Loud blast heard inside New York bus terminal sparking ‘stampede’

[FakeNews]

A LOUD blast has been heard inside a New York bus terminal with reports of a stampede as people rushed from the area.

Police have said they are responding to reports of an “explosion” at the Port Authority Bus Terminal, close to Times Square, in Manhattan and are evacuating people.

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/51137...n-latest-reports-port-authority-bus-terminal/

 

[Rightguide]

A bomb has exploded and a suspect is in custody.

 

[BizzyBody]

You mean a MUSLIM TERROR ATTACK

 

[Rightguide]

You mean a MUSLIM TERROR ATTACK

No doubt. Let's see if they rush to Mirandize him or treat him as an enemy unlawful combatant.

 

[Luk]

A failed suicide bombing is far scarier than a whacko slaughtering 50+ Americans with a firearm.

 

[MagnusRichard]

Woke up, it was a Chelsea mornin'
And the first thing that I heard

https://musicimage.xboxlive.com/catalog/music.album.8D6KGX50TK5Q/image?locale=en-ca&w=330&h=330

 

[phrodeau]

You mean a MUSLIM TERROR ATTACK

Trump has failed to keep us safe.

 

[Hypoxia]

A failed suicide bombing is far scarier than a whacko slaughtering 50+ Americans with a firearm.

Distrust your raw perceptions. Count the numbers in USA of those killed in mass shootings vs terror bombings. Count the numbers killed in terror attacks by white Americans vs non-white Others. Consider the ease of access of firearms vs explosives.

Meanwhile, what we know about suspect Akayed Ullah is that he's from Bangladesh. Which isn't on Tromp's list. He came to USA with family in 2011. He has a green card, a lapsed taxi license, and no criminal record.

And he's a fuckup who exploded himself. Duh. With a pistol and clips, he could have actually killed people.

 

[Colonel Hogan]

No doubt. Let's see if they rush to Mirandize him or treat him as an enemy unlawful combatant.

Let's play "American Criminal Procedure." If you are a police officer and you manage to arrest a suspect in the vicinity of a bombing or on-scene mass shooting on American soil and he "looks" middle eastern (beard and long loose garments), do you rush to Mirandize him or treat him as an enemy unlawful combatant?

Take your time.

 

[Rightguide]

Let's play "American Criminal Procedure." If you are a police officer and you manage to arrest a suspect in the vicinity of a bombing or on-scene mass shooting on American soil and he "looks" middle eastern (beard and long loose garments), do you rush to Mirandize him or treat him as an enemy unlawful combatant?

Take your time.

So far, at least in the last 8 years, an act of war against the United States has been treated as a crime, so yes you Mirandize him, just like they did the truck terrorist on the bike path a month or so ago.

 

[phrodeau]

So far, at least in the last 8 years, an act of war against the United States has been treated as a crime, so yes you Mirandize him, just like they did the truck terrorist on the bike path a month or so ago.

At least you can try and convict them, instead of tossing them in Gitmo like lost luggage.

 

[MagnusRichard]

Let's play "American Criminal Procedure." If you are a police officer and you manage to arrest a suspect in the vicinity of a bombing or on-scene mass shooting on American soil and he "looks" middle eastern (beard and long loose garments), do you rush to Mirandize him or treat him as an enemy unlawful combatant?

Take your time.

Is he black enough to shoot?

 

[Colonel Hogan]

So far, at least in the last 8 years, an act of war against the United States has been treated as a crime, so yes you Mirandize him, just like they did the truck terrorist on the bike path a month or so ago.

Correct answer, but not for the coincidental reason of how the violations have been historically "treated."

Many are familiar through TV crime dramas or movies with the famous Miranda warnings. What is not always understood about the rule first announced in 1966 by the Supreme Court is the limitations on the rule and the possible remedy if there is a violation of the rule by the police. There are also significant distinctions between Miranda and the rights a military suspect is entitled to under Article 31, a rule that predates the Miranda decision by over a decade. The biggest limitation on the Miranda rule is that a suspect must be in custody to trigger the requirement to advise them of their rights. A person is considered to be in custody when a reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel that they were free to leave. Assuming a civilian defendant was in custody and was subjected to questioning by law enforcement without first being advised of their rights, the remedy is the exclusion of the incriminating statements at trial. A violation, however, does not mean that a criminal prosecution cannot continue if there is other evidence a crime was committed.

By comparison, Article 31 requires that anyone who is subject to the UCMJ, whether or not they are a designated law enforcement officer, advise a military suspect of the nature of the allegation, that the person has a right to remain silent, and that anything they say may be used as evidence against them regardless of whether the suspect is in custody.

http://www.ericroperlaw.com/miranda-warnings-vs-article-31b-ucmj-rights-whats-the-difference/

In short, where a criminal suspect could theoretically be tried EITHER under civilian criminal statutes OR the UCMJ, the need to inform them of their Miranda rights exists under both systems. The decision under which system to prosecute is a completely separate issue unrelated to the warning and made well after any arrest or initial pre-trial detention.

