Air France Black Box

I find this hard to believe. I'm not a pilot but even I can figure out that in a high altitude stall, you put the nose of the aircraft down to recover speed and regain control.

How is it possible that professional pilots, three of them, couldn't figure it out?
 
There was a NOVA that discussed this very issue. When the autopilot fails, you set the throttle, ailerons slightly down and cruise through the storm. It's standard procedure and taught in simulators to all pilots of any type of jetliner. Very disturbing!
 
How is it possible that professional pilots, three of them, couldn't figure it out?

I believe that you have pinpointed the problem. Obviously, the pilots were not really professionals, nor were they even talented amateurs.
 
Civilian pilots have become increasingly dependent on their digital controls and instruments when flying these big birds and less on their own skills. This disaster was a combination of 'digital dependence', lack of fundamental flying skills, incompetence on the part of the aircraft's designers, airline negligence and Murphy's Law. All causes but the last are avoidable if recognized beforehand instead of after the fact.
 

The astounding recovery of both the voice and data recorders after two years' immersion in nearly 13,000 feet of seawater allowed investigators to re-examine and re-analyze the accident.

Based on the recoveries, the French investigative body, Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, issued a PRELIMINARY statement
( http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/point.enquete.af447.27mai2011.en.pdf ) suggesting that as a result of the loss of reliable speed information, the pitch darkness, the storm and the automatic disengagement of the autopilot, the pilots and the craft were probably victims of sensory overload, a total loss of horizon and an inappropriate response to a stall.




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http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1rWNJ3fqXas


Air France Crew May Have Faced Baffling Data in 2009 Crash
By Mary Schlangenstein and Mary Jane Credeur

May 28 (Bloomberg) -- Air France Flight 447’s pilots were probably bewildered by erratic instrument readings and may have done the opposite of what was needed to keep the jet from crashing into the Atlantic in 2009, safety specialists said.

One pilot responded to stall alarms by angling the Airbus SAS A330’s nose higher, according to a preliminary report from the French air-accident investigation office. Pilots are trained to avert stalls, which occur when an aircraft slows enough that its wings lose lift, by dropping the nose to increase speed.

Earlier transmissions from the jet had shown that airspeed sensors had failed, presenting pilots with a sharp drop in speed readings after the flight entered ice clouds. Instruments showed the speed tumbled from 275 knots to 60 knots, the investigation office, the Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyses, said yesterday. The stall warning sounded three times.

“I don’t think there’s any question the reaction wasn’t what we would like it to be, what it should be -- you keep the nose down,” said John Cox, a former pilot now with Safety Operating Systems LLC in Washington.

The preliminary report showed pilots scrambling to prevent disaster in the three and a half minutes the jet fell toward the ocean at a speed of 180 feet (55 meters) a second. The least- experienced of the three pilots was flying the aircraft until less than a minute before recordings stopped, with the captain present though not at the controls. The crash killed all 228 people aboard.

‘All Over Map’
In repeatedly raising the nose, the pilots may have thought they were reacting properly because the speed readings were “all over the map” and turbulence from a storm might have tricked them into feeling they were going too fast, said Richard Healing, a former U.S. National Transportation Safety Board member who is now a consultant in Alexandria, Virginia.

“We don’t have the full picture of what their flight displays showed them and the full transcript of their conversations,” Healing said. “All we know is that the information wasn’t reliable, and that a lot of warnings were going off and it was probably very, very confusing.”

Because the accident happened at night during foul weather and in the middle of the ocean, the pilots didn’t have the benefit of seeing a horizon or using landmarks to help gauge their speed, orientation and direction the nose was pointing...


more...
http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1rWNJ3fqXas
 
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http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXcOcfv5Sy1I


Airbus Crash Pits Brain Against Computer Encroaching on Cockpit
By Andrea Rothman and Laurence Frost

...The findings will likely fan the debate whether modern-day pilots, accustomed to simulators and automated flight controls, still possess the airmanship skills and training routine needed to overcome sudden adverse scenarios. The interaction between man and machine in the last two decades has moved toward computers flying the jet, with pilots more at the receiving end of electronic commands rather than the other way around.

