fgarvb1
We are in for it now.
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A little dated, but interesting.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html
Iraq
Iraq is estimated to hold more than 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and possibly much more undiscovered oil in unexplored areas of the country. Iraq also is estimated to contain at least 110 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The country is a focal point for regional and international security issues.
Note: The information contained in this report is the best available as of August 2003 and can change. Also, please click here for a complete chronology of events pertaining to Iraq from 1980 through July 2003.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the aftermath of war in March and April 2003, Iraq now finds itself in a period of uncertainty and transition from over three decades of Ba'ath party rule. The events of 2003 mark the latest upheaval which Iraq has faced in its recent history. Since the early 1980s, for instance, Iraq experienced two major wars (Iran-Iraq and the Kuwait war), plus more than a decade of economic sanctions. As a result, the country's economy, infrastructure, environment, health care system, and other social indicators all deteriorated sharply. Iraq also assumed a heavy debt burden, possibly as high as $116 billion if debts to Gulf states and Russia are counted, and even more if $200 billion in reparations payments stemming from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait are included. It is possible, however, that much of Iraq's debt will be written off in the end, and that reparations will be capped at a certain level, possibly $40 billion or so. On August 8, 2003, the U.N. Humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Ramiro Lopez da Silva, estimated that Iraq's reconstruction bill for 2004 would be $20 billion.
Now, with the regime of former President Saddam Hussein no longer in power, the country is being governed temporarily by a "Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)" led by the United States and the United Kingdom. On May 6, 2003, President Bush named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as presidential envoy to, and senior CPA official in, Iraq. In addition, there is a 25-member "Governing Council" made up of leading Iraqis, which met for the first time on July 13, 2003. The Governing Council's goals are to help rebuild Iraq as well as to prepare for "full, free and fair democratic elections." Also heavily involved in rebuilding Iraq are the U.S.-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (headed by Brig. Gen. Robert Crear), private contractors like Halliburton (and its subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root - KBR), non-governmental organizations, and coalition military forces.
Iraq's economy appears to have recovered somewhat from its condition just after the war, but the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) still forecasts a contraction in Iraq's real gross domestic product (GDP) of 7.5% in 2003, with inflation of 75%. This follows more than a decade of economic stagnation and decline. In 2004, on the contrary, the EIU expects a sharp upturn in real Iraqi GDP growth, to around 20%, assuming continued increases in Iraqi oil production (and export revenues). In mid-August 2003, at the first meeting of the Council for International Coordination (CIC), which is tasked to coordinate donor countries financing Iraqi reconstruction, Paul Bremer stated that "Iraq is a rich country that is temporarily poor."
In July 2003, World Bank President James Wolfensohn stated that Bank assistance for Iraq's reconstruction could come after "a constitution and an elected government" were in place. Estimates of total, long-term Iraqi reconstruction costs run to $100 billion or higher. As of late June 2003, the CPA reportedly had $5.4 billion available in order to rebuild Iraq's power grid, sewer systems, and other public services. Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, said that the 2004 budget would run a deficit of $4 billion.
In May 2003, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1483, lifting sanctions on Iraq, phasing out the U.N. "Oil-for-Food" program over six months, and designating a U.N. "special representative" to assist Iraq in its reconstruction efforts. In addition, according to the U.S. State Department, the resolution "stresse[d] the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their own political future and control their own natural resources" (including oil), "encourage[d] international support for Iraq's recovery," and "enliste[d] the support of international financial institutions" in this effort. One billion dollars of unallocated funds in the U.N. escrow account were to be transferred to an Iraqi "Development Fund" to provide for immediate reconstruction needs. In June 2003, Paul Bremer suggested that revenues from oil sales "could be distributed to Iraq's citizens as 'dividends', along the lines of the system used by the State of Alaska."
On May 27, 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted most U.S. sanctions on Iraq, thereby implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483. For over a decade after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States had maintained unilateral economic sanctions against Iraq. Executive Order #12722 (August 2, 1990) imposed a complete trade embargo, and Executive Order #12724 (August 9, 1990) imposed additional restrictions. Under U.S. sanctions, goods or services were not permitted to be imported from or exported to Iraq, with the exception of the U.N. "oil-for-food" program.
OIL
On May 4, 2003, ORHA announced the appointment of Thamir Ghadban as chief executive of the interim management team for the Iraqi oil sector, in essence the de facto Oil Minister. Phillip Carroll, former head of Royal Dutch/Shell in the United States, also was appointed as head of an advisory board for the sector. Thamir Ghadban had formerly been a top official in Iraq's South Oil Company (SOC). Other important players include Ali Hassan at the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), Adel Qazaz at the North Oil Company (NOC), and Jabbar Hussein Luaibi at SOC. In early August 2003, the CPA put the cost of rehabilitating Iraq's oil sector to its pre-war state at $1.144 billion, and the time frame to do so at nine months.
According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Canada). Estimates of Iraq's oil reserves and resources vary widely, however, given that only 10% or so of the country has been explored. Some analysts (the Baker Institute, Center for Global Energy Studies, the Federation of American Scientists, etc.) believe, for instance, that deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels or more), but have not been explored. Other analysts, such as the US Geological Survey, are not as optimistic, with median estimates for additional oil reserves closer to 45 billion barrels.
Iraqi oil development began in 1901, with the first well (Chia Surkh-1) drilled. The Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) was formed in 1964, and with Iraqi oil nationalization between 1972 and 1975, INOC took over from the international oil companies previously running the country's oil industry. In 1987, INOC was merged with the Ministry of Oil.
Iraq's oil development and production costs are amongst the lowest in the world (perhaps $3-$5 billion for each million barrels per day), making it a highly attractive oil prospect. However, only 17 of 80 discovered fields have been developed, while few deep wells have been drilled compared to Iraq's neighbors. Overall, only about 2,300 wells reportedly have been drilled in Iraq (of which about 1,600 are actually producing oil), compared to around 1 million wells in Texas for instance. In addition, Iraq generally has not had access to the latest, state-of-the-art oil industry technology (i.e., 3D seismic, directional or deep drilling, gas injection), sufficient spare parts, and investment in general throughout most of the 1990s. Instead, Iraq reportedly utilized sub-standard engineering techniques (i.e., overpumping, water injection/"flooding"), obsolete technology, and systems in various states of decay (i.e., corroded well casings) in order to sustain production. In the long run, reversal of all these practices and utilization of the most modern techniques, combined with development of both discovered fields as well as new ones, could result in Iraq's oil output increasing by several million barrels per day.
Iraqi oil reserves vary widely in quality, with API gravities in the 22o to 35o range. Iraq's main export crudes come from the country's two largest active fields: Rumaila and Kirkuk. The southern Rumaila field, which extends a short distance into Kuwaiti territory, has around 663 wells and produces three streams: Basra Regular; Basra Medium (normally 30o API, 2.6% sulfur); and Basra Heavy (normally 22o-24o API, 3.4% sulfur). Basra Blend normally averages around 32o API, 1.95% sulfur, but reportedly is heavier and more sour currently at around 29-30o API and 2%+ sulfur content.
The northern Kirkuk field, first discovered in 1927, forms the basis for northern Iraqi oil production. Kirkuk has around 337 wells and normally produces 35o API, 1.97% sulfur crude, although the API gravity and sulfur content both reportedly deteriorated sharply in the months just preceding the war. Kirkuk's gravity, for instance, had declined to around 32-33o API, while sulfur content had risen above 2%. Declining crude oil qualities -- and an increased "water cut" as well -- was likely the result of overpumping as Iraq attempted to sell as much oil as possible. An additional export crude, known as "Fao Blend," is heavier and more sour, with a 27o API and 2.9% sulfur. Pre-war, Bai Hassan, Jambur, Khabbaz, Ajil (formerly "Saddam"), and Ain Zalah-Butmah-Safaia were the other oil fields in northern Iraq. An estimated 60% of Northern Oil Company's (NOC) facilities in northern and central Iraq were damaged during the Gulf War.
Another major Iraqi oil field is the 11-billion barrel East Baghdad field, which came online in April 1989. Prior to the war, this centrally-located field currently produced around 50,000 bbl/d of heavy, 23o API oil as well as 30 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of associated natural gas.
Production
As of mid-August 2003, Iraqi oil output was fluctuating on a daily basis, but generally was averaging just under 1 million barrels per day (bbl/d). Some Iraqi oil -- perhaps 200,000-300,000 bbl/d -- was being reinjected into oil reservoirs in the North due to constraints on both domestic processing ability as well as export outlets. According to the U.N. Joint Logistics Centre (JLC), as of mid-August 2003 "about 40% of [northern Iraqi] production is transferred to the Baiji refinery, with the balance reinjected into the fields, ostensibly to maintain pressure. This is a most unusual practice but extraction of the surplus crude is necessary to produce much needed LPG. It means, however, that crude oil production is overstated by the volume reinjected (it not being available for refining or export, but counted as production). The reinjected crude may be lost forever."
On August 13, Iraq's main oil export pipeline from its main northern oilfield of Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan reopened (see below for more details), but the line was shut down once again shortly thereafter due to sabotage on August 15 and 17. Iraq currently is aiming to increase its production to 2 million bbl/d by December 2003, and 2.8 million bbl/d by April 2004, but this goal may not be attained if problems continue in both the north and the south of the country.
Historically, Iraqi production peaked in December 1979 at 3.7 million bbl/d, and then in July 1990, just prior to its invasion of Kuwait, at 3.5 million bbl/d. From 1991, Iraqi oil output increased slowly, to 600,000 bbl/d in 1996. With Iraq's acceptance in late 1996 of U.N. Resolution 986, which allowed limited Iraqi oil exports in exchange for food and other supplies ("Oil-for-Food"), the country's oil output began increasing more rapidly, to 1.2 million bbl/d in 1997, 2.2 million bbl/d in 1998, and around 2.5 million bbl/d during 1999-2001.
During 2002, Iraqi oil production averaged 2.04 million bbl/d, down from about 2.45 million bbl/d in 2001 (and 2.69 million bbl/d in 2000), with large weekly and monthly fluctuations. Iraqi monthly oil output increased in the last few months of 2002 and in early 2003, peaking at around 2.58 million bbl/d in January 2003. Iraqi officials had hoped to increase the country's oil production capacity to 3.5 million bbl/d by the end of 2000, but did not accomplish this given technical problems with Iraqi oil fields, pipelines, and other oil infrastructure. Iraq also had hoped to expand production by 2010, to around 6 million bbl/d, through joint efforts by international oil companies (IOCs) and the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC).
Prior to the latest war, oil industry experts generally assessed Iraq's sustainable production capacity at no higher than about 2.8-3.0 million bbl/d, with net export potential of around 2.3-2.5 million bbl/d (including smuggled oil). In comparison, Iraq produced 3.5 million bbl/d in July 1990. Approximately 2 million bbl/d of Iraq's production pre-war capacity came from oil fields in the southern part of the country, particularly North Rumaila (0.8 million bbl/d), South Rumaila (0.5 million bbl/d), West Qurnah (250,000 bbl/d at the end of 2002), Az Zubair (200,000-240,000 bbl/d), Misan/Buzurgan (100,000 bbl/d), Majnoon (50,000 bbl/d), Jabal Fauqi (50,000 bbl/d), Abu Ghurab (40,000 bbl/d), and Luhais (30,000-50,000 bbl/d). Iraq's remaining oil production capacity is located in the northern and central fields of Kirkuk (around 550,000-700,000 bbl/d), Bai Hassan (100,000-150,000 bbl/d), Jambur (75,000-100,000 bbl/d), Khabbaz (30,000 bbl/d), Ajil (formerly "Saddam," 25,000 bbl/d), East Baghdad (20,000 bbl/d), and 'Ayn Zalah/Batmah (17,000-20,000 bbl/d).
