Brits vs Americans - discuss

[TheEarl]

I'm surprised no-one's picked up on this story yet: The US army has requested over 600 British troops to help secure Baghdad. The British Army's expertise in guerilla fighting and our experience with terrorism (American-funded terrorism to be precise, but let's not quibble) means that Basra and other British controlled cities are considerably quieter than the American-controlled areas. Although Moqtada Al-Sadr's rebellion is active in the South, the British aren't utilising the American's method of throwing petrol on the fire by ordering large scale strikes and blowing up the general population with the terrorists (guaranteed way to provide more terrorist fighters) and thus the general population actually likes us (probably why Al-Sadr hates us so much).

Despite the fun to be had from sticking tongues out at the Americans about how they're asking for our help (which we will) and the 'I told you so's that we could offer about their 'hardline' approach to quelling the insurgents (which should be said at some point. Maybe next time you'll ask the advice of officers who've dealt with terrorism for 20 years!), this request is actually quite a difficult one for the government to juggle. The transferral of the soldiers will leave Britain exposed in the South. The British control of the South is solid at the moment, but if we're weak anywhere, then the insurgents will strike. The US have requested a heavy infantry unit (which will probably be the Black Watch) and this will remove our reserves, which are carted around to cover hotspots. No reserves means no Plan B and no soldiers to spare. Our reserve reserves are a Light Unit on manoeuvres in Cyprus and, although they can (and probably will) be called in, they're no replacement.

Also the US military have requested that the soldiers be put under US command. Quite apart from the patriotic yelling about surending control the the USA, this would put the soldiers in some awkward positions. The Black Watch (assuming it is them) have served in N.Ireland and have trained under some of the finest anti-terrorist experts in the world. The American officers, on the other hand, seem to have as much experience and expertise of dealing with terrorism as Pope John Paul II. What if the British troops are ordered to do something patently stupid, that they know will inflame the situation?

Another consideration it that the UK has signed up to a lot of Treaties and Conventions on human rights and acceptable behaviour in wars that the USA have rejected outright. Under American control, a British soldier could be given the choice of performing an unlawful killing or refusing a direct order.

My proposal would be that the entirety of the Iraq operation be put under the control of experienced British officers, given their experience of just this kind of situation. I know that it will never happen, what with the US election and public appearances of the USA being in control of the situation, but it makes sense to have the people who know what they're doing in charge.

Imagine terrorism as a chip-pan fire. If you put the lid on top of the pan and turn off the heat, the fire will burn itself out, denied of fuel. If you rush into any violent action, the entire kitchen will be ablaze. Blowing up religious terrorists creates martyrs and makes you look like tyrants. Ordinary people will flock to their banner - hundreds of guerillas waiting to blow themselves up or snipe at you, because your last action resulted in their innocent father being killed in the crossfire. The only way to stop them is to withdraw their heat, remove the support from the people. When both sides see them as lunatics who disturb the peace, then they'll have nowhere to hide. While there are people who still agree with them, there will always be more volunteers for bombs.

I understand that this is a long and involved rant (with a lot of parentheses as I make snide off-hand comments) and I didn't really have a point, I just wanted to know what you thought.

The Earl

 

[dr_mabeuse]

Lord knows they need some kind of help.

The present policy of going into Faluja and other hotspots with bombs and missiles is certainly counterproductive, but with an election coming up no one wants to actually send in ground troops where they might be chewed up, so once again strategy and tactics take a back seat to politics, and the soldiers pay the price.

A little help from terrorism experts would be most welcome.

---dr.M.

 

[Guest]

I quote Geoff Hoon: "The possible movement of troops to the North does have to do with the election, not the US election, but the planned elections for Iraq in January."

I para-phrased a bit there, but that's the gist of what he said.

I dunno, this is a tricky one. As the Doc said, they definitely need help. What worries me is that all the specialists and armoured vehicles would be moved to the North, thus leaving those in Basra and the surrounding area somewhat lacking in protection.

Lou

 

[Virtual_Burlesque]

Coming from a country where a number of people have publically confessed that the person they plan to vote into power is not terribly bright, but then, neither are they; my suggestion may come as a shock.

Then again, it may not.

Let knowledgeable military experts decide what should be done, and with as much material as they honestly believe the situation warrants. We are here as a direct consequence of allowing political desires to eclipse military intelligence.

I do not know whether splitting the heavy infantry unit between two hot spots would cause their overall ability to diminish (Other than the general rule against splitting your army in the face or the enemy. [See, I can communicate in parentheses, too!] ) but I would bet my lucky g-string that said heavy infantry unit does know — from the uppermost of the upper echelon to the lowliest of grunt.

