Objective Demonstration Thread

[Pure]

This thread is for objective demonstrations in the area of morality.

There are several around here who believe/claim there is an 'objective morality'--some follow Ayn Rand; some follow the Pope; some follow John Calvin.

In any case these folks are invited here, to show their stuff:

[ADDED: This thread is intended to have a large scope and subsequent pages bring up a variety of topics.

The basic challenge is to give an objective demonstration regarding any substantive moral principle, e.g., prohibitions against murder, theft, kidnapping.]


[Further specific example.] Give an 'objective demonstration'* that infanticide, killing--e.g., of the severely deformed babies-- is wrong (or right for that matter).

There are a number of reasons that might be advanced for it NOT being wrong, e.g., that these babies will have either early death or miserable lives in store, that they drain scarce resources of society and families, that they cause heartbreak and divorce in families, etc.

So a person arguing for the wrongness of such cases of infanticide has, besides her positive case, to deal with (counter) the reasons given above.
---

*Definition: a demonstration is 'objective' if it--the evidence and the reasoning involved-- would compel any sane and reasonable person to agree with a very high degree of certainty **. to take an example from another area: it can be 'objectively' demonstrated that 1) the Earth is round/spherical and that its diameter is about 8000 miles;

2) that Earth is about 90 million miles from the sun, which is a star.

We would assemble evidence gathered by various instruments, such as telescopes, etc. In the end, no rational person will disagree; the 'flat earth' people have to rely on a series of implausible dodges to explain away the evidence (e.g optical illusions, etc; their own visions).

To take an example from biology: it's an objective truth

3) that human beings are omnivorous primates who do best, without extraordinary measures, in climates ranging from those with average daily temperatures of 0-110 degrees F. IOW, unassisted living on either Mercury or Uranus is not possible.

[**Added: Such a demonstration would not invoke items of faith, or revelation ("God says its wrong") or authority ("It says so in the Bible"). This does not mean that rational considerations are the only ones for a given person, but merely that they suffice to render the point convincing to any rational others.]

 

[glynndah]

Hey, you never said anything about essay questions!

 

[amicus]

Poor, Poor Pure, endlessly thrashing around in a relativistic mental state, burdened by the Kantian and Hegelian baggage of the past.

I often experience a pang of pity for the Pure one and wonder how he facilitates dancing on the head of so many devious pins, always evading him.

Then, alas, poor Pure is captured by his own efforts to diminish the power and function of the human mind by offering a 'demonstration' of just what aspects of reality are comprehensible to the human mind.

Therein lies the rub my friend. You propose that some forms of knowledge are knowable but insist that others are not; a rumbling tumbling limbs akimbo falling through empty space and time in a quest to deny the efficacy of epistemology.

And no, I decline your invitation to 'demonstrate' for you an objective, rational, logical, absolute system of value recognition. We have been this route too many times before.

Get your own box.


amicus...

 

[amicus]

Amicus2k6 Victorious Again! Lefties wilt away!

Almost a year ago, TheEarl, whom I have not heard from recently, invited me to participat,e in an online game called NationStates.

I was suspect of the invitation after reading the mechanics of the competition as it appeared to be grossly tilted to left wing politics and philosophy, however, I was drawn in and after a while began to enjoy the daily decisions about issues.

From a high of 56 participants, the Empire of Literotica is currently left with only nine nations still surviving and yes, for something like eight out of the last nine months, amicus2k6 has reigned supreme.

This is not to gloat, but in the inimical way of Amicus, to goad a few on to join NationStates and do a little down and dirty competition in the fantasy world of politics and business.

Amicus2k6, Capitalist Paradise, 'Give me Liberty or give me Death', is as ostracized there as here and with good reason, no body likes a winner.

So...knock me off the pedastal of victory...if you can.

It is a free site and the rules are not difficult. If anyone can't find it by searching NationStates, or Jennifer Nation, I will be happy to provide an url..


amicus...

Edited to add: My sincere apologies, I swear I posted this as a new thread and not on your post, dunno how that happened.

amicus...

 

[Lauren Hynde]

/threadjack

 

[Pure]

A:You propose that some forms of knowledge are knowable but insist that others are not;

P: i haven't proposed that, and certainly not in this thread. i simply asked those of you with objective knowledge, such as you, to show why (if it is) infanticide is wrong, objectively, and such that no rational person could disagree.

this doesn't call for one of your tapes, just a few fresh thoughts.

 

[amicus]

Sighs...so I changed my mind; decided to take the bait and see where it leads.


"...Objective Demonstration Thread

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This thread is for objective demonstrations in the area of morality.

There are several around here who believe/claim there is an 'objective morality'--some follow Ayn Rand; some follow the Pope; some follow John Calvin.

In any case these folks are invited here, to show their stuff:

First task. Give an 'objective demonstration'* that infanticide--e.g., of the severely deformed babies-- is wrong (or right for that matter).

There are a number of reasons that might be advanced for it NOT being wrong, e.g., that these babies will have either early death or miserable lives in store, that they drain scarce resources of society and families, that they cause heartbreak and divorce in families, etc.

So a person arguing for the wrongness of such cases of infanticide has, besides her positive case, to deal with (counter) the reasons given above...."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Infanticide: "The act of killing an infant." (Random House)

Rather a terse definition, eh?

I suspect that not a single person reading your question is without a feeling of revulsion at someone who did not innately know, that is is 'wrong' to take the life of an innocent infant.