Among other challenges in maintaining, let alone increasing, oil production capacity, were Iraq's battle with "water cut" (damaging intrusion of water into oil reservoirs) especially in the south. Saybolt International had reported that NOC and SOC were able to increase their oil production through use of short-term techniques not generally considered acceptable in the oil industry (i.e., "water flooding," injection of refined oil products into crude reservoirs). A U.N. report in June 2001 said that Iraqi oil production capacity would fall sharply unless technical and infrastructure problems were addressed.
Exports
Iraqi oil sales and exports currently are being handled by the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), under CPA supervision. SOMO operations were seriously disrupted by war and turmoil during 2003, but the organization has now been reconstituted and has resumed many of its operations. On June 5, 2003, SOMO issued its first oil sales tender since the war started, for 8 million barrels of Kirkuk crude stored in tanks at Ceyhan and 2 million barrels stored at Basra. Dozens of companies placed bids for the oil, with winners including ChevronTexaco, Cepsa, ENI, Repsol, Total, and Tupras. Bids for the Kirkuk oil reportedly ranged around $2.70-$3.30 per barrel below dated Brent (f.o.b. Ceyhan). On June 22, a tanker arrived at Ceyhan to load the first oil since March 20, 2003, when the 600,000-barrel tanker "Caithness" completed loading one day after the outbreak of war. On July 3, SOMO issued its second spot tender, for 8 million barrels of Basra Light. At the time, SOMO stated that it was not yet ready to resume term sales, which generally require a certain level of stability, certainty, and predictability.
In late July 2003, however, SOMO signed its first term contracts since the war, for Basra Light oil from Iraq's southern fields. Exports of about 650,000 bbl/d were anticipated through the rest of 2003. Major purchasers included BP, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Marathon Oil, Mitsubishi, Brazil's Petrobras, Repsol, Shell, Chinese trader Sinochem, and Vitol. However, with difficulties at the southern port of Mina al-Bakr (see below), Iraq has only been averaging exports of 545,000 bbl/d or less since the restart of term contracts.
Pre-War State of Iraq's Oil Sector
In December 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute released a report on Iraq's oil sector. Among other things, the report concluded that: 1) Iraq's oil sector infrastructure is in bad shape at the moment, being held together by "band-aids," and with a production decline rate of 100,000 bbl/d per year; 2) increasing Iraqi oil production will require "massive repairs and reconstruction...costing several billions of dollars and taking months if not years;" 3) costs of repairing existing oil export installations alone would be around $5 billion, while restoring Iraqi oil production to pre-1990 levels would cost an additional $5 billion, plus $3 billion per year in annual operating costs; 4) outside funds and large-scale investment by international oil companies will be needed; 5) existing oil contracts will need to be clarified and resolved in order to rebuild Iraq's oil industry, with any "prolonged legal conflicts over contracts" possibly "delay[ing] the development of important fields in Iraq;" and 6) any "sudden or prolonged shut-down" of Iraq's oil industry could result in long-term reservoir damage; 7) Iraq's oil facilities could easily be damaged during any domestic unrest or military operations (in early February 2003, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan claimed that Iraqi soldiers were mining oil wells in the north of the country in anticipation of war); and 8) given all this, a "bonanza" of oil is not expected in the near future.
According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), problems at Iraqi oil fields include: years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities; and more. MEES estimates that Iraq could reach production capacity of 4.2 million bbl/d within three years at a cost of $3.5 billion, and 4.5-6.0 million bbl/d within seven years.
Status of Oil Development Deals with Foreign Companies
Prior to the toppling of Iraq's Ba'athist regime, the country reportedly had signed several multi-billion dollar deals with foreign oil companies mainly from China, France, and Russia. Deutsche Bank estimates $38 billion total on new fields -- "greenfield" development -- with potential production capacity of 4.7 million bbl/d if all the deals come to fruition (which Deutsche Bank believes is highly unlikely). The former Iraqi government reportedly had been growing increasingly frustrated at the failure of these companies actually to begin work on the ground, and was threatening to no longer sign deals unless firms agreed to do so without delay. Iraqi upstream oil contracts generally required that companies start work immediately, but U.N. sanctions dissuaded companies from doing so for the most part.
Now, following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, the legal status of these agreements is up in the air, increasing the uncertainty level for companies interested in doing business with Iraq. Besides legal issues, companies are also looking for a relatively stable security situation, a functioning government, and other conditions to be in place before they move heavily into the country. In May 2003, Philip Carroll stated that contracts signed under the previous regime would be assessed to determine whether "they were made in the best interests of the Iraqi people."
Russia, which is owed billions of dollars by Iraq for past arms deliveries, has a strong interest in Iraqi oil development. This includes a $3.7 billion, 23-year deal to rehabilitate Iraqi oilfields, particularly the 11-15 billion barrel West Qurna field (located west of Basra near the Rumaila field). West Qurna is believed to have production potential of 800,000-1 million bbl/d. In a surprising and somewhat puzzling development, in mid-December 2002 the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced that it was severing its contract with the Lukoil consortium on West Qurna due to "fail[ure] to comply" with contract stipulations. Specifically, the Iraqis cited Lukoil's failure to invest a required $200 million over three years. Two other, smaller, stakes in West Qurna by Russian companies Zarubezhneft and Mashinoimport reportedly were left intact.
In addition, three exploration and production deals were signed between Iraq and Russian companies (Soyuzneftegaz, Stroytransgas-Oil, and Tatneft, to develop the 100,000-bbl/d Rafidain field, the Western Desert's Block 4, and the Western Desert's Block 9, respectively). Despite all this, Russia's Foreign Ministry said that it viewed the Iraqi decision on Lukoil and West Qurna "with regret." In mid-February 2003, following a month of talks between the two sides aimed at reversing Iraq's decision, the Iraqis announced that its decision to cancel the Lukoil deal was "finished and the contract has been scrapped." In May 2003, Lukoil said it would fight to keep the contract, and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister said that Russia would seek compensation if contracts signed under the Saddam Hussein regime now were not honored.
In May 2003, another Russian company, Tatneft, set up a joint venture with Germany's MRH in order to win work in Iraq's oil sector. According to Tatneft's President, the company had been close to reaching a deal on exploring Block 9 in Iraq's Western Desert region prior to the war. In October 2001, a joint Russian-Belarus oil company, Slavneft, had signed a $52 million service contract with Iraq on the 2-billion-barrel, Suba-Luhais field in southern Iraq. Full development of Suba-Luhais could result in production of 100,000 bbl/d (35o API) at a cost of $300 million over three years.
In early April 2001, Russia's Zarubezhneft received U.N. approval to drill 45 wells in the Ajil (formerly"Saddam") field, plus Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, as part of an effort to reduce water incursion into the fields. The Ajil field contains 3 billion barrels of oil and 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of associated gas. Iraq had been seeking foreign assistance for a second-phase Ajil development, which would raise oil production capacity to 50,000 bbl/d, as well as 300 Mmcf/d of gas.
The largest of Iraq's oilfields slated for post-sanctions development is Majnoon, discovered by Braspetro of Brazil in 1975, and containing reserves of 11-30 billion barrels of 28o-35o API oil. Majnoon is located 30 miles north of Basra on the Iranian border. In the 1990s, French company Elf Aquitaine (now merged with Total as TotalFinaElf) negotiated on a possible $4 billion deal with Iraq on development rights for Majnoon. In 1999, however, TotalFinaElf declined to sign a 23-year production sharing agreement (PSA) with Iraq on Majnoon. Following this, the field reportedly was brought onstream (under a "national effort" program begun in 1999) in May 2002 at 50,000 bbl/d. Future development on Majnoon ultimately could lead to production of 450,000 bbl/d within two years or so at an estimated (according to Deutsche Bank) cost of $4 billion. Eventually, Majnoon could produce significantly more oil than that, possibly as high as 3 million bbl/d.
In July 2001, angered by France's perceived support for the U.S. "smart sanctions" plan, Iraq announced that it would no longer give French companies priority in awarding oil contracts, and would reconsider existing contracts as well. Iraq also announced that it was inclined to favor Russia, which has been supporting Iraq at the U.N. Security Council, on awarding rights to Majnoon and another large southern oil field, Bin Umar. As of February 2003, Russian company Zarubezhneft reportedly was negotiating a contract to develop Bin Umar. The status of TotalFinaElf, which had previously expressed interest in the field, was not clear. In February 2003, TotalFinaElf's chief executive, Thierry Desmarest, said "We will fight in order to have the best chances for participating in the reconstruction of the country's oil industry."
In early June 2003, China's National Petroleum Company (CNPC) refuted a comment by Thamir Ghadban that CNPC's contract on the 90,000-bbl/d al-Ahdab development was now "void by mutual agreement." CNPC agreed in 1997 to spend $1.3 billion on Al-Ahdab, located in southern Iraq, but no progress was made while sanctions remained in place.
The 2.5-5 billion-barrel Halfaya project is the final large field development in southern Iraq. Prior to the war, several companies (BHP, CNPC, Agip) reportedly had shown interest in Halfaya, which ultimately could yield 200,000-300,000 bbl/d in output at a possible cost of $2 billion. Smaller fields with under 2 billion barrels in reserves also had received interest from foreign oil companies. These fields included Nasiriya (Eni, Repsol), Tuba (ONGC, Sonatrach, Pertamina), Ratawi (Shell, Petronas, CanOxy), Gharaf (Mashinoimport, Rosneftegasexport), Amara (PetroVietnam), Noor (Syria), and more.
In May 2003, Thamir Ghadban stated that three exploration agreements for blocks in Iraq's Western Desert were still valid. These included Indonesia's Pertamina on Block 3, Russia's Stroitransgas on Block 4, and Indian's Oil and Natural Gas Corp. for Block 8. In January 2003, Stroitransgas signed a $33.5 million contract for exploration on Block 4, and in July 2003, it indicated its interest in winning post-war business in Iraq.
Upstream Oil Sector: Current Status
During the war, approximately 7 Iraqi oil wells were set on fire, out of around 1,500 total wells. On April 14, 2003, the last of these fires were extinguished at the South Rumaila field. This was considered a significant accomplishment, given pre-war speculation that Iraq might set many of its oilfields ablaze as it did with Kuwaiti oilfields in 1991. However, in spite of the fact that little damage was done to Iraq's oil fields during the war itself, looting and sabotage after the war ended was highly destructive. On June 6, 2003, Phillip Carroll, Chairman of the Advisory Board to Iraq's Oil Ministry, indicated that there was an organized campaign of sabotage against Iraq's oil industry, and that "their techniques appear to be very professional and aim at causing harm to significant and important installations." On July 24, 2003, the CPA launched "Operation Power Crude" to protect key infrastructure (fuel pipelines, power facilities, etc.) against sabotage and looting.
On April 22, the first oil production since the start of the war began at the Rumaila field, with the restart of an important gas/oil separation plant (GOSP). Starting in mid-May 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers -- which has the lead in restoring Iraq's oil output to pre-war levels -- began a major effort to ramp up production in Iraq. At that time, Iraqi output was only about 230,000 bbl/d: 120,000 bbl/d from southern fields; and 110,000 bbl/d from northern ones. Plans at that time called for Iraq to reach over 1 million bbl/d in output by June 1. This proved overly optimistic. In actuality, Iraqi oil output did not hit 1 million bbl/d until late July
Iraq's southern oil industry was decimated in the 1990/1991 Gulf War, with production capacity falling to 75,000 bbl/d in mid-1991. That war resulted in destruction of gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at Rumaila, storage facilities, the 1.6-million bbl/d (nameplate capacity) Mina al-Bakr export terminal, and pumping stations along the 1.4-million bbl/d (pre-war capacity) Iraqi Strategic (North-South) Pipeline. Seven other sizable fields remain damaged or partially mothballed. These include Zubair, Luhais, Suba, Buzurgan, Abu Ghirab, and Fauqi. Generally speaking, oilfield development plans were put on hold following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, with Iraqi efforts focused on maintaining production at existing fields.