I am always loath to let slip the dogs of war, but once they are unleashed, since they are unleashed, at least let them do their doggonedest to do get the job done right. Let us not allow any clutch of hyper thyroid swivel-chair heros and tin-plated pettifoggers draw out the affair through an attempt to micro-manage this war from the safety of their ivory tower or concrete cobweb. Don’t permit them to make another dog’s breakfast of every bodies’ mothers and sons.

That said, with even the rosiest outcome on November 2nd some time is bound to pass before inertia will allow the present course to be much altered. In the meantime, each member of the coalition must maintain an ability to protect their troops from the wretched clasp of incompetence. (Not to mention incompetents.)

The best British response would be to insist upon maintaining direct control of British troops due to the lack of a uniform interpretation of the applicability of the Geneva Convention covenants. In actuality, by this time there probably is little to chose amongst the disparate forces, however that pronouncement would make a fine judicious sound for the world’s attendant media, as well as being a diplomatic loophole for egress.






2 p. rant

 

[Belegon]

Remember, I am American. What is more, I am one with a family history of military service incl. both grandfathers in WW2; father, uncles and father-in-law in Vietnam; brother is retired(medical reasons) special forces and I have a cousin serving with the 3rd Army who was in Baghdad until recently.


UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should British troops be put under direct American command. Spoils the entire point of bringing them up there in the first place. They need at least limited autonomy to do their jobs correctly.

It will never happen for political reasons, but I would actually advocate the reverse. Put British non-coms in charge of US troops. Use the experience where it will do the most good.

 

[TheEarl]

The best British response would be to insist upon maintaining direct control of British troops due to the lack of a uniform interpretation of the applicability of the Geneva Convention covenants. In actuality, by this time there probably is little to chose amongst the disparate forces, however that pronouncement would make a fine judicious sound for the world’s attendant media, as well as being a diplomatic loophole for egress.

Burlesque: As I understand it, the problem is not the Geneva Convention, but several rules of war treaties which the UK is a signatory to, but not the US. Not so much an interpretation of one set of rules, rather they're playing by a completely different set.

The Earl

 

[Guest]

Very informative post, Earl; I simply had not thought of British military as terrorist fighting experts. I hope they do not surrender their command to the U.S., and perhaps even that U.S. soldiers may learn enough to fight or keep safer.

Pear

 

[Colleen Thomas]

I don't like us asking the Brits for help.

In the first place, they have relative calm in their sector, while some of it can be atributed to luck, the truth is their restraint in applying force has won them a lot more freinds than our approach has. More than even UN peacekeepers right now, they have credibility among the populous. If you sipon them away, you are inviting insurgents to start playing hob where they were.

In the second place, if they end up in the north and become assocciated with our heavy handed approach, it might cost them that credibility, even if they don't actually participate.

I'm not saying the heavy handed approach is wrong. The South isn't the North. I am saying it makes little sense to risk compromising a peaceful south for a few hundred extra troops in the north and it makes absolutely no sense to risk damaging the British troop's rapport with the people when you plan on having elections soon and will need someone the people believe in to administer those elections or you risk them all loosing faith in the very process you are trying to instill.

I hope the British government can find a way to gracefully refuse.

-Colly

 

[Pure]

Hey, your Brit soldier is a decent guy, but the generals??? in counterinsurgency???

Let's see: Success in the Boer War through massacres, starving out the enemy. (That's how it must be done.)

Malaya: insurgency not contained (?)

Kenya: no success against the Mau Mau uprising.

Lack of success in Iraq a few decades back.

Generally:

Loss of all colonies to national and/or insurgent forces.

Irish problem solved with starvation, massacres, etc. Evolving to the N Ireland problem which continues, with terrorism in Britain.

----
Imagine terrorism as a chip-pan fire. If you put the lid on top of the pan and turn off the heat, the fire will burn itself out, denied of fuel. If you rush into any violent action, the entire kitchen will be ablaze. Blowing up religious terrorists creates martyrs and makes you look like tyrants. Ordinary people will flock to their banner - hundreds of guerillas waiting to blow themselves up or snipe at you, because your last action resulted in their innocent father being killed in the crossfire. The only way to stop them is to withdraw their heat, remove the support from the people. When both sides see them as lunatics who disturb the peace, then they'll have nowhere to hide. While there are people who still agree with them, there will always be more volunteers for bombs.

Can you give 3-4 examples where this approach worked?