In the absence of an organized religion, the word of 'god' to impress upon you that all human life is sacrosant or even the opposite, for those religions that advocate the sacrifice of human life, in the absence of faith, Pure turns to pure thought and cannot find a reason not to commit infanticide.


"Objective morality" has nothing to do with the Pope or John Calvin, but it has quite a lot to do with Ayn Rand.

Young children do not know it is 'wrong' to strangle a kitten or to pull the wings off of insects.

They also do not know of many things, the dangers or fire or electricity or falling a great distance, they are not born with that knowledge, they must 'learn' those aspects of reality.

It is here, Pure, that you usually lose your way in these discussions, you seem quite willing to accept the laws of nature, gravity, the speed of light in a vacuum as a K, constant and absolute observation. But when the subject gets around to ethics and morality you immediately dismiss reason and rational thought and scream at the unfairness of it all, hoping someone, somewhere can provide you with a moral and ethical foundation.

You also seem to get hung up with concepts involving axioms and apriori; the moment the discussion leaves the physical and goes into metaphysics, (beyond physics) you go into a tizzy and you insist on touching a percept or an abstract or a concept. Well, you can't.

And no one, not I or anyone else can 'give' you an understanding of epistemology, the 'science' of how the mind works and why 'knowledge' is valid and how it can be proven and demonstrated.

If I were a kind man, I would suggest that when they were passing out the ingredients to make your mind, they left out a spoonful or two of the few essentials.

However, knowing you after years now of confrontation, I know full well it is your conscious intent to destroy any attempt by anyone to offer reason and logic as a means of acquiring and ethical and moral system by which to live.

So if you really don't know why it is wrong to plunge an icepick into a child's skull, then I doubt anyone could ever educate you.


amicus...

 

[Pure]

A And no one, not I or anyone else can 'give' you an understanding of epistemology, the 'science' of how the mind works and why 'knowledge' is valid and how it can be proven and demonstrated.

If I were a kind man, I would suggest that when they were passing out the ingredients to make your mind, they left out a spoonful or two of the few essentials. [...]

So if you really don't know why it is wrong to plunge an icepick into a child's skull, then I doubt anyone could ever educate you.

P: You seem to have a strong intuition about this case; as do i, for many variants of it.

But "intuitionism" in morals is not 'objectivism.' Objective non-basic* knowledge is to be demonstrable--not merely "I know it's so." The objectivist can say, "I know it's true, objectively, for the following reasons, to which you, as a rational person, need to pay attention." The intuitionist can only say, 'Well some people have a sense of this like I do, and a few lack it, and there's nothing more to be said.'

*I agree that certain basic axioms, which we may call 'objective truths,' cannot be demonstrated, e.g. that the writer of this sentence is conscious. that the writer of this sentence perceives something--a computer screen--in front of him, etc. But i hardly think "infanticide is wrong" falls into this 'directly given' category.

 

[cantdog]

I think he doesn't know much about reason, but he knows what he likes; you know, a patron of the rational.

 

[BlackShanglan]

Asking for an objective demonstration that something is moral or immoral is like asking for an objective demonstration that something is beautiful or ugly. The lack of an objective answer does not indicate that the concept of beauty (or morality) itself is flawed, nor that people should not attempt beautiful (or moral) lives, nor that they should not have standards of beauty (or morality), nor even that there does not exist some actual standard of absolute beauty or morality. It only indicates that the subject under discussion is currently incapable of an objective answer because no person can bring empirical evidence to bear on the core assumptions involved in any position. In the absence of empirical evidence, one is left taking one's best guess - and the theory that no standard exists is quite as much a guess as the theory that any specific standard does.

The difficulty with taking the "you can't prove that this exists" line of argument to mean "this thing does not exist" is that a few hundred years ago, it would have worked just as well on electrons, DNA, several planets, and the continents of North and South America. What is and what one can prove should not be confused with each other.

Shanglan

 

[rgraham666]

But when you have an 'objective' viewpoint, that is 'perfect and absolute', you need never worry again about making an immoral decision.

You're right. That's the end of the matter. And even if other people get hurt, you didn't have any choice in the matter.

Which is why it's so damned popular. Freedom from responsibility is the greatest freedom of all.

 

[BlackShanglan]

But when you have an 'objective' viewpoint, that is 'perfect and absolute', you need never worry again about making an immoral decision.

You're right. That's the end of the matter. And even if other people get hurt, you didn't have any choice in the matter.

Which is why it's so damned popular. Freedom from responsibility is the greatest freedom of all.

My point is that deciding that one is correct in assuming that there is no absolute standard is just as erroneous and just as likely to lead to various enactions of hubris and unpleasantness. Freedom from responsiblity takes many guises and I agree that it's an insidious thing, but I'd argue that it shows up under the heading of "there is no absolute morality and therefore no one can tell me I am ever wrong" as often as it does under "there is an absolute standard so I can accept that and never consider my actions so long as they technically fit it." Nasty things, both of them.

Shanglan

 

[rgraham666]

My point is that deciding that one is correct in assuming that there is no absolute standard is just as erroneous and just as likely to lead to various enactions of hubris and unpleasantness. Freedom from responsiblity takes many guises and I agree that it's an insidious thing, but I'd argue that it shows up under the heading of "there is no absolute morality and therefore no one can tell me I am ever wrong" as often as it does under "there is an absolute standard so I can accept that and never consider my actions so long as they technically fit it." Nasty things, both of them.

Shanglan

Yep.

Yawn. Shouldn't be posting deep thoughts when this tired. The echoes confuse me.