Oil Export Pipelines
Under optimal conditions, and including routes through both Syria and Saudi Arabia that are now closed, Iraq's oil export infrastructure could handle throughput of more than 6 million bbl/d (2.8 via the Gulf, 1.65 via Saudi Arabia, 1.6 via Turkey, and perhaps 300,000 bbl/d or so via Jordan and Syria). However, Iraq's export facilities (pipelines, ports, pumping stations, etc.) were seriously disrupted by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1990/1991 Gulf War, the most recent war in March/April 2003, and periodic looting and sabotage since then.
The 600-mile, Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) dual pipeline is Iraq's largest crude oil export line. One, 40-inch line has a fully-operational capacity of 1.1 million bbl/d, but reportedly could handle only around 900,000 bbl/d pre-war. The second, parallel, 46-inch line has an optimal capacity of 500,000 bbl/d and was designed to carry Basra Regular exports, but at last report was inoperable. Combined, the two parallel lines have an optimal capacity of 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d. On August 13, 2003, officials at the Turkish port of Ceyhan said today that Iraq had begun pumping fresh crude oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline for the first time since war broke out in late March 2003. However, the pipeline was operating far below capacity, at perhaps 300,000-400,000 bbl/d, with significant repairs still required. Also, the line was damaged by a bridge ("Al Fatah") that collapsed on it after being bombed by U.S. planes during the war. This will require major repairs, including the drilling of a new tunnel under the Tigris River and the laying of a new pipeline. In addition, the IT-1 pumping station on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line was damaged by looters, but reportedly is operable manually. The IT-2 pumping station on the same line reportedly was looted and destroyed.
On August 16, 2003, two blasts on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line once again shut down Iraqi oil flows to Turkey. Officials estimated that it would take 10 days to two weeks in order to repair the line, and also that the shutdown was costing Iraq $7 million per day in lost oil export revenues.
At least since 2001 until March 2003, Iraq and Syria were utilizing the 50-year-old Banias oil pipeline in violation of U.N. sanctions. The pipeline, from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria's Mediterranean port of Banias (and Tripoli, Lebanon), reportedly was being used to transport as much as 200,000 bbl/d of Iraqi oil, mainly from southern Iraq, to Syrian refineries at Homs and Banias. The oil was sold at a significant price discount and freed up additional Syrian oil for export. Iraq and Syria also had talked of building a new, parallel pipeline as a replacement for the Banias line. In March 2003, flows on the pipeline were halted, although the US Defense Department denied that its forces had targeted the line.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq also built a pipeline through Saudi Arabia (called IPSA) to the Red Sea port of Mu'ajiz, just north of Yanbu. IPSA has a design capacity of 1.65 million bbl/d, but was closed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In June 2001, Saudi Arabia expropriated the IPSA line, despite Iraqi protests. In June 2003, Thamir Ghadban said that he hoped Iraq would be able to use the IPSA line again.
In order to optimize export capabilities (i.e., to allow oil shipments to the north or south), Iraq constructed a reversible, 1.4-million bbl/d "Strategic Pipeline" in 1975. This pipeline consists of two parallel 700,000-bbl/d lines. The North-South system allows for export of northern Kirkuk crude from the Persian Gulf and for southern Rumaila crudes to be shipped through Turkey. During the 1990/1991 Gulf War, the Strategic Pipeline was disabled after the K-3 pumping station at Haditha as well as four additional southern pumping stations were destroyed. In June 2003, the NOC estimated that it would take "a long time," possibly until the end of 2003, to repair the K-3 pumping station and resume operations on the Strategic Pipeline. The whole system also reportedly is in need of modernization.
In April 2003, there was some discussion of "reopening" the old oil pipeline from Mosul in northern Iraq to Haifa, Israel. The line, which was built in the 1930s, carried 100,000 bbl/d at its peak, but has been closed since Israel's establishment in 1948. Today, however the Mosul-Haifa pipeline is in extremely poor condition (the Iraqi section is completely rusted and the Jordanian section was sold as scrap metal several years ago), and reportedly would require hundreds of millions of dollars to repair/rebuild, even if this were politically feasible. Along those lines, Jordan strongly denied any interest in rebuilding this pipeline at the present time, stating that "the pipeline no longer exists in Jordanian territory."
Jordan and Iraq had agreed in 1998 to build a pipeline for the transport of Iraqi oil to Jordan's 100,000-bbl/d Zarqa refinery, and renewed this commitment in their most recent oil supply agreement. This would eliminate the necessity of transporting oil over 600 miles of highway from Haditha, Iraq, using a fleet of 1,500 tanker trucks, as was done for several years prior to 2003. Eventually, the line was seen as transporting as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Iraqi crude through Jordan, including oil for export. In December 2002, the Jordanian government was evaluating bids on the project from four competing contractors. However, it now seems unlikely that the project will move forward in the near future. With Iraqi oil supplies to Jordan halted since the war started, Jordan has been receiving oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE at a discounted price.
Oil Terminals
In the Persian Gulf, Iraq has three tanker terminals: at Mina al-Bakr, Khor al-Amaya, and Khor az-Zubair (which mainly handles dry goods and minimal oil volumes, plus natural gas liquids and liquefied petroleum gas). Mina al-Bakr is Iraq's largest oil terminal, with four 400,000-bbl/d capacity berths capable of handling very large crude carriers (VLCCs). Gulf War damage to Mina al-Bakr appears to have been repaired in large part and the terminal reportedly was handling around 1 million bbl/d in early 2003. A full return to Mina al-Bakr's nameplate capacity (1.6 million bbl/d) would require extensive infrastructure repairs. Mina al-Bakr also is constrained by a shortage of storage and oil processing facilities, most of which were destroyed in the Gulf War.
As of mid-August 2003, Mina al-Bakr was experiencing sporadic problems with power supplies (in part the result of wide-scale looting of copper power transmission cables), slowing the port's rate of tanker loading and throwing overall oil export targets into question. Reportedly, the power problems had slowed the time needed to load a VLCC from 2 days to 4-6 days. Mina al-Bakr's nameplate loading capacity is 85,000 barrels per hour (bph), but the loading rate now reportedly is only around 55,000 bph, about two-thirds of capacity.
Iraq's Khor al-Amaya terminal was heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq War (and completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991) and has been out of commission since then. As of March 2001, reports indicated that Iraq had largely completed repairing two berths at Khor al-Amaya, allowing for capacity of 600,000 bbl/d. Upon full completion of repairs, Iraq projects Khor al-Amaya's capacity will rise to 1.2 million bbl/d, and will help prevent delays at Mina al-Bakr while repairs are conducted there.
Refining
Iraq's refining capacity as of January 2003 was believed to be over 417,000 bbl/d, compared to a pre-Gulf War, nameplate capacity of 700,000 bbl/d. Before the latest war, it was believed that Iraq needed to refine 560,000 bbl/d in order to produce 400,000 bbl/d of needed products for domestic consumption. Currently, around 250,000 bbl/d of Iraqi heavy oils reportedly are being burned for power generation. In late April 2003, the Basra refinery restarted at 70,000 bbl/d, or half of its total capacity. As of mid-August, the 140,000-bbl/d plant was experiencing periodic stoppages due to electric power problems, reducing its output by around 40%-50%.
Overall, Iraq has 10 refineries and topping units. The largest are the 150,000-bbl/d Baiji North, 140,000-bbl/d (or higher) Basra, and 100,000-bbl/d Daura plants. During the Gulf War, both Baiji in northern Iraq as well as the refineries at Basra, Daura, and Nasiriyah were severely damaged. Prior to the war in March/April 2003, a lack of light-end products, low quality gasoline, and rising pollution levels because of a lack of water treatment facilities were some of the major problems faced by Iraq's refining sector. Following the war, significant investment will now be needed to perform refinery upgrades (Iraq had identified dozens of such projects prior to the war) and possibly to build a new $1 billion, 290,000-bbl/d "Central" refinery near Babylon.
At the present time, problems with Iraq's refineries are forcing the country to barter fuel oil for gasoline and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) from neighboring countries (mainly Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey). In addition to supply shortfalls, distribution of LPG and other petroleum products, plus low "buffer stock levels," each remain major challenges that needs to be resolved. According to the JLC, "the supply of fuels in Iraq continue[d] to be poor," with an "LPG shortage in particular...affecting the most vulnerable elements of the population." In addition, as of mid-August 2003, the JLC was reporting that "gasoline was also in short supply...especially in the north, but at levels that the populace has become used to" and that "major shortages of LPG and diesel continue." However, the overall fuel supply situation in Iraq seems to be improving slowly if not steadily as of mid-August 2003. At the same time, the situation is being made somewhat worse by smuggling of refined products out of the country.
NATURAL GAS
Iraq contains 110 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, along with roughly 150 Tcf in probable reserves. About 70% of Iraq's natural gas reserves are associated (i.e., natural gas produced in conjunction with oil), with the rest made up of non-associated gas (20%) and dome gas (10%). Until 1990, all of Iraq's natural gas production was from associated fields. In 2001, Iraq produced 97 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas, down drastically from peak output levels of 700 Bcf in 1979. Iraq plans to increase its natural gas output in order to reduce dependence on oil consumption and possibly for export at some point. Prior to the recent war, Iraq had even been developing plans to build a liquefied natural gas terminal.
Within two years after the lifting of U.N. sanctions, Iraq had hoped to produce 550 Bcf, and within a decade, Iraq had aimed to be producing about 4.2 Tcf of natural gas annually. Since most of Iraq's natural gas is associated with oil, progress on increasing the country's oil output will directly affect the gas sector as well. Associated gas often is simply flared off. Significant volumes of gas also are used for power generation and reinjection for enhanced oil recovery efforts.
Main sources of associated natural gas are the Kirkuk, Ain Zalah, Butma, and Bai Hassan oil fields in northern Iraq, as well as the North and South Rumaila and Zubair fields in the south. The Southern Area Gas Project was completed in 1985, but was not brought online until February 1990. It has nine gathering stations and a larger processing capacity of 1.5 billion cubic feet per day. Natural gas gathered from the North and South Rumaila and Zubair fields is carried via pipeline to a 575-Mmcf/d natural gas liquids (NGL) fractionation plant in Zubair and a 100-Mmcf/d processing plant in Basra. At Khor al-Zubair, a 17.5-million-cubic-foot LPG storage tank farm and loading terminals were added to the southern gas system in 1990. Natural gas also used to be pumped from Rumaila into northern Kuwait via a 40-inch, 105-mile pipeline. The gas was used to supply Kuwaiti power stations and LPG plants, but was halted following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Iraq's only non-associated natural gas production is from the al-Anfal field (200 Mmcf/d of output) in northern Iraq. Al-Anfal production, which began in May 1990, is piped to the Jambur gas processing station near the Kirkuk field, located 20 miles away. Al-Anfal's gas resources are estimated at 4.5 Tcf, of which 1.8 Tcf is proven. In December 2001, Russia's Gazprom reportedly was negotiating possible development of al-Anfal. In November 2001, a large non-associated natural gas field reportedly was discovered in the Akas region of western Iraq, near the border with Syria, and containing an estimated 2.1 Tcf of natural gas reserves. It is not clear whether the field is associated or non-associated.
Besides al-Anfal, Iraq has four large non-associated natural gas fields (Chemchamal, Jaria Pika, Khashm al Ahmar, Mansuriya) located in Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. In February 2000, Iraq's Oil Ministry named Agip and Gaz de France as leaders on a $2.3 billion PSA (production sharing agreement) project to develop these fields, which reportedly have total recoverable reserves of more than 10 Tcf.
