighting in Tyotkino in the Kursk region and near Popovka and Demidovka in Belgorod, but Moscow is clearly too alert to the danger of sudden Ukrainian counterattacks to make these wise.

Sumy front,

The Kursk front is where the battalion commander from 47th Mechanized Brigade insists that Kyiv is mismanaging its forces, ordering attacks through ruscist fortifications that make no sense. Up front: I have mixed feelings about how the officer in question is making his case. I’m always skeptical when someone resigns from a position claiming interference from higher authorities instead of doing what is necessary and being fired as a consequence. When they threaten to talk to their friends in the media, my skepticism grows. But I’m not there, just observing patterns from afar. But I agree with him that the situation on the Sumy front does not support aggressive offensive operations for the sake of holding a sliver of holy mother russia. If Moscow wants to lose a hundred thousand soldiers trying to push ten kilometers closer to Sumy, okay. But if you’re walking onto the enemy’s home turf, do it in a place they don’t expect. Kharkiv has likewise been static, if not by any means quiet. In fact, there has been a notable surge in Ukrainian drone strikes to the west of the Lyptsi sector, with open source reports suggesting that Moscow is building up forces ahead of opening a new attack vector.

Kharkiv front

This is another sector where the correct Ukrainian response is probably let them come. What’s fifty thousand more casualties pushing the Ukrainians back into a forest plantation that should make a fantastic fortress within easy driving distance from Ukraine’s second biggest city? If it lets Putin say he’s advancing, all is well. In theory, a major push and breakthrough northeast of Kharkiv would be devastating for Ukraine. But the risk by all the evidence is just that: theoretical. And to carry it off would require beating one of Ukraine’s first corps out of the gate, headed by the 13th Khartia brigade from the National Guard, a leader in using ground drones. And 92nd Assault, another veteran outfit.

Eastern Theater

Remarkably, despite intense orc assaults from the international border near Kupiansk all the way down to the heights between Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, Ukrainian troops gave virtually no ground this past week. If you look at territorial control maps alone, it would almost seem as if the front was entirely static. A one week data window from Geoconfirmed shows a lot more action further south, but for every incident released there are probably a dozen more that remain outside the public view. But Ukrainian drone operators have begun launching a notably high number of strikes around the key orc logistics node up in Valuyki, which supports the attempt to get into Kupiansk. In Torske, orc attempts to wave their flag were matched by Ukrainians doing a more credible job of it, while also losing some POWs.

Furious fighting continues in Toretsk, and Ukrainian troops are holding tighter here than expected. The orcs are making it abundantly clear that they want to get at Kostiantynivka from the south, but despite occupying most of the Toretsk ruins they’re stuck. The one area where the orcs are managing to make real progress is the area between Toretska and Pokrovsk, where the breakthrough along the Bychok that was evident last week has expanded as expected. Fortunately, the pace is not great, and Ukrainian reinforcements seem to be arriving. This should be a replay of what happened to the bridgehead over the Solona, west of Pokrovsk, where the orcs have been stuck for months.

That’s far from guaranteed, though, because over the past year and a half the Muscovites have proven that they’ve got at least one command team with enough collective brainpower to organize operations that actually work somewhat as intended once in a while. Usually by employing a new tactic at scale and pouring in resources until Ukrainian leaders adapt. But if recent ruscist promotions are anything to go by, this is enough to make Putin believe you’re good at your job. Yet the orcs face a serious challenge whatever they hope to achieve by pushing Ukraine off the T-0504 highway that links Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka. As expected, Ukraine is shortening the line south of the Kleban-Byk reservoir, allowing the enemy to advance into the jaws of a trap. There, or immediately to the west, on the outskirts of Pokrovsk, the corps with 12th Azov at its head is making life hell for the orcs pushing through Toretsk. To outflank them, the orc general has got to shove Ukraine off the line of the Bychok. Accomplishing this will be close to impossible unless Moscow is able to fully secure a ridge near Poltavka.