 

[impressive]

Asking for an objective demonstration that something is moral or immoral is like asking for an objective demonstration that something is beautiful or ugly. The lack of an objective answer does not indicate that the concept of beauty (or morality) itself is flawed, nor that people should not attempt beautiful (or moral) lives, nor that they should not have standards of beauty (or morality), nor even that there does not exist some actual standard of absolute beauty or morality. It only indicates that the subject under discussion is currently incapable of an objective answer because no person can bring empirical evidence to bear on the core assumptions involved in any position. In the absence of empirical evidence, one is left taking one's best guess - and the theory that no standard exists is quite as much a guess as the theory that any specific standard does.

Interesting OpEd related to the proposed subject of infanticide:

Virtual Mentor. 2006; 8: 53-56.

The Uncertain Rationale for Prenatal Disability Screening
by David Wasserman, JD, and Adrienne Asch, PhD

On November 10, 2005, an article in The New England Journal of Medicine reported the increasing accuracy of first trimester screening for Down syndrome. The introduction of first trimester tests for the condition was heralded in 1998 by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHHD), as reducing complications for women who choose abortion. NICHHD reportedly spent $15 million on the study—presumably to fulfill its mission “to ensure that every person is born healthy and wanted.” Of course, few children with trisomy 21 detected in the first trimester are likely to be born at all. NICHHD’s mission is also “to ensure that women suffer no harmful effects from reproductive processes,” and that goal may also have provided a rationale for funding the research—many women might see the birth of a child with Down syndrome as a “harmful effect” of their pregnancy. We suggest that it is difficult to justify prenatal screening for disability on either of these grounds, as protecting the health of the fetus or child or as protecting women from harmful effects of reproduction.

Prenatal diagnosis—through amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, or preimplantation genetic dianosis (PGD); for Down syndrome, cystic fibrosis, female gender, or blue eyes—needs to be seen for what it is, or more importantly, what it is not. It is not a medical procedure—that is, a procedure intended to protect or restore an individual’s physical or mental health. Rather, it is typically a procedure to identify unwanted organisms. Occasionally, testing is sought to guide the management of delivery and labor. But far more often its purpose is to provide information about fetal characteristics so a woman can decide whether or not to continue her pregnancy.

To say that prenatal testing and any resulting abortion are not medical procedures is not to say that they are wrong or that a doctor is wrong to perform them. A pregnancy test for an unmarried adolescent who does not want a child is not a medical procedure either, nor is the abortion that may follow positive pregnancy test results. We may regard that test and abortion as justifiable, and regard a doctor as the appropriate agent to carry them out, without believing that they serve to protect or restore the health of an individual patient. If doctors can properly perform a non-healing intervention in aborting the unwanted fetus carried by a teenager, can they do so in enabling parents to prevent the birth of a child with Down syndrome?

The answer will depend on whether there is a distinct justification for the intervention that is not based on protecting or restoring the health of individual patients. Two rationales are often given for the use of prenatal testing, and both gain spurious strength from their conflation with stronger rationales for different practices. The first is the public health rationale of reducing the incidence of genetic disease and “defects.” This rationale elides the striking difference between prenatal testing and true medical preventive measures: for the foreseeable future, prenatal testing can prevent disease and disabilities only by preventing the existence of people who would bear them. Prevention by prenatal screening lacks the obvious justification of most public health measures: preventing medical harm to existing people. While it may be reasonable to treat the incidence of disability among existing people as, in part, a public health problem, it is problematic to treat the existence of future people with disabilities that way. A policy of prevention-by-screening appears to reflect the judgment that lives with disabilities are so burdensome to the disabled child, her family, and society that their avoidance is a health care priority—a judgment that exaggerates and misattributes many or most of the difficulties associated with disability.

We believe the principal difficulties faced by people with disabilities and their families are caused or exacerbated by discriminatory attitudes and practices that are potentially remediable by social, legal, and institutional change—in much the same way that many of the difficulties associated with being African American or female in America have been ameliorated. A policy that promotes selection against embryos and fetuses with disabling traits conveys the strong impression that the problem is the disability itself rather than the society that could do so much more to welcome and include all its members.

The second rationale offered in support of prenatal screening is the enhancement of parental autonomy. The justification for enabling a woman to decide whether to have a child is stronger than the justification for enabling her to decide what kind of child she will have. Pregnancy makes massive demands on a woman’s body; parenthood involves an enormous, open-ended commitment. To treat the difference between having a disabled and a nondisabled child as being of a similar magnitude as the difference between having and not having a child greatly exaggerates the burden of disability and ignores the source of so much of that burden.

We recognize that people with disabilities and their families face difficulties in our present society and that perhaps some of those difficulties would remain even after comprehensive social reform. But we maintain that few disabilities are so undesirable that they provide good reason for abandoning a parental project, for declining to become a parent to the child who would develop from the diagnosed fetus. Given the difficulties that a disabled child is likely to face in our present society, a prospective parent may have good reason not to cause disability, but that is not reason enough to select against a fetus with a disability. In creating families, prospective parents should aspire to an ideal of unconditional welcome; an ideal opposed to the exercise of selectivity through prenatal testing. If a child develops a disease or disability—diabetes or attention deficit disorder—loving parents incorporate the challenges posed by that condition into the project of raising and nurturing him. We do not believe that parents should reject those challenges in bringing future children into their families. (It is important to recognize that most disabilities are caused by accidents or disease, not by genetic variations.)