 

[Rightguide]

Correct answer, but not for the coincidental reason of how the violations have been historically "treated."



In short, where a criminal suspect could theoretically be tried EITHER under civilian criminal statutes OR the UCMJ, the need to inform them of their Miranda rights exists under both systems. The decision under which system to prosecute is a completely separate issue unrelated to the warning and made well after any arrest or initial pre-trial detention.

Actually Colonel, I believe if the government declares him an illegal combatant under the The Military Commissions Act of 2006 they can evoke the public safety exception and refrain from reading him his Miranda warning before questioning. It also states,“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.” He is also denied the right to file Habeas Corpus petitions.

 

[Colonel Hogan]

Actually Colonel, I believe if the government declares him an illegal combatant under the The Military Commissions Act of 2006 they can evoke the public safety exception and refrain from reading him his Miranda warning before questioning. It also states,“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.” He is also denied the right to file Habeas Corpus petitions.

Nope.

There is no basis for an arresting officer "declaring" a suspect an "illegal combatant" for the purpose of invoking the public safety exception to the Miranda rule. That exception was an outgrowth of the 1984 Supreme Court decision in New York v. Quarles. It is a VERY narrowly and specifically applied legal standard of interrogation attendant to an arrest as follows:

According to the Supreme Court, the public safety exception is triggered when police officers have an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from immediate danger. Because the standard is objective, the availability of the exception does not depend on subjective motivation of the officers. Legitimate concerns for officer safety or public safety prompting unwarned custodial questioning arise in a variety of contexts. A common factor that can be gleaned from the courts addressing this issue is the prior knowledge or awareness of specific facts or circumstances that give rise to the imminent safety concern that prompted the questioning.


For example, in U.S. v. Talley, ...

In U.S. v. Jones,...

In each of the two cases above, information that came to the attention of the law enforcement officers concerning an immediate threat to safety prompted the officers to ask questions directed at neutralizing the danger. In both cases, the reviewing courts agreed with the officers that the information prompted a public safety concern.

Limited Questioning

The Quarles Court made clear that only those questions necessary for the police “to secure their own safety or the safety of the public” were permitted under the public safety exception.

A common theme throughout cases such as this is the importance of limiting the interrogation of a subject to questions directed at eliminating the emergency.

Voluntariness

Voluntariness is the linchpin of the admissibility of any statement obtained as a result of government conduct. Thus, statements obtained by the government under the public safety exception cannot be coerced or obtained through tactics that violate fundamental notions of due process. Here, it is worth mentioning that prior to the Miranda decision, the only test used to determine the admissibility of statements in federal court was whether the statement was voluntarily made within the requirements of the due process clause. This test requires that a court review the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the subject’s will was overborne by police conduct. If a court finds that the questioning of a subject, even in the presence of a situation involving public safety, violated due process standards, the statement will be suppressed.

CONCLUSION

The “public safety” exception to Miranda is a powerful tool with a modern application for law enforcement. When police officers are confronted by a concern for public safety, Miranda warnings need not be provided prior to asking questions directed at neutralizing an imminent threat, and voluntary statements made in response to such narrowly tailored questions can be admitted at trial. Once the questions turn from those designed to resolve the concern for safety to questions designed solely to elicit incriminating statements, the questioning falls outside the scope of the exception and within the traditional rules of Miranda.

https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-the-public-safety-exception-to-miranda

I have not researched the issue as to whether the UCMJ has incorporated the public safety exception from Quarels, but you can bet that if it has, it is every bit as narrowly applied as in civilian law. Particularly in light of the military tradition of eliciting only name, rank and serial number from captured combatants. The context of the public safety exception would have no relevance as to whether those combatants were "legal" or "illegal." The exception only applies to an OBJECTIVE IMMINENT threat to the arresting officers or the general public.

As for the denial of habeas rights to alien unlawful enemy combatants under the 2006 MCA, that provision of the Act was infamously held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2008 case of Boumedine v. Bush. It is one of the few Supreme Court cases with which I still vehemently disagree. My favorite part of Justice Scalia's blistering dissent:

And today it is not just the military that the Court elbows aside. A mere two Terms ago in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 (2006), when the Court held (quite amazingly) that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 had not stripped habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo petitioners' claims, four Members of today's five-Justice majority joined an opinion saying the following:

"Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority [for trial by military commission] he believes necessary.

"Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation's ability to determine--through democratic means--how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means." Id., at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).1

Turns out they were just kidding. For in response, Congress, at the President's request, quickly enacted the Military Commissions Act, emphatically reasserting that it did not want these prisoners filing habeas petitions. It is therefore clear that Congress and the Executive--both political branches--have determined that limiting the role of civilian courts in adjudicating whether prisoners captured abroad are properly detained is important to success in the war that some 190,000 of our men and women are now fighting. As the Solicitor General argued, "the Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Treatment Act ... represent an effort by the political branches to strike an appropriate balance between the need to preserve liberty and the need to accommodate the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States." Brief for Respondents 10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

But it does not matter. The Court today decrees that no good reason to accept the judgment of the other two branches is "apparent." Ante, at 40. "The Government," it declares, "presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims." Id., at 39. What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of Congress and the President on such a point? None whatever. But the Court blunders in nonetheless. Henceforth, as today's opinion makes unnervingly clear, how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.

