Handprints
Literotica Guru
- Joined
- Jul 5, 2007
- Posts
- 547
Just spent a week in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia meeting a wide variety of businesses. How modern are the economies of the latter two? Not very, although the customs inspector in Vientiane, on seeing my golf clubs, asked if I thought his 5-handicap son might be ready to switch to blades from perimeter weights...
Vietnam is significantly further along the economic development path and I thought one or two of the things I noticed there might be of interest to people who are curious about emerging economies and about modern Vietnam. If you're neither of those, this thread probably won't interest you.
For background, Vietnam, like a lot of the rest of Asia, has been operating a kind of semi-decentralised socialist economy for almost 20 years now. Regional governors and department ministers have all been charged with accelerating their patch's GDP and the amount of influence and power they have varies with the result. A few hundred of the larger publicly-owned companies have been part or fully privatised and, in most cases, the state wants someone else to run the companies, even when it holds majority control. Unlike most Asian countries, ownership isn't central or divided among a small number of government departments: a very large number of local, regional and national departments hold stakes in businesses in an almost-random allotment.
For about the last ten years - and increasingly in the past five - the children of 70s refugees have been coming back to assume senior executive positions in Vietnamese companies, many of them still in their late-20s and early 30s. Typically, they were educated at US or European universities, then went to work as investment bankers, hedge fund analysts or other jobs in the financial sector.
These men (and a few women but not many), for the past few years, have been getting offers almost as good as what they make in the US to come work in the mother country, where their dollar probably goes ten times farther. They're the ones who have been modernising the financial system, floating companies, striking the global alliances and - most interesting to me - piling the pressure on the government (national, regional and local) to get the hell out of the way and let them make the people rich.
In fact, these guys are now so highly valued in Vietnam that they are, in some cases, dictating to government what they will divest and how they will sell it. The returnees are highly networked and enjoy enormous social cohesion: they're nominating their own peers to be headhunted and making sure the new guys know the score. Everybody knows everybody in the returnee community and they're not at all afraid to borrow influence from each other to ensure that people who need leaning on feel pressure from all directions.
When one of these returnees sits down for a job interview with a multiple-government-department-owned company, they're essentially saying: "Here's how I'm going to move you guys off the share registry and if you don't like it, none of us are going to work for you."
Two of the places this is most visible are the death of the Nike sweatshop and Vietnam's outrageous success winning high-value outsourcing work from Japan. Most of the ex-outsourcers are now making own-brand goods that sell for three times cost instead of 70 times and targeting low-budget Asian consumers who get very brand-loyal very fast. When Nike comes looking for a contract, they're getting screwed to the wall (which is one of the reasons Nike's now shopping for factory space in Burma and other bottom-end markets. That's a game with a fixed clock...)
Vietnamese manufacturers, largely under the guidance of returnees, are Southeast Asia's wonder story: they've skipped through about three generations of plant to start making high-capital-intensity, high-value-added parts for Japanese auto and heavy industry. The returnees very quickly worked out that Vietnam had no Japanese axe to grind, unlike most of Asia, and no pride problems with having their efforts packaged into a (mostly) made in Japan label. They also knew that the Japanese are past masters at rebuilding old plants and training people how to use them.
The result is an economy growing at China-like speed, faster alignment of company and shareholder interests than anyone looking at the ownership structures would have believed, high-quality (if a bit young for comfort) management in more places than you'd expect to find it, and a very heavy-hitting set of political players from a very unlikely source.
And really, really, gorgeous food. Plus a couple of golf courses that show promise.
Something similar is happening in Nigeria, although the areas of returnee influence are more tightly ring-fenced. Unsurprisingly, a delegation of Nigerian government officials and businessmen were making their quarterly tour of Vietnam while I was there...
Hope that's of interest,
H
Vietnam is significantly further along the economic development path and I thought one or two of the things I noticed there might be of interest to people who are curious about emerging economies and about modern Vietnam. If you're neither of those, this thread probably won't interest you.
For background, Vietnam, like a lot of the rest of Asia, has been operating a kind of semi-decentralised socialist economy for almost 20 years now. Regional governors and department ministers have all been charged with accelerating their patch's GDP and the amount of influence and power they have varies with the result. A few hundred of the larger publicly-owned companies have been part or fully privatised and, in most cases, the state wants someone else to run the companies, even when it holds majority control. Unlike most Asian countries, ownership isn't central or divided among a small number of government departments: a very large number of local, regional and national departments hold stakes in businesses in an almost-random allotment.
For about the last ten years - and increasingly in the past five - the children of 70s refugees have been coming back to assume senior executive positions in Vietnamese companies, many of them still in their late-20s and early 30s. Typically, they were educated at US or European universities, then went to work as investment bankers, hedge fund analysts or other jobs in the financial sector.
These men (and a few women but not many), for the past few years, have been getting offers almost as good as what they make in the US to come work in the mother country, where their dollar probably goes ten times farther. They're the ones who have been modernising the financial system, floating companies, striking the global alliances and - most interesting to me - piling the pressure on the government (national, regional and local) to get the hell out of the way and let them make the people rich.
In fact, these guys are now so highly valued in Vietnam that they are, in some cases, dictating to government what they will divest and how they will sell it. The returnees are highly networked and enjoy enormous social cohesion: they're nominating their own peers to be headhunted and making sure the new guys know the score. Everybody knows everybody in the returnee community and they're not at all afraid to borrow influence from each other to ensure that people who need leaning on feel pressure from all directions.
When one of these returnees sits down for a job interview with a multiple-government-department-owned company, they're essentially saying: "Here's how I'm going to move you guys off the share registry and if you don't like it, none of us are going to work for you."
Two of the places this is most visible are the death of the Nike sweatshop and Vietnam's outrageous success winning high-value outsourcing work from Japan. Most of the ex-outsourcers are now making own-brand goods that sell for three times cost instead of 70 times and targeting low-budget Asian consumers who get very brand-loyal very fast. When Nike comes looking for a contract, they're getting screwed to the wall (which is one of the reasons Nike's now shopping for factory space in Burma and other bottom-end markets. That's a game with a fixed clock...)
Vietnamese manufacturers, largely under the guidance of returnees, are Southeast Asia's wonder story: they've skipped through about three generations of plant to start making high-capital-intensity, high-value-added parts for Japanese auto and heavy industry. The returnees very quickly worked out that Vietnam had no Japanese axe to grind, unlike most of Asia, and no pride problems with having their efforts packaged into a (mostly) made in Japan label. They also knew that the Japanese are past masters at rebuilding old plants and training people how to use them.
The result is an economy growing at China-like speed, faster alignment of company and shareholder interests than anyone looking at the ownership structures would have believed, high-quality (if a bit young for comfort) management in more places than you'd expect to find it, and a very heavy-hitting set of political players from a very unlikely source.
And really, really, gorgeous food. Plus a couple of golf courses that show promise.
Something similar is happening in Nigeria, although the areas of returnee influence are more tightly ring-fenced. Unsurprisingly, a delegation of Nigerian government officials and businessmen were making their quarterly tour of Vietnam while I was there...
Hope that's of interest,
H