Military Rules of engagement

Wrong. It was about forcing Turkey out of the war, and if Churchill's instructions had been followed it would have worked.

What Churchill asked for was a surprise naval attempt to force the straits using obsolete battleships that were useless in a modern naval battle. If some of those ships had been lost or damaged it wouldn't have affected the allied naval battle strength. Once through to Constantinople/Istanbul they could have threatened to destroy the city.

The naval commanders ignored Churchill's instruction. Instead of sending obsolete battleships which Turkey wouldn't have been worried about nor would intelligence notice the movement of ancient ships - they sent modern ones. Instead of surprise, they telegraphed their intentions by sending scouting ships. The main Turkish battery was out of shells when the fleet retired for the night. The big ships turned in the same bay every time, giving the Turks an opportunity to lay the world's most effective minefield, damaging/sinking modern ships. If they had been the old ships Churchill had wanted, that wouldn't have mattered strategically but the loss of modern ships was too much so they switched to a landing but again lost the element of surprise. A landing in force had not been suggested by Churchill - just a low cost naval attack.

Churchill's idea was sound - a surprise naval attack by small forces that were otherwise useless. The execution was botched and nothing like his requirements. It came very close to succeeding despite the errors. After that - the landings, which Churchill hadn't wanted - were botched too.

If Churchill's plan has worked it might have shortened the First World War at minimal cost. The disaster wasn't his fault but that of the commanders who implemented it.

I must agree. The original plan had a reasonable chance of success. Had they been able to force the straits and bring Constantinople under its guns, Turkey might - might - have been forced to capitulate. That would have freed up enormous Allied resources and opened a desperately-needed supply line to Russia. Good plan, badly executed.

Despite having given the Turks a month to prepare after the naval failure, the later landings might still have worked had the commanders done their job in the first 24 hours. Had the peninsula been cut at any point, it would have worked - and while some landings were stalled by very effective defences, some were walk-overs at which the local commanders just sat on their thumbs rather than push on and achieve the victory hanging just above them. Despite having had a month to prepare, from the Turkish point of view, it was a very near-run thing in the first few days.

A touch of pour encourager les autres would have served the British Army and the Royal Navy well afterwards, I think.
 
I must agree. The original plan had a reasonable chance of success. Had they been able to force the straits and bring Constantinople under its guns, Turkey might - might - have been forced to capitulate. That would have freed up enormous Allied resources and opened a desperately-needed supply line to Russia. Good plan, badly executed.

Despite having given the Turks a month to prepare after the naval failure, the later landings might still have worked had the commanders done their job in the first 24 hours. Had the peninsula been cut at any point, it would have worked - and while some landings were stalled by very effective defences, some were walk-overs at which the local commanders just sat on their thumbs rather than push on and achieve the victory hanging just above them. Despite having had a month to prepare, from the Turkish point of view, it was a very near-run thing in the first few days.

A touch of pour encourager les autres would have served the British Army and the Royal Navy well afterwards, I think.

Yes, Gallipoli was one error on top of another. I've read a couple of books on it (raiding my husband's bookshelves) and I read Alan Moorehead's "Gallipoli". Disregarding the failure of the naval attempt, things could have gone differently: at Anzac beach on April 25, and Sari Bair Ridge and Suvla Bay on August 7-11, when the attackers almost took and held the high ground, which would have forced the Turks to withdraw. But poor generalship and leadership resulted in the Turks being able to hold on. I read somewhere that near the top of the high ground, the ANZAC soldiers stopped to make some tea - and the end result was the Turks got to the top first and that pretty much decided it. Small things decide wars sometimes.
gallipoli_moorehea_3261515a.jpg
 
Yes, Gallipoli was one error on top of another. I've read a couple of books on it (raiding my husband's bookshelves) and I read Alan Moorehead's "Gallipoli". Disregarding the failure of the naval attempt, things could have gone differently: at Anzac beach on April 25, and Sari Bair Ridge and Suvla Bay on August 7-11, when the attackers almost took and held the high ground, which would have forced the Turks to withdraw. But poor generalship and leadership resulted in the Turks being able to hold on. I read somewhere that near the top of the high ground, the ANZAC soldiers stopped to make some tea - and the end result was the Turks got to the top first and that pretty much decided it. Small things decide wars sometimes.
gallipoli_moorehea_3261515a.jpg

The same thing happened on D-Day 1944. Many British and Canadian troops stopped when there was little resistance in front of them. Had they continued, they might, but that is unlikely, have taken Caen on D-Day. They would have been in a better position to take Caen in the next few days instead of the long campaign that cost many tanks and troops.
 