Currently, Iraq has a major natural gas pipeline with the capacity to supply around 240 MMcf/d to Baghdad from the West Qurna field. The 48-inch line was commissioned in November 1988, with phases II and III of the project never completed due to war and sanctions. The last two phases of the pipeline project were meant to supply Turkey. Iraq's Northern Gas System, which came online in 1983, was damaged during the Gulf War as well as by the Kurdish rebellion of March 1991. The system supplied LPG to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, as well as dry gas and sulphur to power stations and industrial plants. Iraq also has a Southern Gas System, which came online in 1985.
ELECTRIC POWER
As of late July 2003, indications were that Iraq had no more than perhaps 3,600 MW of power generating capacity, well below the amount needed to satisfy peak summer demand. Baghdad alone is estimated to require 2,400 MW of power during the summer's extreme heat for refrigeration and air conditioning, but was receiving perhaps half that amount. The Doura plant, which supplies the capital, was only running at 30% capacity as of late July, while power lines between the Beiji facility, which also serves Baghdad, had been cut or looted. Overall, according to Paul Bremer, Iraq requires an extra 2,000 MW of generating capacity in order to meet demand, at a cost of perhaps $2 billion. In the meantime, the CPA has introduced a rationing system for the entire country, except for Basra, with three hours on and three hours off. Key facilities like hospitals, oil facilities, water and sewage plants were to receive power 24 hours a day under the plan.
Around 85%-90% of Iraq's national power grid (and 20 power stations) was damaged or destroyed in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Existing generating capacity of 9,000 megawatts (MW) in December 1990 was reduced to only 340 MW by March 1991. In early 1991, transmission and distribution infrastructure also was destroyed, including the 10 substations serving Baghdad and about 30% of the country's 400-kilovolt (kV) transmission network. In early 1992, Iraq stated that it had restarted 75% of the national grid, including the 1,320-MW Baiji and Mosul thermal plants as well as the Saddam Dam. The U.N. Iraq Program estimated in November 2002 that Iraq's generating capacity was 4,300-4,400 MW. The U.N. Iraq Program further stated that, by the summer of 2004, Iraq's generating capacity could reach 5,900 MW, with several power stations (Al-Quds, Beji, Himreen,Yousfiya, Rumaila -- all gas-fired) under construction and several others (Dibs, Hart, Najaf, Nassriya -- gas and thermal) awaiting approval and/or funds.
Prior to the war, Iraq reportedly had signed contracts for renovating two generation units at the Harithah power plant, and another to rebuild the Yusufiyah plant, which stopped operating in 1990. Iraq's Electricity Authority reportedly also had signed several other contracts with Chinese, Swiss, French, and Russian companies, to build 3,000 MW of additional power generating capacity. In December 2000, it was reported that a Chinese company had completed work on the Abdullah power plant north of Baghdad. In October 2001, it was reported that Russia's Mosenergomontazh was working to modernize Iraq's Southern Heat and Power Plant in Najibia, Basra province. The project aims to add 200 MW of generating capacity to Iraq's grid. In August 2002, the Najaf governate in southern Iraq announced that two new power plants, with a combined capacity of 20 MW, had come online.
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Sources for this report include: Agence France Presse; APS Review Oil Market Trends; Associated Press; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; Business Week; Chicago Tribune; CIA World Factbook; Deutsche Bank; Dow Jones; The Economist; Economist Intelligence Unit; Energy Compass; Energy Intelligence Briefing; Financial Times; Global Insight; Gulf News; Hart's Africa Oil and Gas; Interfax News Agency; Janet Matthews Information Services (Quest Economic Database); Los Angeles Times; Middle East Economic Survey; Nefte Compass; New York Times; Oil & Gas Journal; Oil Daily; Petroleum Economist; Petroleum Finance Company (PFC); Petroleum Intelligence Weekly; Platt's Oilgram News; Reuters; Russian Oil and Gas Report; Stratfor; U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme; U.S. Energy Information Administration; U.S. Department of State; Wall Street Journal Europe; Washington Post; Weekly Petroleum Argus; World Markets Research Centre.
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COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Head of Government: N.A. For a discussion of Iraq's current governing structure, please see the discussion above.
Independence: October 3, 1932
Population (2002E): 23 million
Location/Size: Middle East/168,709 square miles, slightly more than twice the size of Idaho.
Major Cities: Baghdad (capital), Basra, Mosul, Karbala, Kirkuk
Languages: Arabic, Kurdish
Ethnic Groups: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkmen, Assyrian, or other 5%
Religions: 97% Muslim (Shi'a 60-65%, Sunni 32-37%), Christian or other (3%)
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Currency: Iraqi Dinar (ID)
Unofficial Exchange Rate (7/03E): US$1=ID 1,500, compared to around US$1=ID3,000 just after the war
Gross Domestic Product (at market exchange rates) (2002E): $28.6 billion (down from $54 billion in 1988)
Gross Domestic Product (at purchasing power parity rates) (2002E): $15.5 billion (around one-third of 1989's economic output)
Real GDP Growth Rate (Global Insight: Base Case Scenario) (2002E): 5.5% (2003F): -22.0% (2004F): 37.0%
Inflation Rate (Global Insight: Base Case Scenario) (consumer prices) (2002E): 24.6% (2003F): 7.6% (2004F): 6.9%
Major Export Products (2002): Crude oil and oil products (regulated by the United Nations)
Major Import Products (2002): Food, medicine, consumer goods (regulated by the United Nations)
Merchandise Exports (2002E): $13.0 billion
Merchandise Imports (2002E): $7.8 billion
Merchandise Trade Balance (2002E): $5.2 billion
Current Account Balance (2002E): $2.3 billion
Oil Export Revenues (2002E): $12.3 billion (includes $3 billion or so in smuggling)
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (2002E): 95% or more
External Debt (2003E): estimates range from over $100 billion to more than $300 billion
ENERGY OVERVIEW
Minister of Oil: N.A., although Thamir Ghadban is de facto acting head of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, with Philip Carroll as an advisor (see above for more details)
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/03E): 112.5 billion barrels (around 75 billion barrels of which has not yet been developed; "probable" and "possible" reserves are as high as 220 billion barrels)
Oil Production (2002E): 2.04 million barrels per day (bbl/d), of which 2.02 million bbl/d was crude oil
Oil Production (January-May 2003E): 1.35 million barrels per day (bbl/d), ranging from a high of 2.58 million bbl/d in January to a low of 64,000 bbl/d in April; as of mid-August, production was believed to be above 1 million bbl/d)
Pre-war Oil Production Capacity, Maximum Sustainable: 2.8-3.0 million bbl/d (declining by about 100,000 bbl/d per year)
Current Oil Production Capacity, Maximum Sustainable (8/03E): 1.0 million bbl/d
Oil Export Routes: Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline; Mina al-Bakr port; to Jordan and Turkey via truck; reportedly to Syria via the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline; smuggling by boat along the Gulf coast
Oil Consumption (2002E): 460,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) (8/03E): 300,000-350,000 bbl/d
Net Oil Exports (2002E): 1.58 million bbl/d (8/03E): 650,000-700,000 bbl/d
U.S. Oil Imports from Iraq (2002E): 459,000 bbl/d (down from 795,000 bbl/d during 2001)
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/03E): 417,500 bbl/d (according to the Oil and Gas Journal)
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/03E): 109.8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
Natural Gas Production/Consumption (2001E): 97 billion cubic feet (Bcf)
Electricity Generation Capacity (2002E): 4.3-4.4 gigawatts (90% thermal) (8/03E): x.x gigawatts
Electricity Production (2001E): 36.0 billion kilowatthours
ENVIRONMENTAL OVERVIEW
Total Energy Consumption (2001E): 1.08 quadrillion Btu* (0.3% of world total energy consumption)
Energy-Related Carbon Emissions (2001E): 20.0 million metric tons of carbon (0.3% of world total carbon emissions)
Per Capita Energy Consumption (2001E): 45.6 million Btu (vs U.S. value of 341.8 million Btu)
Per Capita Carbon Emissions (2001E): 0.85 metric tons of carbon (vs U.S. value of 5.5 metric tons of carbon)
Energy Intensity (2000E): 13,172 Btu/ $1995 (vs U.S. value of 11,014 Btu/ $1995)**
Carbon Intensity (2000E): 0.24 metric tons of carbon/thousand $1995 (vs U.S. value of 0.17 metric tons/thousand $1995)**
Fuel Share of Energy Consumption (2001E): Oil (90%), Natural Gas (9%); Hydroelectric (<1%)
Fuel Share of Carbon Emissions (2001E): Oil (90%), Natural Gas (10%)
Status in Climate Change Negotiations: Iraq is not a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or to the Kyoto Protocol.
Major Environmental Issues: Under Saddam Hussein, government water control projects drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers. A once sizable population of "Marsh Arabs," who have inhabited these areas for thousands of years, were displaced, while the destruction of the natural habitat harmed the area's wildlife populations. Other problems include inadequate supplies of potable water, development of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey, air and water pollution, soil degradation (salination) and erosion, and desertification.
Major International Environmental Agreements: A party to the Law of the Sea and the Nuclear Test Ban.
* The total energy consumption statistic includes petroleum, dry natural gas, coal, net hydro, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste electric power.
**GDP based on EIA International Energy Annual 2001
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Major Oil Fields (proven reserves - billion barrels, 2002E): Majnoon (12-30), West Qurna (11.3-15.0), East Baghdad (11+), Kirkuk (10+), Rumaila (10+), Bin Umar (6+), Rattawi (3.1), Halfaya (2.5-4.6), Nassiriya (2-2.6), Suba-Luhais (2.2), Tuba (1.5), Khurmala (1.0), Gharaf (1.0-1.1), Rafidain (0.7), Amara (0.5)
Oil Refineries (crude refining capacity bbl/d, 2003E): Baiji (150,000), Basra (140,000), Daura (100,000), Khanakin (12,000), Haditha (7,000), Muftiah (4,500), Qayarah Mosul (2,000)
Major Ports: Mina al-Bakr, Khor al-Amaya, Khor al- Zubair, Umm Qasr
Major Pipelines (nameplate capacity): Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Dortyol) Pipeline - around 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d (currently partly operational); Iraq-Saudi Arabia Pipeline (IPSA1, 2) - possibly 1.65 million bbl/d (closed by Saudi Arabia in 1990); Banias/Tripoli Pipeline - possibly 0.3 million bbl/d (currently closed); Iraq Strategic Pipeline - less than 1.4 million bbl/d (reversible, internal transportation only)
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LINKS
For more information on Iraq, see these other sources on the EIA web site:
Iraq Chronology: 1980-2003
EIA - Country Information on Iraq
Links to other U.S. government sites:
CIA World Factbook - Iraq
Coalition Provisional Authority Home Page
US Dept. of Commerce Iraq Reconstruction Task Force
US State Dept. Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Page
US State Dept. International Information Programs: Iraq
U.S. Office of Foreign Assests Control (for information on Iraqi Sanctions)
Radio Free Europe "Iraq Report"
U.S. State Department's Consular Information Sheet - Iraq
State Dept. Iraq information
US Agency for International Development Iraq page
Library of Congress -- Iraq Country Study
The following links are provided solely as a service to our customers, and therefore should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any position of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the United States Government. In addition, EIA does not guarantee the content or accuracy of any information presented in linked sites.
UN Office of the Iraq Program U.N. Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iraq
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
MENA Petroleum Bulletin
University of Texas at Austin -- Iraq Page
Perry Castaneda Collection: Iraq Maps
University of Pennsylvania -- Middle East Center
Baker Institute/Council on Foreign Relations Iraq Study
Planet Arabia.com
BBC "After Saddam" page
Washington Post "War in Iraq" page
Online NewsHour: "The New Iraq"
Iraq Daily
AME Info Middle East Business Information
CSIS: Electric Power Sector in Iraq (presentation by Major General Robert Griffin)
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Iraq
Iraq is estimated to hold more than 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and possibly much more undiscovered oil in unexplored areas of the country. Iraq also is estimated to contain at least 110 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The country is a focal point for regional and international security issues.