If, however, we accept the use of biomedical technology to give parents greater choice in the kind of children they have, we should not limit that choice to the avoidance of genetic impairment; we should facilitate testing for any conditions parents might find burdensome or desirable. And even if we are comfortable with such parental selectivity, enhancing it clearly should not enjoy the priority given to measures that protect the choice about whether to become a parent in the first place.

On the other hand, if we object to such unfettered choice as corrupting or debasing the parental role, we should not make an exception for disability. To do so is to treat disabilities as uniquely burdensome, in the face of strong contrary evidence from research on families with disabled children [1-5]. To assume that most genetically detectable disabilities impair the prospects for individual and family flourishing in a way that other potentially detectable characteristics do not is truly to stigmatize disability. While such stigmatization is understandable when it is displayed by anxious couples awaiting a life-transforming event, it should not guide the public funding of reproductive research or the formulation of reproductive policy.

Given the difficulties in justifying the public funding of research and development in prenatal screening, the money spent for that purpose might be better used for research on improving the health, functioning, and longevity of children with genetically based disabilities.

References
1. Baxter C, Poonia K, Ward L, Nadirshaw Z. A longitudinal study of parental stress and support: from diagnosis of disability to leaving school. International Journal of Disability, Development, and Education. 1995;42:125-136.
2. Cahill BM, Gidden LM. Influence of child diagnosis on family and parental functioning: Down syndrome versus other disabilities. Am J Ment Retard. 1996;101:149-160.
3. Ferguson PM. Mapping the family: disability studies and the exploration of parental response to disability. In Albrecht G L, Seelman KD, Bury M. Handbook of Disability Studies. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications; 2001.
4. Gallimore R, Weisner TS, Kaufman SZ, Bernheimer LP. The social construction of ecocultural niches: family accommodation of developmentally delayed children. Am J Ment Retard. 1989;94:216-230.
5. Krauss MW. Child-related and parenting stress: similarities and differences between mothers and fathers of children with disabilities. Am J Ment Retard. 1993;97:393:404.

Suggested Reading
Wasserman D, Asch A. Where is the sin in synecdoche: prenatal testing and the parent-child relationship. In: Wasserman D, Wachbroit R, Bickenbach J, eds. Quality of Life and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health Care, and Disability. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 2005.

Asch A. Disability, equality and prenatal testing: contradictory or compatible? Fla State Univ Law Rev. 2003;30:315-342.

David Wasserman, JD, is a research scholar at the University of Maryland’s Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. He works on ethical and policy issues in disability, genetics, and reproduction.

Adrienne Asch, PhD, is the Edward and Robin Milstein Professor of Bioethics at Yeshiva University. She is the author of many articles on reproductive ethics, bioethics, disability, and feminism. Much of her work has focused on ethical issues in prenatal testing.

The viewpoints expressed on this site are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the AMA.

http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/15809.html

 

[rgraham666]

In the game I designed a few years ago, I had to put together what the world would look like in 2060.

In several areas of the world prenatal screening was heavily used, mostly to ensure only male children were born.

The result?

Those places in the world are dying out. They don't want female children, they won't marry outside their 'class' or 'race'. After almost three generations of this there aren't enough of them left to continue their cultures.

I am a severely evil person sometimes, aren't I?

 

[BlackShanglan]

Impressive, that's a very interesting article. Thank you for posting it.

Rob - I think China has you beat to it. The last statistics I heard pegged the rising young generation at something like two-thirds to three-quarters male.

Shanglan

 

[rgraham666]

Impressive, that's a very interesting article. Thank you for posting it.

Rob - I think China has you beat to it. The last statistics I heard pegged the rising young generation at something like two-thirds to three-quarters male.

Shanglan

And I gather that generation is extremely spoiled as well. I read an article a few years ago that said the common term for that generation is 'Little Emperors'.

That demographic both relieves and worries me.

Spoiled brats aren't likely to work as hard. Whih could bring China's 'economic miracle' to a halt.

On the other hand, young men tend to be rather belligerent, which means China may end up spoiling for a fight. I understand this is one of the current problems with the Arab world. Much of its population is young, male and unemployed.

[threadjack]

 

[Pure]

reply to Black.

thanks for your thoughtful piece.

BS: Asking for an objective demonstration that something is moral or immoral is like asking for an objective demonstration that something is beautiful or ugly. The lack of an objective answer does not indicate that the concept of beauty (or morality) itself is flawed, nor that people should not attempt beautiful (or moral) lives, nor that they should not have standards of beauty (or morality), nor even that there does not exist some actual standard of absolute beauty or morality. It only indicates that the subject under discussion is currently incapable of an objective answer because no person can bring empirical evidence to bear on the core assumptions involved in any position. In the absence of empirical evidence, one is left taking one's best guess - and the theory that no standard exists is quite as much a guess as the theory that any specific standard does.

The difficulty with taking the "you can't prove that this exists" line of argument to mean "this thing does not exist" is that a few hundred years ago, it would have worked just as well on electrons, DNA, several planets, and the continents of North and South America. What is and what one can prove should not be confused with each other.

P: Let's start at the beginning. There are at least three kinds of people claiming that principles of morality can be demonstrated: those like--Ayn Rand; the Pope; John Calvin.

They claim not just that, for the arena of human action 1) there are objective standards, but that 2) we can know them and 3) make utterly convincing, 'objective' demonstrations based on them.

As it were, they believe that the moral world--like the physical world, for them--has A) a kind of transparency to human perception and understanding and B) a kind of tractability in relation to human capabilities of communication and demonstration--its truths are not only accessible (NOT too deep to fathom) but can be convincingly communicated about; not only can i know the world, but I can tell you about it; I can explain it for myself and to you, and thus have a solid basis to persuade you of truths about it.

