Rumsfeld/McNamara comparisons?

[Wildcard Ky]

Is it fair to compare the two? If so, how would you liken the two of them?

McNamara was before my time, so I have no memory of what things were like. From the outside, it would seem that there's a lot of similarities in McNamaras handling of Vietnam, and Rumsfelds handling of Iraq.

 

[rgraham666]

The similarities are glaring to me.

Both are technocrats, their principle skill is with power.

Neither had a real set of ethics. Instead they had a blind belief in the rightness of their actions.

Both tried to impose perfect, rational, abstract structures on reality. And then bitched that it was reality's fault when this structure failed.

It's no wonder that everything they did turned into a disaster.

 

[3113]

Both tried to impose perfect, rational, abstract structures on reality. And then bitched that it was reality's fault when this structure failed.

Can you offer some similar examples? I don't doubt you, I'm just curious as to similar actions, etc.

 

[Pure]

i remember mcnamara well. also his recent admissions of fuck up.

rg's right about the similarities. they were fine administrators, in a sense, though i don't remember that McN was so brusque and demeaning with subordinates.

they both believed in 'the cause,' but R is clearly more rightwing and neo con. McN is one of the 'crusading liberals' many of whom were to morph into neo cons (though McN did not).

rg is a little generous here:
Both tried to impose rational, abstract structures on reality.

Putting it a little differently, both were not connected with reality; McN believed that 'body count' could tell how the war was going; he forgot that 'body count' could be concocted by the army AND who the fuck knows if a body is "Viet Cong"?

Rummy, too, did/does not deal with complexity very well (like Mr. Santorum and his 'islamofascists). He perhaps could have done well in WWII. Rummy, of course, is one of the few Bushies to actually serve in the military. Too bad his worldview was 50 years behind the times.

Both had problems with the military, though I can't put it in a sentence. For all their 'gung ho' and 'get the job done,' many top military persons have a fine sense of reality, in the long run; but the US system allows the civilians to 'cherry pick' the Generals. Both Mcn and R disregarded or shunted aside realistic military estimates.
---

PS: Contrary to Roxanne, McN was not a 'spineless turd.' We will see if Rummy ever admits the slightest misstep. Rummy's boldness is ultimately that of the bully. Rudeness to generals, subordinates, and journalists is perhaps a virtue to the far right, who think the journalists are all leftie slimeballs.

 

[Roxanne Appleby]

I would say that Rummy had orders of magnitude more integrity than McNamara, but since the latter had none that doesn't really work. Rummy came in with a reform agenda and pushed it against stern resistance from the Pentagon dinasaurs. Remember the "Crusader" SP gun? Too big and heavy to go anywhere (and with a name that soon became a liability too). Rummy faced open warfare on that one, and, pardon the pun, stuck to his guns.

Despite Colly's second first post in Ami's "open letter" thread I think the actual battle plan for the Iraq war was essentially sound. The "mission" as defined then was "accomplished" with relatively little cost. Much of the noisy sniping against it came from the same dinosaurs who had been so in love with the Crusader. The Cold War mindset still dominated the pentagon.

I found Rummy's exchanges with the press back then even more enjoyable than Paul Volcker's jousting with slimy pols during his semi-annual congressional testimony back in the 1980s. He committed candor with panache, and made his would-be tormentors the tormented.*

I've tuned it all out somewhat in the last couple years, so I can't comment on his twilight. But he had a good run in the early days.

Oh, McNamara. He was one of many who laid the groundwork for the slow demise of Ford Motor. He never spoke a straight word in his life as far as I know. His "running" of the Viet Nam war was emblematic of all that was wrong with that conflict. His post-public life efforts to rehab his reputation were shameless and despicable. He was a spineless turd, to put it nicely.


* Reporter: "Mr. Secretary, why are U.S. forces using such heavy bombs in Afghanistan?"

Rumsfeld: "They are being used on frontline al Qaeda and Taliban troops to try to kill them."

Oh.

 

[Rumple Foreskin]

There are a lot of similarities between McNamara and Rumsfeld. Both are brilliant, hard-charging, domineering, and arrogant. In my opinion, the main difference is McNamara eventually developed second thoughts about his policies in Vietnam. Rumsfeld has given no signs of having second thoughts.