Only once the left flank is secure to a depth of about ten kilometers can the orcs move in force up the Bychock towards Kostiantynivka. If their goal is instead to push towards Pokrovsk, the orcs still have to accomplish this, then solve a bigger problem: a natural defense line along the Kazenyi Torets backed up by the town of Myrnohrad. Enveloping Pokrovsk from the west was always likely to prove easier. The situation in Pokrovsk itself is stable, Moscow appearing to understand that a frontal assault won’t work and focusing on the flanks. Unfortunately for the orcs, they’ve got the lower Solona to cope with, Ukraine holding ground on the southern bank that has to be cleared before it can be bridged. If the orcs want to cling to their bridgehead closer to Pokrovsk, they have got to make it bigger and get farther from a place where Ukraine can easily muster reserves. Frankly the orc operations west of Pokrovsk all the way down to Velyka Novosilka appear to be motivated more by a political demand to reach Dnipro district than sound military sense. Theoretically, a ruscist push through Mezhova would be devastating to the defense of Pokrovsk, allowing the orcs to at last directly threaten the rail line carrying supplies in from the north. In a world where Moscow’s power wasn’t so degraded, this could cause a chain reaction leading to the loss of urban Donbas.

But Putin’s chances are very, very low. And so what if he is able to claim a bit more of Donetsk? Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk are key to anything resembling victory after a million casualties. The rest is just fertilizing the fields.

 

[Lazaran]

Russian propaganda again. Yanukovych first ran for president in the 2004 election, where he was declared the winner against Viktor Yushchenko. However, allegations of electoral fraud and voter intimidation caused widespread protests, in what became known as the Orange Revolution. The Ukrainian Supreme Court nullified the election and ordered a rerun, which Yanukovych lost to Yushchenko. Yanukovych ran for president again in 2010, this time beating Yulia Tymoshenko in an election deemed free and fair by international observers. In November 2013, Yanukovych suddenly withdrew from signing an association agreement with the EU, amidst economic pressure from Russia. Ukraine's parliament had overwhelmingly approved finalizing the agreement. This sparked massive protests against him, known as the Euromaidan.The unrest peaked in February 2014, when almost 100 protesters were killed by government forces.

An agreement was signed by Yanukovych and the opposition on 21 February 2014, but he secretly fled the capital that evening. The next day, Ukraine's parliament voted to remove him and schedule early elections on the grounds that he had withdrawn from his constitutional duties. Some of his own party voted for his removal. Ukraine's new government issued an arrest warrant for Yanukovych, accusing him of responsibility for the killing of protesters. He fled to Russia, claiming to still be the head of state. In 2019, he was sentenced in absentia to a thirteen-year prison term for high treason by a Ukrainian court.

Under the 2004 Constitution, which was again in force, the President's powers would transfer to the chairman of Parliament in case the President should resign or be unable to fulfill his duties. Yanukovych had fed and was unable to be found. In the afternoon, the Rada voted 328–0 (about 73% of its 447 members) to remove Yanukovych from his post and to schedule an early presidential election for 25 May. The resolution stated that Yanukovych had withdrawn from fulfilling his constitutional duties, "which threatens the governance of the state, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine", and cited "circumstances of extreme urgency".[209] The resolution to remove Yanukovych was supported by all opposition parties: 86 deputies of Batkivshchyna (Fatherland Party), 41 deputies of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR), 36 deputies of Svoboda (Freedom Party), 30 deputies of the Communist Party, as well as 99 independents. Furthermore, 36 deputies of Yanukovych's Party of Regions voted for his removal. There were no votes against. Under the 2004 constitution, parliament chairman Turchynov became acting president.

The vote came an hour after Yanukovych said in a televised address that he would not resign. He subsequently declared himself to still be "the legitimate head of the Ukrainian state elected in a free vote by Ukrainian citizens", and maintained that his removal was a coup d'état. Political scientist Maria Popova says that "the solution that took place within the Rada was more legitimate than any strictly legal solution that could have come from the Constitutional Court". Parliament did not vote to impeach the President, which would have involved formally charging Yanukovych with a crime, a review of the charge by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, and a three-fourths majority vote in parliament—at least 338 votes in favor. The Ukrainian Constitution at this time (like many other constitutions) did not provide any stipulation about how to remove a president who is neither dead nor incapacitated, but is nonetheless absent or not fulfilling his duties. The lack of such provisions was a lacuna. Viktor Yanukovych fled from Ukraine to Russia.

The only coup was in his own mind. He opted for Putin rather than the Ukrainian people, and the Ukrainian people tossed his corrupt ass out the door.