The same thing happened on D-Day 1944. Many British and Canadian troops stopped when there was little resistance in front of them. Had they continued, they might, but that is unlikely, have taken Caen on D-Day. They would have been in a better position to take Caen in the next few days instead of the long campaign that cost many tanks and troops.

Yes, it was that lack of aggressive leadership in the right circumstances that cost the British time and time again. They were aggressive enough on the Somme and Vimy and battles like that, but it was more stubborn and stupid that aggressive and smart. I've read a bit about the fall of Singapore and really, it seems to have been that same mindset. The other side got inside their decision loop (read that one too, it works really well in sparring where you psych your opponent out and move fast enough that they're always defending and never attacking...) and they were done like toast, they could never get back on the right foot and get their balance again.
 
There were two reasons for lack of aggressive leadership by the British in WW2.

1. We just didn't have reserve manpower. We couldn't afford major losses.

2. General Montgomery and others were very aware of 1 above and very conscious of British losses in WW1.

What we needed on D-Day was a General like Patton, but he often had the men and reserves we didn't have. He might have done better with the limited resources we had.

However, General Patton, in charge of the mythical army poised to attack the Pas De Calais, worried the Germans so much that they didn't try to move reserves from the Calais Area to Normandy until it was too late. Even the threat of Patton was vital.
 
The same thing happened on D-Day 1944. Many British and Canadian troops stopped when there was little resistance in front of them. Had they continued, they might, but that is unlikely, have taken Caen on D-Day. They would have been in a better position to take Caen in the next few days instead of the long campaign that cost many tanks and troops.

That is of course the traditional interpretation, however at the risk of being accused of nationalistic bias, consider the following.

The plan for OVERLORD, not including the US landings on OMAHA and UTAH beaches, was for 50 (UK) Division to land on GOLD Beach, 3 (Cdn) Division on JUNO Beach and 3 (UK) Division, its flank protected by 6 (UK) Airborne Division, landing on SWORD Beach.

The initial plan for GOLD Beach was for 50 Div to link up with US and Canadian divisions on their flanks, capture Bayeux if possible and cut roads between Caen and Bayeux. They had reasonable success, capturing Bayeux on D+1 and cutting the one road, but in general were halted about 5 or 6 km short of their objectives.

The plan for SWORD had 3 (UK) Div capturing Caen on D-Day, D+1 at the latest. The landing there met with unexpectedly heavy resistance, causing much congestion on the beach itself. While 3 Div did eventually succeed in moving inland, it then got hit by 21 Panzer Division, one of the top German formations. That was, I think, the only major German armoured formation committed on D-Day itself. Given German reinforcements into the Caen region in May and early June, it is in any case doubtful if it ever had had the strength to capture Caen.

3 (Cdn) Div on JUNO Beach was to capture three small towns in their beachhead and support 3 (UK) Div’s capture of Caen by capturing high ground and roads into Caen. It accomplished most of its objectives with one exception, the capture of Carpiquet.

It had one other crucial task, one generally overlooked in the history we read. Allied war games had suggested the Germans would launch a strong counterattack, probably armour-heavy, in the week following D-Day. The likely place for that wold be on the open areas north and west of Caen, essentially between Bayeux and Caen. That put 3 (Cdn) Div smack in its way.

I (UK) Corps (under which 3 (Cdn) Div fell) orders specifically noted this possibility when laying out 3 Div’s objectives and Montgomery refused RAF requests for more priority on the capture of the Carpiquet airfield due to the likelihood of an enemy counterattack. Further, 3 (Cdn) Div was specifically ordered to hold the line from Putot-en-Bessin to Carpiquet in expectation of enemy counterattacks.

Looking at the Allied order of battle moreover, the Canadians were in many ways the strongest division landing that day, having been heavily reinforced by Allied planners with both artillery and anti-tank elements. Significantly, most of these were self-propelled, giving them better mobility and protection. In short, 3 (Cdn) Div was placed and equipped and tasked to deal with what Allied planners felt would be the major German counterattack.

That happened – the Germans hit with I SS Panzer Corps, comprising some of the strongest and most experienced divisions on the Western Front. 3 Div did what it had been tasked to do – defeated the German thrust threatening to split the Allied bridgehead, thus spelling disaster for OVERLORD. Bottom line - had 3 Canadian Infantry Division attempted to swing left to capture Caen on D-Day, it would have left its flank wide open and failed in its most important mission.