I would STRONGLY recommend reading (or re-reading) the section on McNamara in David Halberstam's "The Best and the Brightest."

Rumple Foreskin

 

[Pure]

to 3113

rg said,
Both imposed: rational, abstract structures on reality

You have to remember how the VietNam conflict was conceived by crusading liberals and many conservatives.. It was part of a global fight against "communism." "Communism" or better "World Communism" is an abstract entity of the far right, conceived to be rampant. That's the first abstraction.
The theory was that Ho was the 'cat's paw' of the Soviets. The Soviets, it was alleged wanted to have 'satellites' in SE Asia.

The second abstraction is that "communism" is always imposed; that its leaders are hated tyrants; that democratic processes never produce 'communism.'

(I've talked about these distortions in the discussion with Sweet P in the 'neo con thread'. See especially postings #32 and #36, url, below, and SweetP's contrary, more orthodox view.)

https://forum.literotica.com/showthread.php?t=473502&page=2&pp=25


Since you (3113 )know the Iraq situation, I think the parallels will be clear.

The new abstraction is Islamofascism. Without going into detail--please comment as to what *you* see-- one can see that Cheney/Rummy fatally conflate Saddam, Osama and the Ayatollahs, their movements, goals and rationale. They think that fighting Saddam is fighting Osama. (Just as the crusading liberals thought that fighting Ho was fighting Brezhnev.)

 

[rgraham666]

The thing of McNamara's tenure I remember the best is 'Flexible Response'.

It was supposed to make atomic warfare 'rational', 'winnable'.

It drew lines across Europe, with clearly defined responses of atomic weaponry.

It meant that the Soviets could, if they attacked, occupy stretches of Europe, mostly Germany, before the States would use its atomic weapons. And first the weapons were of limited sizes, the 'battlefield' types. And as more of Europe was occupied, more and bigger atomics would be used.

This fancy plan required more atomic weapons to be designed and built. Which required the Soviets to respond. Soon there was a major arms race.

The plan was logical, precise and nuts. Use of atomic weapons is not rational. Well, no war is rational, but atomics is worse. MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction, was just that, mad. But it worked. Nobody wants to lose a war and MAD meant nobody won. So people were careful.

Once McNamara made atomic war 'winnable' it greatly increased the chance of it occurring.

Oh and then there was the way McNamara re-organized the U.S. Armed Forces. He bought 'modern management methods' into the Pentagon. The result? The U.S. Armed Forces are run by managers for the most part, not soldiers. The results of which can be seen by the long string of losses of important wars. And even the little wars are won in a ham handed manner. If you want a good look at this phenomena I recommend this book

And don't quote the Cold War at me. The U.S. and the West didn't win that one. The Soviets lost. A completely different thing.

 

[Jenny_Jackson]

The thing of McNamara's tenure I remember the best is 'Flexible Response'.

It drew lines across Europe, with clearly defined responses of atomic weaponry.

It meant that the Soviets could, if they attacked, occupy stretches of Europe, mostly Germany, before the States would use its atomic weapons. And first the weapons were of limited sizes, the 'battlefield' types. And as more of Europe was occupied, more and bigger atomics would be used.

McNamara and Rumsfield were both "micro-managers" trying to manage every facet of a structure made up of millions of people, installations, weapons, ships, airplanes etc. This for McNamara was his undoing. Same for Rumsfield.

Both of them were so lost in the "forest" of papers generated by the military establishment, they couldn't see the reality of the world.

McNamara thought of little guys in pajamas running around Viet Nam. Rummy thought of Al Quida terrorists running around Iraq. Neither of them could see they were fighting well organized and equiped armies.

As far as europe, McNamara came up with the plan based on the (right or wrong) idea that if the Soviets to attack western europe they would come through Germany. As I recall, the joke is those days went:

"What's the definition of a 'Sub-Critical' neuclear device?"
"Anything that falls on Germany."

As far as Rumsfield's war, his anger was evident in his last few public appearances before the ax fell. Anger, not because the war wasn't advancing per his plan, but rather because the insurgents weren't following it.

They were both pretty stupid and arrogant.

 

[Pure]

3113

Here are a couple excerpts from wikipedia.