 

[Boxlicker101]

Is he black enough to shoot?

He's pretty dark. I hope he's not an illegal alien. If he is, the mayor will probably apologize to him for the inconvenience of being arrested.

 

[sr71plt]

'Cause anyone who is dark skinned quite clearly should be suspected to be an illegal alien.

 

[bigmane]

I heard something about this on the radio.

This is why I don't go into city centres at busy times of year.

I'd rather stay in the countryside.

 

[Hypoxia]

He's pretty dark. I hope he's not an illegal alien. If he is, the mayor will probably apologize to him for the inconvenience of being arrested.

This idiotic troll isn't worth a reply.

(But you replied anyway!)

So sue me.

 

[Rightguide]

Nope.

There is no basis for an arresting officer "declaring" a suspect an "illegal combatant" for the purpose of invoking the public safety exception to the Miranda rule. That exception was an outgrowth of the 1984 Supreme Court decision in New York v. Quarles. It is a VERY narrowly and specifically applied legal standard of interrogation attendant to an arrest as follows:



I have not researched the issue as to whether the UCMJ has incorporated the public safety exception from Quarels, but you can bet that if it has, it is every bit as narrowly applied as in civilian law. Particularly in light of the military tradition of eliciting only name, rank and serial number from captured combatants. The context of the public safety exception would have no relevance as to whether those combatants were "legal" or "illegal." The exception only applies to an OBJECTIVE IMMINENT threat to the arresting officers or the general public.

As for the denial of habeas rights to alien unlawful enemy combatants under the 2006 MCA, that provision of the Act was infamously held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2008 case of Boumedine v. Bush. It is one of the few Supreme Court cases with which I still vehemently disagree. My favorite part of Justice Scalia's blistering dissent:

If you're right, we're fucked. This unelected oligarchy has assumed the roles of the Commander in Chief and the Congress. The judiciary needs to be dismantled and reconstructed by Congress.

 

[Colonel Hogan]

If you're right, we're fucked. This unelected oligarchy has assumed the roles of the Commander in Chief and the Congress. The judiciary needs to be dismantled and reconstructed by Congress.

To be "fair" to the other side, the following article (http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/255281-yes-illegal-aliens-have-constitutional-rights) provides better context to the right of aliens, both legal and illegal, under United States jurisdiction. I fully understand and endorse that principle with respect to legal aliens who run afoul of the law on American territory. The further one gets from "legal residency" and/or "American territory" the less applicable, it seems to me, Constitutional protections should reach -- to the point that illegal combatants waging war against the United States should ONLY be governed by the international laws of war -- and by the Geneva Convention, for any party which is a signatory.

Unfortunately, that's not the way the world works anymore. ANY "person" under "jurisdiction" of the United States whatsoever has virtually the entire penumbra of Constitutional protection through (the broadest possible application of) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. And I don't think the legislative history of the Equal Protection Clause justifies that breadth of application. It was intended to enfranchise, as legal citizens, former slaves brought here against their will.

It was never intended to protect international criminals bent on waging war against the United States. It has been distorted to do so.

Dismantling the judiciary will not right that wrong. A properly drafted Constitutional amendment is what is required to restore a proper perspective of the scope of Equal Protection under the 14th.

 

[Rightguide]

To be "fair" to the other side, the following article (http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/255281-yes-illegal-aliens-have-constitutional-rights) provides better context to the right of aliens, both legal and illegal, under United States jurisdiction. I fully understand and endorse that principle with respect to legal aliens who run afoul of the law on American territory. The further one gets from "legal residency" and/or "American territory" the less applicable, it seems to me, Constitutional protections should reach -- to the point that illegal combatants waging war against the United States should ONLY be governed by the international laws of war -- and by the Geneva Convention, for any party which is a signatory.

Unfortunately, that's not the way the world works anymore. ANY "person" under "jurisdiction" of the United States whatsoever has virtually the entire penumbra of Constitutional protection through (the broadest possible application of) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. And I don't think the legislative history of the Equal Protection Clause justifies that breadth of application. It was intended to enfranchise former slaves brought here against their will as legal citizens.

It was never intended to protect international criminals bent on waging war against the United States. It has been distorted to do so.

Dismantling the judiciary will not right that wrong. A properly drafted Constitutional amendment is what is required to restore a proper perspective of the scope of Equal Protection under the 14th.

The meaning of "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" meant something a lot different to the authors of the 14th Amendment than what it is understood to mean today. In fact, the 14th Amendment was never meant to be a grab bag of rights for the left they couldn't achieve by the democratic process. It was meant to apply to freed Negro slaves in the South and elsewhere who were being denied their civil rights during the reconstruction.