Yanukovych betrayed his people and his oath -

JUST. LIKE. DONOLD. DID.



We. Told. Them. So.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Southern Theater

Fighting on the Dnipro and Orikhiv fronts continues in fits and spurts, both appearing ancillary to Muscovite efforts elsewhere. While Ukrainian troops are tied down to some degree, the same is true of orc reserves. Talk of the orcs crossing the Dnipro in force to threaten continues, and an attempt might even be made to let Putin claim that he’s advancing towards Kherson. The Orikhiv-Kamianka line is more difficult, because here Ukraine doesn’t have a water barrier to rely on to make every crossing under drone observation a roll of weighted dice. Still, all the orcs have managed here lately is to take a few fields in the gray zone. If Moscow is struggling to allocate reserves to support the ongoing attacks on Chasiv Yar, which are needed to help complicate the Ukrainian defense of Kostiantynivka on other directions, then sending soldiers to die in minor attacks towards Zaporizhzhia makes little sense. This is a bureaucracy on autopilot.

In putting together these reports, I’m constantly on the lookout for evidence supporting alternative theories. I keep searching for a more compelling logic than pure bureaucratic inertia to explain Moscow’s pattern of behavior since around the time Ukraine marched into Kursk. But nothing says that a policy system has to function in a manner any external observer would personally consider rational. Like a psychopath, a distinct internal logic operates driven by forces that are at any given moment opaque to observation. But patterns of behavior always out given sufficient observation. The Muscovite system can’t imagine trying everything short of nuclear strikes and still losing. So it just goes on, like a zombie, everyone trapped inside bound by a tacit agreement to pretend that if everybody follows orders and sticks to the plan they’ll come through alright.

Naval Matters

The Black Sea and Crimea fronts were fairly quiet, save for at least one large Ukrainian drone attack on a depot and a strike by maritime drones on a gas rig used by the orcs to support sensor masts. Not much is written about this quiet struggle, but every now and again a fairly large skirmish involving brief marine assaults on offshore gas mining facilities takes place. Destroying them isn’t the goal; Ukraine aims to disrupt the endless ruscist attempts to use the elevated towers to mount signal relays, electronic warfare arrays, and radars. Neither side can garrison troops where they have no guarantee of being able to sustain them, so Moscow flies or sails in bodies to handle installation and repairs, while Ukraine finds new ways to inflict damage. This sort of fighting can be expected to continue. It costs little by way of resources while irritating Moscow. The more orc jets are pushed out of the Black Sea’s skies by armed naval drones, the easier it will be to effect crewed landings - even raids in Crimea. When the enemy’s drones can be neutralized. A step too many leaders on both sides still seem determined to neglect.

Aviation Duel

Ukraine lost another F-16, but this time the pilot got out of the aircraft okay and is probably already back riding fire. So all is well - there are plenty of Vipers in the world. Belgium is reportedly accelerating deliveries, the Norwegians are supposed to be done with theirs fairly soon, and the Danes too. Dutch deliveries are less clear, but Ukraine still has a minimum of thirteen to sixteen Vipers, likely closer to two dozen, and potentially hitting three or even four dozen by the end of the year.

Ukrainian jets deliver bombs to orc positions up to fifteen kilometers behind the front lines on a regular basis, with videos of headquarters, depots, and bridges routinely getting plastered by Small Diameter Bombs or Hammer rocket bombs. Moscow’s air defenses are surprisingly bad at catching them, which I evaluate as being down to a combination of weaker sensors than advertised, inadequate aerial coverage, and inflexible tactics. There are some suggestions by Ukrainian pilots that R-37 very long-range air-to-air missiles are unlike Chinese weapons of similar function, under-perform specifications. The ground-based S-400 complex is much more dangerous, if inferior to Patriot and probably Aster systems, but if its radars are attacked or spoofed it becomes dangerously vulnerable.

The glide bomb problem hasn’t been solved, and the orcs are still using their jets to deliver powerful strikes. But overall these appear to work more like rocket barrages these days, requiring luck to score a direct hit thanks to Ukrainian electromagnetic warfare. That’s a big change from two years back, when they became the go-to orc option when raw firepower is required.