Note: The information contained in this report is the best available as of August 2003 and can change. Also, please click here for a complete chronology of events pertaining to Iraq from 1980 through July 2003.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the aftermath of war in March and April 2003, Iraq now finds itself in a period of uncertainty and transition from over three decades of Ba'ath party rule. The events of 2003 mark the latest upheaval which Iraq has faced in its recent history. Since the early 1980s, for instance, Iraq experienced two major wars (Iran-Iraq and the Kuwait war), plus more than a decade of economic sanctions. As a result, the country's economy, infrastructure, environment, health care system, and other social indicators all deteriorated sharply. Iraq also assumed a heavy debt burden, possibly as high as $116 billion if debts to Gulf states and Russia are counted, and even more if $200 billion in reparations payments stemming from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait are included. It is possible, however, that much of Iraq's debt will be written off in the end, and that reparations will be capped at a certain level, possibly $40 billion or so. On August 8, 2003, the U.N. Humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Ramiro Lopez da Silva, estimated that Iraq's reconstruction bill for 2004 would be $20 billion.
Now, with the regime of former President Saddam Hussein no longer in power, the country is being governed temporarily by a "Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)" led by the United States and the United Kingdom. On May 6, 2003, President Bush named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer as presidential envoy to, and senior CPA official in, Iraq. In addition, there is a 25-member "Governing Council" made up of leading Iraqis, which met for the first time on July 13, 2003. The Governing Council's goals are to help rebuild Iraq as well as to prepare for "full, free and fair democratic elections." Also heavily involved in rebuilding Iraq are the U.S.-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (headed by Brig. Gen. Robert Crear), private contractors like Halliburton (and its subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root - KBR), non-governmental organizations, and coalition military forces.
Iraq's economy appears to have recovered somewhat from its condition just after the war, but the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) still forecasts a contraction in Iraq's real gross domestic product (GDP) of 7.5% in 2003, with inflation of 75%. This follows more than a decade of economic stagnation and decline. In 2004, on the contrary, the EIU expects a sharp upturn in real Iraqi GDP growth, to around 20%, assuming continued increases in Iraqi oil production (and export revenues). In mid-August 2003, at the first meeting of the Council for International Coordination (CIC), which is tasked to coordinate donor countries financing Iraqi reconstruction, Paul Bremer stated that "Iraq is a rich country that is temporarily poor."
In July 2003, World Bank President James Wolfensohn stated that Bank assistance for Iraq's reconstruction could come after "a constitution and an elected government" were in place. Estimates of total, long-term Iraqi reconstruction costs run to $100 billion or higher. As of late June 2003, the CPA reportedly had $5.4 billion available in order to rebuild Iraq's power grid, sewer systems, and other public services. Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, said that the 2004 budget would run a deficit of $4 billion.
In May 2003, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1483, lifting sanctions on Iraq, phasing out the U.N. "Oil-for-Food" program over six months, and designating a U.N. "special representative" to assist Iraq in its reconstruction efforts. In addition, according to the U.S. State Department, the resolution "stresse[d] the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their own political future and control their own natural resources" (including oil), "encourage[d] international support for Iraq's recovery," and "enliste[d] the support of international financial institutions" in this effort. One billion dollars of unallocated funds in the U.N. escrow account were to be transferred to an Iraqi "Development Fund" to provide for immediate reconstruction needs. In June 2003, Paul Bremer suggested that revenues from oil sales "could be distributed to Iraq's citizens as 'dividends', along the lines of the system used by the State of Alaska."
On May 27, 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department lifted most U.S. sanctions on Iraq, thereby implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483. For over a decade after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States had maintained unilateral economic sanctions against Iraq. Executive Order #12722 (August 2, 1990) imposed a complete trade embargo, and Executive Order #12724 (August 9, 1990) imposed additional restrictions. Under U.S. sanctions, goods or services were not permitted to be imported from or exported to Iraq, with the exception of the U.N. "oil-for-food" program.
OIL
On May 4, 2003, ORHA announced the appointment of Thamir Ghadban as chief executive of the interim management team for the Iraqi oil sector, in essence the de facto Oil Minister. Phillip Carroll, former head of Royal Dutch/Shell in the United States, also was appointed as head of an advisory board for the sector. Thamir Ghadban had formerly been a top official in Iraq's South Oil Company (SOC). Other important players include Ali Hassan at the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), Adel Qazaz at the North Oil Company (NOC), and Jabbar Hussein Luaibi at SOC. In early August 2003, the CPA put the cost of rehabilitating Iraq's oil sector to its pre-war state at $1.144 billion, and the time frame to do so at nine months.
According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Canada). Estimates of Iraq's oil reserves and resources vary widely, however, given that only 10% or so of the country has been explored. Some analysts (the Baker Institute, Center for Global Energy Studies, the Federation of American Scientists, etc.) believe, for instance, that deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels or more), but have not been explored. Other analysts, such as the US Geological Survey, are not as optimistic, with median estimates for additional oil reserves closer to 45 billion barrels.
Iraqi oil development began in 1901, with the first well (Chia Surkh-1) drilled. The Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) was formed in 1964, and with Iraqi oil nationalization between 1972 and 1975, INOC took over from the international oil companies previously running the country's oil industry. In 1987, INOC was merged with the Ministry of Oil.
Iraq's oil development and production costs are amongst the lowest in the world (perhaps $3-$5 billion for each million barrels per day), making it a highly attractive oil prospect. However, only 17 of 80 discovered fields have been developed, while few deep wells have been drilled compared to Iraq's neighbors. Overall, only about 2,300 wells reportedly have been drilled in Iraq (of which about 1,600 are actually producing oil), compared to around 1 million wells in Texas for instance. In addition, Iraq generally has not had access to the latest, state-of-the-art oil industry technology (i.e., 3D seismic, directional or deep drilling, gas injection), sufficient spare parts, and investment in general throughout most of the 1990s. Instead, Iraq reportedly utilized sub-standard engineering techniques (i.e., overpumping, water injection/"flooding"), obsolete technology, and systems in various states of decay (i.e., corroded well casings) in order to sustain production. In the long run, reversal of all these practices and utilization of the most modern techniques, combined with development of both discovered fields as well as new ones, could result in Iraq's oil output increasing by several million barrels per day.
Iraqi oil reserves vary widely in quality, with API gravities in the 22o to 35o range. Iraq's main export crudes come from the country's two largest active fields: Rumaila and Kirkuk. The southern Rumaila field, which extends a short distance into Kuwaiti territory, has around 663 wells and produces three streams: Basra Regular; Basra Medium (normally 30o API, 2.6% sulfur); and Basra Heavy (normally 22o-24o API, 3.4% sulfur). Basra Blend normally averages around 32o API, 1.95% sulfur, but reportedly is heavier and more sour currently at around 29-30o API and 2%+ sulfur content.
The northern Kirkuk field, first discovered in 1927, forms the basis for northern Iraqi oil production. Kirkuk has around 337 wells and normally produces 35o API, 1.97% sulfur crude, although the API gravity and sulfur content both reportedly deteriorated sharply in the months just preceding the war. Kirkuk's gravity, for instance, had declined to around 32-33o API, while sulfur content had risen above 2%. Declining crude oil qualities -- and an increased "water cut" as well -- was likely the result of overpumping as Iraq attempted to sell as much oil as possible. An additional export crude, known as "Fao Blend," is heavier and more sour, with a 27o API and 2.9% sulfur. Pre-war, Bai Hassan, Jambur, Khabbaz, Ajil (formerly "Saddam"), and Ain Zalah-Butmah-Safaia were the other oil fields in northern Iraq. An estimated 60% of Northern Oil Company's (NOC) facilities in northern and central Iraq were damaged during the Gulf War.
Another major Iraqi oil field is the 11-billion barrel East Baghdad field, which came online in April 1989. Prior to the war, this centrally-located field currently produced around 50,000 bbl/d of heavy, 23o API oil as well as 30 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d) of associated natural gas.
Production
As of mid-August 2003, Iraqi oil output was fluctuating on a daily basis, but generally was averaging just under 1 million barrels per day (bbl/d). Some Iraqi oil -- perhaps 200,000-300,000 bbl/d -- was being reinjected into oil reservoirs in the North due to constraints on both domestic processing ability as well as export outlets. According to the U.N. Joint Logistics Centre (JLC), as of mid-August 2003 "about 40% of [northern Iraqi] production is transferred to the Baiji refinery, with the balance reinjected into the fields, ostensibly to maintain pressure. This is a most unusual practice but extraction of the surplus crude is necessary to produce much needed LPG. It means, however, that crude oil production is overstated by the volume reinjected (it not being available for refining or export, but counted as production). The reinjected crude may be lost forever."
On August 13, Iraq's main oil export pipeline from its main northern oilfield of Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan reopened (see below for more details), but the line was shut down once again shortly thereafter due to sabotage on August 15 and 17. Iraq currently is aiming to increase its production to 2 million bbl/d by December 2003, and 2.8 million bbl/d by April 2004, but this goal may not be attained if problems continue in both the north and the south of the country.
Historically, Iraqi production peaked in December 1979 at 3.7 million bbl/d, and then in July 1990, just prior to its invasion of Kuwait, at 3.5 million bbl/d. From 1991, Iraqi oil output increased slowly, to 600,000 bbl/d in 1996. With Iraq's acceptance in late 1996 of U.N. Resolution 986, which allowed limited Iraqi oil exports in exchange for food and other supplies ("Oil-for-Food"), the country's oil output began increasing more rapidly, to 1.2 million bbl/d in 1997, 2.2 million bbl/d in 1998, and around 2.5 million bbl/d during 1999-2001.
During 2002, Iraqi oil production averaged 2.04 million bbl/d, down from about 2.45 million bbl/d in 2001 (and 2.69 million bbl/d in 2000), with large weekly and monthly fluctuations. Iraqi monthly oil output increased in the last few months of 2002 and in early 2003, peaking at around 2.58 million bbl/d in January 2003. Iraqi officials had hoped to increase the country's oil production capacity to 3.5 million bbl/d by the end of 2000, but did not accomplish this given technical problems with Iraqi oil fields, pipelines, and other oil infrastructure. Iraq also had hoped to expand production by 2010, to around 6 million bbl/d, through joint efforts by international oil companies (IOCs) and the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC).
Prior to the latest war, oil industry experts generally assessed Iraq's sustainable production capacity at no higher than about 2.8-3.0 million bbl/d, with net export potential of around 2.3-2.5 million bbl/d (including smuggled oil). In comparison, Iraq produced 3.5 million bbl/d in July 1990. Approximately 2 million bbl/d of Iraq's production pre-war capacity came from oil fields in the southern part of the country, particularly North Rumaila (0.8 million bbl/d), South Rumaila (0.5 million bbl/d), West Qurnah (250,000 bbl/d at the end of 2002), Az Zubair (200,000-240,000 bbl/d), Misan/Buzurgan (100,000 bbl/d), Majnoon (50,000 bbl/d), Jabal Fauqi (50,000 bbl/d), Abu Ghurab (40,000 bbl/d), and Luhais (30,000-50,000 bbl/d). Iraq's remaining oil production capacity is located in the northern and central fields of Kirkuk (around 550,000-700,000 bbl/d), Bai Hassan (100,000-150,000 bbl/d), Jambur (75,000-100,000 bbl/d), Khabbaz (30,000 bbl/d), Ajil (formerly "Saddam," 25,000 bbl/d), East Baghdad (20,000 bbl/d), and 'Ayn Zalah/Batmah (17,000-20,000 bbl/d).