This bears on the abstraction claim:

During their 1995 meeting, Gen. Giap [of Vietnam] asked McNamara, how a country so rich could not afford history books, because Vietnam had no intention of becoming a Chinese puppet, evidence being the epic 1000 year war between China and Vietnam for independence. (paraphrased from McNamara in The Fog of War)

The reference is to the other theory of Vietnam, besides the Vietnam is the Soviet's tool, theory. Some held that Vietnam was the cat's paw of the Chinese, i.e., represented Chinese expansion.
------

MacNamara in his own words, in the 1990s, on the Vietnam period:

In Retrospect: "We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in light of those values. Yet we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why. I truly believe that we made an error not of values and intentions, but of judgment and capabilities.".

Though the wording is hedged a bit, it will be interesting if Rummy is ever able to go this far.

 

[Jenny_Jackson]

Don't forget that the demise of McNamara and Rumsfield were quite different. Rumsfield and his policies simply ran out of gas. McNamara was shot in the ass from behind by a secret report to the president authored by Clark Clifford.

 

[dr_mabeuse]

As I recall, (& this was at the very dawn of my political consciousness) McNamarra was part of the "Best & the Brightest"--the name given the group of young, sharp, highly-educated advisors and cabinet members that Kennedy brought to Washington to apply modern management techniques to the running of government. Before them, cabinet members had been mostly old Pols and pals of the President, but the Best & Brightest were professional managers and MBA's who focused on efficiency and the bottom line. This was going to be the face of Modern Government and people watched in fascination.

McNamarra did well in a bean-counter kind of way, setting and meeting goals and crunching numbers, but then he stepped into the buzzsaw of Viet Nam where there were no clear goals to meet or tasks to perform. Long after everyone else had accepted that Viet Nam was a new kind of war, Mac was still crunching numbers and acting like we were fighting the North Koreans or something, waiting for the big pitched battle in which American military power could crush the enemy "army" once and for all. He never saw the forest for the trees.

I suppose Rumsfeld was guilty of the same kind of blindness. He insisted it was the USA vs. the Bad Guys up until the end.

Both men's failures, it seems to me, were entirely due to their willful ignorance of the history and anthropology of the countries in which they fought. they thought like businessmen and not like soldiers.

One of the things I heard about Rumseld just before Iraq was that his goal was to make the army so low-manpower and high-tech that Bush could use it as a private instrument of diplomacy, sending in fast shock & awe task forces to do his will and get out before congress could get it together to stop him or demand a declaration of war. That's why he went in with fewer troops than the generals wanted, and why he consistently refused to even discuss upping the numbers. He held onto his dream till the end.

 

[rgraham666]

One of my favourite books, Voltaire's Bastards dedicates several pages to Mr. McNamara's 'accomplishments'. Mr. Saul holds McNamara up as the final product of 'Reason' unsullied by other human traits like imagination and ethics. An exemplar of the Man of Reason as a courtier.

I agree with him. In the words of Northrop Frye, "It is a mistake to believe only emotions can panic the mind."

 

[Pure]

mab One of the things I heard about Rumseld just before Iraq was that his goal was to make the army so low-manpower and high-tech that Bush could use it as a private instrument of diplomacy, sending in fast shock & awe task forces to do his will and get out before congress could get it together to stop him or demand a declaration of war. That's why he went in with fewer troops than the generals wanted, and why he consistently refused to even discuss upping the numbers. He held onto his dream till the end.

P: macnamara had some similar approaches. he wanted to reform the pentagon, and introduced 'systems analysis' and various integrated budgeting approaches. he was a 'bean counter' par excellence, and of course DID accomplish some economies, e.g. having the Army and Navy both use the same fighter plane. OTOH, he brought in the M 16 Rifle which was notorious for malfunction.

macnamara likewise thought the pentagon too rigid, as well as its means of war. his 'flexibility' goal included a counter insurgency capability. "Counter insurgency" of course is a bit of a minefield, but mcnamara thought Vietnam would be fine to prove how the
Special Forces units could root out the enemy.

one might say he didn't appreciate the roots of insurgency or guerrilla warfare, but approached it technocratically. sound familiar?

 

[shereads]

McNamara admitted to having made mistakes that cost lives. Rumsfeld, not so much. (See "State of Denial" excerpt in Pure's 'Wit and Wisdom" thread.)