So a failure, here, to make any demonstration indicates that 1) or 2) or 3) or some pair or all three are false.

So as to your points:
BSThe lack of an objective answer does not indicate that the concept of beauty (or morality) itself is flawed,

P: true

BSnor that people should not attempt beautiful (or moral) lives, nor that they should not have standards of beauty (or morality),

P: most of the poeple mentioned would argue that unless 1,2, and 3 and true, then the motivation and reasons for being moral are gravely, if not fatally undermined. The non objectivists claim, in effect, "Well, i have my answer and it works for my moral guidance and whether it works for anyone else doesn't matter." There are extended possibilities of argument, here, which I put aside for now. See below.

BSnor even that there does not exist some actual standard of absolute beauty or morality.

P: true.

BS It only indicates that the subject under discussion is currently incapable of an objective answer because no person can bring empirical evidence to bear on the core assumptions involved in any position.

P: Yes, were all attempts at objective demonstration to fail; there would be a lack of evidence and/or reasons [or access to them] which have weight across persons (intersubjectively). But the three proponents claim that there is no problem of the existence of evidence and access to it.

BS In the absence of empirical evidence, one is left taking one's best guess

P: That, of course is the position these three do NOT want to end up in. Though yes, it's what we do in situations of uncertainty.

P: To wrap this up, Shang: As a person of some sophistication I'd guess you do have some areas of uncertainty, and maybe even areas where you don't see any possible 'objective' resolution. Yet you don't want to abandon the whole project; you will 'take your best guess' and do a reasonable approximation to a moral life, as far as you can figure the standards. I have some sympathy with that, as I too don't claim to have lots of answers. It's true we have to 'so something in the interim' (between now and the attainment of certainty).

But this ('subjectivist') approach deeply distresses the objectivists [of] all three stripes. And they have some argument that there something fundamentally flawed with the "It's my best guess, and I don't care if other rational people can't be similarly convinced" approach.

In a super-small nutshell, that approach seems (to them) to yield too weak conclusions. Taking Ms. Rand, she doesn't want to say to Stalin, "I don't like your mass deportations; that's just my 'take' on it," and have Stalin say, "Well, well my 'take' is based on the interests of the state; and I think 'heads must roll' [or persons shipped off] to preserve it; your 'take' is subjective, baseless, if not corrupt." She finds that a trivialization of the discussion, as if she and Staline were discussing whether ham sandwiches are tasty.

==
Here's a little note about the example. Two of the three 'objectivists' base themselves in Aristotle. Rand and The Pope.
(through Aquinas). Indeed, Aristotle is the only previous philosopher Rand has any respect for.

Aristotle is known to have no problem with infanticide, based on the interests of human society, i.e having the highest (physical/biological) quality of persons as citizens. Interestingly Aristotle had no problems either with the claims that women and slaves are inferior in various respects (and hence are appropriately ruled).

It has often been argued that 'equality' as we now understand it, and write it into Human Rights Charters is a derivative of Jewish and Christian teachings about humans' souls. But arguably those insights (assuming they are true, ftsoa) are based in revelation.

Ironically then, the argument can be made that an [entirely] empirically based morally would NOT include a number of features we consider absolutely required, i.e., respect for infants' lives, for women's reason, and for the equal, morally relevant endowments of all full-fledged human beings.

Thanks again for an interesting posting.

 

[gauchecritic]

objectivism in infanticide (as far as I can tell) takes no account of potential value or, if it does it must take a completely subjective account of odds against value.

Mongols (to use an emotive term) in general create greater hardship than benefit for any given society, therefore objectively, Downs or mongolism victims should (as a group) be considered not beneficial to society. This, as with Downs, is a matter of degree. Objectivity is almost useless in general terms and only marginally useful in specific cases, because it can make no allowance for what might be, only what is.

A drain on society, which I assume is the subject, is a poor standard by which to attempt any objective outcome, because the drain that is implied is almost totally about that person and not about any positvie side effects of their 'cared for' , 'unproductive' lives.

Objectively, a severely incapacitated child produces nothing, costs money and time and has no intrinsic societal value using those measures.

However, just by existing, as with any person, they create demands.

So project 'valueless to society' (aged, infirm, jobless, fat, ugly, jews, muslims) and not only do you end the 'drain' you also end hospitals, fast food chains, doctors, nurses, carers, Hollywood blockbusters, pharmaceutical empires, lazeeboy chairs, police, helicopters, jumbo jets, space exploration, guns, and etc.

And those 'demands' also create unquantifiable measures such as tolerance, joy, heartbreak, perseverance and patience which could not be accrued by any other means.

So, give me an objective (or even fiscal) value for heartbreak and I'll give you Nazi Germany where they had no palsied, deficient drains on society and wouldn't countenance even the remote possiblity of Stephen Hawking because he was there getting in the 'showers' with the jews.

 

[BlackShanglan]

P: Let's start at the beginning. There are at least three kinds of people claiming that principles of morality can be demonstrated: those like--Ayn Rand; the Pope; John Calvin.

Ah, right. I haven't seen their demonstrations and so cannot comment upon their rationale, but personally, I haven't seen a demonstration of an absolute ethical standard that to me appeared to support all of its assumptions. I don't mean by that that no one can logically claim that there is an absolute standard or even that no one can claim to know what it is - only that I haven't seen anyone offer convincing objective evidence to support either claim more strongly than the host of other options.