Among other challenges in maintaining, let alone increasing, oil production capacity, were Iraq's battle with "water cut" (damaging intrusion of water into oil reservoirs) especially in the south. Saybolt International had reported that NOC and SOC were able to increase their oil production through use of short-term techniques not generally considered acceptable in the oil industry (i.e., "water flooding," injection of refined oil products into crude reservoirs). A U.N. report in June 2001 said that Iraqi oil production capacity would fall sharply unless technical and infrastructure problems were addressed.
Exports
Iraqi oil sales and exports currently are being handled by the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), under CPA supervision. SOMO operations were seriously disrupted by war and turmoil during 2003, but the organization has now been reconstituted and has resumed many of its operations. On June 5, 2003, SOMO issued its first oil sales tender since the war started, for 8 million barrels of Kirkuk crude stored in tanks at Ceyhan and 2 million barrels stored at Basra. Dozens of companies placed bids for the oil, with winners including ChevronTexaco, Cepsa, ENI, Repsol, Total, and Tupras. Bids for the Kirkuk oil reportedly ranged around $2.70-$3.30 per barrel below dated Brent (f.o.b. Ceyhan). On June 22, a tanker arrived at Ceyhan to load the first oil since March 20, 2003, when the 600,000-barrel tanker "Caithness" completed loading one day after the outbreak of war. On July 3, SOMO issued its second spot tender, for 8 million barrels of Basra Light. At the time, SOMO stated that it was not yet ready to resume term sales, which generally require a certain level of stability, certainty, and predictability.
In late July 2003, however, SOMO signed its first term contracts since the war, for Basra Light oil from Iraq's southern fields. Exports of about 650,000 bbl/d were anticipated through the rest of 2003. Major purchasers included BP, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Marathon Oil, Mitsubishi, Brazil's Petrobras, Repsol, Shell, Chinese trader Sinochem, and Vitol. However, with difficulties at the southern port of Mina al-Bakr (see below), Iraq has only been averaging exports of 545,000 bbl/d or less since the restart of term contracts.
Pre-War State of Iraq's Oil Sector
In December 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute released a report on Iraq's oil sector. Among other things, the report concluded that: 1) Iraq's oil sector infrastructure is in bad shape at the moment, being held together by "band-aids," and with a production decline rate of 100,000 bbl/d per year; 2) increasing Iraqi oil production will require "massive repairs and reconstruction...costing several billions of dollars and taking months if not years;" 3) costs of repairing existing oil export installations alone would be around $5 billion, while restoring Iraqi oil production to pre-1990 levels would cost an additional $5 billion, plus $3 billion per year in annual operating costs; 4) outside funds and large-scale investment by international oil companies will be needed; 5) existing oil contracts will need to be clarified and resolved in order to rebuild Iraq's oil industry, with any "prolonged legal conflicts over contracts" possibly "delay[ing] the development of important fields in Iraq;" and 6) any "sudden or prolonged shut-down" of Iraq's oil industry could result in long-term reservoir damage; 7) Iraq's oil facilities could easily be damaged during any domestic unrest or military operations (in early February 2003, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan claimed that Iraqi soldiers were mining oil wells in the north of the country in anticipation of war); and 8) given all this, a "bonanza" of oil is not expected in the near future.
According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), problems at Iraqi oil fields include: years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities; and more. MEES estimates that Iraq could reach production capacity of 4.2 million bbl/d within three years at a cost of $3.5 billion, and 4.5-6.0 million bbl/d within seven years.
Status of Oil Development Deals with Foreign Companies
Prior to the toppling of Iraq's Ba'athist regime, the country reportedly had signed several multi-billion dollar deals with foreign oil companies mainly from China, France, and Russia. Deutsche Bank estimates $38 billion total on new fields -- "greenfield" development -- with potential production capacity of 4.7 million bbl/d if all the deals come to fruition (which Deutsche Bank believes is highly unlikely). The former Iraqi government reportedly had been growing increasingly frustrated at the failure of these companies actually to begin work on the ground, and was threatening to no longer sign deals unless firms agreed to do so without delay. Iraqi upstream oil contracts generally required that companies start work immediately, but U.N. sanctions dissuaded companies from doing so for the most part.
Now, following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime, the legal status of these agreements is up in the air, increasing the uncertainty level for companies interested in doing business with Iraq. Besides legal issues, companies are also looking for a relatively stable security situation, a functioning government, and other conditions to be in place before they move heavily into the country. In May 2003, Philip Carroll stated that contracts signed under the previous regime would be assessed to determine whether "they were made in the best interests of the Iraqi people."
Russia, which is owed billions of dollars by Iraq for past arms deliveries, has a strong interest in Iraqi oil development. This includes a $3.7 billion, 23-year deal to rehabilitate Iraqi oilfields, particularly the 11-15 billion barrel West Qurna field (located west of Basra near the Rumaila field). West Qurna is believed to have production potential of 800,000-1 million bbl/d. In a surprising and somewhat puzzling development, in mid-December 2002 the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced that it was severing its contract with the Lukoil consortium on West Qurna due to "fail[ure] to comply" with contract stipulations. Specifically, the Iraqis cited Lukoil's failure to invest a required $200 million over three years. Two other, smaller, stakes in West Qurna by Russian companies Zarubezhneft and Mashinoimport reportedly were left intact.
In addition, three exploration and production deals were signed between Iraq and Russian companies (Soyuzneftegaz, Stroytransgas-Oil, and Tatneft, to develop the 100,000-bbl/d Rafidain field, the Western Desert's Block 4, and the Western Desert's Block 9, respectively). Despite all this, Russia's Foreign Ministry said that it viewed the Iraqi decision on Lukoil and West Qurna "with regret." In mid-February 2003, following a month of talks between the two sides aimed at reversing Iraq's decision, the Iraqis announced that its decision to cancel the Lukoil deal was "finished and the contract has been scrapped." In May 2003, Lukoil said it would fight to keep the contract, and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister said that Russia would seek compensation if contracts signed under the Saddam Hussein regime now were not honored.
In May 2003, another Russian company, Tatneft, set up a joint venture with Germany's MRH in order to win work in Iraq's oil sector. According to Tatneft's President, the company had been close to reaching a deal on exploring Block 9 in Iraq's Western Desert region prior to the war. In October 2001, a joint Russian-Belarus oil company, Slavneft, had signed a $52 million service contract with Iraq on the 2-billion-barrel, Suba-Luhais field in southern Iraq. Full development of Suba-Luhais could result in production of 100,000 bbl/d (35o API) at a cost of $300 million over three years.
In early April 2001, Russia's Zarubezhneft received U.N. approval to drill 45 wells in the Ajil (formerly"Saddam") field, plus Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, as part of an effort to reduce water incursion into the fields. The Ajil field contains 3 billion barrels of oil and 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of associated gas. Iraq had been seeking foreign assistance for a second-phase Ajil development, which would raise oil production capacity to 50,000 bbl/d, as well as 300 Mmcf/d of gas.
The largest of Iraq's oilfields slated for post-sanctions development is Majnoon, discovered by Braspetro of Brazil in 1975, and containing reserves of 11-30 billion barrels of 28o-35o API oil. Majnoon is located 30 miles north of Basra on the Iranian border. In the 1990s, French company Elf Aquitaine (now merged with Total as TotalFinaElf) negotiated on a possible $4 billion deal with Iraq on development rights for Majnoon. In 1999, however, TotalFinaElf declined to sign a 23-year production sharing agreement (PSA) with Iraq on Majnoon. Following this, the field reportedly was brought onstream (under a "national effort" program begun in 1999) in May 2002 at 50,000 bbl/d. Future development on Majnoon ultimately could lead to production of 450,000 bbl/d within two years or so at an estimated (according to Deutsche Bank) cost of $4 billion. Eventually, Majnoon could produce significantly more oil than that, possibly as high as 3 million bbl/d.
In July 2001, angered by France's perceived support for the U.S. "smart sanctions" plan, Iraq announced that it would no longer give French companies priority in awarding oil contracts, and would reconsider existing contracts as well. Iraq also announced that it was inclined to favor Russia, which has been supporting Iraq at the U.N. Security Council, on awarding rights to Majnoon and another large southern oil field, Bin Umar. As of February 2003, Russian company Zarubezhneft reportedly was negotiating a contract to develop Bin Umar. The status of TotalFinaElf, which had previously expressed interest in the field, was not clear. In February 2003, TotalFinaElf's chief executive, Thierry Desmarest, said "We will fight in order to have the best chances for participating in the reconstruction of the country's oil industry."
In early June 2003, China's National Petroleum Company (CNPC) refuted a comment by Thamir Ghadban that CNPC's contract on the 90,000-bbl/d al-Ahdab development was now "void by mutual agreement." CNPC agreed in 1997 to spend $1.3 billion on Al-Ahdab, located in southern Iraq, but no progress was made while sanctions remained in place.
The 2.5-5 billion-barrel Halfaya project is the final large field development in southern Iraq. Prior to the war, several companies (BHP, CNPC, Agip) reportedly had shown interest in Halfaya, which ultimately could yield 200,000-300,000 bbl/d in output at a possible cost of $2 billion. Smaller fields with under 2 billion barrels in reserves also had received interest from foreign oil companies. These fields included Nasiriya (Eni, Repsol), Tuba (ONGC, Sonatrach, Pertamina), Ratawi (Shell, Petronas, CanOxy), Gharaf (Mashinoimport, Rosneftegasexport), Amara (PetroVietnam), Noor (Syria), and more.
In May 2003, Thamir Ghadban stated that three exploration agreements for blocks in Iraq's Western Desert were still valid. These included Indonesia's Pertamina on Block 3, Russia's Stroitransgas on Block 4, and Indian's Oil and Natural Gas Corp. for Block 8. In January 2003, Stroitransgas signed a $33.5 million contract for exploration on Block 4, and in July 2003, it indicated its interest in winning post-war business in Iraq.
Upstream Oil Sector: Current Status
During the war, approximately 7 Iraqi oil wells were set on fire, out of around 1,500 total wells. On April 14, 2003, the last of these fires were extinguished at the South Rumaila field. This was considered a significant accomplishment, given pre-war speculation that Iraq might set many of its oilfields ablaze as it did with Kuwaiti oilfields in 1991. However, in spite of the fact that little damage was done to Iraq's oil fields during the war itself, looting and sabotage after the war ended was highly destructive. On June 6, 2003, Phillip Carroll, Chairman of the Advisory Board to Iraq's Oil Ministry, indicated that there was an organized campaign of sabotage against Iraq's oil industry, and that "their techniques appear to be very professional and aim at causing harm to significant and important installations." On July 24, 2003, the CPA launched "Operation Power Crude" to protect key infrastructure (fuel pipelines, power facilities, etc.) against sabotage and looting.
On April 22, the first oil production since the start of the war began at the Rumaila field, with the restart of an important gas/oil separation plant (GOSP). Starting in mid-May 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers -- which has the lead in restoring Iraq's oil output to pre-war levels -- began a major effort to ramp up production in Iraq. At that time, Iraqi output was only about 230,000 bbl/d: 120,000 bbl/d from southern fields; and 110,000 bbl/d from northern ones. Plans at that time called for Iraq to reach over 1 million bbl/d in output by June 1. This proved overly optimistic. In actuality, Iraqi oil output did not hit 1 million bbl/d until late July
Iraq's southern oil industry was decimated in the 1990/1991 Gulf War, with production capacity falling to 75,000 bbl/d in mid-1991. That war resulted in destruction of gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at Rumaila, storage facilities, the 1.6-million bbl/d (nameplate capacity) Mina al-Bakr export terminal, and pumping stations along the 1.4-million bbl/d (pre-war capacity) Iraqi Strategic (North-South) Pipeline. Seven other sizable fields remain damaged or partially mothballed. These include Zubair, Luhais, Suba, Buzurgan, Abu Ghirab, and Fauqi. Generally speaking, oilfield development plans were put on hold following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, with Iraqi efforts focused on maintaining production at existing fields.