“Automation is inevitable, yet the whole interface between pilot and automated systems must be rethought...”

...The Airbus A330 jet that crashed on June 1, 2009, was a wide-body aircraft using so-called fly-by-wire technology that replaces traditional manual flight controls with an electronic interface. Airbus pioneered the system in civil aviation more than two decades ago on its A320 single-aisle jet, which remains the Toulouse, France-based company’s best-selling model to date.

Today, all Airbus planes are fly-by-wire, as is Boeing Co.’s 777, introduced in 1995, and its 787 Dreamliner, set for service this year. The system prescribes flight parameters that Airbus pilots cannot override completely to avoid maneuvers that would potentially jeopardize the aircraft. On Airbus, a one-hand joystick similar to those used for computer games has replaced the traditional steering yoke of older aircraft...


more...
http://noir.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXcOcfv5Sy1I
 
Please, let us not confuse the "fly-by-wire" idea and the responses of a faulty sensor to the Autopilot.
 
Please, let us not confuse the "fly-by-wire" idea and the responses of a faulty sensor to the Autopilot.

Eh? HP, I'm not sure I understand your thought— do you care to expand?

It seems to me that the only concern that's being raised is that the prevalance of "fly-by-wire" may ( and I intentionally use the word "may" because the BEA report is preliminary and— in any event— we'll never be 100% certain what caused the accident ) have contributed to the accident. As opined by Andrea Rothman and Laurence Frost, the authors I quoted in an earlier post, "...The findings will likely fan the debate whether modern-day pilots, accustomed to simulators and automated flight controls, still possess the airmanship skills and training routine needed to overcome sudden adverse scenarios."


I presume you would agree that IFR conditions, automatic disengagement of the autopilot and a stall shouldn't, by themselves, cause an accident.


 
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As I understand the situation, the pito tubes ( air speed sensor) iced up and the autopilot shut off, probably retarding the throttles and releasing the 'cruise trim adjustments'. This could cause the craft to loose altitude.

A third pilot who had poor training, seems to have pulled back on the yoke, but not readjusted the throttles to maintain altitude. His pulling back in kept the aircraft in a stalled condition and if they were falling 11,000 feet per minute, it would have been difficult to get back from the head, for the First Officer. (assuming he was on a pee break and not a blow job break.)

The Fly-by-wire issue is due to the possible lack of feedback from the control system that would provide direct 'feel' to the pilot. I can not believe that they would not have a feed back loop to moderate the control inputs, particularly on a sled like an airbus.

Assuming the flight crew was French, when the shit hit the fan, the third officer, paniced and the second officer was glad he wasn't at the controls, and the First Officer was too busy finding someone to surrender to. I submit a revised title to the Article.

"Frantic French Flyers Fuck Up!"



 

Those who denigrate the French not only betray an ignorance of history but also a lack of awareness of the very large contribution made to aviation history by French aviation pioneers and engineers. The Wright brothers may have had the first sustained powered flight but any number of Frenchmen could easily have captured that honor.


Ever been to Verdun?


 
The daredevil pilots of Colombia
Pilots fly through storms over the jungle along one of the most perilous air routes in the world to deliver supplies.

In Colombia, DC3s operate more like rural buses.

Somewhere over Colombia, high above the Amazonian rainforest near the borders with Brazil, an old DC3 prop plane is caught in a violent tropical storm.

No visibility. Radio silence. Undoubtedly flight 30-37 is in trouble. Captain Raul tries to stabilise the twin-engine plane to bypass the worst of the storm.

'Green hell'

But the greatest danger is not the storm or mechanical faults. It's the jungle 2,000m below: the Amazon. A green hell.

These guys wouldn't have crashed the Airbus.
 

Those who denigrate the French not only betray an ignorance of history but also a lack of awareness of the very large contribution made to aviation history by French aviation pioneers and engineers. The Wright brothers may have had the first sustained powered flight but any number of Frenchmen could easily have captured that honor.


Ever been to Verdun?




Not to mention (for Americans) that we'd probably still be a British colony without the help the French gave in the American revolution.
 
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