They claim not just that, for the arena of human action 1) there are objective standards, but that 2) we can know them and 3) make utterly convincing, 'objective' demonstrations based on them.

As it were, they believe that the moral world--like the physical world, for them--has A) a kind of transparency to human perception and understanding and B) a kind of tractability in relation to human capabilities of communication and demonstration--its truths are not only accessible (NOT too deep to fathom) but can be convincingly communicated about; not only can i know the world, but I can tell you about it; I can explain it for myself and to you, and thus have a solid basis to persuade you of truths about it.

So a failure, here, to make any demonstration indicates that 1) or 2) or 3) or some pair or all three are false.

Well, I'll give this to most people who attempt objective demonstrations of morality. They seem to me all to start with an assumption that is inherently unprovable, but that doesn't mean that it's inherently unreasonable. For example, it's impossible to offer empirical, objective proof that "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" is a moral or immoral concept, but it's generally recognized as a reasonable assumption. While recognizing that the assumption cannot be demonstrated to be moral in an absolute sense, I'd also argue that it's got some legs in terms of logic and breadth of acceptance.

BSnor that people should not attempt beautiful (or moral) lives, nor that they should not have standards of beauty (or morality),

P: most of the poeple mentioned would argue that unless 1,2, and 3 and true, then the motivation and reasons for being moral are gravely, if not fatally undermined. The non objectivists claim, in effect, "Well, i have my answer and it works for my moral guidance and whether it works for anyone else doesn't matter." There are extended possibilities of argument, here, which I put aside for now. See below.

I'd really have to see those people arguing that the lack of 1, 2, and 3 fatally undermines moral standards to understand and debate what they were saying. I'm hesitant, frankly, to accept that broad claim on face value, as I know that the Pope at least draws his authority from the Bible, in which we find Paul telling us that "all human knowledge is flawed," and that the invocation of papal infallibility in the rigorous ex cathedra sense is quite uncommon. Given that uncetainty is built into the religion itself, I can't see it could be seen as obviating all attempts at morality.

BS It only indicates that the subject under discussion is currently incapable of an objective answer because no person can bring empirical evidence to bear on the core assumptions involved in any position.

P: Yes, were all attempts at objective demonstration to fail; there would be a lack of evidence and/or reasons [or access to them] which have weight across persons (intersubjectively). But the three proponents claim that there is no problem of the existence of evidence and access to it.

I see what you're saying here. From my point of view, I think that the dividing issue is one of assumptions. That is, I generally associate objective demonstration with empirical evidence. While recognizing that abstract concepts or equations can be proven to be inherently coherent or flawed without reference to empirical reality, I differentiate that which is logically consistent from that which is real - that is, represents material reality as we experience it. When I say that something can be demonstrated to be true, I mean that factual empirical evidence can be brought to bear and will show that the claim corresponds to material reality. Because I don't believe that morality is an issue that involves material reality alone - that is, because I think it is an abstract concept that cannot be resolved using only empirical evidence - I believe that by its nature it is impossible to demonstrate.

I think that your cited opponents, on the other hand, don't perceive the same distinction between that which is logically coherent and that which can be demonstrated that I do. Most attempts at objective demonstrations of morality that I have seen start with some core unprovable assumption and then strive to build from that in logicaly coherent / demonstrably consistent fashions. I think that this is a good idea in many ways, as I personally think that any system of ethics that's worth its salt must be the result of rigorous examination of one's principles (those unprovable assumptions) and the ways in which one applies them, ideally consistently. However, I think that it's also important to remember that at the bottom of it all is an assumption - that there is a God who tries to guide us, that the way in which animals behave in nature is inherently moral, that self-actualization is the root of morality, or what have you. I've never seen anyone who could prove one of those assumptions, although I've seen good arguments for each.

BS In the absence of empirical evidence, one is left taking one's best guess

P: That, of course is the position these three do NOT want to end up in. Though yes, it's what we do in situations of uncertainty.

I think that their position, broadly summarized, might be that reason, careful thought, divine inspiration, or something similar can make up for the lack of empirical evidence to such an extent that they feel certainty. But I'm just guessing there. I think we might possibly agree (do we?) in thinking that being certain about what one thinks sometimes leads people to assume an undo certainty about what everyone else should think.

P: To wrap this up, Shang: As a person of some sophistication I'd guess you do have some areas of uncertainty, and maybe even areas where you don't see any possible 'objective' resolution. Yet you don't want to abandon the whole project; you will 'take your best guess' and do a reasonable approximation to a moral life, as far as you can figure the standards. I have some sympathy with that, as I too don't claim to have lots of answers. It's true we have to 'so something in the interim' (between now and the attainment of certainty).

I'm awfully charmed to be thought sophisticated in any way. *laugh* I hope that you are never exposed to the terribly disappointing reality. Yes, this is a fair summary of my position, with the addition that I would argue that subjective interpretations of morality are doing exactly the same thing - i.e., making their best guess at the nature of morality (that it is subjective) while recognizing that ultimately, no conclusive evidence can be brought to bear.

But this ('subjectivist') approach deeply distresses the objectivists or all three stripes. And they have some argument that there something fundamentally flawed with the "It's my best guess, and I don't care if other rational people can't be similarly convinced" approach.

