Actual Class Discussion

[Lucifer_Carroll]

1) ...it was meant for Shanglan.
2) It would still be a rational contradiction of ideas--independant of terms. If its a universe where contradiction is possible, then that's not a universe we can actually say, prove, or discuss anything about in a meaningful way. If it can't reference our language for it, it can't be discussed. (and the Stoics, near as I ever knew, never said anything like that... they were Aristotelian philosophers... material world and science and all).
3) Me, too. What Hawkins talks about in things like The Universe in a Nutshell is a cobweb of reality-divergeances and overlappings that have dimension--he even says that by convention its "multiple universe theory", but essentially all those things are part of the same universe--as the universe is an encompassment.

1) Yes. That's why I congratulated you instead of replying in any meaningful manner.
2) Fraid you're incorrect on the Stoics. The same idea was also done by the Cynics and much later the Nihilists. You're restrictions on discussion are unreasonable as is your point of dismissal.
3) Going through the reality possibilities I admit to simplifying the idea of multiple universes. I also went outside direct Hawkings into the realm of what people see about the world. A universe to encompass everyone's conceptions about the universe would have multiverse characteristics. Imagine every world in every book being possible in a continuum, they would be in separate reality spheres of a universe. Such a concept is easier to relate in the idea of universes (containing a set group of laws) in a multiverse.

Furthermore what I was philosophically considering was in truth far outside of Hawkins as EIP is not bounded by physics. It's an everything is possible. Hawkins terms were just useful to explain it (me trying to overcome the problem you and I pointed out in 2s (damn I wish you read more speculative fiction)).

 

[Joe Wordsworth]

Originally posted by poohlive
I was going over this, and I think step logic might help. At least, it made sense to me. Perhaps I am missing something though, I don't doubt that I am not. I know not everything is possible.

But, let's say we had two gods. God A and God B. Now, God A is all powerful, God B is not. By definition a god must be all powerful. So, God A fits inside this definition, God B does not. God A is better than God B.
God A is all good, God B is not. God A is all knowing, God B is not. God A is better than God B. Now, God A exists, God B does not.
Therefor, God A is better than God B. So, God A must exist.

God A, is in fact, the best God.

But, there does lie a problem with this. God exists, and we aquit that to a dimension of God, but if God DOES exist, than that means God can't NOT exist. There is a quality that god does not posess, the quality of non-existance. There is a limit to God, and by definition of an all powerful being, God can not have a limitation, or he is not considered a God.

So, God A exists and non-exists. God B only exists. God A is greater than God B.

This is a paradox. Or, we can put it more bluntly. God A can create a paradox in his universe, God B can not. God A is better than God B.

If I was mislead in my logic somewhere, then please point it out to me. I guess it doesn't prove round squares in the universe, but I thought we were saying round squares do not exist because paradoxes can not exist. So, if we can prove paradoxes exist, we can prove that in some way round-squares exist. Although, I can't make the leap from one to the other. I suppose I'll leave someone else to think up that part.

Augustine's Ontological argument... well put, too.
Problems:

If by definition, God is eternal and cannot have come into existence or have been caused to come into existence, then by definition if he exists at all, his existence is part of what he is: that is, his existence is logically necessary. If God does not exist, his not existing must also be part of his very definition, because nothing other than that definition could account for his actually existing or not. But if God's non-existence is part of his definition, then his existence is logically impossible (which would mean that the existence of God would be a contradiction in terms, a logical contradiction). However, we know that there is nothing logically contradictory about a God who exists, so we can rule out the possibility that God does not exist. The only other available option is that he exists, and (as shown above) if he exists he exists necessarily.

 

[poohlive]

Thank you. I didn't think I came up with it myself. Forgot who had come up with it though.

My only question was lack of qualities. If God has the quality of existance, then he is limiting himself to only existance. The quality of non-existance is lost to him, or rather, its beyond his grasp. So, God can not be all powerful since he can not non-exist.

If he exists and non-exists it's a contradiction, I know, but being that God is all powerful, isn't he just the person who can both exist and non exist? Isn't he the person that can have contradictory qualities?

That again, is another limit on God. He can not contradict himself. He is limited by definitions. He can not make a round-square, or a rock so big that he can not pick it up (age old example).

 

[Joe Wordsworth]

Originally posted by poohlive
Thank you. I didn't think I came up with it myself. Forgot who had come up with it though.

My only question was lack of qualities. If God has the quality of existance, then he is limiting himself to only existance. The quality of non-existance is lost to him, or rather, its beyond his grasp. So, God can not be all powerful since he can not non-exist.

If he exists and non-exists it's a contradiction, I know, but being that God is all powerful, isn't he just the person who can both exist and non exist? Isn't he the person that can have contradictory qualities?

That again, is another limit on God. He can not contradict himself. He is limited by definitions. He can not make a round-square, or a rock so big that he can not pick it up (age old example).

Philosophy of Religion is one of two areas I'm specialized in. Here's some interesting things to help you along:

1) Omni's - people make a lot of use out of terms like omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent. However, over use drains them of meaning altogether (a thing in contradiction doesn't really refer to anything, it lacks meaning). Here's a more accurate way of putting them:

Omnipotent is "able to do anything that can be done". Logical contradictions, impossibilities, these things cannot be done... as such, omnipotence is best defined with that in mind. It would be meaningless to talk about a God who could make a rock so heavy He couldn't lift it... as such a rock is inconcievable.