In practice, the 'people' are only kept from supporting 'rebels' through a number of draconic measures, e.g., they are herded to certain 'secure locations' (e.g., strategic hamlets) and their villages destroyed. If they are massacred and starved. If all persons looking like guerrillas in the 'free kill' zones are killed.


Hey, if help for colonial projects is needed, I'd rather turn to the French (who also lost everything) but put up a much more deadly fight. (Battle of Algiers is a training film at the Pentagon.)

Note to the Earl: Military solutions to colonial projects and to most so called 'insurgencies' generally do not work. There are occasional exceptions where the suppression is ruthless enough, and decimates the population. One example is the US pacification of the Philippines, early in this century. LOTS of civilian killings, relocation etc. A bit like the Brits 'success' in S. Africa.

 

[Pure]

How about those Brits ?

http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=535432004

The Scotsman, 11 May, 2004


Yesterday, as more allegations emerged in a leaked report from the International Committee of the Red Cross, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic attempted to defuse the row.

Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, said the allegations against British troops had been investigated swiftly and acted upon.

Mr Hoon pledged that any abuse would be "rooted out", amid accusations that the government had "lost its grip" on Iraq policy.

George Bush, the US president, mounted a strong defence of his embattled secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, telling him: "You are doing a superb job."

The ICRC report criticised British troops over the death of Baha Mousa, a hotel worker, in custody last September. It also criticised the hooding of prisoners and the confiscation of a prisoner’s car.

However, its strongest criticism was reserved for US forces. ....

=====
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A81AA8B8-3264-4ECF-9817-A800BD71C270.htm

{Note this is a Reuters story}

UK compensates for slaying Iraqis


Wednesday 07 January 2004, 16:06 Makka Time, 13:06 GMT


Britain has paid compensation to families of three Iraqi civilians who died in incidents involving occupying British troops since the war.

The unspecified payouts - which media said were in the thousands of pounds - included payment to the family of an Iraqi man whose family said was tortured to death by British soldiers while holding him in custody.

"We can confirm that a compensation payment has been made for the deceased, Mr (Baha) Mousa," a Ministry of Defence spokesman said. "This doesn't represent an admission of guilt or responsibility from any soldier. An investigation is under way."

The MoD said that since the 1 May end of formal hostilities, Iraqis had submitted 23 claims for compensation "in connection with alleged fatalities involving UK forces".

Of those, seven had been rejected, 13 were still under investigation and three had received compensation, it said.

"We take our legal obligations very seriously," the spokesman added. "But I would stress that where we've made a payment, it doesn't amount to an admission of guilt."

The ministry declined to give more information on the cases.

'Caked in blood'

Baha Musa, 26, died in British custody in September after soldiers arrested him and seven other young Iraqis in the southern city of Basra. His body was returned to his family four days later battered and caked with blood.


His nose and wrist were broken and bruises covered his body, Musa's father Dawud told Reuters in October. Dawud said he believed Musa, a hotel receptionist and father-of-two, had been tortured to death.

The MoD said a military police unit, not linked to the soldiers' regiment, was investigating the case.

Another Iraqi arrested at the same time, 44-year-old Kefa Taha, was later admitted to hospital with "renal failure, rhabdomyolysis and severe bruising to his upper abdomen and the right side of his chest", according to British army hospital
records in Basra.

Britain was Washington's chief ally in the March invasion to oust former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and has more than 10,000 troops there, mainly in the south.

Reuters

 

[Lord Naraku]

Really the US Military is not trained to fight a guerrilla war. The US military has never been good at such wars. They are a board sword not a scalpel. The US's true anti terrorist force is the FBI.

 

[TheEarl]

Hey, your Brit soldier is a decent guy, but the generals??? in counterinsurgency???

Let's see: Success in the Boer War through massacres, starving out the enemy. (That's how it must be done.)

Malaya: insurgency not contained (?)

Kenya: no success against the Mau Mau uprising.

Lack of success in Iraq a few decades back.

Generally:

Loss of all colonies to national and/or insurgent forces.

Irish problem solved with starvation, massacres, etc. Evolving to the N Ireland problem which continues, with terrorism in Britain.

Pure: Let's go on the record of the current army. In the last invasion of Iraq, the British zone was again the best controlled and they enlisted the support of the common people. Then, by command of the Americans, we pulled out and the common people who helped us got slaughtered by Hussein. Any wonder that they don't trust us?

The Irish problem has been mostly solved. You can't fight the IRA directly, just like you can't fight a chip pan fire. You may score minor victories and beat back the flames, but you'll never win. The peace was agreed by politicians and negotiators who managed to secure 'peace in our time.' There is no Irish terrorism in Britain and hasn't been since the agreements were passed. That's one example where the chip pan fire example worked - we took away their base of popular support by actually attending to the grievances of the common people and coming to the solution that they wanted.