I have to hope that Sweden will find a way to gift Ukraine more than two AWACS jets. If Ukraine can maintain comprehensive radar coverage up to a hundred kilometers behind enemy lines, defending Ukrainian airspace and preventing the orcs from utilizing their own both become a lot easier. Supposedly more Patriot systems are set to come from European stocks. Regardless, over the past two years Ukraine’s air force has been reborn. It’ll get tougher each month that passes. And the orcs still can’t manage to hit a Viper on the ground.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Strike Campaigns

It’s nothing short of remarkable that something important to the orc war machine blows up in Ukraine almost every night. An endless series of pinprick strikes might not seem like much, but they add up - this is how the Allied strategic bombing campaign in the Second World War began. The turn to destruction of whole urban areas often took pressure off the German armaments industry, which gained time to rebuild capacity and disperse to remote sites - there joined by homeless workers fleeing ruined cities. When you couple this to the strengthening of German public support for the Nazi regime that resulted from being made targets in a war they didn’t have a say in themselves, most of the Allied strategic strike effort across the Second World War was a tragic error. This is why Ukraine must never replicate the mistake - Putin’s subjects remain largely apathetic, and that’s all that can be hoped for. It won’t be ordinary people in the empire who overthrow him, but elites who see the impending collapse of the system if he stays. That may well be triggered by military districts or regions going rogue and negotiating directly with Europe, but Wagner’s march on Moscow misjudged the nature of Putin’s system. The next to try rebellion won’t be so foolish as to march on the Kremlin when starved it will consume itself.

Moscow’s own strategic strike campaign these days appears strangely muted. That’s never a good sign, since it can only mean that reserves of weapons are building up. However, the orc failure to breach Ukraine’s defenses in a systematic way no matter what they try may mean that Moscow is using its missile arsenal as a hedge against NATO. This would track with the recent spate of announcements suggesting impending tests of scary new intercontinental ballistic missiles - followed, curiously, by nothing happening. Observes widely speculate that launches failed, leading to the Kremlin pretending that nothing happened. A successful launch will happen eventually if that’s the plan, with the objective likely being to scare European leaders, giving them an excuse to back away from their present strong support for Ukraine. It could also herald a major missile and drone assault, perhaps unprecedented in size. Some strike weapons like Iskander missiles are still used on the battlefield, in a tragic case this week catching a group of Ukrainians at a training facility near Sumy. Ukraine - always more reliable than Moscow with casualty reports - claims six dead, ten injured.

Leadership & Personnel

This brings the report back around to the Ukrainian officer who resigned, publicly accusing senior commanders of making egregious mistakes and wasting lives. It’s tough to gainsay the testimony of someone serving at the front. And as I laid out above, there is evidence to suggest that some of the choices made in Kursk lately seem to be driven by political appearances. In any military system, there will be incompetence. While Ukraine sees less of it on average than is standard on the ruscist side, just as the enemy has a few capable leaders so does Ukraine have some terrible ones. Like whoever decided it was a good idea to have soldiers marching in formation up in Sumy, within easy range of an orc recon drone. The natural result? Iskander strike.

If given the chance, from now on I’d probably have every officer who orders soldiers to march in formation as if it’s the seventeenth century again summarily executed. This is a perfect case of an institutional relic that teaches bad cognitive habits. So without a doubt, Ukrainian leaders make mistakes. The tendency to hold on to ground for the sake of it is apparent. This habit has to be broken. All this being said, it’s difficult to be entirely certain of any single person’s motives and influences. There is, within Ukraine’s Armed Forces, a bastion of NATO-trained officers who tend to think according to NATO doctrinal lines. And there exists a certain tendency in NATO doctrine to follow American intellectual patterns, which aren’t always reliable or even proven in a contemporary context.

To state it baldly, there is a cohort of Ukrainian officers who tend to see everything that doesn’t work as being down to the activities of Soviet holdouts lurking in the forces. Sure, these exist, but it is no accident that the moment Syrskyi replaced Zaluzhnyi - someone who has always built close ties with NATO partners, and continues to as UK ambassador on the way to probably becoming Ukraine’s president one day - the rumors about Syrskyi being a Soviet hardliner began to spread without any real substantiation. Fanned by conspiracy-minded bloggers and foreigners familiar with the more publicly prolific Zaluzhnyi, a dumb legend has sprung up which is morphing close to a kind of defeatism in places.