Oil Export Pipelines
Under optimal conditions, and including routes through both Syria and Saudi Arabia that are now closed, Iraq's oil export infrastructure could handle throughput of more than 6 million bbl/d (2.8 via the Gulf, 1.65 via Saudi Arabia, 1.6 via Turkey, and perhaps 300,000 bbl/d or so via Jordan and Syria). However, Iraq's export facilities (pipelines, ports, pumping stations, etc.) were seriously disrupted by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1990/1991 Gulf War, the most recent war in March/April 2003, and periodic looting and sabotage since then.
The 600-mile, Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Turkey) dual pipeline is Iraq's largest crude oil export line. One, 40-inch line has a fully-operational capacity of 1.1 million bbl/d, but reportedly could handle only around 900,000 bbl/d pre-war. The second, parallel, 46-inch line has an optimal capacity of 500,000 bbl/d and was designed to carry Basra Regular exports, but at last report was inoperable. Combined, the two parallel lines have an optimal capacity of 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d. On August 13, 2003, officials at the Turkish port of Ceyhan said today that Iraq had begun pumping fresh crude oil through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline for the first time since war broke out in late March 2003. However, the pipeline was operating far below capacity, at perhaps 300,000-400,000 bbl/d, with significant repairs still required. Also, the line was damaged by a bridge ("Al Fatah") that collapsed on it after being bombed by U.S. planes during the war. This will require major repairs, including the drilling of a new tunnel under the Tigris River and the laying of a new pipeline. In addition, the IT-1 pumping station on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line was damaged by looters, but reportedly is operable manually. The IT-2 pumping station on the same line reportedly was looted and destroyed.
On August 16, 2003, two blasts on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line once again shut down Iraqi oil flows to Turkey. Officials estimated that it would take 10 days to two weeks in order to repair the line, and also that the shutdown was costing Iraq $7 million per day in lost oil export revenues.
At least since 2001 until March 2003, Iraq and Syria were utilizing the 50-year-old Banias oil pipeline in violation of U.N. sanctions. The pipeline, from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria's Mediterranean port of Banias (and Tripoli, Lebanon), reportedly was being used to transport as much as 200,000 bbl/d of Iraqi oil, mainly from southern Iraq, to Syrian refineries at Homs and Banias. The oil was sold at a significant price discount and freed up additional Syrian oil for export. Iraq and Syria also had talked of building a new, parallel pipeline as a replacement for the Banias line. In March 2003, flows on the pipeline were halted, although the US Defense Department denied that its forces had targeted the line.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq also built a pipeline through Saudi Arabia (called IPSA) to the Red Sea port of Mu'ajiz, just north of Yanbu. IPSA has a design capacity of 1.65 million bbl/d, but was closed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. In June 2001, Saudi Arabia expropriated the IPSA line, despite Iraqi protests. In June 2003, Thamir Ghadban said that he hoped Iraq would be able to use the IPSA line again.
In order to optimize export capabilities (i.e., to allow oil shipments to the north or south), Iraq constructed a reversible, 1.4-million bbl/d "Strategic Pipeline" in 1975. This pipeline consists of two parallel 700,000-bbl/d lines. The North-South system allows for export of northern Kirkuk crude from the Persian Gulf and for southern Rumaila crudes to be shipped through Turkey. During the 1990/1991 Gulf War, the Strategic Pipeline was disabled after the K-3 pumping station at Haditha as well as four additional southern pumping stations were destroyed. In June 2003, the NOC estimated that it would take "a long time," possibly until the end of 2003, to repair the K-3 pumping station and resume operations on the Strategic Pipeline. The whole system also reportedly is in need of modernization.
In April 2003, there was some discussion of "reopening" the old oil pipeline from Mosul in northern Iraq to Haifa, Israel. The line, which was built in the 1930s, carried 100,000 bbl/d at its peak, but has been closed since Israel's establishment in 1948. Today, however the Mosul-Haifa pipeline is in extremely poor condition (the Iraqi section is completely rusted and the Jordanian section was sold as scrap metal several years ago), and reportedly would require hundreds of millions of dollars to repair/rebuild, even if this were politically feasible. Along those lines, Jordan strongly denied any interest in rebuilding this pipeline at the present time, stating that "the pipeline no longer exists in Jordanian territory."
Jordan and Iraq had agreed in 1998 to build a pipeline for the transport of Iraqi oil to Jordan's 100,000-bbl/d Zarqa refinery, and renewed this commitment in their most recent oil supply agreement. This would eliminate the necessity of transporting oil over 600 miles of highway from Haditha, Iraq, using a fleet of 1,500 tanker trucks, as was done for several years prior to 2003. Eventually, the line was seen as transporting as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Iraqi crude through Jordan, including oil for export. In December 2002, the Jordanian government was evaluating bids on the project from four competing contractors. However, it now seems unlikely that the project will move forward in the near future. With Iraqi oil supplies to Jordan halted since the war started, Jordan has been receiving oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE at a discounted price.
Oil Terminals
In the Persian Gulf, Iraq has three tanker terminals: at Mina al-Bakr, Khor al-Amaya, and Khor az-Zubair (which mainly handles dry goods and minimal oil volumes, plus natural gas liquids and liquefied petroleum gas). Mina al-Bakr is Iraq's largest oil terminal, with four 400,000-bbl/d capacity berths capable of handling very large crude carriers (VLCCs). Gulf War damage to Mina al-Bakr appears to have been repaired in large part and the terminal reportedly was handling around 1 million bbl/d in early 2003. A full return to Mina al-Bakr's nameplate capacity (1.6 million bbl/d) would require extensive infrastructure repairs. Mina al-Bakr also is constrained by a shortage of storage and oil processing facilities, most of which were destroyed in the Gulf War.
As of mid-August 2003, Mina al-Bakr was experiencing sporadic problems with power supplies (in part the result of wide-scale looting of copper power transmission cables), slowing the port's rate of tanker loading and throwing overall oil export targets into question. Reportedly, the power problems had slowed the time needed to load a VLCC from 2 days to 4-6 days. Mina al-Bakr's nameplate loading capacity is 85,000 barrels per hour (bph), but the loading rate now reportedly is only around 55,000 bph, about two-thirds of capacity.
Iraq's Khor al-Amaya terminal was heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq War (and completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991) and has been out of commission since then. As of March 2001, reports indicated that Iraq had largely completed repairing two berths at Khor al-Amaya, allowing for capacity of 600,000 bbl/d. Upon full completion of repairs, Iraq projects Khor al-Amaya's capacity will rise to 1.2 million bbl/d, and will help prevent delays at Mina al-Bakr while repairs are conducted there.
Refining
Iraq's refining capacity as of January 2003 was believed to be over 417,000 bbl/d, compared to a pre-Gulf War, nameplate capacity of 700,000 bbl/d. Before the latest war, it was believed that Iraq needed to refine 560,000 bbl/d in order to produce 400,000 bbl/d of needed products for domestic consumption. Currently, around 250,000 bbl/d of Iraqi heavy oils reportedly are being burned for power generation. In late April 2003, the Basra refinery restarted at 70,000 bbl/d, or half of its total capacity. As of mid-August, the 140,000-bbl/d plant was experiencing periodic stoppages due to electric power problems, reducing its output by around 40%-50%.
Overall, Iraq has 10 refineries and topping units. The largest are the 150,000-bbl/d Baiji North, 140,000-bbl/d (or higher) Basra, and 100,000-bbl/d Daura plants. During the Gulf War, both Baiji in northern Iraq as well as the refineries at Basra, Daura, and Nasiriyah were severely damaged. Prior to the war in March/April 2003, a lack of light-end products, low quality gasoline, and rising pollution levels because of a lack of water treatment facilities were some of the major problems faced by Iraq's refining sector. Following the war, significant investment will now be needed to perform refinery upgrades (Iraq had identified dozens of such projects prior to the war) and possibly to build a new $1 billion, 290,000-bbl/d "Central" refinery near Babylon.
At the present time, problems with Iraq's refineries are forcing the country to barter fuel oil for gasoline and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) from neighboring countries (mainly Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey). In addition to supply shortfalls, distribution of LPG and other petroleum products, plus low "buffer stock levels," each remain major challenges that needs to be resolved. According to the JLC, "the supply of fuels in Iraq continue[d] to be poor," with an "LPG shortage in particular...affecting the most vulnerable elements of the population." In addition, as of mid-August 2003, the JLC was reporting that "gasoline was also in short supply...especially in the north, but at levels that the populace has become used to" and that "major shortages of LPG and diesel continue." However, the overall fuel supply situation in Iraq seems to be improving slowly if not steadily as of mid-August 2003. At the same time, the situation is being made somewhat worse by smuggling of refined products out of the country.
NATURAL GAS
Iraq contains 110 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, along with roughly 150 Tcf in probable reserves. About 70% of Iraq's natural gas reserves are associated (i.e., natural gas produced in conjunction with oil), with the rest made up of non-associated gas (20%) and dome gas (10%). Until 1990, all of Iraq's natural gas production was from associated fields. In 2001, Iraq produced 97 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas, down drastically from peak output levels of 700 Bcf in 1979. Iraq plans to increase its natural gas output in order to reduce dependence on oil consumption and possibly for export at some point. Prior to the recent war, Iraq had even been developing plans to build a liquefied natural gas terminal.
Within two years after the lifting of U.N. sanctions, Iraq had hoped to produce 550 Bcf, and within a decade, Iraq had aimed to be producing about 4.2 Tcf of natural gas annually. Since most of Iraq's natural gas is associated with oil, progress on increasing the country's oil output will directly affect the gas sector as well. Associated gas often is simply flared off. Significant volumes of gas also are used for power generation and reinjection for enhanced oil recovery efforts.
Main sources of associated natural gas are the Kirkuk, Ain Zalah, Butma, and Bai Hassan oil fields in northern Iraq, as well as the North and South Rumaila and Zubair fields in the south. The Southern Area Gas Project was completed in 1985, but was not brought online until February 1990. It has nine gathering stations and a larger processing capacity of 1.5 billion cubic feet per day. Natural gas gathered from the North and South Rumaila and Zubair fields is carried via pipeline to a 575-Mmcf/d natural gas liquids (NGL) fractionation plant in Zubair and a 100-Mmcf/d processing plant in Basra. At Khor al-Zubair, a 17.5-million-cubic-foot LPG storage tank farm and loading terminals were added to the southern gas system in 1990. Natural gas also used to be pumped from Rumaila into northern Kuwait via a 40-inch, 105-mile pipeline. The gas was used to supply Kuwaiti power stations and LPG plants, but was halted following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Iraq's only non-associated natural gas production is from the al-Anfal field (200 Mmcf/d of output) in northern Iraq. Al-Anfal production, which began in May 1990, is piped to the Jambur gas processing station near the Kirkuk field, located 20 miles away. Al-Anfal's gas resources are estimated at 4.5 Tcf, of which 1.8 Tcf is proven. In December 2001, Russia's Gazprom reportedly was negotiating possible development of al-Anfal. In November 2001, a large non-associated natural gas field reportedly was discovered in the Akas region of western Iraq, near the border with Syria, and containing an estimated 2.1 Tcf of natural gas reserves. It is not clear whether the field is associated or non-associated.
Besides al-Anfal, Iraq has four large non-associated natural gas fields (Chemchamal, Jaria Pika, Khashm al Ahmar, Mansuriya) located in Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. In February 2000, Iraq's Oil Ministry named Agip and Gaz de France as leaders on a $2.3 billion PSA (production sharing agreement) project to develop these fields, which reportedly have total recoverable reserves of more than 10 Tcf.