----
Imagine terrorism as a chip-pan fire. If you put the lid on top of the pan and turn off the heat, the fire will burn itself out, denied of fuel. If you rush into any violent action, the entire kitchen will be ablaze. Blowing up religious terrorists creates martyrs and makes you look like tyrants. Ordinary people will flock to their banner - hundreds of guerillas waiting to blow themselves up or snipe at you, because your last action resulted in their innocent father being killed in the crossfire. The only way to stop them is to withdraw their heat, remove the support from the people. When both sides see them as lunatics who disturb the peace, then they'll have nowhere to hide. While there are people who still agree with them, there will always be more volunteers for bombs.

Can you give 3-4 examples where this approach worked?

In practice, the 'people' are only kept from supporting 'rebels' through a number of draconic measures, e.g., they are herded to certain 'secure locations' (e.g., strategic hamlets) and their villages destroyed. If they are massacred and starved. If all persons looking like guerrillas in the 'free kill' zones are killed.

I can't give 3-4 examples where it's worked. I can give 7,000 examples where your measures didn't work though. One of the biggest terrorist problems in the world (Ireland) was solved by my method. Should be example enough, especially seeing how well the Americans are doing with their draconion measures. Cf also how the Germans failed to win the support of the French people in WW2 and were undermined by their guerilla efforts.

Hey, if help for colonial projects is needed, I'd rather turn to the French (who also lost everything) but put up a much more deadly fight. (Battle of Algiers is a training film at the Pentagon.)

The British Empire was lost through mismanagement by the government of the time and was relinquished, rather than forcibly removed. Several countries like Pakistan actually voted to stay within the empire, but Imperialism wasn't making us popular in the international world, so we relinquished the lot.

Note to the Earl: Military solutions to colonial projects and to most so called 'insurgencies' generally do not work. There are occasional exceptions where the suppression is ruthless enough, and decimates the population. One example is the US pacification of the Philippines, early in this century. LOTS of civilian killings, relocation etc. A bit like the Brits 'success' in S. Africa.

So in fact you agree with me that the draconion measures do not work and the only solution is working out how to separate the terrorists from the people? So where's the argument?

Or are you just sore that I suggested that Britain may be better at something than America?

The Earl

 

[rgraham666]

My understanding is that the British handling of the crisis in Malaysia was successful.

Rather than go after the guerillas in the jungle, they concentrated on protecting the villages from the guerillas, thereby gaining the support of most people and depriving the guerillas of support, both logistical and political.

 

[steve w]

Earl,

Don't get drawn into Pure's simplistic John-Wayne-movie view of complex political and military issues. It's his kind of naive stupidity that infects the White House, and got us into this mess to begin with - more fool Blair for going along with it.

There is NO WAY the British troops should be under US control. British troops are trained to avoid conflict if possible, enforce peace through co-operation where it can, but hit people hard where there is no other alternative. Most American troops are trained to shoot first and ask questions later. It's a fundamental mismatch of what the respective countries expect their army to do.

It's clear that the British approach is securing greater security for the local population than the American approach. The north/south difference is only partly due to the elements living there, the rest is down to differing approaches. This would be undermined by the British troops (incidentally, a regiment the government intends to abolish once they return - nice supportive gesture, eh?) being controlled and directed by US generals and, presumably, operating with the same attitude as US troops.

In relation to a wider point on terrorism, Earl is right and Pure is wrong again. You don't defeat terrorism by shooting people. The virtual end of terror inflicted by the IRA in Ireland and ETA in Spain (to give two examples) came from serious and long intelligence efforts, the enforcement of democratic law, and talking amongst various political groups, all of whom had to yield from their starting position to make progress.

I don't think the British need to take lessons in "dealing with terrorism" from the nation that funded thirty years of it in the UK. 3,000 people died because of some Americans' misty-eyed view of Ireland. Prosecute the people behind Noraid, and its' donors, then come back and talk to us.

 

[Pure]

Hi, the Earl, (comments to Steve W, included)

Thanks for your comments. I agree that *sometimes* insurgents(terrorists) have been suppressed in the manner you describe. I don't intend to advertise for American counterinsurgency skills, in case that was the impresssion. See below. Sorry if that appeared to be the case.

It's rather faint praise though, if you say the Brits finally 'succeeded' regarding Ireland in, what, 1990? (Is that about the time you believe 'success' came?)

Earl: I can't give 3-4 examples where it's worked. I can give 7,000 examples where your measures didn't work though. One of the biggest terrorist problems in the world (Ireland) was solved by my method.