Everyone’s experience of any war is unique, but there are a number of outfits across Ukraine’s forces that have, despite sometimes being ignored by higher command, perform admirably. There is a reason that many of Ukraine’s standout units aren’t mechanized or air assault brigades, but hail from the National Guard or the few well-funded territorial formations. So I figure that if someone can’t stand the way their brigade is run, the best option is to transfer somewhere else. Or start up an assault regiment, which seems to have worked for a few leaders in similar situations. Speaking of, Skala is apparently using motorcycles now. Count me skeptical, but as with everything, it’s the context of use that counts. Mass rushes in a bid to get a percentage of bodies through to directly assault Ukrainian bunkers isn’t sustainable. Moving an infantry team to an advance location already secured by drones while enemy surveillance is blinded by interceptor drones and electronic warfare - now that could work.

North America

As about sixty percent of Republicans support ongoing military aid to Ukraine and even hard security guarantees that would risk America going to war with Moscow over Ukraine, Trump can’t come at Ukraine without domestic consequences. That single-digit majority in the House is already causing the Republican Party grief. The cost of selling Ukraine to Putin is Trump becoming an early lame duck. This cuts against his personal interests. That’s not to say he won’t jerk Ukraine around more, but the deployment of US surveillance assets to the Black Sea last week and the movement of Abrams tanks donated by Australia (finally) suggests that Team Trump, under Rubio, is trying to resurrect some shred of dignity.

The nice thing about NATO is that it doesn’t preclude smaller groupings from taking the lead on certain issues. So long as the US doesn’t veto a given action, Ukraine can receive effective support without having to wait for formal membership. Independence from the D.C morass is now a national security imperative for everybody. Offering further evidence that the USA is pretty much at the same place the USSR was in the late 80’s and early 90’s, Trump announced a series of big-ticket white elephant weapons projects that are every Cold War technofetishists’ dream come true. Updated F-22 and F-35 fighters tagged with that “Sixth Generation” hype? A Golden Dome missile shield? The old USSR also pushed a bunch of fancy high-tech projects right before the end. For the record, the fifth generation of crewed aircraft has only just begun. What people are trying to call the sixth is a culmination of the fifth.

Anyway, the Soviets didn’t have to worry about international bond markets imposing their own crude form of discipline. Along with the vicious god of political-economy, it is equally unwise to mess around with the one Adam Smith identified by her invisible hand. Call her Freyja, Lakshmi, or any of the non Indo-European names for the same force of nature, but she taketh away as readily as she giveth. Americans may like to think that they’re truly Christian, but deep down the true gods of this land since Europeans arrived have always been expressions of the desire for wealth. Spurn them, and the entire point of the thing becomes dangerously unclear.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Europe

Once presented with a public repudiation of Europe’s hesitation to go too far in backing Ukraine to this point, European leaders were quick to pounce. That is what Putin’s refusal to accept a simple thirty-day ceasefire represents: a declaration of intent to wage war against the entire continent forever. Europe is effectively under siege, and once properly motivated with significant investments, inertia will carry Europe’s institutions relentlessly down the chosen path. Late is better than never.

Italy sending probably all its working reserve M-113 variant armored personnel carriers and a second Aster air defense system is a sign of what’s coming. Ukraine has done an incredible job scaling up domestic industry under relentless pressure and in despite of the challenges posed by decentralization. Frankly, this is proving to be a net benefit, as different producers are able to work directly with fighting brigades and their parent corps to get feedback. When an arrangement works, it can be exported. Incidentally, Italy’s move strongly supports my theory that NATO has not in fact come anywhere near to depleting its actual reserves of materiel. It is almost certain that NATO is effectively requiring that every member maintain both its share of active-duty forces needed to meet alliance obligations and a full reserve of kit. For the most part - some smaller countries like Estonia and Denmark being notable exceptions - NATO countries have been sending the remainder of their stocks after both of these categories are taken into account.

This made sense three years ago, even two. It makes none now. Europe can produce armored vehicles faster than Moscow, and existing models are painfully vulnerable. The logical option is to dispense with reserve gear as quickly as possible, replacing it with new production before a future break in hostilities gives Moscow a chance to recover. With Europe less indebted than the USA and global capital starting to worry about the sustainability of American investments, the fact that Europe tends to make long-term investments should keep European borrowing costs relatively low. Internally, the American economy is increasingly driven by the need to lower the costs of caring for an increasingly elderly population, generating strong incentives to gut protections for seniors in a bid to reduce their numbers.