Hmmm. Curious. If I might just gadfly for a moment - it's you who've started the thread. At the moment, it appears that it is they who distress you? I can see the tensions between the ideologies, as you describe, for indeed there are areas of action and endeavor in which subjective and objective stances are inherently in conflict with each other. But I don't see that either is demonstrably more correct than the other. Both are guesses. It seems to me that you favor the approach of "we have no direct evidence, so let's not interfere with others" - but again, it's as much of a guess as the opposing system, and as little capable of being demonstrated to be correct.

In a super-small nutshell, that approach seems (to them) to yield too weak conclusions. Taking Ms. Rand, she doesn't want to say to Stalin, "I don't like your mass deportations; that's just my 'take' on it," and have Stalin say, "Well, well my 'take' is based on the interests of the state; and I think 'heads must roll' [or persons shipped off] to preserve it; your 'take' is subjective, baseless, if not corrupt." She finds that a trivialization of the discussion, as if she and Staline were discussing whether ham sandwiches are tasty.

Yes, I think that's always where it gets messy. When morality is a matter of individual affect that has no impact on others, it's easy to remain detached and philosophical. However, when one sees very ugly and painful actions, I think it's fairly nature for humans to get upset. I take your point that this emotional distress can lead to actions that lack a really rigorous grounding in objective proofs, but given that those proofs are (in my opinion) impossible to obtain under any circumstances, I don't think them worth waiting for. I'm guessing that you'd be more happy with people saying "I am distressed by this spectacle of suffering and therefore have chosen to act upon it" rather than "I am objectively certain that my actions are correct and therefore and taking them," and on that I think I agree with you - but I'm not convinced that in the practical sense of actions taken, it makes a great deal of difference. That is, humans (in my opinion) very often act on gut instinct and make up explanations for what they did as they go along; the nature of the explanations does not seem to me all that often to be crucial to the actions.

Aristotle is known to have no problem with infanticide, based on the interests of human society, i.e having the highest (physical/biological) quality of persons as citizens. Interestingly Aristotle had no problems either with the claims that women and slaves are inferior in various respects (and hence are appropriately ruled).

Yes. He also recorded, if memory serves, that women have fewer teeth than men, despite having access to a woman (his wife) to verify the accuracy of this claim. Aristotle has many excellent ideas, but I don't see him as a strong model of objective scientific method. He proceeds (to be fair, quite straightforwardly) from cultural assumptions and then tries to build with rigorous logic. His logic is often good, but I find his examination of his assumptions often wanting.

Ironically then, the argument can be made that an [entirely] empirically based morally would NOT include a number of features we consider absolutely required, i.e., respect for infants' lives, for women's reason, and for the equal, morally relevant endowments of all full-fledged human beings.

Well, here we split on two matters. The first is that I don't believe that Aristotle works empirically. He seems to me quite riddled with cultural assumptions. He is, I would argue, another example of someone who starts with assumptions and builds logically from them, but does not acknowledge that those assumptions are inherently unprovable.

The other issue on which I think we either differ or perhaps simply speak differently is that I think it impossible for there to be such a thing as an entirely empirically based morality, by the definition of the concept of morality. To return to my earlier comparison, I think of morality as similar to beauty in that part of its definition is that it affects us or exists on a non-empirical level. For that reason, I think an empirical definition a contradiction in terms. Part of the definition of beauty is that it has certain intangible, variable, non-empirical effects on humans, and for that reason there can be no empirical standard that satisfies the definition of beauty. Similarly, I see morality as an abstract construction that can have ramifications in the empirical world (there can be moral actions, as there can be beautiful objects), but that does not exist primarily as a material force or object.

Thanks as well, Pure, for a most interesting discussion. I think we're actually fairly close in thinking on this one?

Shanglan

 

[BlackShanglan]

I like Gauche's point on perceived value. I agree that such calculations nearly always miss even the measurable, empirical ramifications of the issue, let alone the immeasurable, non-empirical matters like emotion, shaping of mindset, and unrealized potential.

 

[CharleyH]

This thread is for objective demonstrations in the area of morality.

There are several around here who believe/claim there is an 'objective morality'--some follow Ayn Rand; some follow the Pope; some follow John Calvin.

In any case these folks are invited here, to show their stuff:

First task. Give an 'objective demonstration'* that infanticide--e.g., of the severely deformed babies-- is wrong (or right for that matter).

There are a number of reasons that might be advanced for it NOT being wrong, e.g., that these babies will have either early death or miserable lives in store, that they drain scarce resources of society and families, that they cause heartbreak and divorce in families, etc.

So a person arguing for the wrongness of such cases of infanticide has, besides her positive case, to deal with (counter) the reasons given above.
---

*Definition: a demonstration is 'objective' if it--the evidence and the reasoning involved-- would compel any sane and reasonable person to agree with a very high degree of certainty. to take an example from another area: it can be 'objectively' demonstrated that 1) the Earth is round/spherical and that its diameter is about 8000 miles;

2) that Earth is about 90 million miles from the sun, which is a star.

We would assemble evidence gathered by various instruments, such as telescopes, etc. In the end, no rational person will disagree; the 'flat earth' people have to rely on a series of implausible dodges to explain away the evidence (e.g optical illusions, etc; their own visions).

To take an example from biology: it's an objective truth

3) that human beings are omnivorous primates who do best, without extraordinary measures, in climates ranging from those with average daily temperatures of 0-110 degrees F. IOW, unassisted living on either Mercury or Uranus is not possible.

Great ask. I can't say or not say without my personal opinion being questioned by dufuses, but I do agree that we are all animals.

Before I answer this set of questions? I would like to hear your answers, Pure.