Beyond that, and here's a good one, there is nothing about "God" that demands he be omnipotent, even in the regard given. My thesis, back in the day, was coming up with the 168 possible categories of "God" and boiling them down until I had one, pure concept that was the bare minimum God must be in order to be referential and "God".

Neither omniscience, omnibenevolence, omnipotence, nor omnipresence were on the list. It was called the "ultraminimalist conception of necessary God"--after a political theory of government of a similar name by a philosopher named Nozick.

 

[poohlive]

Yes, that is understandable. I guess it all comes down to what you consider the concept of God, and what you consider the concept of the universe.

And, qualities attributed to a god. I know different philosophers have some up with different definitions, as have you, 168. Very good.

A logical contradiction can not exist, because God can not create it. But, if God could create it, then a logical contradiction could exist. I guess it comes down to that, whether or not God himself has the power to make that which is an impossibility possible.

And, that depends on what you believe is the definition of God, and what you believe is a characteristic of God.

 

[Joe Wordsworth]

Originally posted by poohlive
Yes, that is understandable. I guess it all comes down to what you consider the concept of God, and what you consider the concept of the universe.

And, qualities attributed to a god. I know different philosophers have some up with different definitions, as have you, 168. Very good.

A logical contradiction can not exist, because God can not create it. But, if God could create it, then a logical contradiction could exist. I guess it comes down to that, whether or not God himself has the power to make that which is an impossibility possible.

And, that depends on what you believe is the definition of God, and what you believe is a characteristic of God.

A+

 

[BlackShanglan]

I think that Pooh and Joe are on the right track on the God issue. What we're discussing really has nothing to do with the measurable, known, or implied qualities of any actual being. Rather, we are trying to arrive at an understanding of what humans mean by "God" and how that interacts with a human understanding of logic. I wholeheartedly agree with what I think is the underlying implication of Joe's approach. When faced with the ideas "God is omnipotent," "An omnipotent being can make a rock so big he can't lift it," and "God can't do this; therefre, he doesn't exist," one is best served by examining one's definition of God rather than working onself into a coil about the paradox involving the rock. As Joe points out, if perhaps not explicitly, there is an immense difference between the meaning of the word "impossible" as normally used - i.e., extremely difficult or very, very unlikely - and "impossible" in terms of absolute logic, meaning a contradiction in logical terms. God, one presumes, can do many of the first order of impossible things - make water into wine, part seas, etc. But none of these are contradictions on the level of pure logic. The rock example is a contradiction of logical rules, but applying the example to God only shows us that we need to refine our definition of God, not that he doesn't exist. It's possible to define many things as impossible if you look at them from the right perspective - i.e. Zeno (Xeno?) 's paradox "proving" that motion is impossible. It only works if you have a faulty definition of motion.

Joe, I am looking forward to the standards and norms resolution. Can't wait to see what you have come up with.

Lucifer, I'm mulling over your multiverse concept. It's an intriguing one, and the compartmentalisation seems at first to cover a variety of problems by isolating things from each other. That is, if anything can (and it seems to me, by your definition, almost must?) happen in the multiverse, one can dodge many of the difficulties by a division of events into discrete universes where rules work differently. However, I lean more towards Joe's theory that in all likelihood logical contradictions are *not* possible even in an EIP multiverse, and this is why. If, in an EIP multiverse, all possiblities either are played out or could conceivably be played out, then there would have the be the possiblity of a universe in which all of them are played out at once - i.e., where the neat compartmentalization is broken down and we do indeed have gravity both functioning and not functioning at the same time, two being the same as five and one, circles being square, etc., etc. While on the surface the compartmentalization of seperate realities seems to solve these problems, I think that if you take the E in EIP seriously, this "EIP *at once*" universe would have to be out there, and then we are back at the same place we were before introducing the idea of seperate compartmentalized realities.

For that reason, I lean toward saying that even in an EIP universe or multiverse, the Everything has to exclude contradictions in terms. Don't get me wrong; I'm not saying that language gets to shape how the universe functions (although there is part of me that loves the appeal of that). Much as in the example with God above, I think that when language alone suggests a limit, one should first check the language rather than assuming that empirical reality must bow to one's linguistically-based understanding. However, if we've nailed down our terms carefully, I think we're safe in saying that things cannot exist that contradict their own terms, if only because we would then be calling them something different.

Your example of the cylinder viewed from two dimensions is, I think, a good one to illustrate what I mean. If the inhabitants of a two-dimensional world had the terms "square" and "circle" and were then presented with their two-D-eye view of a cylinder on its side, they might think it was a square. This might at first seem to challenge what they would think a rule: that which is a square cannot have the property of roundness. However, when we look at this from the 3-D world, we realize that the problems lie in perceptions and in definition, not in a reality that permits logical contradictions. The observers are not looking at something that is both a square and a circle; they are looking at a 3-dimensional object, which is neither. It is not a square or a circle, and while it may, depending on how it is viewed, have properties of both, it is still not that logical contradiction, a square circle. Rather, it is smply something for which 2-D creatures would probably not have a term. I'm open to the constant possiblity of new things that will require new terms and ideas - i.e., new dimensions that challenge what we know of geometry, physics, etc. However, in each case, what needs to yield is language and definition, not logic. The logically contradictory does not become possible; we simply have to adjust our understanding and definitions as we learn new modes of being and existing.

No?

Shanglan