====
Steve W claims to know my position; that it's "John Wayne." This is not true:

Steve: In relation to a wider point on terrorism, Earl is right and Pure is wrong again. You don't defeat terrorism by shooting people. The virtual end of terror inflicted by the IRA in Ireland and ETA in Spain (to give two examples) came from serious and long intelligence efforts, the enforcement of democratic law, and talking amongst various political groups, all of whom had to yield from their starting position to make progress.

Yes there are some cases of success through political (and police) processes, such as you mention, i.e., against the ETA. The 'success' against the IRA I commented on, above.

There is, however, *limited ways* in which the Iraqi insurgents are like the ETA, and *no way* in which the entities fighting the insurgents/terrorists are comparable. In the Iraq case, it's an occupying power. Against the ETA was a democratic *SPANISH* government. Which, incidentally, there is little chance will happen under Allawi.

Let me clarify: I'm NOT recommending American methods over the methods of the Brits or the French. There's much in common in fighting 'terrorists', who are often nationalists. It's never nice, and America's hands are almost as dirty as those of the older colonial powers. I do NOT recommend the methods that led to "success" in the Philippines, or S. Africa. I simply described them.

Steve W, I would not deny a role of American funding in the last few decades of the Ireland tragedy. But consider the role of outside funding/support, at present, in Iraq. Outside funding and material support (as in Vietnam) immensely complicates a picture.

Returning to Iraq, and Earl's points:
Here is another point that's relevant, Earl, in the Iraq case. The Brits presence, besides being linked to the Americans' (and the 'torture' cases somewhat reflect the Americans' problems), is historically tarnished. Consider this bit of history. Is it not being repeated with America in place of Britain? In any case, I say it suggests that British efforts are likely to be rather unwelcome, and hence unsuccessful, even if implemented in the whole of Iraq


http://historymedren.about.com/library/text/bltxtiraq9.htm


Iraq: Historical Setting
Library of Congress Country Study

World War I and the British Mandate


{{My summary: The British, at some cost, subdued Iraq in 1920, dealing with several nationalist and/or revolutionary groups in which the Sunnis and Shias worked together.}}


{excerpt, verbatim}
At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine also was placed under British mandate, and Syria was placed under French mandate. Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was ejected by the French in July of the same year.

The civil government of postwar Iraq was headed originally by the high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and his deputy, Colonel Arnold Talbot Wilson. The British were confronted with Iraq's age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. Villagers demanded that the tribes be restrained, and tribes demanded that their titles to tribal territories be extended and confirmed.

Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the establishment of public health and education facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock.

The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala and their satellite tribes were in a state of near anarchy. British reprisals after the murder of a British officer in An Najaf failed to restore order. The Anayzah, the Shammar, and the Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset by violent infighting. British adminis- tration had yet to be established in the mountains of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, from the Hakkari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains of Urmia in Iran, thousands of Assyrians began to pour into Iraqi territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery.

The most striking problem facing the British was the growing anger of the nationalists, who felt betrayed at being accorded mandate status. The nationalists soon came to view the mandate as a flimsy disguise for colonialism. The experienced Cox delegated governance of the country to Wilson while he served in Persia between April 1918 and October 1920. The younger man governed Iraq with the kind of paternalism that had characterized British rule in India. Impatient to establish an efficient administration, Wilson used experienced Indians to staff subordinate positions within his administration. The exclusion of Iraqis from administrative posts added humiliation to Iraqi discontent.

Three important anticolonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organized; its numerous and varied members included ulama (religious leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of the Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy city, Karbala.

Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organizing and mobilizing the population for major resistance. In February 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al Hillah.

Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mujtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia ulama temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders.

When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Riza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British.

By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran.

Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors: the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and the riverine cities and among the tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure.

The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government.

The provisional government was aided by the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were underrepresented.

{end verbatim excerpts }

 

[TheEarl]

It's rather faint praise though, if you say the Brits finally 'succeeded' regarding Ireland in, what, 1990? (Is that about the time you believe 'success' came?)

It was more like 2000 that the violence stopped and considering the situation was as tortuous as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I wouldn't say it was faint praise at all. The IRA wanted N.Ireland to become part of Ireland. The N.Irish terrorists (whose acronym escapes me for the moment) wanted it to stay part of Britain. Both sides were willing to blow each other and innocents up using nail bombs and mortars. In case that wasn't spicy enough, religion could be tossed in there to make the situation more fraught, as the ordinary people of N.Ireland were split along lines of Catholocism (Irish Nationalist) and Protestantism (British Nationalist). And in the middle, the British Army were trying to protect the innocents in the crossfire, killed by the IRA being the British jackboot and condemned by the world for suppressing those poor little freedom fighters. I would say that it's a bloody miracle that there is any kind of peace and I think it's highly unknowledgeable of you to suggest any different.