That sounds conspiratorial, but no plan is required: market forces will suffice. That’s why government is supposed to function as a balance, responding to public outrage over the market power wielded by shareholders through the companies they invest in by capping their profits. Someone has to bear the cost of people living longer, and nobody wants to be it. Partisanship in America has dissolved the normal bond that keeps elected officials accountable for keeping the delicate balance between the power of profit to create medical innovations and ensuring that everyone has access to them as quickly as possible.

Once investors globally start to see through the long charade of American economic reliability, the result will be very unpleasant for Americans. A casino economy is great… until it isn’t. For the USA, the best path forward is probably accepting high debt levels and the volatility they will bring while investing as many public resources as possible in material technology (what do people think makes AI possible?) and domestic logistics. Which includes taking care of people. Once the foundations for a properly focused growth spurt are laid, costs will naturally be recouped during the long summer that follows. This was the second half of the twentieth century for the USA. Ain’t rocket science, people.

This is what’s happening in Europe right now, and Europe’s head start on the process comes thanks to Putin’s abject humiliation by Ukraine. Britain signing a new trade pact with the EU will hopefully help reintegrate the UK with Europe a bit, something that ought to draw in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Heckuva job, Team Trump. Trying to hedge between Moscow and the rest of the world is how you screw yourself and your country over. But hey, I’m on the record with a policy stance that the United States federal government needs to be broken up into autonomous constitutional zones. This is one way to get there.

 

[ChloeTzang]

Ukraine's new drone strategy — cripple Moscow's airports, make Russian population 'pay'​

Ukrainian drones have forced at least 217 temporary airport closures across Russia since Jan. 1, independent Russian outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported on May 14, citing data from Russia's state aviation agency Rosaviatsia. The figure already surpasses the combined total for all of 2023 and 2024, underscoring Kyiv's growing ability to put pressure on Russia, even in areas far from the border with Ukraine. According to Serhii Bratchuk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Army's Southern Division, the surge in disruptions reflects a strategic shift in Ukraine's drone campaign. "Moscow is the biggest aviation hub in the Russian Federation — flights go everywhere, not only across Russia, but worldwide," he told the Kyiv Independent. "This is about the potential disintegration of Russian regions and the weakening of internal control."

Three nights of Ukrainian drone raids before Russia's Victory Day on May 9 forced Rosaviatsia to order temporary flight restrictions that disrupted travel plans for at least 60,000 passengers, according to the Association of Tour Operators of Russia. Just shy of two weeks of calm have been followed by another wave. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that 485 Ukrainian drones had been downed over the past three days, from May 20 to May 22, including 63 over Moscow Oblast. "The priority direction is clear — Moscow and the surrounding regions," Bratchuk said, highlihjting that due to Russia's vast geography, air travel is essential for maintaining connectivity, and disruptions in aviation could increase the risk of regional disintegration and public unrest.

Russia's layered defense network is already under visible strain from Ukraine's now years-long campaign targeting Russian oil production in an attempt to deprive the Kremlin of money to fund its full-scale invasion, as well as military targets like ammunition dumps. Targeting Moscow and the surrounding oblast with increasing numbers of drones could spread Russia’s air defenses even thinner. With Russia's air defense units forced to react to every aerial threat, Kyiv appears to be testing the limits of the Kremlin's ability to protect its own territory — a tactic that could lay the groundwork for future strikes with greater precision and deeper penetration.


https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine...moscows-airports-make-russian-population-pay/

 

[ChloeTzang]

 

[ll74]

Question - if we are leading the negotiation for peace, where is Russia's mineral deal?

 

[ChloeTzang]

And so, one by one, the Russian war criminals meet receive their just desserts....

Andrey Kondratyev, chief designer at Russian defense firm NPO "Kurganpribor", was attacked with a hammer in his apartment building on May 22 by an unknown assailiant. He remains in intensive care with severe head injuries. Sadly, whoever attacked him didn't take the time to beat his skull to pulp.