 

[Pure]

Some comments,

Thanks to Shang and gauche for contributing.
These are just some thoughts. As you know there is a lack of anyone trying to meet the challenge who has training in philosophy, so i've had to expound 'objective' approaches.

Though 'objective ethics' is not the same thing as 'virtue ethics,' there is a large overlap, because Aristotle can be considered under both headings. There is a nice article about virtue ethics at the Internet Encycl. of Philos.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/virtue.htm

To anwer Charley, I do have some sympathies with the 'objective' approach to ethics, and have a lot of respect for those who've resurrected it, for instance Philippa Foot. Anscombe and MacIntyre are also important.

Following Aristotle to varying degrees, they want to look at human excellences-- exemplary, including morally exemplary qualities. Also from Aristotle is the concept of 'human flourishing' or 'living well' (eudaimonia).

The bedrock of this approach is this axiom, affirmed by Rand and others: Human flourishing is and should be the foundation of ethics. This will necessarily involve the development of the specifically human excellences, among them, reason.

The claim to objectivity can be illustrated by a biological analogy. Consider a pack of wolves in a forest: Their flourishing requires certain things, for instance, adequate numbers of prey. But of course this implies a whole host of things, such as their common pursuit of prey, their dividing the spoils, their sharing with the weaker, including the cubs. There is no 'subjective' element, here; a person can NOT say, 'it's a matter of taste; wolves in fact would do well to eat grass and berries, in my opinion; they would do well to let the cubs fend for themselves and find such food without assistance; that is my opinion. you may have yours.'

But, as gauche suggests, the requirements of a particular human society are not necessarily uniquely specifiable. What should the human 'race' look like, for instance? Solitary animals like tigers, or a wolf pack, or bees in a hive? What color might it be?

Further some very obvious things turn out NOT to be obvious; you might google for 'eating young.' Female mother mammals sometimes devour some of their young.

This brings us back to infanticide. None of the ancients had any problem with this. In one preserved letter, a roman soldier says, roughly, "My wife, I'll be gone for some time and you will have given birth. If it's a boy, I'm sure you'll bring him up strong for me to see. If it's a girl, you'll expose it [leave it to die]."

Indeed, many 'virtue ethics' persons seek to dissuade us from seeking hard rules such as 'taking innocent life is wrong.' Hard rules belong to the Kantians and maybe the utilitarians. Rather one might look at the virtues of a warrior. If you've read the Iliad, a warrior, in some circumstances has no problem taking 'innocent life' (e.g. of the Trojan women).

Generally there is a problem of a variety of visions of human possibility, on how human life is to be furthered. To take the Pope, for instance, it's obvious to him that the objective requirements of human life do NOT involve 'artificial contraception.' Indeed, it's required for 'life' that 'artificial contraception' be avoided. Just like Ayn Rand, he will say, "to behave otherwise is to betray life and favor death" --which offends natural law and reason. However the Pope admires those who sacrifice themselves for others (affirming the ultimate value of life), while Rand says it generally NOT a mark of the virtuous and self respecting human to sacrifice herself for others.

As Shanglan has mentioned, the issue of empirical fact is quite stubborn. And Hume, for one, didn't think the 'facts' could dictate much of anything, as my example [of Hume's] indicated; the fellow who'd rather see the world destroyed rather than undergo a transient pain in his little finger. The issue of 'facts' becomes quite slippery, since ethical concepts are involved.

Rand would say, "Look at the disgusting collectivist society where 'I am' is blasphemy. Leeches and exploiters abound and suck the blood of the the true individuals those creatively producing, seizing the wealth they creature and distributing it to the lazy and unproductive." The Pope, following Marx, might say, "The advances in recognizing workers' rights and their requirements as human beings must be affirmed; society does well to offer social supports to human living: unemployment insurance, assistance in housing for the poor, etc. THIS is the society that *affirms life.* "

When one reads these forums and hears talk of life in England, Sweden, or in Canada or the States, one realizes that very different 'facts' are being seen. Is there, in country X, "Loathsome dependence on a nanny state" or is there "Calm productivity based on feeling secure because of the social 'safety net'"?

 

[amicus]

Shanglan...you said in part:

".... Part of the definition of beauty is that it has certain intangible, variable, non-empirical effects on humans, and for that reason there can be no empirical standard that satisfies the definition of beauty. ...

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I realize I do a disservice to the others on this thread and to the width and breadth of yours by drawing out that single statement...

however...recently, a world wide survey, following all the procedures required to qualify for an 'objective, scientific survey', found that world wide, all surveys determined that 'beauty' in a human being, was consistent in all societies, all age groups, both genders and over a period of time.

In other words, the same human physical features that you might define as 'beautiful' were also defined the same way by all others.

The parameters were symmetry and physical health and youth and to those, all who viewed them found them 'beautiful'

So...one can assume that there is an universal definition of 'beauty' in the human form and from that assumption, one can begin to build and objective, absolute, intellectual, ethical and moral definition of 'beauty' so that it becomes an 'objective' pursuit of knowledge and does not remain forever, 'in the eye of the beholder', or 'subjective' as my relativistic friends would have it.

amicus...

 

[rgraham666]

As far as facts go, I liked Diderot's take on them.

You can divide facts into three types: the divine, the natural and man-made. The first belongs to theology, the second to philosophy and the third to history. All are equally open to question.

L'Encyclopédie, Vol. 2, 97

It always come down to the question of being good versus being right. Most of the 'objectivists' are, in my opinion, more concerned with the latter. It's why they so viciously defend their position. They've confused good with right. So if they were wrong, they'd also be evil.

So they can't be wrong.