There is, however, *limited ways* in which the Iraqi insurgents are like the ETA, and *no way* in which the entities fighting the insurgents/terrorists are comparable. In the Iraq case, it's an occupying power. Against the ETA was a democratic *SPANISH* government. Which, incidentally, there is little chance will happen under Allawi.

Agreed. We are an invading force and there is no way that we should be there. However, we are there and what we will (hopefully) do is create stability before we leave. I'd say there is more chance of a democratic government under Allawi than under Moqtada Al-Sadr. Do you believe they are freedom fighters, or men who lust after power? If we leave them in charge, then we have caused irreparable damage to remove a tyrant in order to allow another to install himself.

Steve W, I would not deny a role of American funding in the last few decades of the Ireland tragedy. But consider the role of outside funding/support, at present, in Iraq. Outside funding and material support (as in Vietnam) immensely complicates a picture.

Pure - I will apologise for this, it is a pet peeve of mine and you are about to get a rant. America is supposed to be a civilised, intelligent country. What the hell were your citizens doing paying for bombs to blow up one of your allies!! And your government knew that Noraid was supplying bombs to the IRA to kill innocent civilians and yet did not outlaw the group because of the risk of alienating the Irish-American vote (who, in most cases were about as Irish as a plastic shamrock with 'Made In China' stamped on the back). Terrorism wasn't a big deal to the USA until it happened to you! Quite frankly I am appalled at GWB's 'War on Terror.' Where were you when Irish fuckwits blew up Canary Wharf or nail-bombed Omagh, both of which were almost certainly paid for by Noraid? It's not a problem when it's happening to someone else, only when your citizens are dying horribly.

[/rant]

Returning to Iraq, and Earl's points:
Here is another point that's relevant, Earl, in the Iraq case. The Brits presence, besides being linked to the Americans' (and the 'torture' cases somewhat reflect the Americans' problems), is historically tarnished. Consider this bit of history. Is it not being repeated with America in place of Britain? In any case, I say it suggests that British efforts are likely to be rather unwelcome, and hence unsuccessful, even if implemented in the whole of Iraq


http://historymedren.about.com/library/text/bltxtiraq9.htm

Very true Pure. Iraq was part of the Ottoman empire before WW1, if my history serves me correctly and the Allied forces enlisted the help of the common people to fight the Turks and Ottomans, promising them independence for their support. Then we stitched them up at the Treaty of Versailles and made them into glorified colonies. However the Iraqis will also remember being enlisted to fight for us in the first gulf war and then being abandoned to Saddam Hussein by GB senior. Yet the British are still winning their trust while the Americans are getting bombed to hell. Do you really believe that this has no connection to the American approach on places like Fallujah where innocents and terrorists were all viable targets.

The Earl

 

[oggbashan]

What worries me most about transferring UK forces into areas with US forces is 'friendly fire', 'Blue on Blue'.

The UK forces have already lost troops to US fire.

Can US forces on the ground distinguish between friendly and unfriendly forces?

In Normandy in WWII there was an ironic saying: "When the British bomb, the Germans take cover; when the Germans bomb, the Allies take cover; but when the Americans bomb, everyone including the Americans take cover and shit themselves."

Og

 

[steve w]

Pure,

I have to agree with Earl that you need to find out more about the Irish situation before dismissing it as partial success or faint praise. Having lived through the 70s and 80s, I find it a complete miracle that there is a form of peace in Northern Ireland, and most people in the UK would never have thought it possible until it happened. I suspect Spanish people would say the same about ETA.

The simple fact is that the United States has, in various ways, been a consistent and regular supporter and funder of terrorists around the world. Let's just name Northern Ireland, Chile, Nicaragua and El Salvador as a couple of examples. Many of the terrorists the US has supported down the years have been killing people in an attempt to overthrow democratically elected governments (such as Allende in Chile) or provoke change against the wishes of the majority of a democratic country (the IRA).

It is this type of interference and manipulation of other countries' destinies (usually at the cost of many lives) which has made the US so unpopular in so many countries. This is a fact that the US should have grasped after Sept 11th, but instead the administration has decided that there is nothing to learn, and has returned to the same inappropriate and arrogant tactics.

