Iraq's weapons of mass casualty
By Al Venter
Saddam Hussein, we are now aware, has prepared - by international standards - a modest, but deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He has already used some of these weapons against his enemies and, by all accounts, is ready to do so again. Why else would he have manufactured hundreds of tons of nerve agents including tabun, sarin, cyclosarin and VX? Those are the ones we know about; there could be others.
In a submission before the House Armed Services Committee on 10 September 2002 biowarfare expert Dr Richard Spertzel, who spent years trying to uncover Saddam's secrets while heading the biological wing of UNSCOM in Iraq after Operation Desert Storm, said that there was some evidence that the Iraqis might now also have the deadliest nerve gas of all: Novichok. A product of the Cold War, Novichok is a dozen times more potent than any other agent easily penetrates all known gas masks produced in the West - Israel's included.
There are not many people unaware that Saddam used chemical weapons (CW) against the Kurds in northern Iraq. However, few know the full extent of CW deployment in the war with Iran, or that Iraq also used biological weapons in that struggle.
In answer to the most obvious question being asked - whether Saddam would use the WMD he is purported to have at his disposal - one need only look at the preparations he made prior to Operation Desert Storm to bomb coalition forces with nerve and bacterial agents.
The danger was more powerfully underscored by Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies in September 2002 when it released a think-tank dossier stating that Saddam could have nuclear weapons within months if he were successful in acquiring fissile material.
What was critical during the Gulf War was that Saddam still needed fissile material to arm the three atomic bombs that his weaponisation team had assembled. He called this group together again in 2000.
One other crucial question is how effective the weapons inspections in Iraq will be. The incisiveness of UNMOVIC director, Hans Blix, is challenged by his former colleagues. During the immediate period following the Desert Storm operations, one of these colleagues, head of the UNSCOM team Dr David Kay, had initiated some inspections of suspect buildings without notifying the Iraqis of his intentions. This new, aggressive strategy had dramatic consequences. Kay uncovered material that confirmed that Iraq was only 12-18 months away from producing a nuclear device.
That historic discovery ended up in a confrontation in Baghdad. UN cars were surrounded by 200 Iraqi soldiers and a mob ordered out to the scene by Iraqi officials. For four days and nights the siege continued, as Kay and his colleagues used satellite telephones to fax crucial documents to the West. According to the former Swedish deputy prime minister, Per Ahlmark, Blix bitterly opposed the raid.
From the Jane's website