Kurganpribor is a key enterprise under Rostec’s Techmash holding. It develops targeting and control systems for Russian precision-guided munitions and UAVs, including components for Lancet loitering munitions and artillery fire control systems.

 

[Rightguide]

There is a growing divergence between Russia's hardline position and Europe’s more idealistic diplomatic posture. What you’ve laid out captures the core of the strategic impasse, and the implications are stark.

Russia’s position has hardened into a clear military-first doctrine. Negotiations will only happen after strategic objectives are met on the battlefield, not before. Putin views any premature ceasefire as a Western tactic to deny Russia the fruits of its current battlefield momentum, a kind of political sleight of hand that would allow Ukraine to rearm under NATO’s umbrella. From that perspective, only battlefield dominance can create the political leverage Russia wants in any future settlement.

Meanwhile, Europe’s calls for a ceasefire before negotiations, often framed in humanitarian or rules-based terms, are increasingly detached from the operational reality on the ground. With Ukraine losing strategic positions and its manpower pool shrinking, Western-supplied aid arriving too little or too late, and western defense industries woefully outpaced, the situation is shifting in Russia’s favor. Europe’s own production capacities for shells, armor, and vehicles are not only lagging behind Russia’s, they’re struggling to meet even Ukraine’s defensive needs, much less enable a counteroffensive.

Putin now has the ability to push 30,000 to 50,000 troops through training every month, it’s not just a show of force, it’s a long war signal. Russia is not exhausted. It’s rotating units, preserving experienced brigades, building reserves, and keeping industrial lines running. In contrast, Ukraine is showing signs of fatigue, not just militarily, but socially and politically, while its Western backers remain fragmented in both vision and will.

So yes, all signs suggest this will not be resolved at a negotiating table in the near term — certainly not on Western or Ukrainian terms. Russia is betting it can win this war by attrition, not just of Ukraine’s military, but of Western resolve. And right now, that wager is looking increasingly calculated rather than reckless.

Russia no longer recognizes President Volodymyr Zelensky as possessing legitimate authority to represent the Ukrainian state in any binding capacity. His term, as Russia sees it, has expired or lacks constitutional continuity, and his position is increasingly seen by Moscow as propped up entirely by foreign support, not domestic democratic legitimacy. Therefore, any future settlement must be signed or endorsed by a Ukrainian leadership with recognized constitutional standing, one that is either duly elected in accordance with Ukrainian law or that emerges from a transitional arrangement acceptable to all parties, including Russia.

One final thought for clarity. The above assessment is presented from a strategic and factual standpoint, not a partisan one. These are simply my thoughts based on the information available. It does not serve to endorse any actor in the conflict but rather to juxtapose the reality on the ground, as it currently stands, against the often ungrounded optimism expressed by many in the Western media. The purpose is to foster a more sober, fact-based understanding of the situation, regardless of political alignment or ideological preference. Effective policy and diplomacy can only arise from an accurate reading of the battlefield, not from wishful thinking. So there you have it, my thoughts and beliefs on the present Ukrainian situation as I see it. We can look back on the above in the months to come. If I'm proven wrong, I will gladly mount the steps of Lit's pillory to be publicly corrected as only Litizens know how to do.

 

[ChloeTzang]

One final thought for clarity. The above assessment is presented from a strategic and factual standpoint, not a partisan one. These are simply my thoughts based on the information available. It does not serve to endorse any actor in the conflict but rather to juxtapose the reality on the ground, as it currently stands, against the often ungrounded optimism expressed by many in the Western media. The purpose is to foster a more sober, fact-based understanding of the situation, regardless of political alignment or ideological preference. Effective policy and diplomacy can only arise from an accurate reading of the battlefield, not from wishful thinking. So there you have it, my thoughts and beliefs on the present Ukrainian situation as I see it.

I pretty much align with you on this. Putin is betting he can win a military victory. The EU still thinks negotiations are possible and hangs on to this hope like grim death, altho some, like Finland and the Baltic States, know who's next if Ukraine is defeated. Trump., meanwhile, is off in his on alternate reality sowing chaos and confusion and seemingly delighting in gnerally fucking around. Ukraine is under no illusions and is playing every card they have, with the EU slowly coming on board. Far too slowly, alas, just as with Biden - this war could likely have been won by Ukraine in 2023 if the Biden Administration had got off the pot and provided enough aid early on.