Sorry to be pedantic. It was one heck of a fight.
 
I find it amusing people keep saying "Slick Willy", yet the con artist who went out of his way to not get drafted AND has said not getting STDs during the 80s was his Vietnam, is perfectly acceptable.

Cadet Bone Spurs has also said he knows more than the generals and his intelligence agencies don't know anything.

But I digress. . .

Thanks to all for their input of personal stories and/or historical knowledge. If I may, I would like to add one thing to the Bosnia stories. General Rose is a coward.

That is all.
 
Last edited:
I find it amusing people keep saying "Slick Willy", yet the con artist who went out of his way to not get drafted AND has said not getting STDs during the 80s was his Vietnam, is perfectly acceptable.

Cadet Bone Spurs has also said he knows more than the generals and his intelligence agencies don't know anything.

But I digress. . .

Thanks to all for their input of personal stories and/or historical knowledge. If I may, I would like to add one thing to the Bosnia stories. General Rose is a coward.

That is all.

The difference is that Slick Willy was who I had to serve under. I have nothing but contempt for him. The current fucknut-in-chief had nothing to do with my Balkan experiences, which is why I didn’t mention him. If it makes you feel any better, I’ve got nothing but contempt for him either. But saying so has nothing to do with helping the OP.

Happy now?
 
The same thing happened on D-Day 1944. Many British and Canadian troops stopped when there was little resistance in front of them. Had they continued, they might, but that is unlikely, have taken Caen on D-Day. They would have been in a better position to take Caen in the next few days instead of the long campaign that cost many tanks and troops.
Let's just be thankful armies stop for no logical reason. The Wehrmacht stopped for 48 hours before Dunkirk - if the blitzkrieg had continued on as the military commanders wanted, the BEF might never have been evacuated, the Battle of Britain might have had another outcome, my father might not have been evacuated from London, might not have met my mother at the train station, and I might not exist. Wars affect millions, but the consequences are singular and happen in a split second, and affect every single individual, personally. That's what contemplation, looking out the window on a Sunday morning does to you. A bit scary, when you think about it like that...
 
Let's just be thankful armies stop for no logical reason. The Wehrmacht stopped for 48 hours before Dunkirk - if the blitzkrieg had continued on as the military commanders wanted, the BEF might never have been evacuated, the Battle of Britain might have had another outcome, my father might not have been evacuated from London, might not have met my mother at the train station, and I might not exist. Wars affect millions, but the consequences are singular and happen in a split second, and affect every single individual, personally. That's what contemplation, looking out the window on a Sunday morning does to you. A bit scary, when you think about it like that...

Think about all those coincidences and inexplicable mischances multiplied by a thousand, back through your ancestry, adding up to... you.

Not so much scary, I think, as wonderful.
 
Think about all those coincidences and inexplicable mischances multiplied by a thousand, back through your ancestry, adding up to... you.

Not so much scary, I think, as wonderful.
Yes, it is, isn't it? My Memory and Loss story cycle is my own contemplation of the unlikelihood of "coincidence" over time, especially the first and fourth parts. I simply cannot explain the synchronicity of two people doing what we did over a period of nine years, that we came together again. But, we did, briefly, and I still don't understand how. The story title, sadly, is self-explanatory.

https://www.literotica.com/s/memory-and-loss-pt-01
 
Which is where this thread should be.

Oh, I dunno.

OP had a tactical question, which is well in-bounds, but the whole concept of “rules of engagement” is by its nature political. Those rules exist for political reasons, sometimes operational reasons, rarely tactical ones. That goes triple in the Balkans in the 1990s, and I can attest that Clintonian politics overlaid the US Army extensively during that era. If a writer here is curious about how all that intersects, I’m happy to help.

Nothing really went all that political, anyway, until a troll stumbled in from the GB.
 
Thanks, guys.
My story's set in Bosnia, during the SFOR peace keeping mission, so around 1998.
I believe no marine lives were lost there, so I don't expect to be changing history but they were involved in a couple shootouts (a Canadian camp came under bombardment) and riot control missions gone south, so there's some latitude.

Best thing to do would be to read through the actual roe card for that conflict.

However, given the situation described, friendly forces taking fire, no warning would be needed. You could engage right of the bat.
 
Back
Top