Currently, Iraq has a major natural gas pipeline with the capacity to supply around 240 MMcf/d to Baghdad from the West Qurna field. The 48-inch line was commissioned in November 1988, with phases II and III of the project never completed due to war and sanctions. The last two phases of the pipeline project were meant to supply Turkey. Iraq's Northern Gas System, which came online in 1983, was damaged during the Gulf War as well as by the Kurdish rebellion of March 1991. The system supplied LPG to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, as well as dry gas and sulphur to power stations and industrial plants. Iraq also has a Southern Gas System, which came online in 1985.
ELECTRIC POWER
As of late July 2003, indications were that Iraq had no more than perhaps 3,600 MW of power generating capacity, well below the amount needed to satisfy peak summer demand. Baghdad alone is estimated to require 2,400 MW of power during the summer's extreme heat for refrigeration and air conditioning, but was receiving perhaps half that amount. The Doura plant, which supplies the capital, was only running at 30% capacity as of late July, while power lines between the Beiji facility, which also serves Baghdad, had been cut or looted. Overall, according to Paul Bremer, Iraq requires an extra 2,000 MW of generating capacity in order to meet demand, at a cost of perhaps $2 billion. In the meantime, the CPA has introduced a rationing system for the entire country, except for Basra, with three hours on and three hours off. Key facilities like hospitals, oil facilities, water and sewage plants were to receive power 24 hours a day under the plan.
Around 85%-90% of Iraq's national power grid (and 20 power stations) was damaged or destroyed in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Existing generating capacity of 9,000 megawatts (MW) in December 1990 was reduced to only 340 MW by March 1991. In early 1991, transmission and distribution infrastructure also was destroyed, including the 10 substations serving Baghdad and about 30% of the country's 400-kilovolt (kV) transmission network. In early 1992, Iraq stated that it had restarted 75% of the national grid, including the 1,320-MW Baiji and Mosul thermal plants as well as the Saddam Dam. The U.N. Iraq Program estimated in November 2002 that Iraq's generating capacity was 4,300-4,400 MW. The U.N. Iraq Program further stated that, by the summer of 2004, Iraq's generating capacity could reach 5,900 MW, with several power stations (Al-Quds, Beji, Himreen,Yousfiya, Rumaila -- all gas-fired) under construction and several others (Dibs, Hart, Najaf, Nassriya -- gas and thermal) awaiting approval and/or funds.
Prior to the war, Iraq reportedly had signed contracts for renovating two generation units at the Harithah power plant, and another to rebuild the Yusufiyah plant, which stopped operating in 1990. Iraq's Electricity Authority reportedly also had signed several other contracts with Chinese, Swiss, French, and Russian companies, to build 3,000 MW of additional power generating capacity. In December 2000, it was reported that a Chinese company had completed work on the Abdullah power plant north of Baghdad. In October 2001, it was reported that Russia's Mosenergomontazh was working to modernize Iraq's Southern Heat and Power Plant in Najibia, Basra province. The project aims to add 200 MW of generating capacity to Iraq's grid. In August 2002, the Najaf governate in southern Iraq announced that two new power plants, with a combined capacity of 20 MW, had come online.
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Sources for this report include: Agence France Presse; APS Review Oil Market Trends; Associated Press; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; Business Week; Chicago Tribune; CIA World Factbook; Deutsche Bank; Dow Jones; The Economist; Economist Intelligence Unit; Energy Compass; Energy Intelligence Briefing; Financial Times; Global Insight; Gulf News; Hart's Africa Oil and Gas; Interfax News Agency; Janet Matthews Information Services (Quest Economic Database); Los Angeles Times; Middle East Economic Survey; Nefte Compass; New York Times; Oil & Gas Journal; Oil Daily; Petroleum Economist; Petroleum Finance Company (PFC); Petroleum Intelligence Weekly; Platt's Oilgram News; Reuters; Russian Oil and Gas Report; Stratfor; U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme; U.S. Energy Information Administration; U.S. Department of State; Wall Street Journal Europe; Washington Post; Weekly Petroleum Argus; World Markets Research Centre.
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COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Head of Government: N.A. For a discussion of Iraq's current governing structure, please see the discussion above.
Independence: October 3, 1932
Population (2002E): 23 million
Location/Size: Middle East/168,709 square miles, slightly more than twice the size of Idaho.
Major Cities: Baghdad (capital), Basra, Mosul, Karbala, Kirkuk
Languages: Arabic, Kurdish
Ethnic Groups: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkmen, Assyrian, or other 5%
Religions: 97% Muslim (Shi'a 60-65%, Sunni 32-37%), Christian or other (3%)
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Currency: Iraqi Dinar (ID)
Unofficial Exchange Rate (7/03E): US$1=ID 1,500, compared to around US$1=ID3,000 just after the war
Gross Domestic Product (at market exchange rates) (2002E): $28.6 billion (down from $54 billion in 1988)
Gross Domestic Product (at purchasing power parity rates) (2002E): $15.5 billion (around one-third of 1989's economic output)
Real GDP Growth Rate (Global Insight: Base Case Scenario) (2002E): 5.5% (2003F): -22.0% (2004F): 37.0%
Inflation Rate (Global Insight: Base Case Scenario) (consumer prices) (2002E): 24.6% (2003F): 7.6% (2004F): 6.9%
Major Export Products (2002): Crude oil and oil products (regulated by the United Nations)
Major Import Products (2002): Food, medicine, consumer goods (regulated by the United Nations)
Merchandise Exports (2002E): $13.0 billion
Merchandise Imports (2002E): $7.8 billion
Merchandise Trade Balance (2002E): $5.2 billion
Current Account Balance (2002E): $2.3 billion
Oil Export Revenues (2002E): $12.3 billion (includes $3 billion or so in smuggling)
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (2002E): 95% or more
External Debt (2003E): estimates range from over $100 billion to more than $300 billion
ENERGY OVERVIEW
Minister of Oil: N.A., although Thamir Ghadban is de facto acting head of the Iraqi Oil Ministry, with Philip Carroll as an advisor (see above for more details)
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/03E): 112.5 billion barrels (around 75 billion barrels of which has not yet been developed; "probable" and "possible" reserves are as high as 220 billion barrels)
Oil Production (2002E): 2.04 million barrels per day (bbl/d), of which 2.02 million bbl/d was crude oil
Oil Production (January-May 2003E): 1.35 million barrels per day (bbl/d), ranging from a high of 2.58 million bbl/d in January to a low of 64,000 bbl/d in April; as of mid-August, production was believed to be above 1 million bbl/d)
Pre-war Oil Production Capacity, Maximum Sustainable: 2.8-3.0 million bbl/d (declining by about 100,000 bbl/d per year)
Current Oil Production Capacity, Maximum Sustainable (8/03E): 1.0 million bbl/d
Oil Export Routes: Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline; Mina al-Bakr port; to Jordan and Turkey via truck; reportedly to Syria via the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline; smuggling by boat along the Gulf coast
Oil Consumption (2002E): 460,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) (8/03E): 300,000-350,000 bbl/d
Net Oil Exports (2002E): 1.58 million bbl/d (8/03E): 650,000-700,000 bbl/d
U.S. Oil Imports from Iraq (2002E): 459,000 bbl/d (down from 795,000 bbl/d during 2001)
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/03E): 417,500 bbl/d (according to the Oil and Gas Journal)
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/03E): 109.8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
Natural Gas Production/Consumption (2001E): 97 billion cubic feet (Bcf)
Electricity Generation Capacity (2002E): 4.3-4.4 gigawatts (90% thermal) (8/03E): x.x gigawatts
Electricity Production (2001E): 36.0 billion kilowatthours
ENVIRONMENTAL OVERVIEW
Total Energy Consumption (2001E): 1.08 quadrillion Btu* (0.3% of world total energy consumption)
Energy-Related Carbon Emissions (2001E): 20.0 million metric tons of carbon (0.3% of world total carbon emissions)
Per Capita Energy Consumption (2001E): 45.6 million Btu (vs U.S. value of 341.8 million Btu)
Per Capita Carbon Emissions (2001E): 0.85 metric tons of carbon (vs U.S. value of 5.5 metric tons of carbon)
Energy Intensity (2000E): 13,172 Btu/ $1995 (vs U.S. value of 11,014 Btu/ $1995)**
Carbon Intensity (2000E): 0.24 metric tons of carbon/thousand $1995 (vs U.S. value of 0.17 metric tons/thousand $1995)**
Fuel Share of Energy Consumption (2001E): Oil (90%), Natural Gas (9%); Hydroelectric (<1%)
Fuel Share of Carbon Emissions (2001E): Oil (90%), Natural Gas (10%)
Status in Climate Change Negotiations: Iraq is not a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or to the Kyoto Protocol.
Major Environmental Issues: Under Saddam Hussein, government water control projects drained most of the inhabited marsh areas east of An Nasiriyah by drying up or diverting the feeder streams and rivers. A once sizable population of "Marsh Arabs," who have inhabited these areas for thousands of years, were displaced, while the destruction of the natural habitat harmed the area's wildlife populations. Other problems include inadequate supplies of potable water, development of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers system contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey, air and water pollution, soil degradation (salination) and erosion, and desertification.
Major International Environmental Agreements: A party to the Law of the Sea and the Nuclear Test Ban.
* The total energy consumption statistic includes petroleum, dry natural gas, coal, net hydro, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste electric power.
**GDP based on EIA International Energy Annual 2001
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Major Oil Fields (proven reserves - billion barrels, 2002E): Majnoon (12-30), West Qurna (11.3-15.0), East Baghdad (11+), Kirkuk (10+), Rumaila (10+), Bin Umar (6+), Rattawi (3.1), Halfaya (2.5-4.6), Nassiriya (2-2.6), Suba-Luhais (2.2), Tuba (1.5), Khurmala (1.0), Gharaf (1.0-1.1), Rafidain (0.7), Amara (0.5)
Oil Refineries (crude refining capacity bbl/d, 2003E): Baiji (150,000), Basra (140,000), Daura (100,000), Khanakin (12,000), Haditha (7,000), Muftiah (4,500), Qayarah Mosul (2,000)
Major Ports: Mina al-Bakr, Khor al-Amaya, Khor al- Zubair, Umm Qasr
Major Pipelines (nameplate capacity): Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Dortyol) Pipeline - around 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d (currently partly operational); Iraq-Saudi Arabia Pipeline (IPSA1, 2) - possibly 1.65 million bbl/d (closed by Saudi Arabia in 1990); Banias/Tripoli Pipeline - possibly 0.3 million bbl/d (currently closed); Iraq Strategic Pipeline - less than 1.4 million bbl/d (reversible, internal transportation only)
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LINKS
For more information on Iraq, see these other sources on the EIA web site:
Iraq Chronology: 1980-2003
EIA - Country Information on Iraq
Links to other U.S. government sites:
CIA World Factbook - Iraq
Coalition Provisional Authority Home Page
US Dept. of Commerce Iraq Reconstruction Task Force
US State Dept. Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Page
US State Dept. International Information Programs: Iraq
U.S. Office of Foreign Assests Control (for information on Iraqi Sanctions)
Radio Free Europe "Iraq Report"
U.S. State Department's Consular Information Sheet - Iraq
State Dept. Iraq information
US Agency for International Development Iraq page
Library of Congress -- Iraq Country Study
The following links are provided solely as a service to our customers, and therefore should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any position of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the United States Government. In addition, EIA does not guarantee the content or accuracy of any information presented in linked sites.
UN Office of the Iraq Program U.N. Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iraq
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
MENA Petroleum Bulletin
University of Texas at Austin -- Iraq Page
Perry Castaneda Collection: Iraq Maps
University of Pennsylvania -- Middle East Center
Baker Institute/Council on Foreign Relations Iraq Study
Planet Arabia.com
BBC "After Saddam" page
Washington Post "War in Iraq" page
Online NewsHour: "The New Iraq"
Iraq Daily
AME Info Middle East Business Information
CSIS: Electric Power Sector in Iraq (presentation by Major General Robert Griffin)
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