As it is, there's only two outcomes now - Ukraine wins militarily, or Ukraine loses. My bet is on an eventual Russian collapse, primarily economic but also militarily, and a Ukrainian victory.

 

[ll74]

There is a growing divergence between Russia's hardline position and Europe’s more idealistic diplomatic posture. What you’ve laid out captures the core of the strategic impasse, and the implications are stark.

Russia’s position has hardened into a clear military-first doctrine. Negotiations will only happen after strategic objectives are met on the battlefield, not before. Putin views any premature ceasefire as a Western tactic to deny Russia the fruits of its current battlefield momentum, a kind of political sleight of hand that would allow Ukraine to rearm under NATO’s umbrella. From that perspective, only battlefield dominance can create the political leverage Russia wants in any future settlement.

Meanwhile, Europe’s calls for a ceasefire before negotiations, often framed in humanitarian or rules-based terms, are increasingly detached from the operational reality on the ground. With Ukraine losing strategic positions and its manpower pool shrinking, Western-supplied aid arriving too little or too late, and western defense industries woefully outpaced, the situation is shifting in Russia’s favor. Europe’s own production capacities for shells, armor, and vehicles are not only lagging behind Russia’s, they’re struggling to meet even Ukraine’s defensive needs, much less enable a counteroffensive.

Putin now has the ability to push 30,000 to 50,000 troops through training every month, it’s not just a show of force, it’s a long war signal. Russia is not exhausted. It’s rotating units, preserving experienced brigades, building reserves, and keeping industrial lines running. In contrast, Ukraine is showing signs of fatigue, not just militarily, but socially and politically, while its Western backers remain fragmented in both vision and will.

So yes, all signs suggest this will not be resolved at a negotiating table in the near term — certainly not on Western or Ukrainian terms. Russia is betting it can win this war by attrition, not just of Ukraine’s military, but of Western resolve. And right now, that wager is looking increasingly calculated rather than reckless.

Russia no longer recognizes President Volodymyr Zelensky as possessing legitimate authority to represent the Ukrainian state in any binding capacity. His term, as Russia sees it, has expired or lacks constitutional continuity, and his position is increasingly seen by Moscow as propped up entirely by foreign support, not domestic democratic legitimacy. Therefore, any future settlement must be signed or endorsed by a Ukrainian leadership with recognized constitutional standing, one that is either duly elected in accordance with Ukrainian law or that emerges from a transitional arrangement acceptable to all parties, including Russia.

One final thought for clarity. The above assessment is presented from a strategic and factual standpoint, not a partisan one. These are simply my thoughts based on the information available. It does not serve to endorse any actor in the conflict but rather to juxtapose the reality on the ground, as it currently stands, against the often ungrounded optimism expressed by many in the Western media. The purpose is to foster a more sober, fact-based understanding of the situation, regardless of political alignment or ideological preference. Effective policy and diplomacy can only arise from an accurate reading of the battlefield, not from wishful thinking. So there you have it, my thoughts and beliefs on the present Ukrainian situation as I see it. We can look back on the above in the months to come. If I'm proven wrong, I will gladly mount the steps of Lit's pillory to be publicly corrected as only Litizens know how to do.

Russia doesn't want peace.

That's the hard line.

 

[HisArpy]

I pretty much align with you on this. Putin is betting he can win a military victory. The EU still thinks negotiations are possible and hangs on to this hope like grim death, altho some, like Finland and the Baltic States, know who's next if Ukraine is defeated. Trump., meanwhile, is off in his on alternate reality sowing chaos and confusion and seemingly delighting in gnerally fucking around. Ukraine is under no illusions and is playing every card they have, with the EU slowly coming on board. Far too slowly, alas, just as with Biden - this war could likely have been won by Ukraine in 2023 if the Biden Administration had got off the pot and provided enough aid early on.

As it is, there's only two outcomes now - Ukraine wins militarily, or Ukraine loses. My bet is on an eventual Russian collapse, primarily economic but also militarily, and a Ukrainian victory.

Putin cannot win. If Ukraine succeeds in defeating the Bear militarily and a total surrender is inevitable, Putin WILL use nukes. And he won't restrict them to targets only in Ukraine.

Given that, what do you think the world should do? What do you think Trump should advocate for?