 

[boutrosboutros]

Both showed a similar disregard for the Geneva Conventions. Both were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands.

The difference is that McNamara had the balls to admit that he made mistakes (which he did in "The Fog of War" - a fantastic film, by the way, in which the man comes across as much more thoughtful and sensitive than you might think). He was guilty of gross misapprehensions about the nature of war, but I believe they were honest misapprehensions.

Rumsfeld strikes me as being one of the most mendacious, mean-spirited men who ever lived; the kind of guy who admits he sanctions the use of poison gas in warfare, dodges responsibility for war crimes whose buck legally stops at his desk, blithely dismisses the lives of enemy combatants as if they're insects, and shows nothing but contempt for his own electorate by telling them barefaced lies at every opportunity.

He's a disgusting, piggy-eyed monstrosity, and it's my sincere hope that now he's out of office he gets everything he deserves.

McNamara, on the other hand, gives the impression that he feels guilty enough already.

 

[boutrosboutros]

One of my favourite books, Voltaire's Bastards dedicates several pages to Mr. McNamara's 'accomplishments'. Mr. Saul holds McNamara up as the final product of 'Reason' unsullied by other human traits like imagination and ethics. An exemplar of the Man of Reason as a courtier.

I agree with him. In the words of Northrop Frye, "It is a mistake to believe only emotions can panic the mind."

Yes, that's absolutely true. I've seen him describing the process whereby he and members of the air force high command worked out how they could maximise efficiency in destroying areas of Tokyo (and, indirectly, killing the most civilians possible - which he admits all of them knew was the implicit aim). Utterly chilling - the work of a man who knows nothing other than what is rational.

 

[Pure]

on rummy,

re reading the 'tribute' of RA, posting above, it's damn hard to see it. esp. about integrity.

so many lies and evasions.

the only point i will concede is that put downs of stupid reporters' questions are certainly fine!

but he made the same putdowns against army persons and his subordinates: when a member of the troops in Iraq asked about body armor, he made his famous, condescending "When you go to war, you have to use the army you've got."

his torture memos, either by Yoo, commissioned by him, or by he himself are pretty unsettling.

 

[Wildcard Ky]

What I see as the most glaring similarity is that both of them viewed the wars that they led from an almost purely statistical point of view.

Military commanders of the day have repeatedly said that the biggest thing with McNamara was the amount of ordinance expended. You had to drop X tons of bombs per month, kill X number of enemy combatants, etc. It was all about the stats. The reality of what was happening on the ground in an unconventional war never set in on him. As Dr. M said, it was in a bean counter sort of way.

I think Rumsfeld never grasped the unconventional war in Iraq either. At the beginning, when it was a conventional military campaign of our armed forces vs Saddams forces, the military action was nothing short of brilliant. Once it became an insurgent led geurilla battle, Rumsfeld didn't seem to know how to react. Inaction and sticking to the predetermined plan led to the quagmire that we have today.

 

[Roxanne Appleby]

What I see as the most glaring similarity is that both of them viewed the wars that they led from an almost purely statistical point of view.

Military commanders of the day have repeatedly said that the biggest thing with McNamara was the amount of ordinance expended. You had to drop X tons of bombs per month, kill X number of enemy combatants, etc. It was all about the stats. The reality of what was happening on the ground in an unconventional war never set in on him. As Dr. M said, it was in a bean counter sort of way.

I think Rumsfeld never grasped the unconventional war in Iraq either. At the beginning, when it was a conventional military campaign of our armed forces vs Saddams forces, the military action was nothing short of brilliant. Once it became an insurgent led geurilla battle, Rumsfeld didn't seem to know how to react. Inaction and sticking to the predetermined plan led to the quagmire that we have today.

Ha! You knew the answer all along, and just started this thread to draw us all out!

 

[Pure]

rummy's problem was reflected in the "mission accomplished" announcement, and 'bring it on' the idea is that we're facing a conventional force. it's pretty well agreed that Rummy et al did NOT plan for the follow up, including such things as guarding national museums, iirc, he said, in effect 'shit happens.'

counterinsurgency and military people generally do not appreciate the human and political side of a struggle. the former TALK the TALK about hearts and minds, but think giving pencils to schools is going to do the trick.