As Earl correctly points out, terrorism did not begin on September 11th. European and Middle East nations had regularly suffered terrorist outrages. The US couldn't give a stuff, even when it happened to a number of their own citizens (the Lockerbie bomb, for example), until it happened on their own territory. This is evidenced by their security forces' complete lack of intelligence on known terrorist cells and activities.

Instead of using the shared outrage and global sympathy after Sept 11th, to build a coherent alliance to isolate terorists, and then use intelligence systems to bring the murderers to a transparent justice, the US has chosen a different route. This basically involves invading a country that has no prayer of fighting back, creating a political vacuum without planning how to fill it, installing a largely discredited puppet regime, and hoping that it all works out. In the case of Iraq, it has not led to a safer world or a safer United States.

George Bush's "steadfast resolution" is in fact a blinkered inability to actually think about what might prevent terrorism in future. He has been shown up to have systematically lied about the reasons for the war, he has clearly not planned for the post-conflict Iraq, and he has no right to commandeer British troops (who shouldn't be there either) for his worthless and counter-productive attempts to fight a guerilla war with heavy bombing.

 

[pop_54]

Hi, the Earl, (comments to Steve W, included)

Thanks for your comments. I agree that *sometimes* insurgents(terrorists) have been suppressed in the manner you describe. I don't intend to advertise for American counterinsurgency skills, in case that was the impresssion. See below. Sorry if that appeared to be the case.

It's rather faint praise though, if you say the Brits finally 'succeeded' regarding Ireland in, what, 1990? (Is that about the time you believe 'success' came?)

Earl: I can't give 3-4 examples where it's worked. I can give 7,000 examples where your measures didn't work though. One of the biggest terrorist problems in the world (Ireland) was solved by my method.

====
Steve W claims to know my position; that it's "John Wayne." This is not true:

Steve: In relation to a wider point on terrorism, Earl is right and Pure is wrong again. You don't defeat terrorism by shooting people. The virtual end of terror inflicted by the IRA in Ireland and ETA in Spain (to give two examples) came from serious and long intelligence efforts, the enforcement of democratic law, and talking amongst various political groups, all of whom had to yield from their starting position to make progress.

Yes there are some cases of success through political (and police) processes, such as you mention, i.e., against the ETA. The 'success' against the IRA I commented on, above.

There is, however, *limited ways* in which the Iraqi insurgents are like the ETA, and *no way* in which the entities fighting the insurgents/terrorists are comparable. In the Iraq case, it's an occupying power. Against the ETA was a democratic *SPANISH* government. Which, incidentally, there is little chance will happen under Allawi.

Let me clarify: I'm NOT recommending American methods over the methods of the Brits or the French. There's much in common in fighting 'terrorists', who are often nationalists. It's never nice, and America's hands are almost as dirty as those of the older colonial powers. I do NOT recommend the methods that led to "success" in the Philippines, or S. Africa. I simply described them.

Steve W, I would not deny a role of American funding in the last few decades of the Ireland tragedy. But consider the role of outside funding/support, at present, in Iraq. Outside funding and material support (as in Vietnam) immensely complicates a picture.

Returning to Iraq, and Earl's points:
Here is another point that's relevant, Earl, in the Iraq case. The Brits presence, besides being linked to the Americans' (and the 'torture' cases somewhat reflect the Americans' problems), is historically tarnished. Consider this bit of history. Is it not being repeated with America in place of Britain? In any case, I say it suggests that British efforts are likely to be rather unwelcome, and hence unsuccessful, even if implemented in the whole of Iraq


http://historymedren.about.com/library/text/bltxtiraq9.htm


Iraq: Historical Setting
Library of Congress Country Study

World War I and the British Mandate


{{My summary: The British, at some cost, subdued Iraq in 1920, dealing with several nationalist and/or revolutionary groups in which the Sunnis and Shias worked together.}}


{excerpt, verbatim}
At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine also was placed under British mandate, and Syria was placed under French mandate. Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was ejected by the French in July of the same year.

The civil government of postwar Iraq was headed originally by the high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and his deputy, Colonel Arnold Talbot Wilson. The British were confronted with Iraq's age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. Villagers demanded that the tribes be restrained, and tribes demanded that their titles to tribal territories be extended and confirmed.

Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the establishment of public health and education facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock.

The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala and their satellite tribes were in a state of near anarchy. British reprisals after the murder of a British officer in An Najaf failed to restore order. The Anayzah, the Shammar, and the Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset by violent infighting. British adminis- tration had yet to be established in the mountains of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, from the Hakkari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains of Urmia in Iran, thousands of Assyrians began to pour into Iraqi territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery.

The most striking problem facing the British was the growing anger of the nationalists, who felt betrayed at being accorded mandate status. The nationalists soon came to view the mandate as a flimsy disguise for colonialism. The experienced Cox delegated governance of the country to Wilson while he served in Persia between April 1918 and October 1920. The younger man governed Iraq with the kind of paternalism that had characterized British rule in India. Impatient to establish an efficient administration, Wilson used experienced Indians to staff subordinate positions within his administration. The exclusion of Iraqis from administrative posts added humiliation to Iraqi discontent.

Three important anticolonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organized; its numerous and varied members included ulama (religious leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of the Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy city, Karbala.

Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organizing and mobilizing the population for major resistance. In February 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al Hillah.

Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only mandate status. Upon the death of an important Shia mujtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia ulama temporarily put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of several leaders.

When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujtahid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Riza acted as liaison among insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued a fatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British.

By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political autonomy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anarchy for three months; the British restored order only with great difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and from Iran.

Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors: the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and the riverine cities and among the tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure.

The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both manpower and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the military regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for eventual self-government.

The provisional government was aided by the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like earlier Iraqi governments, however, the provisional government was composed chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were underrepresented.

{end verbatim excerpts }

You fill your head with too much shit Pure, you wanna get out more

 

[CharleyH]

You fill your head with too much shit Pure, you wanna get out more

Shit? Ok Mr. take your cock in hand and go get yourself worked up, not in this chapter, but ok tell me whats good. Do it! OR get your balls chewed off . . . . hm no good

 

[Pure]

Steve, I have no problem with most of what you last posted, e.g., that the US aids terrorists, and has done so for many decades.

As to the Earl's *big* question

Pure - I will apologise for this, it is a pet peeve of mine and you are about to get a rant. America is supposed to be a civilised, intelligent country. What the hell were your citizens doing paying for bombs to blow up one of your allies!!

But Earl, America pays for ordnance that is used
against itself!

(US, with Brits, helped arm Iraq; US armed the mujihideen in Afghanistan, that is to say, Osama and co.)

I think there's no easy answer, Earl, because of the old cliche: one man's terrorist is another's 'freedom fighter.' The US will, *while denouncing it* , continue to support 'terror' whenever convenient-- Reagan provided several examples, including Iran.

 

[cantdog]

Agreed. We are an invading force and there is no way that we should be there. However, we are there and what we will (hopefully) do is create stability before we leave. I'd say there is more chance of a democratic government under Allawi than under Moqtada Al-Sadr. Do you believe they are freedom fighters, or men who lust after power? If we leave them in charge, then we have caused irreparable damage to remove a tyrant in order to allow another to install himself.

So you are under the impression that our presence in Iraq has a stabilizing, calming effect?

 

[steve w]

Pure,

There are two separate points here. The US willingness to sell arms to distasteful individuals and regimes, including Osama and Saddam, is one issue. Britain is far from blameless in this regard, as is France and a number of others. In global politics, where alliances and allegiances shift over time, that is always likely.

However, the point Earl and I made about Noraid is different. Here, the US willingly and openly allowed its' citizens to provide financial aid, political support, and an ability to hide escaped convicted terrorists. It did so against the wishes of a democratic government in a peaceful nation that is just about its' staunchest ally.

In case you don't know, the IRA killed almost two thousand people. Most of these people were threatening the "brave freedom fighters" of the IRA by, oh, going shopping, or trying to get to work. The IRA planted bombs where they knew they could cause maximum carnage. The IRA packed its bombs with nails and bolts, so that if they didn't kill someone they might maim them and scar them for life. The IRA shot people's kneecaps away for speaking out against them.

Prominent US politicians supported these people. US businessmen donated millions of dollars. US courts refused to extradite convicted terrorists who escaped from prison. All this continued and intensified the problem, and the murdering. Only when Pres Clinton made it clear that the IRA would not receive the tacit support of the US, did the Republicans come to the negotiating table and a form of peace was hammered out.

That's why it's different from selling arms to individuals who later turn out to bat on a different team.

 

[shereads]

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should British troops be put under direct American command.

Holy God, no! I'm not even sure our own troops should be under direct American command.

 

[shereads]

Only when Pres Clinton made it clear that the IRA would not receive the tacit support of the US, did the Republicans come to the negotiating table and a form of peace was hammered out.

I liked that America. The competent America. The America that wasn't 100% focused on itself...Maybe 90%, but still, I was proud of us sometimes. I want it back.

I remember thinking, at the time, that Clinton's stand on the IRA would be remmebered - not only over there, but here. I didn't fully believe back then that we were too selfish to appreciated a leader who cared about the wider world.